124 Ind. 226 | Ind. | 1890
The appellants filed their complaint in two paragraphs, to each of which the appellees filed demurrers which the court sustained, and the appellants excepted, and relying upon these exceptions refused to amend their complaint, and judgment was rendered against them for want of a complaint.
The errors assigned are, that the court erred in sustaining demurrers to the paragraphs of complaint.
The paragraphs of complaint are quite lengthy. The substance of the first paragraph is as follows:
On the 14th day of November, 1879, and for a long time theretofore,, and ever since, the appellants were the owners of the real estate in the said paragraph described ; that until within a few days of the commencement of this action the plaintiffs were minors, and that the transactions and matters of fact complained of all occurred during their minority, and without their knowledge or consent; that on the 14th day of November, 1879, the appellees Fisher Doherty and Alfred G. McLelland filed in said court their complaint against the appellants and others, to subject the said real estate to the payment of a debt of about $200, therein alleged to be due to them from one James H. Wilhite; that it was alleged in said complaint that the said James H. Wilhite had purchased the said real estate, paid the full consideration therefor, and to defraud his creditors had caused the same to be conveyed to the appellants; that on the 7th day of October, 1880, the appellants were called to answer to said action, and
The second paragraph of the complaint is the same as the first, except that it alleges that the appellants had no notice whatever of the first action.
It is well settled by many decisions of this court that a judgment may be impeached on the ground of fraud.
A proceeding instituted to set aside a judgment because of fraud in its obtainment is regarded as a direct, and not as a collateral, attack upon it. Wainright v. Smith, 117 Ind. 414; Overton v. Rogers, 99 Ind. 595; Hogg v. Link, 90 Ind. 346; Earle v. Earle, 91 Ind. 27; Duringer v. Moschino, 93 Ind. 495.
Conceding, but not deciding, that the facts alleged in either paragraph of the complaint as to the first action and judgment referred to therein are sufficient to taint the judgment with fraud, and that but for the second suit and the judgment thereon rendered, the paragraphs of complaint would be good, if there was no fraud in the proceedings and judgment in the second action, then the paragraphs are not good on the ground of fraud.
In an action brought by a person to impeach a judgment taken against him while an infant because of an alleged fraud, as a circumstance to be considered with other circumstances, the age of such person at the time the judgment was taken ought to be considei’ed.
What might be a fraud upon an infant in its cradle might not be so against a full grown man, lacking but a few days or weeks of freedom from his disability.
According to what appears in the record the appellants
It is alleged that they were personally served with process. It is true that the averments in the complaint disclose the fact that the appellants were not summoned to appear until the 22d day of September, and that the court appointed a guardian ad litem, and heard the case and gave judgment on the 15th day of said month, and that the appellants were not in court on that day, nor on any day prior thereto; but for all that is averred in the complaint they may have been in court on the next day, and because of the presumption which always prevails in favor of good faith and honesty, we must presume that they were there on the day they were summoned to appear, in obedience to the command of the summons.
If there was an áverment that they were not present during the term, and were kept away as the result of some wrongful act of the appellee Wilhite, the case would present a different phase.
The appellee had the right to commence his action against the appellants to quiet his title to the real estate, notwithstanding they were minors; the court had jurisdiction of the subject-matter, and of the parties.
So far as we are informed, the appellants were not prevented from appearing to the action and protecting their rights.
It does not appear that the court was in any way imposed upon whereby it was induced to take up the case in advance of the return day and dispose of it.
No doubt if the appellants had gone into court on the 22d day of September and called the attention of the court to the fact that the proceedings taken by the court were premature, and that they desired to make an active defence to the ac
But this they did not do, and for their failure no excuse is offered ; and if their rights have been prejudiced they may attribute it to their own negligence, and iii such cases equity affords no relief.
The proceedings of the court in taking steps in the action, and giving judgment in advance of the return day of the summons, were irregular, and it may have been such an error that in a direct proceeding would have reversed the judgment; but when the question of fraud is eliminated from the complaint its further allegations are, in their character, but a collateral attack upon the judgment and proceedings in the action of the appellee Wilhite, in which he sought to have his title to the real estate in question quieted; and it is too well settled to require the citation of authorities that the courts will not entertain collateral attacks on judgments which, at most, are only erroneous.
Although the return day of the summons had not arrived, and the appellants were, therefore, not bound to appear when the court heard the ease and gave judgment, yet the summons had been issued, some notice had been given, and it was sufficient to enable the court to decide the question of jurisdiction over the person, and if it decided the question wrong its decision was erroneous, but not void, and can not be attacked collaterally. See Essig v. Lower, 120 Ind. 239, and cases cited.
We find no error in the record.
Judgment affirmed with costs.