138 Ky. 846 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1910
Opinion op the Court by
Reversing.
When put upon bis trial for the murder of John Montgomery, the only defense made by the appellant Wilcoxin, was at the time he committed the deed he was insane, and the only errors that we need notice upon this appeal are the ones relating to the in-instructions upon this subject given and refused by the court.
The instructions complained of reads as follows:. “Although you may believe from the evidence to the the exclusion of a reásonable doubt that the defendant, Morrison Wilcoxin, shot and killed J. W. Montgomery, yet if you are satisfied from the evidence that at the time he shot said Montgomery the defendant was suffering from mental disease or from natural feebleness of mind, and that because of said mental disease or natural feebleness of mind he did not know right from wrong, or if he did know right from wrong that said defendant by reason of mental disease or natural feebleness of mind had not sufficient will power to control his actions, you should find him uot guilty on the ground of insanity; but, if you find him not guilty on the ground of insanity, you should state in you^ verdict the ground of acquittal. ’ ’ In addition to this instruction, the only instructions that the court gave were the ones usually given upon the subject of murder, manslaughter, and reasonable doubt. The objection to the instruction is confined
In Graham v. Commonwealth, 16 B. Mon. 587, the court approved the use of the word “satisfied” in an insanity instruction, but other instructions were given that modified in some degree at least the meaning of this word. In Scott v. Commonwealth, 4 Metc. 227, 83 Am. Dec. 461, the jury was authorized to acquit if they “believed” from the evidence that the accused was of unsound mind. In Smith v. Commonwealth, 1 Duv. 224, and Kriel v. Commonwealth, 5 Bush, 362, it was in effect held that, as sanity is always presumed, the jury should be “satisfied” of the insanity of the accused by “a preponderance of the evidence” before they could acquit him. In Brown v. Commonwealth, 14 Bush, 398, the trial court used the word “satisfied” in the instruction presenting the defendant’s plea of insanity; and counsel for the accused insisted that the use of this word was prejudicial, “because' it required the jury to disregard the plea of insanity, unless the evidence was such as to free their minds from doubt as to whether it was of such a character as under the instructions would authorize an acquittal; that they were told by that expression that the'- existence of a reasonable doubt as to the sanity or insanity of the appellant
In Hays v. Commonwealth, 33 S. W. 1104, 17 Ky. Law Rep. 1147, the plea of insanity was interposed 'as a defense to an indictment charging the accused with the offense of housebreaking, and the court said :• “If this case should be retried, it would be proper to say to the jury that if satisfied from 'the.evidence the accused at the time of the alleged offense was an imbecile, or of such weak mind as that he did not know right from wrong, * * * they should acquit. him.” In Moore v. Commonwealth, 92 Ky. 630, 18 S. W. 833, 13 Ky. Law Rep. 738, the jury were told that: “The law presumes the defendant at the time he committed the act, if he so did, .of sound mind ; and, unless the jury believe from ‘a preponider'ance
These are the only cases decided by this court that we have been able to find in which the subject under consideration has been discussed, and it does not appear in any of them that an instruction using the word “satisfied,” unless it was explained or modified by other instructions, has been approved. It is true that in a few of the cases the word “satisfied” and “satisfaction” appear, but in these cases there were other instructions that induced the court to say that the word “satisfied” when taken in connection with the other instructions really meant “preponderance of the evidence. ’ ’ But in this case there was no qualifying or modifying instructions given. The jury were simply told that, unless they were “satisfied” that the accused was of unsound mind, they should disregard his plea of insanity. Prom a consideration of all the cases, we conclude that neither the word “satisfied” nor the words “preponderance of the evidence ’ ’ should be used in an insanity instruction. On
‘ ‘ (A) Although the jury may believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant shot and killed the deceased, J. W.’Montgomery, yet, if they further believe from the evidence that at the •time of the killing the defendant was of unsound mind, then they should acquit him.
“(B) The law presumes every man sane until the contrary is shown by the evidence; and, before the defendant can be excused on the ground of insanity, the jury must believe from the evidence that the defendant was at the time of the killing without sufficient reason to know what he was doing, or had not sufficient reason to know right from wrong, or that, as the result of mental unsoundness, he had not then sufficient will power to govern his actions, by reason of some insane impiüse which he could not resist or control.”
For the error indicated the judgment is reversed.