WILDER CORPORATION OF DELAWARE, INCORPORATED; Maurice Wilder, Plaintiffs-Appellees v. RURAL COMMUNITY INSURANCE SERVICES, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 12-10036
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
Oct. 18, 2012.
487 F. App‘x 487
Summary Calendar.
In making this determination, we bear in mind that “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” United States v. McKnight, 570 F.3d 641, 649 (5th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A defendant ordinarily may not refute testimony given under oath at a plea hearing. United States v. Cervantes, 132 F.3d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir.1998).
By Groome‘s own admission, he never contested his innocence. He waited nearly ten months after pleading guilty before filing a motion to withdraw the plea. Groome was represented by the same attorney throughout the proceedings and indicated at rearraignment that he had consulted counsel about his decision to plead guilty. The record shows that Groome‘s plea was knowing and voluntary. Although there was no evidence that the Government would be prejudiced by the withdrawal of his plea, the district court would suffer inconvenience and waste of judicial resources. Notably, at the time Groome sought to withdraw his plea, the presentence report and its addenda had been prepared, and the sentencing date had been set. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion.
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
John Smithee, Templeton, Smithee, Hayes, Heinrich & Russell, L.L.P., Amarillo, TX, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Jeffrey Scott Dilley, Henke-Bufkin, P.A., Lyon, MS, John Frederick Massouh, Sprouse Shrader Smith, P.C., Amarillo, TX, for Defendant-Appellant.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant Rural Community Insurance Services (“RCIS“) challenges the district court‘s dismissal of its counterclaim against Appellee Wilder Corporation (“Wilder“) for insurance policy premiums, administrative fees, and various charges under several RCIS-issued policies. Concluding the district court properly found RCIS‘s counterclaim precluded by res judicata, we AFFIRM.
Wilder purchased from RCIS‘s agent, NAU County Insurance Company (“NAU“), several crop insurance policies. After NAU denied a claim Wilder filed under those policies, Wilder sued RCIS, and other parties, in Texas state court, seeking declaratory relief, rescission of the three RCIS policies, and damages.
RCIS responded by seeking an abatement of the Wilder claims pending arbitration. NAU further counterclaimed against Wilder for unpaid premiums under the insurance policies. In September 2008, the state court stayed the case and compelled arbitration. Wilder, NAU, and RCIS jointly moved to modify the state court‘s order to retain jurisdiction in the state court, mandating pleadings be filed in state court as well as with the arbiter, and providing for commercial arbitration rules.
In May 2010, RCIS amended its answer to include “all affirmative defenses under the
In June 2011, Wilder sued RCIS again in Texas state court for a declaratory judgment that res judicata barred RCIS from
RCIS appeals, asserting that the district court erred in holding its claim precluded, abused its discretion by refusing to allow RCIS to voluntarily dismiss its counterclaim, and improperly granted Wilder declaratory relief.
We review the res judicata effect of a prior judgment de novo as a question of law. Oreck Direct, LLC v. Dyson, Inc., 560 F.3d 398, 401 (5th Cir.2009).
Under res judicata, or claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action. Id. (citing Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980)). When asked to give preclusive effect to state court judgments, federal courts turn to the preclusion principles of the state whose decision is invoked as a bar to further litigation. Prod. Supply Co. v. Fry Steel Inc., 74 F.3d 76, 78 (5th Cir.1996). Under Texas law, res judicata requires: (1) a prior final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) the same parties in the second action or their privies; and (3) claims in the second action that were or could have been raised in the first. Igal v. Brightstar Info. Tech. Grp., Inc., 250 S.W.3d 78, 86 (Tex.2008).
Here, all three elements have been met. The Texas state court had competent jurisdiction and rendered a final judgment on the merits when it confirmed the arbitration award. RCIS and Wilder are the same parties in both actions. Finally, RCIS‘s claim to recover past premiums, administrative fees, and financing charges could have been raised as a counterclaim in the previous action.
However, Texas law provides a qualification to the doctrine of res judicata for claims that “could have been raised.” Only compulsory counterclaims that could have been raised in the previous action are barred in a subsequent suit. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. Valero Energy Corp., 997 S.W.2d 203, 209 (Tex.1999). Under the
RCIS does not challenge the district court‘s accurate conclusion that its counterclaim meets all the requirements for being compulsory under
RCIS is incorrect. When the Texas state court assumed jurisdiction over Wilder‘s civil suit against RCIS, the action immediately became subject to the
Unlike NAU, RCIS failed to file its compulsory counterclaim in the previous suit as required by the
Because RCIS‘s counterclaim is conclusively barred by res judicata, dismissal with prejudice was appropriate. See Fernandez-Montes v. Allied Pilots Ass‘n, 987 F.2d 278, 284 n. 8 (5th Cir.1993). In addition, RCIS concedes that it had the opportunity to fully brief the issues before the court granted judgment sua sponte on the basis of competing motions to dismiss. The court did not plainly err in its procedural approach. Love v. Nat‘l Med. Enters., 230 F.3d 765, 771 (5th Cir.2000). AFFIRMED.
PER CURIAM