*1 pleading is responsive time before ____” 15(a). Upon this served I.R.C.P. Cay Linda WILKINS and Pamela Jean it record we hold that was abuse Strack, as Adminstratrixes of the Es deny trial the motion court’s discretion tate of Norman Mitchell complaint. remand the to amend On Mitchell, Plaintiffs-Respondents, liberally for the district court should allow pleadings amendment to the under I.R.C.P. FUND AMERICAN LIFE FIREMAN'S 15(a). COMPANY, INSURANCE
Defendant-Appellant. IV 15206. No. ar Sieperts The individual Supreme Idaho. gued filing appeal of this was argu untimely. find no merit We Jan. filing appeal begins to
ment. The time for filing stamp on
run from the date of the “is judgment, terminated”
filing timely post-judgment motion.
Thereafter, com appeal period ... “the upon to run the date of the clerk’s
mences stamp deciding such
filing on the order 14(a). The time before
motion.” I.A.R. motion does not accumu post-judgment disposition. after Rath
late with time
er, the time commences anew after the mo
disposition timely post-judgment Neibaur,
tion. Security See First Bank v. P.2d Since
plaintiff appeal days filed within 42 disposition timely post-judgment
motion, timely. dispo appeal Our unnecessary
sition makes to rule on Sin augment motion the record.
clair’s pro- and remanded for further
Reversed attorney
ceedings. appellant. No Costs
fees. C.J.,
DONALDSON, SHEPARD Tern., OLIVER,
HUNTLEY, JJ., J. Pro
concur.
1007
ville,
policy provides pay-
Tennessee.
$10,000
beneficiary,
ment
named
surviving designated
there
bene-
or if
is no
ficiary,
persons
then to certain
listed
descending
order.
insurance contract
policy, Betty
Under Mr. Mitchell’s
Mitchell
primary
beneficiary
was named the
contingent beneficiary
designated.
was
There is
policy
an exclusion in
provides as follows:
“Exclusions: This
cover
from,
by,
resulting
any
or
loss caused
following:
one or more of the
(F)
any
beneficiary
intentional act
or member of
member’s household to
commit,
commit, bodily
or threaten to
Pocatello,
Maguire,
David H.
for defend-
injury to the member.”
ant-appellant Fireman’s Fund American
§ 15-2-803,
“Slayer
I.C.
the Idaho
Stat-
Life Ins. Co.
ute” was also in
at the
existence
time
Pocatello,
Budge,
plain-
Randall C.
for
pro-
was issued.
I.C.
tiffs-respondents Linda Jean Wilkins and
vides:
Cay
Pamela
Strack.
Ҥ 15-2-803. Effect of
on
homicide
Anderson, Pocatello,
plain-
Gus Carr
for
distribution at death:
tiff-respondent Betty J. Mitchell.
“(a)(1) “Slayer” shall mean any person
participates,
principal
either as
or as
DONALDSON, Chief Justice.
fact,
accessory
before the
in the will-
January 23,1978,
On
Norman G. Mitchell
killing
ful and unlawful
any
other
strangled
wife,
was
to death. His
person____
Mitchell,
subsequently
Jane
was
convicted
“(b)
any
No slayer
way acquire
shall in
degree
of first
murder. Her conviction
or
property
receive
as a
benefit
Mitchell,
upheld
was
v.
104
State
decedent,
result of
death of
493,
(1983),
denied,
P.2d
660
1336
461
cert.
property
pass
provided
such
934,
2101,
U.S.
103 S.Ct.
accidental death
As an
insurance.
incident
slayer as
or
assignee
Banclub,
membership
Mr. Mitchell
any policy or
on
certificate
a policy
with
of accidental
decedent,
the life of the
asor
the surviv-
$10,000.
death benefits of
joint
paid
life policy,
shall be
group policy
decedent,
is a
issued
instead to the estate
designate
Fireman’s Fund American Life Insurance
unless the
or certificate
Company
Banclub Association of Nash-
some
other than
secondary beneficiary
World,
(1923);
to him in
estate as
196 Iowa
recover the benefits “[ijnsurance proceeds payble to to tion heirs of Mr. Fireman’s Fund re- Mitchell. presume slayer” the that under the proceeds to pay fused to of the wrongdoer proceeds. to is entitled the rely- Betty respondents, Mitchell or However, (F) pre- expressly since exclusion (F) upon policy. ing exclusion recovery Mitchell from cludes Respondents brought liability, suit recov- Fund from then to relieves Fireman’s all § proceeds policy. er mo- provisions After I.C. do not 15-2-803 by parties summary judg- tions both for operation. come into ment, granted summary the district court Moreover, statutory amendment The judgment respondents. in favor of implication not is disfavored (F) trial court found that exclusion and I.C. inferred, legislative clear intent. § absent conflicted, and, therefore, 15-2-803 Mining v. Mutual Sunshine Co. Allendale disposition of insur- statute controlled 25, Co., proceeds. appeals Fireman’s Fund § 15-2- purpose of I.C. sole that decision. profit prevent wrongdoer is a from single issue in this case is whether wrong. her his or own I.C. from § (F) 15-2-803, supersedes exclusion I.C. § 15-2-803(n) is that the statute states Mitchell’s accidental death Norman state that no “effect the statute and the Appellant contends that profit by his own person shall be allowed to do not conflict and therefore exclusion wrong____” official The comment disposition. exclusion controls text also states: appellant agree We that I.C. may appear first it that the matter “At § (F) do con and exclusion not is in nature and not a dealt with criminal Therefore, (F) super is flict. exclusion proper probate matter for courts. How- § Other courts seded I.C. 15-2-803. ever, wrongdoer may concept that a considered the and commentators that have wrong is a civil profit by his own held applicability “slayer statutes” have probate is the concept, and the is apply only when there that the statutes determine the effect of proper forum to poli provision whatever the insurance property of the killing on succession to disposition when as to the decedent.” beneficiary kills the insured. National reason, appears in I.C. 15-2-803 For this May, Ass’n. v. Okla. Aid Life Probate intestacy of the Idaho (1949); section Sovereign Camp, O.W. W. section of Clark, not in the insurance S.W,2d 336 Code and v. 184 Ark. Further, nothing there is (1931); the Idaho Code. Mystic McDade Workers of expressing the title a statute a member of the Member’s household to change in insurance law inval- bodily injury commit or threaten to commit exclusions, idate such nor arguable It is Member.” under purport power to be upon limitation coverage exclusion that there is no company avoid liability policy, argument regarding so that the when a kills the insured. It beneficiaries would not arise. Therefore, I.C. 15-2-803 should not be arguable carrier that the meant exclude right read to limit compa- coverage from arising risk nies to contract this matter. bodily death injury caused “committed” decision trial court is there- family designated beneficiary mem- fore reversed. Costs to appellants. coverage, ber. Such a unless restricted statute, prohibited by appears otherwise attorney No appeal. fees on *4 i.e., widely accepted, present policy J., BAKES, McFADDEN, J., and Pro restricted to “accidental” death hence and Tern, concur. coverage there is resulting no for a death suicide, illness, disease, from similar or SHEPARD, Justice, dissenting. examples causes. Other of restricted cov- disagree I with both the conclusion of the erage might circumscription by of risk majority process and its reasoning and issuance policy covering the insured therefore dissent. only passenger particular when a on a com- Mitchell, deceased, Norman was the flight. mercial Although airline an insur- a of “Certificate Accidental may coverage carrier limit its risk Death against speci- Insurance” insuring exclusion, through an it must do so in “resulting fied directly indepen- loss and language pur- clearly accomplishing such dently bodily of all other causes inju- from pose and since an insurance contract is a ries by occurring caused accident while this ambiguities contract of adhesion all in the policy is in as Applicant force to the Mem- contract against will be construed the in- ber, wife, injuries.” herein called such His surance carrier. Mitchell, Betty Jane was the named benefi- In the case I instant would hold that the ciary of policy. said The itself insurance carrier has not clearly excluded beneficiaries, named additional classes of presented by the risk the circumstances of children, including if surviving “there is no the instant case. The record us before designated beneficiary.” beneficiary does not that demonstrate Norman Mitchell was murdered. I be- “commit” did or “threaten to commit” bodi- that, lieve the viewpoint from of the dece- § ly injury. language The of 15-2- I.C. dent such death was accidental and there- “ ‘Slayer’ any person shall mean who coverage fore there was under the broad participates, as or principal either as an policy. allegation terms of the no There is fact, accessory before the and the wilful Betty Jane Mitchell “committed” or killing person,” unlawful of other dem- bodily injury “threatened commit” language onstrates that is available to ex- Rather, against husband. Betty her Jane presented by as is clude risk such degree Mitchell was convicted of first mur- at case hand. der in of her the death husband that she conspired planned had and that others excluded, Since the risk not and should commit murder of her husband. policy provides coverage, only since the question should is who receive face question Apparently involved is mis- my amount of the It is view that perceived majority or me. § statute, 15-2-803, slayer our I.C. is a bar carrier wrote into the stating that, to the claim Jane Mitchell as the an exclusion “This designated beneficiary. resulting caused cover loss or Subsection that, Any by beneficiary provides, ... intentional act in the case of said beneficiary’s having in the participated legis- ful conduct. Such declaration novel; homicide of the lature is not philosophy insured: has guided Idaho, forever courts of proceeds payable slay- “Insurance jurisdictions majority, other as well. er beneficiary assignee wholly for reasons which are unfathom- policy or certificate of insurance on the able, hangs the reversal district decedent, life of the or as the survivor flimsy predicate (ap- on the decision joint policy, paid life shall be instead pearing final decedent, paragraph) in the the estate of the unless the appears states that “I.C. in the designate per- or certificate some intestacy section of Idaho Probate Code son other than the or his estate the insurance section.” Conced- secondary beneficiary to him and in majority correctly that the ascer- which case such shall be secondary beneficiary tained where 15-2-803 can be located the in accordance Code, logic there is sense or policy.” terms what- hypothesis statutory ever to the that the The policy provides: at issue law it is law is not the because “Indemnity payable lump in a found a title of the Code other than record, sum poses should be where beneficiary designated be the found. writing on Spon- file with the Bank Statute, Slayer’s Member, as it has come to be If, sor. at the death *5 known, defining as “slayer” person after surviving designated no there is benefi- participates in the and in who willful unlawful ciary, indemnity payable the shall be killing person, of another and after defin- surviving one sum to the first class of ing realty any following property personalty the of ... as or or classes beneficiaries (3) therein, slayer interest child or children ...” declares that: “No acquire in any way any property shall or pointed As is well the dissent of out as result of the death receive J., Bistline, slayer the statute also contains benefit decedent, property the shall of such language, slayer the “The shall be deemed provided following,” pass as the sections predeceased to have the decedent ...” laid the subsequent and sections out policy question hold the would that legal slayer that shall be fiction “the provide the coverage for the death of predeceased to the decedent deemed have decedent, slayer prohibits the the statute eyes in the the law not sur- ... ”—thus of beneficiary designated wife from obtain- as will viving to the or take proceeds policy the and as intestate succession. pre- matter law that of establishes she and, proceeds the pursuant Notwithstanding deceased the to the insurance policy and if not provisions, proceeds personal property, should be nature children, se, A paid surviving plaintiffs a “benefit.” property, per certainly governing in the instant I would provision case. affirm of 15-2-803 further entirety. provided decision of the district court that policies specifically insurance go proceeds will insurance BISTLINE, Justice, dissenting. slayer: payable to the up- proceeds district court decision should be assignee beneficiary or manifestly slayer held. The district court enter- of insurance on or certificate tained an overall view of the attendant decedent, or as the surviv- the life circumstances which policy, paid is a life shall be question joint blinded. At stake here or decedent, through public policy. people of Idaho instead to the estate of designate or public decreed unless the certificate legislature their have that slayer or his any per- person other than the against allowing in Idaho is some secondary beneficiary him in gain wrong- his estate profit son to own proceeds which case such paid shall be contrary, proceeds paid that the “be into secondary beneficiary decedent, accordance poli- estate of the unless with the terms this designate some certificate slayer other than the or his estate as foregoing In the passage the words “shall secondary beneficiary in case such paid to the estate of the decedent” have proceeds secondary shall to such been underlined. hoped It is doing that so beneficiary____” gain majority’s attention to the fact that legislature justifi- without In legislature such manner did the re- inserting cation for paragraph into the spond Anstine, setting public policy Experience Probate suggests Code. that gain this state that slayer generally situations in- more property wrong- neither nor benefit realty personal volve property other act, BUT, declaring specifically ful than proceeds than insurance proceeds lapse, do not and either proceeds only. decedent, go into the or to estate designated secondary In this beneficiaries. While it seem any legal mind provided case the policy that: would conclude that paragraphs “If, Insured, at the death there is dealing property —above designated beneficiary, surviving set sufficiently encompass insur- forth — payable indemnity shall be in one sum to proceeds, because a surviving following the first class of the wrongfully kills the named insured is wife; (1) (2) hus- classes of beneficiaries: predeceased deemed have insured, band; children; (7) (3) child or ... estate legislature’s the 1971 additional treatment of the insured.” of insurance was occasioned by the then recent case of (1) Anstine v. Haw- slayer, (2) No. was the was the No. kins, insured, (3) deceased are the children. The sole appeal Mitchell, issue was whether No. is deemed to Jane Doris insured, Anstine could predeceased succeed to the hence is estate shooting surviving beneficiary. husband whose designated death not a oc- *6 curred at her hands. legislature’s Equally That is The estate included the law. law, community property lapse. and involved the does not Rather ob- also were proceeds viously, the of majority a the is far base in life insurance off declaring purpose named Doris “The of I.C. that sole Anstine benefi- § ciary. prevent from wrongdoer 15-2-803 is to a husband’s a children former wrong.” marriage profiting from his or her own contended that it was “a violation section, public purpose of That is a but the policy to allow” Doris Anstine to provide section on goes also to where the inherit or proceeds. obtain the insurance property go proceeds or insurance This a opinion Court in unanimous allowed prede- when is the deemed to have prevail. Doris Anstine to In doing so it ceased the decedent. The to observed as public policy matters of that that legislature one believe so if the “socially law as written is or other- is, purpose. enacted aimlessly, without unsound, power wise legis- to correct is lative, judicial____ legislature absolutely The district court was correct research, the resources for the study and perception in its that: slayer’s “The proper public formulation of policy.” broad public as a should matter of sound phoenix, Like the out of the ashes of precedence prevail An- take and provisions over § stine, arose II of contrary.” 15-2-803. of an insurance contract to the Decision, R., p. Memorandum 59. not, legislative policy however, company selling poli- that the insurance The majority would do well to at least question reap in attempt the windfall harvest of a case distinction between this and premiums paying collected without the in- Pendlebury v. 89 Idaho Casualty, Western but, proceeds anyone, quite (1965), to surance where this 1012 point, seeing legislative intent as we are con-
succinctly, to the and without insofar § 15-2-803, impossible elaboration, it is to for stated: cerned with need “It § glean thought disqualify- of obligation axiomatic that the of I.C. 41- therefrom an insured’s beneficiaries from part parcel 1839 became and of the con- all of receiving insur- inheriting property of to as tract insurance the same effect one benefi- though incorporated at ance benefits because therein.” ciary disqualifying a homicide. Pendlebury perpetrated 470. So axiomatic that opinion provided no But ef- citation. little Moreover, thought may a well and required to fort was ascertain that merry Eng- in majority, even old startle Fidelity same statement was made (where proposition first land the base State, 137, 149, Trust v. 72 Idaho Co. days) in medieval ever since the evolved (1951). Taylor par- Chief Justice of year the doctrine of forfeiture ticipated Pendlebury Fidelity and both corruption the blood has been lands and of Trust. also v. Joint School See Robinson Statute 54 Geo. and abolished. remained 263, 265, #150, District 596 P.2d This, gospel of according Ill c. pertinent provisions If the 317,18 Everett, N.E. 148 Avery 110 N.Y. part parcel are thus where, state (N.Y.Ct.App.1888), which us, contract now can Fire- before obtained. Fur- colony, a the doctrine also provi- man’s relieve of those Fund itself thermore, cursory reading of a the Consti- by inserting policy purport- sions into demonstrates tution the United States ed exclusion which overrides and nullifies concept has been riven say Emphatically no. statute? no. Congress “The jurisprudence: American doing company An insurance business the Punish- Power to declare shall have public policy. Idaho cannot override Idaho’s Treason, Attainder Trea- ment but no Blood, Corruption of or For- Wyoming early son shall work neighboring
Our
state of
except during
Life of the Per-
recognized
that even where there is not
feiture
Constitution,
expressly with in-
son
United States
specific
dealing
section
attainted.”
Ill,
3, cl. 2.
proceeds
art.
proceedings, that
those
surance
and must
distributed under
benefits
my
col-
hesitation I submit
Without
statutory
Application
scheme.
Ha-
law,
leagues that it is without
(Wyo.1960). In
P.2d
good, 356
all
public policy
of this and
violation of
said,
also
as did
that same case
of the 50 states
visit
sins
that:
Pendlebury,
this Court
upon
father’s children.
father’s wife
which subsist
It is well settled that laws
Or,
point,
company may
an insurance
place
making
at the time
obliga-
itself of its contractual
relieve
performed,
contract,
to be
and where it is
pay
tion
the chil-
*7
part of it as
and become a
enter into
simply because of
dren of Norman Mitchell
to and incor-
though expressly referred
guilt.
oblige
To so
Fire-
Mitchell’s
in its terms.
porated
does,
Fund,
majority
day
this
man’s
public policy set
is a clear violation of the
Wyoming
upon by the
Hagood
relied
was
legislature.
Bell,
sonableness long has been a rule of terminology. expects that he will He geared construction ascer- toward generally be insured and does antici- taining intent in situations ambi- pate expectations upset these guity. The applied standard to be artfully an clause that he will be posi- what a drawn reasonable in the or, detected, tion of the unable detect event insured would have under- Indeed, language modify. stood the powerless to mean.” will be 96 Ida- 622, (Donald- usually ho at 533 P.2d at can take notice son, J., dissenting.) never until after sees his premium he has contract 102 Idaho at (empha- P.2d at 321 been formed. original). sis people Most I purchased know who have policies, expecta- The doctrine reasonable they are all reason- people,
able peculiarly applicable tions is contracts would here only understand they purchased had where as here is drawn such a an accident which, death, in case of pay away would fashion that one hand steals what the sum certain designated. seemingly therein knowing Those the other confers. A close case, ensuing analysis Anstine and the meaning statu- of the literal (which tory law all presumed know), are provision question words solves reasonably expect only that problems none of the since the literal perpetrator of the disquali- homicide was language is at odds with the reasonable fied from receiving the insurance benefits. expectations an insured would obtain from the contract.
Noting that in the case Foremost I was one of the majority embracing there 619-21, Corgatelli, supra, at 533 P.2d at language of Justice Donaldson in his dis- noted, readily putting 740-42. As is ambi- in Corgatelli sent v. Globe & Accident aside, guity (and where Justice Donaldson Life Co., majority) the Foremost endorsed “the doc- (1975), I join other members bench reasonableness,” probability trine of hard-pressed and bar who have been to find Shepard’s Justice terminology was “the portion distinction between that of Jus- expectations.” doctrine of reasonable Jus- tice opinion Shep- Donaldson’s and Justice applicable tice Donaldson declared the stan- Corgatelli opinion ard’s wherein the latter dard to what a reasonable insured would wrote: understood; Shepard Justice wrote The doctrine of expecta- reasonable standard lay- to be what a acceptance tions from an reasonably of the man expected.1 Having been to policies Missouri, that most fact con- difference, say if there is a tracts of adhesion. Ordinarily there can “show it me.” Other than where bargaining be no over the terms of the pur- insurance salesman has advised the *8 buyer accepts contract. The pro- chaser of insurance what his Forty-five years ago 1. peril may legally nine-member Wash- man who at his be bound or Court, banc, ington Supreme appli- en stated the held to understand the nature and extent of language: cable standard in almost identical coverage. language poli- interpreted cies is to be in accordance with proper opinion, inquiry our In is not way average it be can, understood judge whether a learned or scholar man, rather than in technical sense. Zinn v. study, meaning comprehend the insur- Co., contract, Equitable Ins. 6 Wash.2d poli- but whether the insurance Life meaningful lay- be contract would vides, inescapable that an insured’s
expectations going based on he from the lan-
what understood difference,
guage. If there is not legislative a clear
where there is directive involved, public why is the majori- reversing district commit-
ty judge difference, If
ted no error? there is a
ought members of this learned for the able to illustrate it benefit bench bar? and Callie
John C. POINTNER S. wife,
Pointner, husband and
Plaintiffs-Appellants, JOHNSON, widower, al,
Earl M. et
Defendants-Respondents.
No. 14610. Idaho.
Supreme Court of
Feb.