Opinion of the Court by
Reversing.
Aрpellant was convicted of the offense of burning a dwelling house upon which there was insurance, and his punishment fixed at confinement in the state reformatory for a period of three years.
The evidence may he summarized as follows: On November 7, 1923, Harry Guenther, an insurance agent at Owensboro, issued a policy insuring the property in the sum of $2,000.00. The property was burned about one o’clock a. m. on November 12, 1923, and insurance to the amount of $1,500.00 was paid. According to Gilbert Hazelwood, appellant came to his house on the Sunday morning -preceding the fire, and stated that hе and Ms wife had separated, and he wanted to hoard with witness. Appellant returned after dark that evening and had some things in a blanket which he said he would give to Mrs.
Appellant denied that he was with Hаzelwood after ten or ten-thirty o ’clock on the night of the fire, and testified that none of the testimony of Hazelwood and his wife as to what ocсurred after that time was true. ,On-the contrary, he claims that he left town about 11:30 and went to the home of Sanford Aubrey, where he stayed all
The admission of Hаzelwood’s statement that appellant assaulted him with a brick is the first error complained of. Any conduct of the accused inconsistent with his innocence is admissible. Hence any attempt, whether by persuasion, bribery or threats, to induce a witness not to appear at the trial, or not tо tell the truth, is in the same category as the flight of the accused and should be admitted. Collins v. Commonwealth,
Another contention is that the court erred in permitting Hazelwoоd to testify that appellant said that he had “pulled these stunts before.” The contention is based on the rule that evidence of other distinct offеnses is not admissible. It must not be overlooked, however, that one of the exceptions to the general rule is that such evidence is admissible to show mоtive. Burns v. Commonwealth,
■ The statute under which appellant was indicted and tried makes it an offense to burn a dwelling house or other building or house on which there is any insurance, and plainly contemplates that there shall be legal insurance on the property. It is therefore essential to a conviсtion that the policy be issued by an insurance company regularly engaged in' carrying on the business óf fire insurance in' this state. Though the indictment was sufficient in this rеspect, Guenthei-, who was placed on the stand to show that the insurance ■ was ill- force at the time of the fire, merely stated that he wrote the policy on the property, that the property was burned and that the policy was paid. He never mentioned the name of the comрany that he representód, or the name of the company issuing the policy, nor did he testify to any fact's showing that the policy was issued by an insurancе 'company, much less by an insurance company regularly engaged in carrying on the business of fire insurance in this state. Without stopping to inquire whether this evidence was' sufficient to sustain a conviction, wre deem it necessary to add that the proper method'of proof is to show that the property was covered by a policy issued by an insurance company regularly engaged in carrying on the business of fire insurance in this state.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded for a new trial consistent with this opinion.