WILFRED JONES, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant–Appellee.
No. 18-30776
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit
August 28, 2019
Before KING, SMITH, and WILLETT, Circuit Judges.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana
Wilfred Jones fell while making his duty rounds aboard the M/V CAPE KNOX, injuring his arm. He alleges that grease on the deck caused him to slip. He sued the ship‘s owner—the United States—for negligence under the Jones Act and unseaworthiness under general maritime law. The district court granted summary judgment against Jones because he had no evidence that grease caused his fall.
On appeal, causation evidence remains scant. The Jones Act causation standard is lower than at common law. But it still requires some evidence. Plus, the district court had more than the usual summary-judgment discretion since this would be a bench trial. We AFFIRM the judgment.
I
Jones was an engineer aboard the CAPE KNOX. The United States owns the CAPE KNOX, and Keystone Shipping Company operates it. While making his rounds as duty officer, Jones entered the emergency diesel generator room. As he lifted his left foot over the hatch‘s nine-inch threshold, his right foot slipped. He fell against the carbon dioxide bottles inside the emergency diesel generator room. He did not see what caused him to slip. It was after dark, but Jones had a flashlight with him. He did not see grease on the deck or on his shoes at the time. In a “Report of Illness” the next day, Jones wrote “as I was completing duty round I lost balance and fell into the CO2 bottles in the EDG room causing me to fall on my right forearm.”
At his deposition, Jones testified he believed he slipped on grease on the deck. The CAPE KNOX had cables above the weather decks that were greased regularly. That grease often dropped onto the deck. An overhang covers the deck outside the emergency diesel generator room, but
Jones sued the United States and Keystone. He asserted a negligence claim under the Jones Act,
II
The summary-judgment standard marks our course. The everyday standard is familiar but applies uniquely in bench-trial cases. So we lay it out from harbor to anchorage.
A
“We review grants of summary judgment de novo.”1 Summary judgment is proper if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”2 “[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of . . . demonstrat[ing] the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.”3 Once the moving party does so, the nonmoving party must “go beyond the pleadings and . . . designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”4 An issue is “genuine” if “the evidence is such that a reasonable [factfinder] could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”5 “A non-movant will not avoid summary judgment by presenting ‘speculation, improbable inferences, or unsubstantiated assertions.‘”6 “Rule 56 ‘mandates the entry of summary judgment . . . against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party‘s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.‘”7
Under
B
Jones seeks to recover for his injuries based on employer negligence. Under
Some elements of Jones Act negligence follow the common law. In Gautreaux v. Scurlock Marine, Inc., we recognized that the employer‘s duty of care “retains the usual and familiar definition of ordinary prudence.”11 But the Jones Act causation standard is lighter than at common law. “A seaman is entitled to recovery under the Jones Act . . . if his employer‘s negligence is the cause, in whole or in part, of his injury.”12 The plaintiff can show causation if “employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the injury.”13 This standard is identical to that of the Federal Employers’ Liability Act,
Jones contends there was grease in many places on the ship‘s deck, and this was the most likely cause of his fall. He also contends that the district court prematurely decided witnesses’ credibility and incorrectly burdened him with immediately investigating the accident. The United States responds that Jones has no evidence for the causation element of his claim. Jones did not see himself slip on grease or see grease on his shoes. And neither Jones nor any other witness saw grease outside the emergency diesel generator room.
We hold that Jones did not have enough causation evidence to survive summary judgment. “[S]peculation” cannot defeat summary judgment on a required element of the claim.15 We of course follow the Supreme Court‘s instruction that “entirely circumstantial” evidence can prove a Jones Act claim.16 But grease elsewhere on the ship‘s deck at various times is not “probative” circumstantial evidence that can withstand summary judgment.17 If Jones returned to the hatch that night or the next morning and saw grease where he slipped, things might be different.18 But Jones never saw grease in the spot where he slipped, even when he later investigated his fall. As we explained in Huffman v. Union Pacific Railroad, some evidence
The causation standard for Jones Act negligence is “slight[],” well below the common-law standard.21 But it is not no standard at all. In Huffman we reversed a jury verdict because the employee only had evidence that his work could cause musculoskeletal disorders, not that it caused his particular injury (osteoarthritis).22
And most contrary decisions are distinguishable. The Supreme Court normally presumes that a jury should decide causation for Jones Act and FELA claims.23 But, by statute, admiralty actions against the United States as shipowner are tried to the court.24 And in bench-trial cases the district court has greater discretion to grant summary judgment. The judge may “decide that the same evidence, presented to him or her as a trier of fact in a plenary trial, could not possibly lead to a different result.”25 This resolves any remaining doubt about the sufficiency of Jones‘s summary-judgment evidence.
Jones‘s other arguments lack force. He says the district court prematurely decided credibility because it relied on the United States‘s affidavits about the CAPE KNOX‘s deck condition but not Jones‘s expert affidavit. But Jones‘s expert simply cited Jones‘s deposition for the fact that “there was grease and oil on the deck” and concluded this most likely caused Jones to slip. His opinion is conclusory on this point, and “unsubstantiated assertions” cannot defeat summary judgment.26 Choosing not to rely on this evidence was not a credibility determination. Jones‘s argument that negligence
plaintiffs are not obligated to conduct a full immediate investigation also misses the mark. The district court did not fault Jones‘s investigation or lack thereof. It simply held that no summary-judgment evidence, however it might have been developed, reached the fact of whether Jones slipped on grease.
C
Jones also seeks to recover for unseaworthiness. “Unseaworthiness is a claim under general maritime law ‘based on the vessel owner‘s duty to ensure that the vessel is reasonably fit to be at sea.‘”27 A deck slippery from grease may render a vessel unseaworthy.28 To recover, Jones must also prove “a causal connection between
Jones alleges that grease on the deck made the CAPE KNOX unseaworthy. But to recover he must show that this condition caused his injury.32 He did not show this under the lighter Jones Act standard and cannot do so here either.33
III
We AFFIRM the judgment.