By the Court
delivering the opinion.
A motion was made in this case to dismiss the bill of except tions and writ of error, because the security on the appeal was not made a party. Henry H. Lumpkin had obtained judgment against James Wilder, the plaintiff in error, and his security on the appeal. Wilder brought a writ of error, without joining his security, against whom judgment had passed equally with himself. The reply to the motion to dismiss was an Act of the last Legislature, which declares that, from and after its passage, it shall not be necessary to make securities on the appeal parties to writs of error before this Court. Not only was the judgment of the Circuit Court, upon which error was charged, pronounced before the passage of the Act, but the plaintiff’s suit, upon his writ before this Court, was pending at the time it bears date.
The Legislature did not, as we think, intend this Act to have any retroactive effect. It is in the following words : “ Be it enacted, &c., that from and after the passage of this Act, it shall in no case be considered as necessary to join, with the parties to the suit of the Superior Court, carrying a case from there up to the Su
“ Section 2. That no writ of error shall be dismissed or delayed in its hearing and decision, where the parties to the writ or declaration below are included in said writ of error.”
If it had been the intention of the Legislature to cause this Act to retrospect, or to embrace cases pending, we have a right to presume that they would have so declared. It is not to be presumed that they would have left the exercise of so dangerous a power — a power the exercise of which has been so rarely attempted — to conjecture or construction. That they did contemplate retrospective operation is negatived by the fact, that by the terms of the Act, it is made to take effect from and after its date. It does not differ from any other Act which declares what the law shall be. It is prospective, and as such this Court will give it full effect.
A distinction is sometimes sought to be drawn between a declaratory statute and one which enacts a new rule of law. The former being considered by some as free from the objections which so justly lie against retroactive laws in general. If not obnoxious to the same, it is to equally fatal objections. If a statute or a principle of the Common Law be of such doubtful import —if its meaning be so obscure as to constitute no intelligible rule of action, and the Legislature undertakes to give an exposition of it, then such exposition amounts to one of two things — either a new rule or a judicial construction of an existing rule. If the former, it is, as I shall undertake to show, without retrospective effect, and if the latter, it is the exercise of a power which belongs to the Legislature of no free country — which most assuredly does not belong to the Legislature of Georgia. By the fundamental principles upon which our political system is founded, all the departments of the Government are distinct — their powers are defined with careful exactness — their boundaries are marked with precision and clearness. It is necessary to the entire system that each should be confined to its proper sphere, and that no one should infringe the rightful functions of others. This separation and independence of the legislative, judicial and executive departments, is the chief glory and distinguishing excellence of the free institutions under which it is our happiness to live. Upon the judiciary devolves, more than upon any other branch of the
Forcibly and clearly does Chancellor Kent, in Dash vs. Vankleek, announce the conclusions of his great mind upon this subject: “But,” says he, “if it [a statute of New-York] be considered as an exposition of the former Acts for the information and government of the Courts in the decision of causes before them, it would then be taking cognizance of a judicial question. This could not possibly be the meaning of the Act, for the power that makes is not the power to construe the law. It is a well-settled axiom that the union of these two powers is tyranny. Theorists and practical statesmen concur in this opinion. Our government, like all other free governments upon this continent, and like the only free government at present remaining in Europe, consists of departments, and contains a marked separation of the legislative and judicial powers. The Constitutions of several of the United States, and, among others, those of Massachusetts and Virginia, have an express provision that the legislative and judicial powers shallbe presented separate and distinct, so that one department shall not exercise the functions belonging to the other. # * * * And if it be not found in our own Constitution, in terms, it exists there in substance — in the organization and distribution of the powers of the departments, and in the declaration that the supreme legislative power shall be vested in the Senate and Assembly. No'maxim has been more universally received and cherished as a vital principle of freedom. And without having recourse to the authority of elementary writers or to the popular conventions of Europe, we have a most commanding authority in tbe sense of the American people that the right to interpret laws does and ought to belong exclusively to the Courts of Justice.” 7 Johns. R. 507-8.
The State of Georgia, like Virginia, Massachusetts and other of the States, has declared in her fundamental law, that her departments of government shall be distinct. The first section
If vested rights are thus sacredly regarded and effectually protected in monarchial England and regal France, with what greater solemnity ought they not be considered in republican America ! According to our views of government it is in all its departments a trust. Presidents, Legislators and Judges are but agents, created by, and responsible to, the people. The citizen, and not the ruler, is the object of prime consideration — his liberty — his property — his contracts — and his rights, are the peculiar objects of governmental protection. One of the ends of government, as we have declared, is to establish justice, — justice between individuals. My rights by our rights, according to the compact of government-into which the people of this Union have entered, are to be established and guarded from encroachment — are to be protected from foreign violence, the assaults of our own rulers, and from individual aggression.
But aside from authority derived indirectly from the Constitution, such laws are forbidden by the nature of republican governments, and are opposed to the fundamental principles of our Social Compact. They defeat the justice which government in this country is designed to establish. No government can be pre-