Wilkins v. McGeheeWilkins v. McGehee
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Simmons
There are two questions made for our decision by the record in this case: (1) The first is whether the power’ of sale given by Mrs. Wilkins to Mrs. Mustian survived after the death of Mrs. Wilkins the maker. (2) If the power did not survive, or was revoked by her death, whether the plaintiffs in the court below are estopped from setting up their claim to the land.
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*771Section 2966 of tlie code is in these words : “ A fraud may be committed by acts as well as words; and one who silently stands by and permits another to purchase his property without disclosing his title is guilty of such a fraud as estops him from subsequently setting up such title against the purchaser.” In Brown v. Tucker, 47 Ga. 485, this court held that the section quoted only operates in favor of a bona fide purchaser without notice. Granting that the executors stand, in this respect, on the same footing as an owner, still the purchaser in this case does not fill the description, because he was fully acquainted with the facts involving the title, and there was consequently nothing more of which he could be notified.
So far we have treated the executors who are the plaintiffs in this case, as if they were the real owners of the land in dispute, and concluded that they are not estopped. If any doubt attended this eonclusion, it would be overcome by considering the wide difference between estopping one who acts as an individual and one who acts in a representative capacity.. “Where an administrator makes an unauthorized sale of property belonging to the estate, he will not be estopped from recovering it back. Worthy v. Johnson, 10 Ga. S58 ; Gouldsmith v. Coleman, 57 Ga. 425. The estoppel works against the individual, so that he cannot shun personal liability by pleading his want of authority, but in many cases does not work against the estate.. Thus in Sellars v. Cheney, 70 Ga. 790, it is held: “That an administratrix stood by and saw property of the intestate sold under a void fi. fa. will not estop the administrator de bonis non who succeeded her from attacking the validity of the sale.” In Magee v. Gregg, 11 Sm. & M. 70, it was held that an administrator who was present at the sale of a slave belonging to his intestate, made by another person, and offered no objection to *772the sale, could recover the slave from the purchaser; that he might be estopped of his individual rights, but not deprived of his fiduciary right, by such implied assent.- See also Lewis v. Lusk, 35 Miss. 696, 72 Am. Dec. 153, where it is said that an estate cannot be prejudiced or estopped by the mere silence of the administrator, or by his omission to assert title, or to do an act in relation to its interest. In the present case the plaintiffs declared on three counts, one as executors, another as trustees under the will and another as next friend of the minor beneficiary, and we are asked to hold that they are estopped in all three characters. In addition to the above authorities, we may in answer refer to the case of Groover v. King, 46 Ga. 101, in which Warner, C. J., says : “Although the minor heirs of the intestate may have had a guardian, and that guardian may have receipted to the administrator for their share of the pro-’ ceeds of the sale of the land without any knowledge of the illegality of the sale, as the evidence in the record shows, they were not estopped from asserting their claim to the land when they obtained a’ knowledge of such illegal sale, and it was error in the court to charge the jury that they were estopped. Estoppels are not generally favored by the courts, and it would be a very harsh rule to establish that the minor heirs in this case were estopped when their guardian had no knowledge of the illegality of the sale of the land. But in electing to set aside the sale they must account for what they have received from the sale of the land; they cannot have the land and retain the proceeds of the sale thereof.” So here, in making this ruling, we do not intend to hold that the purchaser has no remedy. He can still set up his mortgage by way of cross-bill to the action of ejectment, and have.it foreclosed and the land sold, and be paid the amount of the mortgage with interest thereon. Judgment reversed.