20 Conn. App. 420 | Conn. App. Ct. | 1989
The defendant appeals from a judgment rendered by the trial court after the court rejected a portion of the findings filed by a factfinder pursuant to Practice Book § 546G. The defendant claims that the trial court erred (1) in substituting its own factual determinations for those made by the factfinder, and (2) in sustaining the plaintiff’s objections to the factfinder’s findings and memorandum of decision. We find error.
This case has its origin in an oral contract for the removal by the plaintiff of fill from a construction site, the contract price to be based on a price per truckload. The plaintiff represented to the defendant that there was no buyer for the fill and that it might even be necessary to pay a charge per truckload to dump it. During the plaintiff’s performance of the contract, however, it sold part of the fill to a nearby condominium project. The plaintiff fully performed under the contract, but the defendant refused to pay when it learned of the sale of the fill. The plaintiff thereafter filed suit for breach of contract, and the matter was referred to a factfinder,
In 1983, the legislature enacted General Statutes §§ 52-549n through 549t, creating the factfinder program for specified types of contract actions, and shortly thereafter Practice Book §§ 546B through 546K implemented that legislation. The statutes and rules of practice both require the factfinder to file findings with the court. The rules of practice also grant the factfinder the discretion to file a memorandum of decision addressing those matters deemed to be helpful in the resolution of the case. Practice Book § 546G.
A reviewing authority may not substitute its findings for those of the trier of the facts. This principle applies no matter whether the reviewing authority is the Supreme Court; Pandolphe’s Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 220, 435 A.2d 24 (1980); the Appellate Court; Lerner v. Ceslik. 17 Conn. App. 369, 372, 553 A.2d 1142 (1989); or the Superior Court reviewing the findings of either administrative agencies; Gervasoni v. McGrath, 36 Conn. Sup. 297, 300, 418 A.2d 952 (1980), or attorney trial referees. See Practice Book § 443; Rostenberg-Doern Co. v. Weiner, 17 Conn. App. 294, 299, 552 A.2d 827 (1989).
It is apparent that here the trial court corrected the finding of facts to make them consistent with its reading of the record and then proceeded to render a judgment in line with that amended finding. This was error. Once the court rejected the finding of facts, its options were severely limited. It either had to remand the matter to the same or a different factfinder for a rehearing or, in the alternative, it had to completely revoke the reference. Practice Book § 546J.
The plaintiff argues that the trial court’s action should be sustained under subsection (6) of Practice Book § 546J which provides that, upon review of the findings, the trial court may take “any other action the court may deem appropriate.” The flaws in this argument become apparent when § 546J is examined in its entirety. Subsection (6) immediately precedes a provision of § 546J that states “[t]he court may correct a finding of facts at any time before accepting it, upon the written stipulation of the parties.” (Emphasis added.) This sentence would be meaningless if we were to hold that a court may correct a finding absent such written stipulation of the parties. In construing statutes, no word or phrase should be treated as superfluous; Gill v. Petrazzuoli Bros., Inc., 10 Conn. App. 22, 31, 521 A.2d 212 (1987); and these rules of statutory construction apply equally to the rules of practice. DeTeves v. DeTeves, 202 Conn. 292, 298, 520 A.2d 608 (1987).
We conclude that the trial court also erred in sustaining the plaintiff’s objection to the factfinder’s
There is error, the judgment is set aside and the case is remanded with direction to render judgment in accordance with the factfinder’s report.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
Practice Book § 546G provides in pertinent part: “The fact-finder may accompany his finding of facts with a memorandum of decision including such matters as he may deem helpful in the decision of the case.”
We note that the Rostenberg-Doern court approved the trial court’s action in that case because the referee had erred on questions of law, not fact. Rostenberg-Doern Co. v. Weiner, 17 Conn. App. 294, 300-301, 552 A.2d 827 (1989). Thus, Rostenberg is inapposite to the present case.