89 Mass. 270 | Mass. | 1863
From the undisputed allegations in the bill and answer, it appears that on the first day of December 1857 Reuben Fish conveyed to the defendants certain personal property, to be held by them as security for the payment of the several promissory notes and drafts for which he was then, or within two years thereafter might become, liable to them, either as promisor, acceptor, drawer or indorser. That this was the object and purpose of the conveyance is expressly stated and declared in the bond
It is claimed by the plaintiffs, on the contrary, that the said conveyance of the said property to the defendants created a trust in favor of all the sureties and indorsers upon the several notes of said Fish discounted and owned by them; and that these sureties and indorsers, being equitable cestuis que trust, are entitled to have the proceeds of said property applied tb their relief pro rata. And in support of this claim they cite and rely upon the decisions of this court in the cases of Eastman v. Foster, 8 Met. 19, and Rice v. Dewey, 13 Gray, 47. The broad principle of equity affirmed in those cases, and upon which they were determined, is, that a mortgage made by a debtor to his
It is, however, undoubtedly an established rule of equity that a surety who has paid the debt of his principal, either voluntarily or by compulsion, is entitled for his indemnity to any property pledged or collateral security given therefor by the principal to the creditor. But as this rule is founded on the principles of reason and justice, and not upon any contract or stipulation to that effect between the parties, it follows as a necessary consequence that a surety is not to be substituted in the place of the creditor, unless from the circumstances of the case it is shown that it is just and reasonable that he should be. Hence it is obvious that, in order to become entitled to such substitution, he must first pay the whole of the debt or debts for which the property is mortgaged or the collateral security is given to the creditor ; for it would be manifestly unjust, and a plain violation of his rights, to compel him to relinquish any portion of the property before the obligation for the performance of which it was conveyed to him as security had been fully kept and complied with. Richardson v. Washington Bank, 3 Met. 536. Copis v. Middleton, 1 Turn. & Russ. 224. Hodgson v. Shaw, 3 Myl. & K. 183.
In the application of these principles to the facts disclosed in the present case, it is a necessary consequence that this bill cannot be maintained. x The plaintiffs have not paid, nor have they
The condition of this bond, after reciting that Fish was liable to the bank on sundry notes and drafts, and desired future accommodation from the bank,