MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plаintiffs Wildearth Guardians, Defenders of Wildlife, and the Sierra Club (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) commenced this civil action challenging the federal government’s decision to authorize the leasing of certain public lands in northeastern Wyoming for coal mining operations. Named as defendants are Ken Salazar, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior (the “Secretary”), the United States Bureau of Land Management (the “BLM”), and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (collectively, the “Federal Defendants”). Intervening as defendants are Antelope Coal LLC (“Antelope”), the State of Wyoming, and the National Mining Association (collectively, the “Defendant-Intervenors”). 1 Presently before the Court are two essentially coterminous motions — the DefendanWIntervenors’ [52] Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings and the Federal Defendants’ [53] Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. Based on the parties’ submissions, the relevant authorities, and the record a whole, the Court shall grant both of the pending motions. 2
The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (the “Act”), 30 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq., provides that “[deposits of coal ... and lands containing such deposits owned by the United States ... shall be subject to disposition in the form and manner provided by this chapter.” 30 U.S.C. § 181. Under the Act, the Secretary is permitted to lease public lands for coal mining operations upon conducting a competitive bidding process:
The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to divide any lands subject to this chapter which have been classified for coal leasing into leasing tracts of such size as he finds appropriate and in the public interest and which will permit the mining of all coal which can be economically extracted in such tract and thereafter he shall, in his discretion, upon the request of any qualified applicant or on his own motion, from time to time, offer such lands for leasing and shall award leases thereon on competitive bidding.
30 U.S.C. § 201(a)(1). While the Act mandates that any coal leasing authorized by the Secretary be done by competitive bidding and prescribes certain terms and conditions for such leasing — for example, by requiring accepted bids to meet or exceed the fair market value of the coal in question — the Act has little to say about the competitive bidding process itself. Instead, Congress elected to confer upon the Secretary “sweeping authority” to promulgate regulations designed to carry out the statutory command.
Indep. Petroleum, Ass’n of Am. v. DeWitt,
Pursuant to that authority, the Secretary enacted regulations describing how the BLM would “conduct competitive leasing of rights to extract [fjederal coal.” 43 C.F.R. § 3420.0-1. The regulations contemplate two separate coal leasing processes — specifically, the “competitive regional leasing” process and the “leasing-by-application” process. See generally 43 C.F.R. pt. 3420. Both processes are forms of competitive leasing, as both contemplate an open, public, and competitive sealed-bid process and preclude the BLM from issuing a coal lease unless the highest bid received meets or exceeds fair market value. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 3422.1, 3422.2, 3425.4.
The competitive regional leasing process is primarily agency-driven, with the BLM identifying public lands for prospective use and offering coal leases for sale. See Public Participation in Coal Leasing, 64 Fed. Reg. 52,239, 52,240 (Sept. 28, 1999). The competitive regional leasing process applies only in areas designated as “coal production regions,” which are creatures of regulation and the boundaries of which the BLM is empowered to alter:
The Bureau of Land Management shall establish by publication in the Federal Register coal production regions. A сoal production region may be changed or its boundaries altered by publication of a notice of change in the Federal Register. Coal production regions shall be used for establishing regional leasing levels.
The leasing-by-application process, in contrast, is primarily applicant-driven, with the applicant assuming responsibility for identifying public lands for potential use and proposing specific tracts for leasing. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 3425.0-3425.5. The leasing-by-application process applies in two circumstances — specifically, in “areas outside coal production regions” and in areas within coal production regions “where an emergency need for unleased coal deposits is demonstrated.” 43 C.F.R. §§ 3425.0-2, 3425.1-5. While the leasing-by-application process is not similarly structured around regional leasing levels, the BLM must nevertheless perform an environmental analysis under the leasing-by-application process. See 43 C.F.R. § 3425.4.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Certification and Decertification of the Powder River Basin as a Coal Production Region
The Powder River Basin covers an area of approximately 24,000 square miles across northeastern Wyoming and southeastern Montana. Suppl. Compl. ¶ 23. In 1979, the BLM established several coal production regions; included among them was the Powder River Coal Production Region. See Identification of Coal Production Regions Having Major Federal Coal Interests, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,196, 65,196 (Nov. 9, 1979). As a result, any leasing within the region was presumptively required to be conducted in accordance with the competitive regional leasing process, which remained the state of affairs for the next decade.
The notice published in the Federal Register included the following statement concerning the basis for the BLM’s decision to establish the various coal production regions in 1979:
In delineating the coal production regions set оut in this notice, the Department has considered the following factors: 1. Similarity in type and situation of coal; 2. General transportation and markets; 3. Broad economic and social-cultural similarities; 4. Administrative efficiency; and 5. Presence of federal leases, preference right lease applications, and other indications of industry interest in Federal coal.
Identification of Coal Production Regions Having Major Federal Coal Interests,
In 1989 — ten years after the Powder River Coal Production Region was first established — the BLM solicited public comments on the proposed total or partial decertification of the Powder River Coal Production Region, citing such considerations as “limited leasing interest in the region, soft market conditions for the foreseeable future, [] public input,” and “administrative efficiency.” Proposed Decertification of All or a Portion of the Powder River Coal Production Region, 54 Fed. Reg. 6,339, 6,339-6,340 (Feb. 9, 1989);
see also
Powder River Regional Coal Team Activities: Public Meeting Announcement, 54 Fed. Reg. 35,941 (Aug. 30, 1989). In so doing, the BLM observed that “if the region were partially or totally decertified, then these areas would be opened to leasing-by-application,” but left open the possibility “for the re-establishment of the regional activity planning process, should market conditions strengthen and more widespread leasing again become[ ] necessary.” Proposed Decertification of All or a Portion of the Powder River Coal Production Region,
On January 9, 1990, the BLM decertified the Powder River Coаl Production Region as a coal production region, which had the effect of replacing the competitive regional leasing process with the leasing-by-application process in that area. See Decertification of the Powder River Coal Production Region, 55 Fed. Reg. 784 (Jan. 9, 1990). According to the notice published in the Federal Register, the BLM received sixteen written responses supporting total or partial decertification, and no letters of opposition. Id. at 784. During a public meeting, three parties proposed retaining the Powder River Coal Production Region in its existing form, including the Powder River Basin Resource Council. Id. Ultimately, the BLM adopted the recommendation of the regional coal team that the Powder River Coal Production Region be completely decertified subject to certain conditions. Id. Accordingly, beginning in early 1990, “[f]ederal coal lease applications [could] ... be filed in accordance with 43 C.F.R. § 3425” — that is, the leasing-by-application process. Id. at 785.
Since decertification, coal production in the Powder River Basin has increased nearly 242%, from 184 million tons in 1990 to 444.9 million tons in 2006. Suppl. Compl. ¶ 33. Since 2000, production has increased nearly 40%. Id. ¶ 1. In 2008, 42% of all coal produced in the United States came from the Powder River Basin. Id. The ten highest producing coal mines in the United States are all located in the Powder River Basin. Id. Throughout this period of increasing production in the Powder River Basin, coal leasing has been conducted according to the leasing-by-application process.
B. The BLM’s Decision to Authorize the Leasing of the West Antelope II Tracts
On April 6, 2005, Antelope filed an application with the BLM pursuant to the leasing-by-application process, requesting that certain public lands adjacent to Antelope’s pre-existing coal mining operations in Campbell and Converse Counties, Wyoming — approximately 4,746 acres of land within the Powder River Basin containing approximately 429.7 million tons of in-place
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move for judgment on the pleadings “[ajfter the pleadings are closed — but early enough not to delay trial.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). The appropriate standard for reviewing a motion for judgment on the pleadings is “virtually identical” to that applied to a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
Baumann v. District of Columbia,
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R.Civ.P. (8)(a), “in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’ ”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
IY. DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs assert a total of four claims in this action, each of which is a challenge— in one way or another — to the BLM’s March 25, 2010 decision to authorize the leasing of the West Antelope II tracts for prospective coal mining operations. Only one of those four claims is the subject of the instant motions — the first. Due in large part to Plaintiffs’ opaque reasoning, the contours of that claim are not readily susceptible to precise definition, and the parties have unsurprisingly offered conflicting characterizations of the claim. As explained in greater detail below, the Court credits Defendants’ characterization of the claim, which leads ineluctably to the conclusion that the claim is time-barred. However, even crediting Plaintiffs’ characterization of them claim, Plaintiffs fail to state a plausible claim for relief.
A. Plaintiffs’ First Claim for Relief is an Untimely Collateral Attack on the BLM’s January 1990 Decision to Decertify the Powder River Coal Production Reyion
The dispute presents at the outset a question of framing — specifically, whether Plaintiffs’ first claim for relief should be construed as a collateral attack on the BLM’s decision to decertify the Powder River Basin as a coal production region in January 1990 — more than twenty years befоre the BLM decided to authorize the leasing of the West Antelope II tracts — or whether it should instead be seen as a challenge to the BLM’s ongoing failure to “recertify” the Powder River Basin as a coal production region prior to approving the leasing of the West Antelope II tracts based upon the alleged increase in coal production within the Powder River Basin in the intervening two decades. The question is an important one; if Plaintiffs’ claim is properly construed as a challenge to the BLM’s 1990 decertification decision, it would plainly be time-barred. The Court therefore begins with a more fulsome discussion of the nature of the claim.
What is clear is that the claim rests to some extent on the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (the “APA”), with Plaintiffs claiming that the BLM’s decision to authorize the leasing of the West Antelope II tracts was “arbitrary and capricious and otherwise not in accordance with law,” Suppl. Compl. ¶ 105, which the Court takes as a reference to the APA provision permitting a reviewing court to “set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). Unfortunately, the picture begins to cloud as one proceeds from this starting point. Plaintiffs allege that the BLM’s March 25, 2010 leasing decision was in error because the BLM approved the leasing of the West Antelope II tracts without first “recertifying” the entirety of the Powder River Basin as a coal production region.
See
Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 98-105. While Plaintiffs concede, as they must,
Defendants persuasively rejoin that Plaintiffs’ first claim for relief is — at its core — a thinly veiled challenge to the BLM’s 1990 decertification decision, because it was that decision that prescribed the specific leasing process that the BLM would apply to administer its federal coal leasing program in the Powder River Basin from that point forward. Significantly, this conclusion necessarily flows from the limitations imposed on the scope of judicial review of agency action. Under the APA, the reviewing court is generally confined to evaluating “final agency action,” 5 U.S.C. § 704, which may include “the whole or part of an agency rule, order, license, sanction, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act,”
id.
§ 551(13). As the United States Supreme Court has observed, all of these enumerated categories implicate “circumscribed, discrete agency actions,” a limitation designed in large part “to prоtect agencies from undue interference with their lawful discretion, and to avoid judicial entanglement in abstract policy disagreements.”
Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness Alliance,
While not dispositive, the Court is mindful that this six-year limitations period must be “strictly construed” in favor of the United States.
Spannaus v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
In sum, the Court construes Plaintiffs’ first claim for relief as a challenge to the BLM’s decertification decision, and construed as such, the claim is untimely and must be dismissed.
B. Plaintiffs Fail to State a Plausible Claim for Relief Based on the BLM’s Alleged Failure to “Recertify” the Powder River Basin
Even crediting Plaintiffs’ characterization of their first claim for relief as a putative challenge to the BLM’s ongoing failure to “recertify” the Powder River Basin at some unspecified point in time prior to authorizing the leasing of the West Antelope II tracts, the same result would obtain. For at least two reasons, Plaintiffs simply fail to state a plausible claim for relief. First, the essential premise to such a claim — that the BLM was somehow
required
to recertify the Powder River Basin — is without legal support. Second, even assuming,
arguendo,
that the BLM was subject to an abstract obligation to establish
some
coal production regions at
some
point in time, the question of when and where to establish coal production regions is a matter that has been committed
1. The Relevant Statutory and Regulatory Framework Does Not Require the BLM to Establish Coal Production Regions
In their first claim for relief, Plaintiffs purport to challenge the BLM’s March 25, 2010 decision to authorize the leasing of the West Antelope II tracts through the leasing-by-application process. There are three important matters that are undisputed about the circumstances surrounding the BLM’s leasing decision. First, it is undisputed that the BLM authorized the leasing of the West Antelope II tracts pursuant to the “leasing-by-application” process. Second, it is undisputed that the West Antelope II tracts were not within a “сoal production region,” as that term is used in 43 C.F.R. § 3400.5, at the time the BLM rendered its decision. 5 Third, it is undisputed that the BLM’s coal leasing regulations provide that the “competitive regional leasing” process applies within coal production regions — and only within coal production regions — while the “leasing-by-application” process applies outside coal production regions. See generally 43 C.F.R. pt. 3420.
All this leads to an important conclusion — one that is not contested by the parties but nevertheless warrants mentioning here. Because the competitive regional leasing process only applies in coal production regions and because the West Antelope II tracts were indisputably not within a coal production region at the time the BLM rendered its decision, Plaintiffs’ first claim for relief necessarily hinges on the premise that the BLM was somehow required to recertify the Powder River Basin as a coal production region before it authorized the leasing of the Wеst Antelope II tracts. Indeed, had the BLM hypothetically sought to lease the West Antelope II tracts pursuant to the competitive regional leasing process without first re-certifying the area as a coal production region, its decision would clearly have run counter to its own coal leasing regulations, as the competitive regional leasing process is by definition confined to coal production regions. See generally 43 C.F.R. pt. 3420. And so, in order to state a plausible claim for relief, Plaintiffs must show that the BLM was required to recertify the Powder River Basin as a coal production region before it authorized the leasing of the West Antelope II tracts.
The logical next question is what could be the source of the alleged obligation. Despite having ample opportunity to do so, Plaintiffs have failed to answer that question. Simply put, no such obligation emanates from the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, the BLM’s coal leasing regulations, or the BLM’s formal or informal policy statements and pronouncements. The Court shall address each of these potential sources in turn.
i. The Mineral Leasing Act of 1920
While Plaintiffs wisely disclaim any reliance upon the terms of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 to support their claim, the Act is not, as they inexplicably suggest,
ii. The BLM’s Coal Leasing Regulations
Recognizing that no mandatory obligation can be found in the Act itself, Plaintiffs purport to rely on the BLM’s coal leasing regulations, suggesting that the BLM has somehow “failed to comply with its own leasing regulations” by failing to recertify the Powder River Basin priоr to authorizing the leasing of the West Antelope II tracts. Pis.’ Opp’n at 6. The argument is without merit. While agencies may certainly be bound by the terms of their own regulations, the two provisions relied upon by Plaintiffs — 43 C.F.R. §§ 3400.5, 3420.0-2 — simply do not impose upon the BLM any obligation to certify, decertify, or recertify coal production regions nor provide any guidance as to whether, when, and where coal production regions should be established. The first cited provision merely authorizes the BLM to alter or change the boundaries of coal production regions by publication of a notice in the Federal Register.
7
43 C.F.R. § 3400.5.
In an attempt to evade this conclusion, Plaintiffs speculate that the BLM simply “must have” intended to have a competitive regional leasing program on an ongoing basis or else the regulations governing that process would be “entirely superfluous.” Pis.’ Opp’n at 7. There are several reasons why this argument is unavailing, but the Court will only mention two. First, the BLM indisputably did maintain a competitive regional leasing program for over a decade, meaning that the regulations plainly were not “superfluous” at that time. What Plaintiffs appear to be suggesting is that the BLM was somehow obligated to rescind the regulations once they were no longer in active use, but they cite no legal support for the proposition and the Court is aware of none. Second, and in a similar vein, the BLM has never foreclosed the possibility that it might create new coal production regions sometime in the future. Should it elect to do so, the regulations would clearly serve a renewеd purpose at that time, and not be, as Plaintiffs suggest, “superfluous.” In the final analysis, Plaintiffs’ arguments fall woefully short of transforming the BLM’s coal leasing regulations into a mandatory obligation to create coal production regions.
iii. The BLM’s Statements and Pronouncements
With these avenues foreclosed, Plaintiffs next turn to a handful of statements and pronouncements made by the BLM over the years with the basic aim of suggesting that the BLM is required to establish coal production regions wherever significant coal production may be expected to occur. Pis.’ Opp’n at 8. True, “[i]t is well settled that an agency, even one that enjoys broad discretion, must adhere to voluntarily adopted, binding policies that limit its discretion.”
Padula v. Webster,
The same holds true for the BLM’s statement — made in the context of delineating the boundaries of coal production regions in 1979 — that it included counties within the designated regions within which “substantial [coal] production may occur.” Identification of Coal Production Regions Having Major Federal Coal Interests,
Nor did the BLM cabin the scope of its broad discretion when it fleshed out the reasons behind its decision to create certain coal production regions. The notice published in the Federal Register included the following statement concerning the basis for the BLM’s decision to establish the various coal production regions:
In delineating the coal production regions set out in this notice, the Department has considered the following factors: 1. Similarity in type and situation of coal; 2. General transportation and markets; 3. Broad economic and social-cultural similarities; 4. Administrative efficiency; and 5. Presence of federal leases, preference right lease applications, and other indications of industry-interest in Federal coal.
Identification of Coal Production Regions Having Major Federal Coal Interests,
In the final analysis, Plaintiffs have failed to point this Court to any legal authority that could conceivably serve as a basis for concluding that the BLM was
required,
to recertify the Powder River Basin before authorizing the leasing of the West Antelope II tracts.
See Alliance to Save Mattaponi v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs,
2. The Relevant Statutory and Regulatory Framework Does Not Provide a Judicially Manageable Standard
Even assuming,
arguendo,
that the BLM was subject to an abstract obligation to establish
some
coal production regions at
some
point in time, the question of when and where to establish coal production regions is a matter that has been committed to the BLM’s discretion by law and lies beyond the ambit of judicial review. It is axiomatic that judicial review cannot extend to “agency action [that] is committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). In order for the dis
In the face of this statutory and regulatory silence, Plaintiffs suggest that “substantial coal production” provides a meaningful standard against which to adjudge the BLM’s exercise of its discretion, language that it pulls from statements made by the BLM in the course of certifying and decertifying the Powder River Basin, none of which created binding norms governing future conduct.
See, e.g.,
Identification of Coal Production Regions Having Major Federal Coal Interests,
V. CONCLUSION
The Court has considered the remaining arguments tendered by the parties and has concluded that they are without merit. Therefore, and for the reasons stated above, the Court shall grant the DefendanL-Intervenors’ [52] Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings and the Federal Defendants’ [53] Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings. An appropriate order accompanies this memorandum opinion.
Notes
. This Court previously granted the Defendant-Intervenors’ motions to intervene in this action as a matter of right, subject to certain limitations and conditions.
See Wildearth Guardians v. Salazar,
. While the Court renders its decision today on the record as a whole, its consideration has focused on the following documents, listed in chronological order of their filing: Pis.’ Supplemented Compl. for Declaratory J. & Injunctive Relief ("Suppl. Compl.”), ECF No. [34]; Def.-Intervenors' Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Mot. for Partial J. on the Pleadings, ECF No. [52]; Fed. Defs.’ Mem. of Law in
. In contrast, the regulations do specify "the process for identifying, ranking, analyzing, selecting, and scheduling” specific lease tracts. 43 C.F.R. § 3420.3-1.
. Viewed from a slightly different perspective, the BLM's 1990 decertification decision "mark[ed] the consummation of [the BLM’s] decisionmaking process” and constitutes the agency decision from which "rights and obligations [were] to be determined.”
Bennett v. Spear,
. Indeed, the Powder River Coal Production Region, which would have encompassed the West Antelope II tracts had it survived, had not been certified as a coal production region for over twenty years. See Decertification of the Powder River Coal Production Region, 55 Fed. Reg. 784 (Jan. 9, 1990).
. As described above, both the competitive regional leasing process and the leasing-by-application process are forms of competitive leasing. See supra Part I.
. The provision provides, in full, as follows:
The Bureau of Land Management shall establish by publication in the Federal Register coal production regions. A coal production region may be changed or its boundaries altered by publication of a notice of change in the Federal Register. Coal production regions shall be used for establishing regional leasing levels under § 3420.2 of this title. Coal production regions shall be used to establish areas in which leasing shall be conducted under § 3420.3 of this title and for other purposes of the coal management program.
43 C.F.R. § 3400.5. The BLM does not interpret this provision as cabining its discretion to establish coal production regions as it sees fit but rather sees it as prescribing the requisite procedure to be followed when it elects to exercise that discretion — namely, publication in the Federal Register. Because the BLM is the agency charged with administering the regulations, its interpretation is entitled to deference.
See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala,
. The provision provides, in full, as follows:
The objectives of these regulations are to establish policies and procedures for considering development of coal deposits through a leasing system involving land use planning and environmental assessment or environmental impact statement processes; to promote the timely and orderly development of publicly owned coal resources; to ensure that coal deposits are leased at their fair market value; and to ensure that coal deposits are developed in consultation, cooperation and coordination with the public, state and local governments, Indian tribes and involved Federal agencies.
43 C.F.R. § 3420.0-2.
. Such an assumption would be of questionable soundness. Notably, while Plaintiffs proffer a litany of statistics concerning the increasing levels of coal production in the Powder River Basin since decertification, they have not even attempted to point to a specific point in time when the levels of coal production allegedly became so ''substantial'' as to require recertification of the area, further suggesting that the proffered standard does not provide a judicially manageable standard of review.