128 Misc. 2d 265 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1985
OPINION OF THE COURT
The plaintiffs in this action are the homeless. Often afflicted with a physical or emotional handicap, these destitute men and women are relegated to living in either the streets or the shelter facilities operated by the City of New York. By this action they seek an order directing the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services (hereinafter DSS) to enforce certain regulations, which establish maximum limits for the capacity of each shelter facility.
At issue are two sections of 18 NYCRR: section 491.3 (g) (1) (i) which limits the total capacity of each shelter facility to 200 beds and section 491.10 (o) (9) (iv) which limits the capacity in a sleeping room to 30 beds. At present the city furnishes shelter for thousands of the homeless pursuant to court order at armories and other large facilities throughout the five boroughs. It is conceded that the homeless population lodged at these facilities
The availability and the quality of the shelter facilities and the services provided by the city to the homeless was first challenged in the courts in 1979 (Callahan v Carey, Sup Ct, NY County, index No. 42582/79). After two years of negotiations and with the aid of the court (Wallach, J.) a consent judgment was entered into by the representatives of the homeless, the city and the State. By its terms the judgment requires the city to provide shelter and board for each homeless man who applies for it.
In the instant action plaintiffs argue that nothing in the Callahan litigation constitutes a waiver of their rights under title 18 and that the court can enter an order directing the defendants to enforce the existing regulations. Plaintiffs also ask for damages incidental to their request for enforcement.
Aid to the needy is not dependent upon governmental compassion but is a fundamental right guaranteed by the State Constitution (art XVII, § 1). The State has an affirmative duty to aid the needy and this constitutional mandate cannot be ignored in either its letter or its spirit (Tucker v Tola, 43 NY2d 1 [1977]). The plaintiffs herein are recipients of aid in the form of shelter facilities and the regulations at issue concern the operation of those facilities. Title 18 was promulgated to ensure that certain minimum standards were enforced at shelter facilities. Clearly the purpose of these regulations is to protect the homeless. Insofar as the specific sections of title 18 set the minimum standards for the adequacy of the shelter facilities, they affect the fundamental rights of the plaintiffs. The decision by the defendants not to enforce the capacity limits established by the regulations impacts upon interests of the plaintiffs which are protected by the Constitution. Plaintiffs therefore have standing
The concept of justiciability essentially involves a recognition by the court of the constitutional limitation on its authority. By attempting to set broad policy guidelines, the court usurps the function of the executive and legislative branches of government. Cases which involve the courts in the direct management of administrative programs, e.g., the exercise of discretion in the allocation of resources or the establishment of program goals, have been found to be beyond the competence of the court and nonjusticiable (Jones v Beame, 45 NY2d 402 [1978]; James v Board of Educ., 42 NY2d 357 [1977]; Matter of Abrams v New York City Tr. Auth., 39 NY2d 990 [1976]). However, a distinction must be drawn between a decision of the court which imposes its own policy determination on the other branches of the government and a decision which merely enforces the individual rights which have already been conferred by the executive and legislative branches (Klostermann v Cuomo, 61 NY2d 525 [1984]). This case falls within the latter category. Not only do the plaintiffs assert a right under a broad constitutional mandate but they also seek protection pursuant to a specific statutory framework.
The declared policy of the State is to maintain adult care facilities, i.e., shelter facilities, of the highest quality (Social Services Law § 460). To this end the DSS has been given the comprehensive responsibility for the development and administration of programs and the implementation of standards of operation for all facilities. Concomitant with this the Commissioner of DSS is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the administration of all public assistance programs (Social Services Law § 34 [3] [f ]). The Commissioner has also been given the responsibility for the inspection and supervision of all facilities (Social Services Law § 461-a) and various enforcement powers (Social Services Law § 460-d). The regulations contained in 18 NYCRR are derived from this statutory framework and are the expression of the policy of the State on this issue. The discretion vested in the DSS to formulate policy, to choose from various options and to allocate resources and establish priorities
By its language 18 NYCRR applies to shelter facilities generally, however, defendants argue that the regulations were not
With respect to the first point it can be assumed that the primary use for which an armory is designed and constructed is not to provide shelter for the homeless. Natural disasters may of course create emergency situations which require that it be put to such use. However, the situation presented here is one in which armories have been opened for the express purpose of providing shelter for the homeless and have been continuously operated as shelter facilities for several years. In practical terms for thousands of the homeless, shelter in an armory is the only response by the city and the State to their problems. Their rights, however, are not contingent upon the type of building in which they are housed. The purpose for which a building was originally designed and constructed is irrelevant. The court can only look to its present use and how the structure affects the rights of the homeless. Any building which is operated as a shelter facility is a shelter within the definition in the regulations regardless of any prior or intended use.
As to the second point the defendants argue that as modification of the physical layout of the armories is impossible enforcement of the regulations would only serve to diminish available resources and the services provided to the homeless. Clearly an armory is a structure which presents problems. Living quarters consist of a single large room with rows of cots, there is poor lighting and no privacy. However, an armory does provide space. Applying even a generous square foot to resident ratio an armory can accommodate more than 200 persons (18 NYCRR 491.3 [g] [1] [i]). Similarly limiting the occupancy of the single room to 30 persons (18 NYCRR 491.10 [o] [9] [iv]) or requiring floor-to-ceiling partitions (18 NYCRR 491.10 [o] [9] [vi]) would seem to be incongruous given the scale of the room. However, the regulations are no less binding because the city and the State have chosen inappropriate buildings. Title 18 is certainly not inviolate. The DSS may amend its regulations at any time or
The 200-person capacity limit may be waived upon request and upon a demonstration that “there are compelling conditions which necessitate the establishment of a larger facility;” (18 NYCRR 491.3 [g] [3] [i]) and “the physical plant and proposed program comply with department regulations and applicable local codes.” (18 NYCRR 491.3 [g] [3] [ii].) The environmental standards set forth in 18 NYCRR 491.10 which include the 30 person per room limit may be waived if the DSS determines “that the proposed waiver will not adversely affect the health and safety of residents.” (18 NYCRR 491.3 [¶] [2].) As yet there has been no formal request by the city for a waiver of any of the regulations; however, this must be viewed in the context of the Callahan litigation.
The lawsuit in Callahan (Sup Ct, NY County, index No. 42582/79, supra) was commenced prior to the issuance of any regulations concerning shelter facilities and the consent judgment was entered into before the regulations in title 18 were promulgated in final form. By virtue of the continuing jurisdiction retained by the court the rights of the parties have not remained static but the terms of the judgment have been subject to frequent modification by the court. The reality of this situation is that the parties are working out the terms of the applicable waivers under the supervision of the court. Clearly if the DSS had chosen to apply the regulations to armories initially the determination whether to grant a waiver and the terms thereof would have been within its sole discretion subject to review in a proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78. That the DSS has chosen not to do so does not change the effect
Accordingly, the motion of plaintiffs for partial summary judgment is denied and the cross motion of the defendants for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is granted.
. [1] Governor has also been made a party in this lawsuit. However, as authority has been delegated to the Commissioner of the Department of Social Services a judgment against the Governor is not necessary to achieve the relief sought by the plaintiffs.
. The defendants concede that the following facilities are not in compliance with the regulations: (a) Fort Washington Armory, (b) Lexington Avenue Armory, (c) Park Avenue Armory, (d) Atlantic Avenue Armory, (e) Flushing Armory, (f) Franklin Avenue Armory, (g) Williams Avenue Shelter, (h) Harlem Shelter, (i) Camp LaGuardia, (j) Greenpoint Shelter, and (k) Charles H. Gay Complex on Ward’s Island.
. This obligation was extended to homeless women in subsequent litigation (Eldredge v Koch, 118 Misc 2d 163, revd on other grounds 98 AD2d 675 [1st Dept 1983]).
. [2] The claim for monetary damages against the State or State officials is not cognizable in the Supreme Court but must be brought in the Court of Claims CAutomated Ticket Sys. v Quinn, 90 AD2d 738, affd 58 NY2d 949 [1983]).
. Without belaboring the point this argument is further drained of its vitality by the acquiescence of the DSS in the supervision by the court in areas of management prerogative as part of the continuing jurisdiction retained by the court in Callahan v Carey (Sup Ct, NY County, index No. 42582/79).