Wiley v. KeokukWiley v. Keokuk
- Reporters:
- Before:
- Kinsman
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Kinsman, C. J.:Nor do we think this ruling is at all in conflict with the case of Carl Horne v. The State, 1 Kas., 42, to which we have been referred. The plea of not guilty in that *106case put everything in. issue, and it was necessary for the State to prove every fact essential to make up the crime; and every such fact was to be passed upon by the jury, unbiassed by anything the court might say. In this case it was the duty of the court on the pleadings to say that the judgment must be for the plaintiff, and it -was proper to say so to the jury; and the court did no more at most, in the instruction under consideration.
*107
These reasons render it unnecessary to consider at length the instructions asked by the defendant and refused, for they are the direct converse of those given, *108asking the court to say that the jury could only give a verdict for the damages sustained, o,r “ actually sustained.” The petition contained the usual averments formerly found in actions for assault and battery, and false imprisonment, and the jury were authorized under it to give exemplary damages. As we understand the law, the instructions asked laid down a much more limited rule, and consequently ought not to have been given.
This is a sufficient outline of the testimony in the case to understand what is deemed necessary to say on the point under consideration. The complaint made by Wiley charges no offense on the part of Keokuk; neither did the warrant or mittimus describe any offense known to the law. The substance of the complaint is stated above, and the warrant and mittimus generally follow it; though in this case the mittimus is more verbose, as though the commissioner felt it necessary to say something more than that Keokuk had left the Reserve and was traveling to Washington, to justify his act in sending him to jail. Still, no offense is charged known to any system of laws of which we have any knowledge. The facts are so barren as not to lay the foundation for jurisdiction. The affidavit, warrant, and mittimus afford ample evidence that no criminal charge was preferred, or passed upon, nor a.sufficient pretense of one to challenge judicial discretion; and this conclusion sweeps away the gi-oiind on which the decisions rested, to which the-plaintiff‘in error refers in his brief.
The second reason urged why the verdict should have been set aside is, that “ the plaintiff below was an Indian, *110“ and as such was subject‘to the power and right of the “United States to make such regulations for his govern“ment as the Presidént of the United States should deem-“proper, and for the interest of the tribe to which he “ belonged ; or, in other words, Keokuk was then a ward “ of the government, and if the government should think “ it for the interest of Keokuk, or his tribe, to restrain “him from going to Washington, it had a clear right so “to do.” We are not prepared to give our sanction to the doctrine above set forth; but might well do so, and not disturb the action of the court below, for we are nowhere shown any law of the United States, or any regulation of the President, that makes it a punishable offense for an Indian to go to Washington at his own expense. Nor does the letter of the commissioner, or superintendent. But we suppose that nothing but a law would avail as a justification for arresting and imprisoning a man. If it is necessary to elucidate this point, then indeed have we learned little of the principles of a government professedly based on law. Nor does it make any difference that the party injured is an Indian, whether he be regarded as “ a ward of government,” or as belonging to a “ domestic dependent nation,” or “ a distinct independent political community, retaining their original natural rights” — to each of which classes they have at times been assigned by the language of the Supreme Court of the United States. In any view, while keeping the peace, and disobeying no law, human or divine, he cannot be the subject of arrest or imprisonment by any one, except at the pevil of the offender. His rights are regulated by law, and when he appeals to the law for redress, it is not in the power of any tribunal to say, “you are an Indian, and your rights rest in the arbitrary decrees of executive officers, and not in the law.”
*111We shall not disturb the decision of the court below for the reasons assigned, and having examined the record, and all the alleged errors, and finding no reason to reverse the judgment of the court below, the same will be affirmed.
Sarrord, J., concurring. . Valentine, J.:I agree with the court upon all questions of law, and of fact, in this case, except, that I do not think that the answer of the defendant Wiley, in the court below, bears the .construction put upon it by this court.