*1 WILCUT, dec., Floyd and Sharon

Wilcut, Appellants, WAREHOUSING,

INNOVATIVE

Respondent.

No. ED 88247. of Appeals,

Missouri Court District,

Eastern

Division Three.

Jan. Rehearing

Motion for Transfer and/or Denied

Supreme Court March

nying compensation on her claim for death benefits. We hold that the Commission husband, in finding Dependent’s erred Floyd (“Employee”), unreasonably Wilcut refused a blood transfusion. We reverse the award and remand.

I. BACKGROUND Employee awas truck driver for Innova- tive Warehousing (“Employer”). He was involved in an accident which he sus- injuries. Employer tained several severe dispute does not that the accident occurred scope Employee’s employment. Employee hospital was taken to a for days treatment. He died seven later. Employee’s complicated treatment was accept his refusal to a blood transfu- sion. awas Jehovah’s Witness. Members of that faith great believe it is a to accept Employ- sin a blood transfusion. ee was conscious and able to make deci- upon sions for himself admission to the hospital, and he it made clear that he would not accept the transfusion. This family was affirmed and others close to him both losing before and after consciousness. was unable undergo procedures essential to treat his accept wounds because he would not blood and he died cardi- ac ischemia and severe anemia due to the following blood lost the accident. Employer There was no evidence that objected Employer paid the refusal. Floros, Louis, MO, George T. St. for Employee’s expenses funeral paid and respondents. death Dependent nearly benefits to for two MO, Gary Matheny, Farmington, G. for years Employer after the accident. After appellant. stopped Dependent paying, filed this ac- tion an award of death benefits com- OPINION mencing they from the date were termi- nated. NORTON, Presiding Judge. GLENN A. (“Dependent”) appeals hearing

Sharon Wilcut At front of the adminis- (“ALJ”), judge Labor Industrial Relation Com- trative law doctors testified (“Commission”) preventable mission’s final award de- death was 287.495.1). fac- The Commission’s A section accepted he had the transfusion. Jeho- are conclusive if Employ- findings vah’s Witness church elder tual are family supported by ee’s members testified substantial without fraud of blood transfusions is a tenet the faith rec- competent evidence the whole *3 that was a follower of the Employment and Division ord. Willcut v. of the good standing (Mo.App. faith and with church. Security, 193 S.W.3d E.D.2006). also that a The elder testified Jehovah’s is not met when This standard may forgiveness for sins. Witness seek overwhelming the against the award is found, among things, The ALJ other Big weight Hampton the evidence. Employee’s refusal was not unreasonable Erection, 220, 222- Boy Steel S.W.3d 287.140.5,1 given under section beliefs 2003). bound, We are not Witness, as a Jehovah’s and therefore he however, determina- by the Commission’s was entitled benefits. law, questions of which we review tions of Willcut, at independently. appealed to the Employer Commission. 412. We to the Commission’s deter- defer the adopted The Commission ALJ’s find- credibility minations and its res- of witness of fact. ings The Commission differed conflicting olutions evidence. Id. ALJ, however, the in its with the reasonableness of refusal accept a transfusion. The blood Com- B. The Decision Commission’s mission found refusal the unreasonable closely first examine the Commis- We the physical both because risk was minimal unique sion’s because of case’s decision compared certainty to the near rea- complicated facts the decision’s injuries if accepted would survive his he Em- soning. The Commission addressed and because Jehovah’s ployee’s with the aid of Martin forgive-

Witnesses believe can seek Commission, Industrial Accident 147 Cal. ness for their sins. (1956). Mar- P.2d 828 In App.2d Dependent appeals. tin, an a employee sustained work-related injury. employee Id. at 828-29. II. DISCUSSION hospital his wife informed authorities A. Standard Review he that was a Jeho- treating physician appeal On a decision vah’s and therefore refused blood from of the Witness Commission, shortly He questions law Id. at 829. died review transfusions. reverse, remand, arose modify complications will thereafter or set likely Commission’s He only during surgical procedure. aside the decision Id. (1) find had a transfusion following: where we one of the would have survived part without the treatment. Id. Califor- that the Commission acted or been (2) power; compen- its nia’s commission denied excess of award was industrial fraud; (8) re- facts it determined that the procured that the found sation because unreasonable, support interpreting not fusal was by the Commission do (4) award; here. (quoting statute similar to ours Id. that there was sufficient as it record of the Labor Code” competent evidence to war “section 4056 The California court making rant the of the award. Zimmer existed whether, light “in the City Heights, 194 framed the issue as man v. Richmond E.D.2006) including religious (citing of all of the evidence (Mo.App. S.W.3d statutory unless otherwise indicated. 1. All references are RSMo 2000 beliefs, it was unreasonable for him to sup was unreasonable —was refuse to-accept necessary ported competent and substantial evi save his life.” Id. at 830. The court found dence on the whole record and unreasonable, that it was explaining that against overwhelming weight of the legislature employer’s conditioned an evidence. liability on finding employee’s caselaw, Our review of Missouri voluntary death was not “the result of the however, reveals no case where the rea act of employee refusing medical sonableness of an employee’s decision to attention.” Id. forego treatment was based on Here, the agreed Commission with the *4 beliefs. must We then determine what is court’s rationale in Martin and considered meant “unreasonable” section all facts in the record that it found rele- states, 287.140.5. Section in per 287.140.5 decision, vant including to its Employee’s part, tinent that: (1) beliefs. It found: that the physical No compensation payable shall be for risk of transfusion was minimal compared disability employee, the death or of an (2) benefit; to the was 53- and insofar as the disability death or (3) years-old death; at the time of his caused, may aggravated be continued or spiritual risk Employee’s faith’s by any unreasonable refusal to submit to perspective “was the commission of a capi- any medical surgical or treatment or sin, tal prayer which would hinder is, operation, the risk of which in the prevent enjoyment could everlasting opinion of the division or the commis- (4) life;” and that “Jehovah’s Witnesses sion, inconsiderable in view of the seri- forgives, believe that Jehovah if [E]m- so injury. ousness of the lived, ployee [Ejmployee may had have been able accepting to atone for the sin of Dependent argues for a liberal interpreta the blood transfusion.” The Commission tion of section 287.140.5.At the time of the Employee’s concluded that refusal was un- accident, 2000, April Compen Workers reasonable and “broke the medical causal sation Law was to be liberally. construed link between work-related accident and his Section 287.800.2 We review a worker’s death.” compensation case under the statutes in effect at the time of the accident. See C. Unreasonable Refusal of Treatment Construction, v. Chouteau Netco 132 Procedure Under Section W.D.2004). (Mo.App. S.W.3d 336 n. 3 liberally We will construe section 287.140.5 Whether claimant’s refusal of accordance with the statutes effect at Thus, question is unreasonable is a interpret time. the statute Stawizynski fact. v. public J.S. Alberici Con with a view to welfare and for the (Mo. Co., purpose enabling struction 936 S.W.2d 163 employees more to be E.D.1996), App. eligible compensation injuries overruled on other for aris grounds by Hampton, ing at 222- out employ S.W.3d of and the course of review, our Under standard of we ment. State ex rel. Run Doe Co. v. Brown, must examine whether the Commission’s (Mo.App. 918 S.W.2d E.D. 1996), determination —that refusal of grounds by overruled on other Supp. 2. The statute has since been revised to dictate RSMo 2006. strict construction. See section 287.800 Cum. Inc., Lines, object to the treat- employer does not

Farmer v. Barlow Truck (Mo. 1998). 169, 171 sanctuary claim Dependent ment.” cannot S.W.2d banc proving com- in this section alone outset, that statu At we note claim, however, her because pensability of law, matter tory construction is a his care directing and those City Joseph Village fact. St. Coun in lieu chose medical Club, 905, 907 try sup- including medicines interpret therefore statute We pro- to stimulate blood plements intended Willcut, 193 at independently. S.W.3d duction. legislature’s must We ascertain language intent from the of the statute. Nevertheless, does section Compensation v. Tort Skabialka Victim contemplated legislature show that Fund, (Mo.App. S.W.3d E.D. might impact em religious beliefs 2004). Further, provisions of legislative treat ployee’s decision-making on what Compensation act such as Worker’s Necessarily, if section ment to undertake. consistently Law are to be construed harmoniously read 287.140.5 is be harmoniously give effect to the entire construed, sincerely-held religious liberally See, e.g., County statute. St. Louis *5 the Commis by beliefs must be considered B.A.P., Inc., (Mo.App. Therefore, interpret liberally sion. when E.D.2000); Snow v. Hicks Brothers Chev ing “unreasonable refusal phrase [of] the rolet, Inc., (Mo.App. S.W.2d ... in section 287.140.5harmo treatment” 1972) Compen that (finding the Worker’s give to effect niously with section 287.140.9 pari sation Law is in materia and its intent, legislature’s to the we understand provisions together). are to be construed liberally to accommodate an statute We must determine to what extent the religious beliefs to the extent employee’s legislature reli- employee’s intended pursue, to influence his decision gious analyz- to be beliefs considered when course pursue, or not to of treatment. ing of whether refusal treatment was unreasonable. Section does not Analysis of Deci- D. the Commission’s low-risk, simply any state that aof sion beneficial, in but treatment will result de- interpretation of this sec Under of compensation; nial the refusal must also 287.140.5, analyze tion whether be unreasonable in some The sec- sense. was supported Commission’s decision provide any guidance tion further does competent substantial evidence. might legislature to determine what review, no Upon question there was consider exam- “unreasonable.” We then were sincere. His fam Employee’s beliefs provisions ine the of other the Worker’s ily testified about his and church elders Compensation in harmony Law with sec- standing good with Jehovah’s Wit weight to interpret tion 287.140.5 what to personal par his in this nesses and belief in give Employee’s religious beliefs as- ticular of the faith. This is evi tenet sessing the reasonableness his refusal. willingness further his to die denced nearby found in a guidance Some is professionals medical face of several Compensation section of the Worker’s to recover advocating a blood transfusion Law. states that Section 287.140.9 “Noth- injuries. from his ing chapter prevent an em- this shall failed to ployee being provided for his We find that the Commission accommodate adequately Employee’s reli- injuries by prayer spiritual means gious injuries; in its While it order to it stated that beliefs decision. did treat beliefs, of Employee’s recite some these purpose he instead refused “for the beliefs received no deference the final complying religious with a edict so he Instead, decision. the Commission fol Further, could remain free of sin.” when lowed Martin and found that Employee’s claim addressing his that he was denied voluntary decision was one broke the free of his religion, exercise Commis- between causation his accident and his sion stated that had bear the death. The Commission’s reliance on weight strictly religion. observing Martin, however, misplaced is at best. In These statements demonstrate being addition to a case from outside this Commission believed that a rea- Martin jurisdiction, expressly over son, held, no strongly matter how would in Montgomery v. Board Retire ruled justify un- enough compensation be ment, Cal.App.3d Cal.Rptr. der determining section 287.140.5.3 In (1973). court 185-86 Mont unreasonable, only what was it relied not gomery found that reasoning the court’s question on the an employee whether Martin was not consistent with the United gravely injured in a work-related accident Supreme States Court’s California likely had refused would interpretations courts’ constitutional him, have benefited but also its conclu- right freely religion, exercise and the sion that could have asked for Id. at follow Martin. court refused to atonement for his sins. disregard The Commission’s for Em- We hold that Commission’s decision ployee’s religious is evident in its beliefs supported by competent was not sub- short claim under *6 statutory stantial evidence. The scheme 287.140.9. The Commission stated that religious liberally did not be refuse the transfusion dictates that beliefs (1979); disagree Judge Elijah 3. We Presbytery with Romines’s dissent 61 L.Ed.2d 775 of (Mo. ing opinion, Lovejoy Jaeggi, which v. concludes this deci Parish 682 S.W.2d 465 analyzing sion violates the United and banc We are not States Missouri also analy Constitutions. Our here is decision an whether freedom to exercise reli violated, legislature’s language gion sis of the the own and its was which was issue of expressed King, Roy intent as in these statutes. Cases Bowen v. and Penner v. both cited 693, 2147, proposition the cited in dissent for the in the 476 U.S. 106 S.Ct. dissent. (1986); (Mo. stay “courts are to 887 removed denomina L.Ed.2d 735 1985) (both government analy holding are a tional doctrine” not related to our banc statutory requirement supply Security and sis of the scheme the Commis to Social num violative). Supreme a sion’s decision. The United States ber to receive benefit was not accept Finally, recognize Court has held that civil courts shall we do not the relevance of remaining highest the "decisions of the ecclesiastical tri the cases cited in dissent. See the Tony polity” a v. Secre bunal within church of hierarchal and Susan Alamo Foundation faith, Labor, 290, 1953, discipline, tary matters church law or U.S. 105 S.Ct. here, (1985) organization; ques (finding we are no Free Exer internal not 85 L.Ed.2d 278 tioning religious cise violation in tribunal’s decision. See or Establishment Clause religious recognizing "associ Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese United foundation’s for Milivojevich, “employees” Canada ates” foundation’s States and 426 U.S. as and the 708-713, enterprise” 49 L.Ed.2d under S.Ct. activities as a “commercial (1976) Act); (holding State v. that state court erred in re the Fair Standards San Labor dles, 1987) (hold jecting church tribunal’s decisions and substi 740 S.W.2d 169 inquiry). ing juror capital case for tuting own cases cited in that excusal of his its Other opposition penalty prop did the involve resolution of church faith-based to death dissent ju erty disputes, because which are not at issue here. not violate Missouri Constitution State). Wolf, laws See Jones 443 U.S. S.Ct. rors must follow conundrum for this considered, religious is no there find sincerely to tackle. strong held reli- Court invoked This against transfusion.4 gious beliefs by assuming that our Workers’ I start light unreasonable not to neutral as statutes are Compensation beliefs, owed death ben- Dependent is statutory The sections religious precepts. were efits from the date that the benefits are ambiguous; they are clear-not at issue terminated.5 Sections contradiction. reconcilable—not state: 287.140.5and 287.140.9 III. CONCLUSION payable be compensation No shall reverse the Commission’s decision We an disability employ- for the death or con- proceedings and remand further ee, as death or disabili- if and insofar opinion. this sistent with caused, aggra- or ty may be continued to by any unreasonable refusal vated MOONEY, J., E. concurs LAWRENCE surgical treat- any submit medical or with J. NORTON. is, risk of which operation, ment or opinion in the of the division or ROMINES, J., KENNETH M. dissents. commission, inconsiderable view ROMINES, M. Judge. KENNETH injury. If the of the the seriousness operation an as a result of employee dies This I dissent. case is about necessary by injury, death made about religious exercise of a belief—it is caused shall be deemed be money. majority confuses the opinion injury.; and imposes manner of our an review amorphous compelled prevent standard that is in this shall Nothing chapter being provided Constitution or statute and is not con- employee an duty by prayer spiritual sistent with court’s avoid injuries for his employer object another’s beliefs. does not means the treatment. Initially, testimony is clear—a blood requires the have patent, transfusion and Mr. Wilcut would As is Section *7 if a is determine “compli- survived. This refusal was not Commission to cation,” “... of the serious- majority suggests. Simply, as the unreasonable view obvious, is family injury_” their of the As Mr. Wilcut and exercised ness threatening. This rec- injury here was life employer beliefs—the did intervention, opin- judicial nor leaves no doubt that the medical seek did ord such, State, was ion was unanimous —a transfusion compel transfusion.1 As employee’s an line 4. We note that our decision is in with this evaluate reasonableness employee's according Court’s refusal to treatment decision refuse v. receive for tetanus Cuchi this employee’s circumstances. In individual Sons, George Prendergast C. & S.W.2d 136 case, those include sincere circumstances There, (Mo.App. we affirmed the Com religious beliefs. because mission’s decision award benefits refuse employee's decision to Dependent’s other to address 5. We decline doing at 138. In was not unreasonable. Id. point disposi- is appeal point on because this so, carefully cir reviewed the individual tive. employee, who "an of the was cumstances thoroughly foreigner illiterate who did State, (Mo. 252 S.W.2d 97 1. See Morrison English language.” As in understand the Cuchi, Id. App.1952). must we find that the Commission compelled. medical opinion The I suspect cor- that a Jehovah’s Witness who rect. reads the Court’s doctrinal discussion would find it clumsy cluttered. Courts This record is likewise clear that cannot base decisions doctrine. There family Wilcut and medical staff were in can Presbyterian, be neither a Christian contact with Jehovah’s Witness counselors Science, nor exception Jehovah’s Witness who recommended medical treatment that 287.140.5; to Section to do so violates the did not include transfusion of whole First Amendment to the United States blood. This is the record on which the Constitution, I, and Mo. Const. Art. Sec- Commission reached the conclusion factual tions 5 and 7. unreasonable, that the refusal was consis- tent with Section 287.140.5. The Commis- only

sion principled reached the conclusion

under the facts before it. my majority, judgment, com-

pounds by error then making Section something more than it is. I Missouri, ex STATE of rel. Jeremiah read say this sub-section to “pray you NIXON, Attorney General, W. State wish”, or, your Pastor, Priest, “bring Missouri, Appellant, Practitioner, or Shaman.” This section does not justify the Court’s straying into a discussion principles of the of a Jehovah’s Ruby WORTHY, Respondent. Witness. Whatever Mr. Wilcut’s beliefs were, No. 68152. WD necessary are not to a construc- tion the Commission as to whether of Appeals, Missouri Court money paid pursuant is to be to Section District. Western 287.140. engage To even this discussion violates principles clear set out 2008. Jan. United Supreme States Court and the Mis- Rehearing Motion for Transfer to and/or Court, Supreme

souri in both free exercise Supreme March Court Denied cases and establishment cases2—courts As Modified March are to stay removed from denominational doctrine. have an Courts affirmative Con-

stitutional duty predestination, to avoid

transubstantiation, and blood transfusions.

The Court in a engages Lewis Carroll if an

exercise—under which Atheist or

Methodist blood refused would, assume,

Court I find this “unrea-

sonable.” 693, 2147, Roy,

2. See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese Bowen v. 106 S.Ct. 476 U.S. 696, Milivojevich, U.S. and (1986); Canada v. 426 U.S. King, Penner v. L.Ed.2d 735 2372, (1976); 96 S.Ct. 49 L.Ed.2d 151 1985); Sandies, Jones (Mo. S.W.2d 887 banc State v. 595, Wolf, 443 U.S. S.Ct. (Mo. 1987); banc (1979); Tony L.Ed.2d 775 and Susan Alamo Presbytery Elijah Lovejoy Jaeggi, Parish Labor, Secretary Foundation v. 471 U.S. 682 S.W.2d 465 (1985); 105 S.Ct. 85 L.Ed.2d 278