24 A. 1056 | Conn. | 1891
Lead Opinion
This is an action to foreclose a mechanic's lien. E. R. Bishop Co. purchased a lot of land on which they proposed to erect three dwelling houses to rent. The houses were erected, the plaintiff, under an agreement, furnishing materials for that purpose. In a suit to foreclose his lien, others who claimed liens on the premises were made defendants. In their answers they also claimed foreclosures of their respective liens. The trial court rendered judgment for the lienors and the other defendants appealed.
In each case the lien or filed but one lien, covering the entire lot of land, about three quarters of an acre, for supplies furnished, labor performed, etc., in the construction of the three dwelling houses. The first and principal question in *580 the case is, whether there should not have been separate liens for each dwelling house. The material facts bearing upon this question are as follows: —
The plaintiff, Wilcox, is a lumber merchant. His claim is for lumber which entered into the construction of the three houses. C. E. Woodruff, one of the firm of E. It. Bishop Co., stated to him that he and his associates had purchased the lot, that they had formed a syndicate, and that they were going to erect on the lot three dwelling houses to rent. He wanted prices for the lumber for the three houses, and sought low prices because of the amount of the materials required. An agreement was made pursuant to which Wilcox furnished the lumber for the houses. He did not keep a separate account of the lumber which entered into the construction of each house, and the same cannot now be ascertained. The dwelling houses were intended to be, and were in fact, under one management, although they were capable of separation, and were separated before they were completed for the purpose of raising money thereon. One of them fronted on Camp street, and the other two on Grand street, and all were upon different grades.
The liens of the other claimants rest upon the same or similar facts. Each one claimed one lien only, for one sum, including the price of all materials furnished and labor performed, and filed but one certificate of lien, covering all the land and all the houses. Did the Superior Court commit error in holding that the several liens were valid?
Had there been but one dwelling house, and the other buildings had been a barn and other out-buildings connected therewith, all forming one homestead, the cases of Bankof Charleston v. Curtiss,
But we are of opinion that none of these considerations can avail. Nor, in our judgment, is there anything in the cases cited which supports the contention of the lienors. On the contrary, other cases within this jurisdiction are decisive against it. An examination of our statute, and of the cases in which it has received judicial construction, will, we think, clearly demonstrate this. The statute, at present constituting section 3018 of the General Statutes of 1888, creates a lien upon every building in the construction or repairs of which, or of any of its appurtenances, the claim arose. It provides that such claim shall be a lien on the land on which the building may stand, the building and its appurtenances. It follows therefore that in order to be entitled to claim a lien, pursuant to the statute, on any building, for work done upon any other building, the latter must be either an appurtenance of the former, or land upon which it stands, as these terms are construed. And the same principle must apply when a lien is claimed upon several buildings for work done generally upon all. Of course the lienor's rights are purely statutory, and in Chapin
v. Persse Brooks Paper Works,
In Brabazon v. Allen,
In the case before us, however, all that the plaintiff in error in the case cited claimed as a matter of construction, is found as a matter of fact. The court in its finding says: — "All of said dwelling-houses are separate and independent of each other in this respect, namely, that they are disconnected, the distance between No. 4, which was an old house upon the lot, and No. 3 being twelve feet; between No. 3 and No. 2, eleven and one half; and between No. 2 and No. 1, about fifty-two feet; and they are so constructed as to be adapted for separate and independent use; and each of said dwelling-houses constitutes a single and independent structure." It is further found that each of the three houses has, since completion, been occupied by two separate families. So that in substance the contention of the plaintiff in error in Brabazon v. Alien, is similar to a claim, if made here, that each of these houses constitutes two buildings, or that there are six instead of three. It is true that in the opinion in that case a quotation is made from the opinion in the case of Bank ofCharleston v. Curtiss,
The full and clear exposition of this principle is condensed on a single page (348) of Bank of Charleston v.Curtiss, and Lindsay v. Gunning
is only an application of that principle. The latter case is indeed said by this court (
Applying these clear and reasonable rules of unity of structure, or of use to the case before us, (and no broader rules can, as it seems to us, be applied as rules of construction of the statute, on which alone the lienor's claim must depend — a statute which this court again says in Lindsay v. Gunning, (p. 318,) in ascertaining whether a given case is within it, "will be construed with reasonable strictness,") it seems manifest that the claimed liens before us are not within it. Certainly, as we have already seen, there was no unity of structure. There was not one building but three. Nor were any of these buildings, in any sense, dependencies of or appurtenant to any other. There was, in no particular, unity of use. In Chapin v. Persse Brooks PaperWorks, supra, there was a semblance of such unity, but the court held that it was insufficient. Here there was no such semblance. It is true that the syndicate represented that "they were going to erect on said lot three dwelling-houses to rent," and such was in fact their design. But the renting was not intended to be for one common purpose, employment, *587 enterprise or undertaking, to one tenant, but to three, or rather six. It is doubtless true, also, that each house enhanced the value of the lot, if by lot is understood the entire tract upon which they all stood, but such lot was capable of separation, and would naturally, sooner or later, be separated into as many different lots as there were houses. Such separation would in no wise tend to decrease the value of any part; in fact, if it had any tendency at all, it would rather be to increase such value. There was nothing in common; only the expressed intent of the owners to rent them all separately. It might as well, for all purpose or semblance of unity of use, have been an intent to sell them all separately. The lot was indeed divided, for the purpose of description in mortgaging, so as to include with each house a separate house lot, and the finding says that "if said lot had been in fact divided in accordance with the boundaries given in said several mortgages, each lotwould embrace all the land which is necessary for the use ofthe house standing thereon." It seems to us that, under the circumstances disclosed and in view of the decisions which we have reviewed, this finding is clearly decisive against the validity of the claims of the plaintiff and of the other claimants who were made parties.
The conclusion which we have reached renders the consideration of other questions presented, which relate to particular liens and to priorities, and to admission of evidence, unnecessary.
There is error in the judgment of the court below and it is reversed.
In this opinion SEYMOUR and TORRANCE, Js., concurred.
Dissenting Opinion
The majority of the court in construing the statute relating to liens so as to deprive the claimants of the benefit of its provisions has gone further in that direction, I apprehend, than the court has ever gone before. It may be that some expressions in the opinions in some of the cases give countenance to the position the court *588 has now assumed. But I think that the logic of the facts in those cases, and the language of the court when considered in connection with those facts, will hardly justify the conclusion drawn.
It will not be denied that in the earlier decisions the inclination of the court was to regard the statute as an innovation and somewhat inconsistent with natural right, and consequently to give it a rather rigid construction. On the other hand, it will be conceded that the tendency in more recent times has been to regard the statute with more favor, and give it a more liberal construction, so as fairly to effectuate its intention. I believe in a strict construction of the statute so far as to require those who would receive its benefits to comply literally with all of its direct and positive provisions; for example, those relating to notices, the filing of the lien, the time when the same shall be done, and the like. But as to those parts of the statute which are less definite, and necessarily more general and comprehensive, a more liberal rule should prevail. The object then should be to construe the statute fairly and reasonably, so as to give effect to the intention of the legislature.
The statute is certainly indefinite in respect to the quantity of land and the number of buildings which may be covered by a lien; and that is the point involved in this case.
I am of the opinion that these liens should have been sustained, and I think that they would have been if the principles to which I have alluded had received their due weight in construing the statute and applying it to the facts of the case.
In this opinion ANDREWS, C. J., concurred.