History
  • No items yet
midpage
Wilkerson v. State
173 S.W.3d 521
Tex. Crim. App.
2005
Check Treatment

*1 comments, With these I concur in the judgment.

Court’s

Ray WILKERSON, Appellant Mitchell

The STATE of Texas.

No. PD-1605-04.

Court Criminal Appeals of Texas.

Oct. *3 Worth, Alford,

Barry Appel- J. Fort for lant. Horn,

Jeffrey First L. Van Asst. State’s Austin, Paul, Atty., Atty., Matthew State’s Austin, for State.

OPINION COCHRAN, J., the opinion delivered of PRICE, JOHNSON, in Court which HERVEY, KEASLER, HOLCOMB, and JJ., joined. (CPS)

A Child Protective inves- Services tigator interviewed about appellant the re- moval of his three children from the home appellant after wife and his were arrested for injury to a child. The court of appeals held that the trial court committed revers- ible error in allowing investigator the CPS testify appellant’s about statements made during this custodial interview be- cause the CPS worker did not administer warnings Miranda or follow the proce- dures article 38.22 of Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.1 We hold that only when CPS investi- (or gator other enforcement state non-law agent) acting is in tandem with investigate gather evidence for a crim- inal such prosecution are re- quired.2 no Here there was evidence that (Tex. 1. Wilkerson v. subsequent- statement and that is statement 2004). App.-Fort Worth ly reported to law enforcement the CPS investigator? Prosecuting Attorney’s 2. The State two (2) investiga- If a Child Services Protective grounds for review are as follows: tor, of a while in the course child abuse (1) investiga- Is a Child Protective Services investigation, conducts an interview with who, tor while in the course of a child subject report of a of child abuse while investigation, abuse conducts an interview custody, subject subject said is in and the subject report with the child abuse incriminating makes an statement subject custody, while said inis to be con- subsequently reported to law enforcement solely sidered an law enforcement investigator, the CPS must the CPS in- subject because the makes an Appel- crying, with was and she looked scared. worker was tandem CPS lant, An- urging, deputy’s said appel- police officers when she interviewed Hospital had been taken to Parkland drew Thus, trial not abuse lant. court did my temper “I explained, Dallas lost in admitting appellant’s its discretion ... pressure I’m a lot of because under statements. water, and got I a bathtub full of hot [S]o in it to him a put ... I him down teach I. appellant Deputy lesson.” Marshall told charged injury to a Appellant was tell the Dallas that he needed to bodily injury serious causing child gave he exactly happened, what had son, Andrew, three-year-old by putting his *4 gas. Shortly for appellant ten dollars scalding him in a He was tub of water. thereafter, wife, the appellant, his and injury charged causing bodily to also with Daniel, Curtis, and three other children— son, Brydon, hitting five-year-old by his Brydon apartment to their —returned him awith belt. Crowley police approached car. officers trial, At John Officer Shelton appellant arrested and his wife. and both Crowley Department that Police testified taken to a foster The three children were a com- dispatched investigate he was to home. plaint injury appellant’s of to a child at Deanna day, investigator The next CPS An- three-year-old apartment. He found the appellant at Lane-Martines met were lying in bed. His buttocks drew jail, being held Crowley where he was burned, severely and his were so feet following injury his to a child. arrest togeth- that the “skin was webbed burned place- the children’s She needed to discuss par- like a called er fin.” Officer Sheldon ment in a foster home because there Parkland amedics who flew Andrew to family to parents no other members Ap- Hospital helicopter. on an ambulance trial, At she testified about care for them. that An- told the officer pellant’s wife3 Family the legal her duties under Texas earlier, days had drew been burned three are removed [from “Once children Code: ap- and and February that she home], we interviewed the we have—once the men- pellant had treated burns with children, notify parents, have to the we shaving thol cream. them with- parents, to the interview speak First, his wife day, appellant Later that and and a co- period.” in a 24-hour she Curtis, De- and neighbor, Brydon, to home of their went worker interviewed Marshall, County depu- Brydon at Wayne a Tarrant interviewed Daniel.4 When she pictures of his took of ty. morning, and members she Deputy Marshall school Next, family thighs. his and appellant’s marks on buttocks church had befriended him asked appellant interviewed nearby apartment it into she when moved Brydon. wife the marks on Appellant’s earlier. about three months five, six, Curtis, Brydon, age age vestigator provided sub- ther of always have to the Andrew, marriage ject pursuant age to Miranda admonishments three. It was second Arizona, Sandralyn. U.S. 86 S.Ct. appellant and for both (1966), Ann. and Vernon's L.Ed.2d 694 38.22, before the C.C.P. art. went to day Lane-Martines 4. Later Ms. ad- subject will be statement made Andrew, but, Hospital to interview Parkland evidence? missible into condition, was not of she because his medical able to talk to him. wife, Sandralyn, Appellant’s the mother Appellant ten-year-old was the fa- Daniel. of trial, that when a trial. The court reasoned point during appellant At this statement,6 testimo- objected to Ms. Lane-Martines’s suppress a defendant moves to ny,5 judge objection but overruled to show the burden shifts to State testimony. and admitted the Appellant statutory constitutional proper told Ms. Lane-Martines that he had assume, given.7 We how- warnings were spanked Brydon several times on Febru- ever, court meant that the burden that the ary soiling pants. 7th for his facts that proves shifts the defendant if jury appellant causing convicted finding interroga- that the support would bodily to injury serious Andrew and caus- According to tor is an the state. ing bodily injury Brydon. It assessed appeals, the State failed the court punishment thirty years’ imprison- his burden, the trial meet this and therefore years’ charge ment on the first and ten appellant’s oral overruling court erred probation appeal, on the second. On the statement.8 suppress motion appeals appellant’s court of affirmed con- appeals’s published opinion The court of case, viction and sentence on the first but in conflict with appears this case be injuring Bry- it reversed his conviction for *5 unpublished opinions don and remanded that case for a new several recent from children, 5.Appellant’s objection against entire trial and voir that could occur and she questioning dire of Ms. as questions Lane-Martines was over to law enforce- turns those follows: agencies parts ment that become of their you hap- State: What did the defendant tell files and are used to result in the arrest pened Brydon? charges. to citizens on object, Defense: I’ll Your Honor. Let me ask objection Court: The is overruled. questions her a few on voir dire. appeals categorized appellant’s perfect your objection? 6. The court of Court: To Yes, quoted objection Defense: Your trial above as an oral motion Honor. suppress. Court: Go ahead. By the defense: Q: you employed by agency? Are a state 7. S.W.3d at 152. A: Yes. Q: you reports Do take from defendants that appeals stated: The court of police agencies? are forwarded to the suppress a When a defendant moves to question. A: I don't understand the statement, the shifts to the State to burden Q: Reports- proper warnings given. show that the you repeat A: Could it. proved Appellant Q: you question If a defendant and make (cid:127) interrogated about his Lane-Martines him you, they documentation of what tell are concerning culpability offense in the instant reports by duty those forwarded of law to Crowley jail attorney present; with no police agencies? (cid:127) he was incarcerated for the instant offense Yes, A: sir. time; Q: at the reports Do those sometimes result in the (cid:127) employed by agency; she was state people? arrest of (cid:127) jail to the she knew when she went my report? A: Based on that, Q: Appellant ques- she interview when Yes. made tioned defendant and documenta- report police, A: If a is made to the I don’t her, report tion of what he told they my believe arrest them based on re- by duty questioning would be forwarded port. report police A can be made to the incident, police agencies; law to the about a certain would (cid:127) it, interroga- of her she turned over the results investigate and an arrest would be made Crowley police; and that infor- investigation, tion to the based on their not on mine. Honor, prosecuting used as a basis for object mation was Defense: Your I still based on employed by agency, Appellant. the fact she is a state (footnote omitted). questions she what 144 S.W.3d at 152 defendants about crimes II. appeals.9 two other Texas courts of We do normally rely unpub- not refer to or Fifth provides Amendment value, opinions precedential lished for their person compelled any that no “shall be but law in opinions these state against criminal case to be a witness him settled,”10 implying area is “well this thus Arizona,11 self ...” In Miranda publication unnecessary. Given Supreme may Court held that the State precedent, in applying the conflict our any stemming not use statements from may entirely area of law not be clear. interrogation “custodial of the defendant Thus, opportunity provide we take this proce unless it demonstrates the use of guidance for the bench and bar on the safeguards dural effective to secure the legal question: important To what extent privilege against self-incrimination.”12 statutory requirements do the that a CPS specifically defined “custodial The Court report independent investiga- worker her interrogation” “questioning initiated tion results make her person law after a has enforcement officers surrogate purposes of Miranda warn- custody taken into de been otherwise ings is in person any when the she interviews of his freedom of action prived way.”13 custody? significant The Court concluded * 04-02-00615-CR, *2, 9.Rodriguez Tex.App. No. at LEXIS 4733 *1, (Tex.App.-Dallas pet.) (jailhouse Tex.App. no 2003 WL * require CPS officer did not Mi interview (Tex.App.-San LEXIS 3911 2 Antonio warnings; prove (unwarned randa defendant failed to pet.) no statement to CPS officer agency relationship admissible; between and CPS that when "the record establishes *6 practice worker who "testified it was the of Rodriguez spoke with she was [CPS worker] police department to refer child abuse engaged conducting in a child abuse investi job cases to CPS. Her as a CPS worker was to gation, any incriminating responses she persons accused of child abuse .... interview exclusively legitimate pur a elicited were for involved in [her] were not [but] pose other than law enforcement.... [CPS investigation. They get never asked her to explained spoke worker that she with defen any appellant, did not ask information from protocol required based on DPRS dant] investiga her to assist them in their criminal parents, explain the her to visit with both tion, what to do nor did instruct her process investigation, of the DPRS and alert appellant”; when CPS work she interviewed Rodriguez trying as to what DPRS would be er testified that she defendant interviewed help family through to do to the situa "carry responsibilities a CPS out her offi 05-00-01215-CR, State, tion”); Carter v. No. cer, purposes”). police department not for 1466174, *2, Tex.App. at LEX 2001 WL 2001 2001, (Tex.App.-Dallas pet.) IS 7746 *4-9 no 21018395, *1, Rodriguez, WL at 2003 2003 (unwarned during jailhouse statements made * ("Because Tex.App. 3911 1 the is- LEXIS admissible; with CPS worker work interview by existing appeal settled sues in this are officer before interview to er met precedent, this memorandum we affirm ... in plan” interviewing the determine a "case 1466174, State, opinion”); 2001 WL Carter once; only children officer never told her to * *1, ("Be- Tex.App. LEXIS 7746 1-2 2001 defendant; following was stan interview she clearly settled dispositive issues are cause all procedure “requires an in dard CPS which law, opinion in we this memorandum issue vestigator principals to interview the in a ...”). case, including alleged perpetrator”; she an investigating told defendant that she was fam 1602, 436, 16 L.Ed.2d U.S. 86 S.Ct. 11. 384 neglect ily abuse or would share informa (1966). police, that she was not a tion with but officer; was not "a court finds that interview 444, 12. Id. at 86 S.Ct. 1602. interrogation Mi custodial in violation of Amendment"); randa and the Fifth Cordova 05-00-01320-CR, added). (emphasis WL 13. Id. No. randa rule is intended to “against compulsion guard “inherent custodial questioning by police; custodial it coercive surroundings,” special therefore safe- possibility from the of protects suspect a guards required are the case of “incom- physical psychological degree’ or ‘third in a interrogation municado of individuals procedures.”16 police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating full statements without Miranda does not course, ap Of rights.”14 of constitutional It ply questioning. gener to all custodial a Supreme recognized Court there is ally only questioning by law applies unique danger police- of coercion in the agents.17 their enforcement officers the Mi- Thus, relationship.15 types agents”: arrestee of all There are two “state 458, Supreme 14. Id. at 445 & 86 S.Ct. 1602. Article Court held that the defendant’s non- 38.22 of the Code of Criminal Procedure re- a custodial statements to court- Mirandized quires slightly more appointed psychiatrist elaborate set of warn- who interviewed ings requirements than Miranda and adds the jail defendant to determine his mental written, signed either a statement or an against competency could not be used him recording audio or video of custodial interro- during punishment phase capital of a gations by law enforcement. TexCode Crim. prove dangerousness. murder trial to future 38.22. art. 466-67, Proc. Id. at 101 S.Ct. 1866. The Court using noted the unfairness of the results of 467, ("without proper 15. Id. at 86 S.Ct. 1602 "compelled” purportedly interview with safeguards process in-custody interro- expert designated by "neutral” the trial court gation persons suspected or accused of prove dangerous- as evidence to his future inherently compelling pres- crime contains Grigson beyond ness. "When Dr. went sim- sures which work to undermine the individu- ply reporting to the court on the issue of compel speak al’s will to resist and to him to competence prosecution and testified for the freely”); where he would not otherwise do so stage penalty at the on the crucial issue of States, see also Beckwith v. United 425 U.S. dangerousness, role [defendant’s] future his 345-46 & n. 96 S.Ct. 48 L.Ed.2d changed essentially and became like that of (1976) (reiterating that the Miranda "Court recounting an of the State unwarned gave great weight contemporaneous police postarrest statements made in a custodial set- and concluded manuals that custodial interro- essence, ting.” Id. at 101 S.Ct. 1866. In oriented,’ gation 'psychologically ... judge, of the trial himself a state *7 principal psychological that the factor con- agent, was used to collect evi- tributing interrogation to successful was iso- prosecution. dence for the lating suspect surroundings the in unfamiliar purpose subjugate 'for no other than to Mathis, Similarly, Supreme Court ”) (cita- to individual the will of his examiner’ investigator held that an IRS tax who inter- Court, omitted). Supreme tions Like the this prison viewed the defendant in a state about recognized interroga- Court has that custodial significantly—asked his tax returns and— by agents may tion law enforcement be inher- sign a defendant to waiver of the statute of State, ently coercive. See v. Cobb 85 S.W.3d returns, "investigat- limitations on his tax 258, (Tex.Crim.App.2002). ing” collecting against and evidence the de- legal proceeding fendant for a future while Cobb, 263; 16. 85 S.W.3d at see also Doescher custody.” "in the defendant was 391 U.S. State, 385, 391, (Tex.Crim. 578 S.W.2d n. 6 2, 2-4 &n. 88 S.Ct. 1503. ("the App.1978) purpose prophylactic for the neatly of these two cases fit While neither by measures mandated Miranda was to miti interroga- into the normal Miranda "custodial gate the inherent coerciveness of station model, by tion an of law enforcement” interrogations”). house upon premised are both the fact that the Smith, 454, primary purpose state-agent of the interview- 17. Estelle v. U.S. S.Ct. 451 101 1866, (1981), er was the collection of evidence to be used 68 L.Ed.2d 359 and Mathis v. States, 1503, against prosecu- the interviewee in a criminal United 391 U.S. 88 S.Ct. 20 (1968), L.Ed.2d tion. 2 W. LaFave & J. 381 are often cited as two See Isreal, Criminal Smith, 6.10(c) (1991 possible exceptions Supp.). § to this rule. In at 623-24 Procedure 528 any employed by possible prosecution.

those who are state In le- pursuing this are, definition, agency by “state agents,” gitimate goal, police might tempted be only working but those who are for or on physical illegiti- to use coercion or other behalf of police are law-enforcement “state gather mate to methods confession. The agents.” Although employment state Supreme Court was concerned with this clearly person “agent makes a an particular power and imbalance the result- State,” not, itself, that label does make ing inherently coercive it interactions when person “agent of the State” devised the Miranda warnings.20 purpose defining interroga- “custodial (CPS) Child Protective Services work- government tion.” Not all workers must ers, hand, very the other have differ- ready be familiar with and to administer ent goals responsibilities. set of and Their Miranda or comply pro- with the protect safety mission is to the welfare and requirements cedural of Article 38.22. As community.21 in the Although children LaFave, noted Professor “the when may at duty investiga- times entail the given police powers, official has not been claims, tion of child abuse that alone does Miranda has been held to inapplicable officials, questioning by in- not transform CPS workers into law en- school welfare vestigators, personnel, prison medical agents.22 forcement officers or their Nor counselors, parole probation and offi- statutorily does the fact CPS worker is cers.” required report suspected child abuse to law enforcement authorities transform a recognizes types

Our law that different CPS worker into an of law enforce- employees of state serve different roles. statutorily required ment. All citizens are job It is enforcement’s ferret out law crime, au- commission, report suspected child abuse to the investigate arrest its perpetrator, gather obligation report evidence for a thorities.23 If the sus- State, (Tex.Crim. compelled 681 S.W.2d be to incriminate himself.” Ac- Paez App.1984); cordingly, see also Cates v. we laid “concrete constitu- down (Tex.Crim.App.1989). guidelines agen- tional for law enforcement cies and courts to follow.” 6.10(c) LaFave, § 19. 2 W. at 622. omitted; (citations omitted). Id. footnote States, 20. See Dickerson v. United 530 U.S. 264.002(a) (stating § 21. See Tex. FamCode 428, 434-35, 120 S.Ct. 147 L.Ed.2d 405 Regulatory Department of Protective Ser- Dickerson, (2000). In the Court reaffirmed "(1) promote the enforce- vices-CPS-shall and reiterated its Miranda concerns: protection all abused ment of laws for the Miranda, we noted that the advent of children; (2) neglected ini- take the interrogation modern custodial involving tiative in all the interests of matters brought with it an increased concern about *8 adequate provision has not children where by confessions obtained coercion. Because made”). already been interrogation, very police by its custodial nature, Cates, 172; pressures isolates and the individu- 22. at v. See 776 S.W.2d Garza al, State, 813, employing (Tex.App.-Fort we stated that “even without S.W.3d 825 18 2000, ref'd). brutality, degree' spe- pet. the 'third or [other] Worth stratagems, interrogation cific ... custodial § That section 23. Tex. FamCode 261.101. liberty heavy and exacts a toll on individual reads: on the of individuals.” We trades weakness (a) person having that a inherent in A cause to believe concluded that the coercion interrogation physical or mental health or welfare custodial blurs the line be- child’s involuntary adversely abuse or voluntary tween and state- has been affected ments, any person immediately heightens neglect by shall and thus the risk that an provided by subchap- privi- report a individual will not be "accorded his make lege ... ter. under the Fifth Amendment not to Miranda warnings convert a are not re- pected police, child abuse itself could a agent, quired.24 CPS worker into law enforcement every person suspects then who child hand, the other if the once- On abuse could called a “law enforcement be parallel paths police of CPS and the con agent” in the Miranda context. This is agent in verge, police and and state are law, clearly certainly not the and it was not tandem, in vestigating a criminal offense Miranda purpose prophylactic of the Miranda compliance and with warnings

warnings. may necessary.25 be At this article 38.22 may as an part, point,

For the most CPS case a CPS worker be viewed workers, investigating family police. “agency” who are The term matters, placement safety relationship police and denotes a consensual which officers, persons parties criminal investigating who are exists between two matters, separate parallel paths. run on where one of them is for or on not, gathering Both are interested in informa of the other.26 The law does behalf however, agency relationship. police collecting presume tion. While are informa prosecu person alleging relationship tion for an arrest and criminal such a tion, if investigating proving CPS workers are has the burden of it.27 But a housing protection prove particular per find safe defendant does that a caseworker, teacher, neglected abused or children. When a son —whether CPS officer, state-agency employee working preacher, probation family on a or mere to, from, is, fact, path parallel yet separate working for or on behalf friend — State, 37-38; jail 24. v. S.W.2d Davis 173. The defendant was in on these Paez State, 78, charges v. (Tex.App.-Dallas 687 S.W.2d when the CPS worker interviewed 1985, ref’d). Paez, pet. example, questions held that For him. Id. This Court defendant, investigator the CPS worker asked the defendant were CPS interviewed the incriminating responses "calculated to evoke custody who was in for the murder of her husband, pending charges.” relevant Id. at 173. proper placement to determine the case, only In that the CPS worker not investi- of her children. 681 S.W.2d at 36. This abuse, gated suspected child but followed Court held that the CPS worker was not act- up post-arrest interrogation gather ing pursuant as an of law enforcement prosecu- additional evidence for the criminal police practice ato because the record did played tion the case in which she had not establish that the defendant's statements case, major role in his In such a arrest. product to the CPS worker were “the working and CPS were in tandem and part or actions words on the of the moving inception forward as a team from the likely to elicit an re- Therefore, investigation. simply Rather than con- sponse.” Id. at 38. we found ducting [CPS] a "routine interview to assist the defendant's statements did not stem from solving problem family the abuse within the interrogation by custodial a law enforcement conducting unit .... CPS agent, [the worker] required and the CPS worker was not investigation officially operating criminal give Miranda or follow the statu- agencies responsible for to assist those tory procedures gen- of article 38.22. Id. See Innis, enforcing Id. at the State’s criminal laws.” erally, U.S. Rhode Island case, (1980). 174. the CPS worker had re- 100 S.Ct. 64 L.Ed.2d 297 "child-protection” put moved her hat and an "evidence-collection” hat. See Cantu *9 State, (Tex.Crim.App.1991); Cates v. 776 606, State, (Tex. Ackley 172; 26. v. 592 S.W.2d 608 McCrory S.W.2d at 643 S.W.2d Crim.App.1980). (Tex.Crim.App.1982). 734-35 For exam- Cates, ple, gathered by the evidence a CPS 284, 286, Klein, caseworker was instrumental to the defen- 27. 143 Tex. 184 Buchoz (1944). dant’s arrest for child abuse. 776 S.W.2d at S.W.2d 271 530 in- person police using agent’s a in that the the police by interrogating

of the they could not custody, agent accomplish is bound all consti terview to what rules, in In statutory lawfully accomplish tutional and confession themselves?30 sum, cluding Miranda and Article 38.22.28 attempting to was law enforcement agent?

use the interviewer as its anointed It sometimes difficult to deter is Second, courts should examine the paths,

mine whether the two that of the CPS, ac parallel concerning of or record the interviewer’s police and that are perceptions: was the in they converged particu whether have tions and What so, questioning primary lar case. To do courts must examine terviewer’s reason person? questions evalua the the aimed at the entire record. Central to this Were gaining information and evidence for perceptions tion are the actions and the prosecution, they criminal or were related parties police, involved: the the CPS case (or agent goal? of the to some other How did the inter potential worker other in the case? Did and the defendant himself. viewer become involved police), help “build a case” that the interviewer First, arrest,31 courts should look for infor was in person’s led to the or the relationship between the mation about the pursuing goal some other or terviewer agent. police potential police and the Did duty? other At whose performing some going the know the interviewer was question interviewer the request did the Did the speak sum, with the defendant? did the interviewer be arrestee? the police arrange meeting? the Were agent of law lieve that he was police present during the interview? Did enforcement? interviewer with the provide the examine they give Finally, inter courts should

questions to ask? Did the the record for evidence of the defendant’s implicit explicit or instructions to viewer When the perceptions from the defen of the encounter. get certain information interviewed, he defendant was did believe practice” dant? Was there a “calculated speaking with a law-enforce the and the interviewer he was between the ac ment someone cloaked with likely agent, that was to evoke an authority police? apparent inter tual or response during from defendant impression?32 him Alter finally, gave the record show view? And does What Cantu, 75; Cates, apparent authori- at with the indicia 28. See 817 S.W.2d 172; NationsBank, McCrory, ty. Dilling, 643 S.W.2d at 734. S.W.2d See N.A. v. (Tex.1996) curiam); (per S.W.2d Cates, 776 S.W.2d at 172. 29. See Bldg. Co. v. Northland Southwest Title Ins. (Tex.1977) ("Only Corp., (CPS categorized worker will be as an 30. Id. leading principal, one the conduct of the law enforcement if the record estab- authority suppose agent has the he that the made the [defendant] lishes "that when admissions, exercise, may charge principal purports employee utilizing DHR agent.”). through apparent authority of an capacity accomplish so as to what her Thus, lawfully accomplished only if evidence that there is police could not have themselves”). the third- acted in some manner to cloak have suspect authority interrogate person with Cates, 776 S.W.2d at 173. 31. See apparent authority and that on their behalf suspect, the sus- communicated to the will only through authority Apparent arises pect’s perceptions be relevant. knowledge, acquies- participation, acts of (the police) principal that clothe cence

531 natively, person would a III. reasonable de position fendant’s believe that the inter court of Appellant argues that the viewer was an of law enforcement?33 appeals did not conclude that Ms. Lane-

Martines was an of law enforcement. bottom, inquiry At is: Was findings by He contends that the factual (explicit this custodial interview conducted the court of were appeals ly implicitly) police or on behalf of the rely on pure dicta. The court did not primary purpose of gathering evidence decision, any way nor them for its or statements to be in a used later criminal they necessary were to that decision. proceeding against Put the interviewee?34 holding The courts reliance for its full way, another is the interviewer as Appellant sup was that once moved to “instrumentality” or “conduit” for the press, on to the burden was the State police prosecution?35 or simply: Most is of Miranda /38.22 giving establish the the interviewer “in po cahoots” with the warnings, go and the State did not for lice? ward to meet that burden.36 it, Kerner, phrased People 33. As one court has Ill.App.3d 35. See Ill.Dec. 538 N.E.2d person dealing Unless realizes that he is (1989) (child-services police, acted with the their efforts to worker as "con elicit incrim- inating against statements from him do not consti- duit for information” defendant "police interrogation” tute setting requested within custodial where worker as meaning impact of Miranda. It is the on police investigation sistance from in his suspect's interplay mind of the between children; sexual abuse defendant on defen police interrogation police custody— and dant was to escorted interview with worker at reinforcing each pressure condition and officer; by police office door chief’s produced by anxieties the other —which interview; during was locked statement was interrogation” creates "custodial within the form; given prosecu on officers and a meaning suspect’s of Miranda. It is the immediately tor entered office thereafter and persons realization that the same who have defendant; arrested and the child-services world, cut him off from the outside exchanged worker and officer informa control, power have him in their want interview). tion both before and after confess, get him to and are determined to so, him to "interroga- do that makes the position Appellant's menacing tion” more than it would be with- custody "custody” out the Appellant; more No matter who interviewed no intimidating than it would he without the matter what his custodial status was or for interrogation. incarcerated; what offense he was no mat- (La. 1982). Loyd, State v. 425 So.2d knew, investigator planned ter what the do, do, do; duty or had a did or in fact Cates, 172; Paez, 34. See 776 S.W.2d at single solitary holding the court’s re- appellant S.W.2d at 37. Both the State and go mains—the State did not forward on the Family note 2003 revisions to the Code in warnings issue when the defense moved 261.301(f) § require highest prior- which "the suppress, simply and the State has not chal- ity” reports of child abuse to be conducted lenged that issue in this Court. "jointly” by agency a local law enforcement Although appellant might reasonably construe investigator. provision and CPS That went manner, appeals's opinion the court of in this interview, into effect after this thus the issue opinion holding we cannot read its that the "joint” investigations presently is not be- making suppress Court, mere of a motion to casts a express opinion fore the and we no upon burden State to show Miranda operation statutory provision. of that given. were We conclude that the say Suffice it to that Ms. Lane-Martines testi- appeals acting pursuant legal fied that court of meant that the State had a she was to her duty notify parents proper warnings emergency re- burden to show that given appellant proven moval of children from the home under because had certain § supra. 262.109. facts. See note 8 *11 conclude, however, the record is that mis- is evident from appellant than What We jail in appellant court of visited construes the law and reads the Ms. Lane-Martines literally. part procedure. too The mere of a routine CPS She appeals’s opinion Family the Texas filing suppress duty imposed of a motion to does not had a notify parents with- on the State to show Code to and interview thrust burden re- working day in of their children’s compliance with Miranda or article 38.22 one It was for this and until the defendant moval from the home.38 unless any law enforcement purpose, that the statements he wishes to rather than proves appellant. in- met product purpose, exclude were the of custodial that she with Thus, Furthermore, fails to show that terrogation. the State has no bur- record any practice” “calculated be- at all unless “the record as a whole there was den police Ms. Lane-Martines and the clearly establishe that the defendant’s tween [s]” likely in- an product of custodial which was to elicit statement was that does the record show terrogation by response. for law enforce- Nor Lane-Martines to ac- police It is the defendant’s initial burden used Ms. ment.37 lawfully ac- they what could not complish to establish those facts on record. fact, appears it complish themselves. in turn now to the record We not involved in the were appeals case to decide whether the court of investigation at all.39 CPS holding in the trial was mistaken implicitly court abused its discretion ap- appeals The court of stated concluding that Ms. Lane-Martines was Ms. “Lane-Martines pellant proved that not an of law enforcement who culpability interrogated him about his required comply with Miranda warn offense,”40 that concerning the instant procedures required ings and all of jail of- for the instant appellant was under article 38.22. fense, employed by a state that she was best, knew when she went is, agency, that “she sparse. This record that, Lane-Martines, jail appellant to the to interview that Ms. record does show questioned she defendant appellant when investigator, the CPS met her, 11, 2002, of what he told made documentation February the first time on for would be report questioning already custody on the when he was by duty of law to the It is forwarded concerning Andrew’s burns. charges turned over and that “she agencies[,]” unclear from the record whether interrogation to the CPS, of her but took the results hospital called CPS information Crowley and that police; custody the children because both ap- prosecuting was used as basis arrested and there parents their had been fact that Ms. But the mere family pellant.”41 no other known members. Paez, body origi- on his and that she (emphasis in school of the marks at 36 681 S.W.2d Brydon. nal) happened to appellant what McCrory asked (quoting (Tex.Crim.App.1982)). "If a re- testified: 41.Id. Ms. Lane-Martines police, I believe port is made to the don't § 38. Tex. Fam.Code 262.109. my report. report A arrest them based dire, police about a certain to the argument, can be made objection, voir 39. The entire it, incident, investigate and an they would ruling quoted four. in footnote their investi- would be made based on arrest Although possible it is gation, not on mine.” at 152. Ms. Lane-Martines 40. 144 S.W.3d that Ms. Lane- Brydon's this statement pictures at to infer from had taken said that she *12 may Lane-Martines have told In spanked Brydon. particular situa- appellant’s tion, about incriminating statement ruling the trial court’s that the CPS is not sufficient to transform her into an investigator agent was not an of law en- agent of law enforcement. forcement was within zone reason- disagreement. appeals able The court of There is nothing the record to indi- in concluding mistaken otherwise. cate that the investigating police knew interview, about Ms. Lane-Martines’s that Therefore, judgment we reverse the they spoke interview, to her before the appeals, judg- the court of and affirm the they that asked her to question appellant ment of the trial court. manner,

at all in any particular or that any attempt made to use her as a WOMACK, J., concurred in the result. conduit interrogation purposes. Nor is MEYERS, J., not participating. anything there in this record that indicates that it was Ms. Lane-Martines’s intention KELLER, P.J., concurring filed a of, to investigate on behalf inor tandem opinion. with, Crowley police. KELLER, P.J., filed a concurring Finally, nothing there is in the record opinion.

concerning appellant’s perceptions or how agree I with the Court that he viewed term “[t]he Ms. purposes Lane-Martines’s ‘agency’ denotes a consensual asking relationship him Brydon. Therefore, about which exists between only persons we can two where evaluate the situation from the one of them is acting for or on behalf of standard of a person reasonable in appel- other,”1 agree and I that position. lant’s the CPS Ms. Lane-Martines told qualify worker did not appellant as of law that she was a CPS investigator However, enforcement. I disagree there to him with interview and inform him agency about Court’s formulation of the test “removal” status of his children “acting as in tandem” with law because there enforce- was no family available Acting ment. “in tandem suggests member to with” custody. take Without more meaning broader than “acting information to for or on contrary, we cannot behalf of’ might sweep serve to within conclude that a person reasonable in appel- holding the Court’s position lant’s situations that are not would have believed that examples agency. true Ms. To avoid confu- Lane-Martines was an of law sion, I would eschew the “in enforcement. tandem” lan- guage and stick with the traditional defini- sum, In record, based on this the trial agency. tion of court did not abuse its discretion when it implicitly concluded that Ms. Lane-Mar- I disagree also sugges- the Court’s tines was not an “agent as of law tion that the perceptions defendant’s have enforcement” for the purposes of Miranda anything to do question with the of agen- when she interviewed appellant, Rather, and there- cy status. per- the defendant’s fore testimony admitted her appel- about ceptions are relevant to the issue of cus- lant’s concerning statement how he had todial interrogation. support of its did, fact,

Martines turn op. over results of 1. Court's at 529. Crowley her interview to the and that present prosecution upon was based report, obliged the trial court was not reach that conclusion. suggestion, Loyd, cites Fifth Miranda context but the Court State v. Amendment ease, right in the for the not Amendment to coun- proposition Louisiana Sixth require do Miranda was not violated when the de- sel context. Both contexts unaware of the of a fendant was status the statements be elicited law en- government agency informant.2 But agent, forcement but with status *13 shows, Loyd held that quotation being by alleged Court’s agent’s determined enforcement, conduct did not constitute relationship informant’s actual law fact, In interrogation.3 Loyd perceptions. custodial not the defendant’s what presciently anticipated Supreme comments, I concur in the With these Court later hold v. Per- would Illinois Court’s judgment. does un- kins: that Miranda not bar made to warned statements undercover agents.4

law enforcement The reason that, when the is un- defendant agent’s

aware of the law enforcement sta-

tus, subjected to he is not the coercive

pressures transform a conversation interrogation.”5

into “custodial (“Gene”) WRIGHT, E. Don Harrold matter, a separate status is agency But Holloway, Kennard, Pat and Pat S. Supreme as is well illustrated Court Holloway, P.C., Appellants S. in Massiah v. United decision States.6 Massiah, the defendant was unaware that the informant was an law enforce- Verner, Liipfert, Michael SYDOW ment, but because defendant’s Sixth Hand, Mcpherson Bernhard & attached, counsel right Amendment had Chartered, Appellees in- deliberately by that statements elicited formant inadmissible.7 have re- We 14-03-00222-CV. No. question agency cently addressed Texas, Appeals in the Sixth Amendment context Court of status Dist.). (14th that an not a explained informant was Houston had government agent when informant 24, Nov. 2004. no with and not agreement government under from offi- instructions distinguishes

cial.8 factor that Per- Massiah, making

kins from the defen- relevant to he perceptions

dant’s whether violation, is that

suffered a constitutional in the interrogation” matters

“custodial 1199, 201, 710, (La. Loyd, 6. 377 84 S.Ct. 12 L.Ed.2d 2. 425 So.2d U.S. See State v. 1982). (1964). Loyd, op. (quoting 3. at 531 n. 33 Court’s 299, Id.; Perkins, 110 S.Ct. 2394 7. 496 U.S. supra). Massiah). (distinguishing Perkins, 4. 496 U.S. Illinois v. (1990). L.Ed.2d 243 S.Ct. 8. Manns (Tex.Crim.App.2003) Id.

Case Details

Case Name: Wilkerson v. State
Court Name: Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
Date Published: Oct 5, 2005
Citation: 173 S.W.3d 521
Docket Number: PD-1605-04
Court Abbreviation: Tex. Crim. App.
AI-generated responses must be verified and are not legal advice.