Wight v. BankAmerica Corp.Wight v. BankAmerica Corp.
BACKGROUND
In 1991 the Bank of Credit and Commerce International and its various related entities (“BCCI”) collapsed amidst claims of spectacular fraud and chicanery. In July of that year, bank regulators across the world moved to seize BCCI’s assets and bring the bank under court supervision. Plaintiffs are liquidators appointed by courts in England and the Cayman Islands to wind up BCCI’s affairs and to supervise the collection of its assets (“the Liquidators”). Defendants are successors in interest to various entities including Security Pacific International Bank and its affiliates (“SPIB”).
Founded in 1972 by a Pakistani banker named Agha Hasan Abedi, BCCI had a short, swashbuckling life. Abedi remained at its helm until 1988, when he had a heart attack. His chief lieutenant, Saiyid Mohammad Swaleh Naqvi succeeded him. Throughout Abedi’s and Naqvi’s reigns, BCCI was involved in countless fraudulent schemes, all designed to conceal its underlying insolvency. Eventually, the various intrigues collapsed and BCCI went bankrupt. Abedi has since died. Naqvi is serving an eight year federal prison term for his involvement in BCCI’s frauds.
The bank itself was indicted by the Manhattan District Attorney for corporate fraud, and by the Justice Department for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”).
In late 1991, the Liquidators pled guilty on behalf of BCCI to the New York indictment. The factual allegations made by the New York indictment were that BCCI and its affiliates:
made false and fraudulent pretenses, representations and promises as to ... the financial condition, net worth, and capital of the member entities of [BCCI], and the ability of [BCCI] to repay creditors.... The essence of the scheme was to convince depositors ... by means of false pretenses ... that [BCCI] was a safe financial repository and institution for funds.
In early 1992, the Liquidators entered into a similar plea on behalf of BCCI to the federal indictment. See United States v. BCCI Holdings,
Both the federal and New York plea agreements expressly provided that the pleas were “not intended by the parties ... to preclude ... any civil action against any culpable BCCI officers, employees, agents or other entities.”
In July 1997, the Liquidators brought this action against SPIB in Supreme Court, New York County. The Liquidators also filed a petition in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, pursuant to
The Liquidators’ complaint focuses on one of the many frauds allegedly committed by Abedi and Naqvi. Early in its existence, BCCI extended large loans to a Pakistani shipping group, the Gokal/Gulf Group. When the Gokal/Gulf Group was unable to repay these loans, Abedi and Naqvi secretly agreed to lend it even more money, so that the Gokal/Gulf Group could avail itself of further BCCI loan facilities. To disguise this sinister arrangement, Abedi and Naqvi arranged for BCCI to funnel money to the Gokal/Gulf Group through various conduit companies incorporated in Liberia (the “Conduit Companies”).
SPIB was the primary correspondent bank for BCCI in the United States. SPIB also maintained accounts for the Conduit Companies. Essentially, the complaint alleges that SPIB knowingly or recklessly aided BCCI in the commission of the Gokal/Gulf fraud. According to the complaint, Butch Ahmad and James Cano-ra — the SPIB account officers responsible for BCCI — had longstanding personal ties to BCCI and Gulf/Gokal personnel. Butch Ahmad had been friends with Abedi since 1960. And Mehdi Taqi, a senior employee of the Gokal/Gulf Group, as well as a member of its founding family, had dealt with James Canora when he had worked at another bank. Thus, when Canora moved to SPIB, Taqi used him to help open the accounts for the Conduit Companies.
The complaint alleges that, for four years, Canora and Ahmad executed transfers between the accounts of the Conduit Companies and BCCI at SPIB. Detailed instructions for these transfers were communicated to Canora from Taqi, who would then call to ensure that the transfers went through. On occasion, SPIB deviated from its own internal procedures to accommodate Taqi’s demands.
The complaint alleges that SPIB knew these transfers had no business purpose. BCCI’s money was transferred out of its SPIB account to the Conduit Companies and then ultimately shifted back into BCCI’s SPIB account, where it was recorded as a loan repayment from
The complaint sought money damages under New York law for: (1) aiding and abetting fraud; (2) aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty; and (3) commercial bad faith. The Liquidators sought $530 million in damages for each of these three claims.
In May 1998, SPIB moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to
The Liquidators then moved for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e). They sought to add as parties other liquidators appointed by a court in Luxembourg (who under Luxembourg law did have standing to assert claims on behalf of creditors and depositors), and a class of BCCI overseas creditors. The Liquidators also argued, for the first time, that SPIB should now be judicially estopped from denying the Liquidators’ standing based on an unrelated BCCI case, where SPIB had successfully argued that BCCI’s depositors also lacked standing to sue.
Finally, the Liquidators also sought leave to amend their complaint pursuant to
In those depositions, Canora testified that he was told by Taqi that the various accounts for the Conduit Companies, which he himself described as “shell” companies, were opened for “accounting purposes.” He admitted, however: “I don’t recall having complete knowledge of the rationale for the separate accounts.” Canora also testified that after BCCI was indicted in 1988 on an unrelated money laundering scheme, he and Ahmad acknowledged the “sad possibility” that BCCI might also be using SPIB to launder money. Nevertheless, they continued to cycle funds between BCCI and the Conduit Companies for another two years. Finally, Canora testified that: “We actually overcharged BCCI.” Later, Canora softened this somewhat by explaining that SPIB simply gave BCCI less of a discount than they could have gotten had they bargained harder.
The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, declining to grant the Liquidators leave to amend their complaint, reasoning that even with the addition of Canora’s testimony, the Liquidators still could not adequately allege scienter as required by
The Liquidators now appeal.
DISCUSSION
I. Appellate Jurisdiction
As a threshold matter, we must consider whether we have appellate jurisdiction,
Under
To be timely, a Rule 59 motion must be filed within 10 business days after entry of judgment. See
Here, the Liquidators’
Troubled by this incongruity, we issued a sua sponte order on March 3, 2000, notifying the parties of the problem, and asking them to “explainf ] the discrepancy between the dates and whether and how that discrepancy affects the appellate jurisdiction of this Court.” Both sides responded to our request. From the parties’ submissions, the following undisputed facts emerge.
On April 21, 1999, the Liquidators submitted two copies of a motion for reconsideration pursuant to
Nevertheless, after receiving the
The Clerk’s Office then mailed the offending declaration together with all the other
SPIB maintains that under all of these facts, the Liquidators’
Our case law establishes that so long as a paper comports with the Local Rules, and there is no other valid basis to reject it, see Somlyo v. J. Lu-Rob Enters.,
To be sure, the Clerk’s Office rejected the entirety of the Liquidators’
We approve of the district judge’s fair and pragmatic approach. Though the district court lacked the power to enlarge the 10 day statutory filing limit for
We have appellate jurisdiction.
II. Standing
Turning to the substance of this appeal, the Liquidators argue that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint for lack of standing. We agree.
We review the district court’s dismissal for lack of standing de novo. See Hirsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
“The doctrine of standing incorporates both constitutional and prudential limitations on federal court jurisdiction .... ” Lamont v. Woods,
There are also several judge-made “prudential” requirements. Lamont,
A. The Wagoner Rule
The Liquidators do not dispute that, like the trustees of a bankruptcy estate, they stand in the shoes of the defunct corporation, and they do not have standing to assert claims belonging to BCCI’s depositors and creditors. See In re Mediators, Inc.,
In a bankruptcy proceeding, state law — here the law of New York— “determines whether a right to sue belongs to the debtor or to the individual creditors.” Mediators,
The rationale underlying the Wagoner rule derives from the fundamental principle of agency that the misconduct of managers within the scope of their employment will normally be imputed to the corporation. See id.; see also Mediators,
B. The Adverse Interest Exception
“Under New York law, the adverse interest exception rebuts the usual presumption that the acts and knowledge of an agent acting within the scope of employment are imputed to the principal.” Mediators,
The complaint in this case alleges that “BCCI was adversely dominated by corrupt [management], who, act[ed] in their own interests and not in the interests of BCCI....” Relying on this language, the district court found that the complaint pled facts sufficient to trigger the adverse interest exception.
SPIB takes issue with this finding, arguing that the complaint also alleges that BCCI was “dominated by corrupt prior senior managers and directors” and that in such circumstances the adverse interest exception does not operate to abrogate the Wagoner rule. See Mediators,
We find no fault in the district court’s analysis. For purposes of SPIB’s
The district court went on to conclude, however, that the Liquidators were collaterally estopped from invoking the adverse interest exception because they pled guilty on behalf of BCCI to the New York indictment. More specifically, the court ruled that: (1) by pleading guilty to the New York indictment the Liquidators admitted that Abedi and Naqvi acted in the interests of BCCI by orchestrating the Gulf/Gokal scam; and (2) this admission collaterally estopped the Liquidators from invoking the adverse interest exception. We reject this reasoning.
1. Collateral Estoppel
“[T]he preclusive effect of a state court determination in a subsequent
The district court concluded that the “full and fair opportunity” prong of collateral estoppel was satisfied in this case because in New York “a guilty plea is accorded the same preclusive effect ... as is a conviction after trial.” Wight,
We are not convinced that this is an accurate statement of New York law. True, some lower New York courts have afforded guilty pleas preclusive effect. See Abrahao v. Perrault,
Moreover, • we • question whether any New York court would apply collateral es-toppel based 1 on the unique guilty plea involved here. The New York plea agreement expressly provided, that it would not preclude the Liquidators from bringing actions against third parties like SPIB. Indeed, in another (unrelated) BCCI case, the district court held that the identically worded federal plea agreement did not deprive the Liquidators of standing to bring fraud claims on behalf of BCCI against its former legal counsel. See BCCI (Luxembourg) Holdings, S.A. v. Clifford,
Ultimately, however, we need not take this issue head on. This is so because the other prerequisite of collateral estoppel under New York law was not met. Specifically, the same issue of whether Abedi and Naqvi acted in the interests of BCCI by orchestrating the Gulf/Gokal scam was not necessarily decided by the Liquidators guilty plea. See Schwartz,
The Liquidators pled guilty on behalf of BCCI to various corporate frauds, such as overstating its capital, and authorizing kickbacks to other financial organizations to deter them from 'scrutinizing the bank’s rotting capital structure.
A corporation is guilty of an offense when ... [t]he conduct constituting the offense is engaged in, authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, or recklessly tolerated by ... a high managerial agent acting within the scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation.
The essential facts alleged by the indictment to support the Liquidators’ plea were that BCCI, together with Abedi and Naqvi, engaged in a scheme to convince “depositors and other banking and financial institutions, by means of false pretenses, representations, and promises that the BCCI was a safe financial repository and institution for funds.”
It may be true that by pleading guilty to these allegations the Liquidators admitted that Abedi and Naqvi were acting generally in the interests of BCCI. To use the language of
The problem is that the Liquidators did not condescend to particulars and they never specifically admitted that Abedi and Naqvi acted in the interests of BCCI by orchestrating the Gulf/Gokal scam. Indeed, the Gulf/Gokal scam is nowhere even mentioned in the indictment. Accordingly, Abedi and Naqvi could have been acting in favor of BCCI in one or more of their many other scams, but could have been acting adversely to the bank’s interests in the Guli/Gokal scam.
In sum, we believe that the Liquidators did not necessarily concede that Abedi and Naqvi acted in the interests of BCCI by orchestrating the Gulf/Gokal scam. We, therefore, conclude that the district court erred in applying collateral estoppel on the basis of the New York guilty plea. Accordingly, the Liquidators may continue to litigate the potential applicability of the adverse interest exception. Of course, we express no opinion on whether the exception may ultimately apply.
2. Judicial Estoppel
The Liquidators see no need at all for any further analysis of the adverse interest issue. Going for the jugular, they assert that in an earlier BCCI case — Hamid v. Price Waterhouse & Co., No. CV 91-4488,
Judicial estoppel is designed to prevent a party who plays fast and loose with the courts from gaining unfair advantage through the deliberate adoption of inconsistent positions in successive suits. Bates v. Long Island R.R.,
Special care in this area makes eminently good sense. It is axiomatic that a lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time “ ‘even by a party who originally asserted jurisdiction.’ ” United States v. Leon,
In the circumstances of this case, our independent duty to ensure the Liquidators have standing cannot be hamstrung by the arguments previously made by SPIB in the Hamid case. To the contrary, we conclude that the court should have the benefit of whatever illumination SPIB’s arguments on the standing question can provide.
A party invoking judicial estoppel must show that: (1) his adversary “advanced an inconsistent factual position in a prior proceeding, and (2) the prior inconsistent position was adopted by the first court in some manner.” AXA Marine & Aviation Ins. (UK) Ltd. v. Seajet Indus. Inc.,
In Hamid, the closest SPIB itself came to advancing an inconsistent position on the issue of the Liquidators’ standing to assert the common law claims advanced here, was joining in a brief to the Ninth Circuit that included a footnote stating:
[The depositors-plaintiffs] complain that [the third-party defendants (77 in number including SPIB) ] have not conceded that the liquidators have standing to sue and argue that B CCI’s liquidators would have difficulty succeeding on any claim that they did have standing to bring because of the possibility that the misconduct of B CCI’s former management would be attributed to the bank. Defendants have never denied the liquidators standing to sue third parties for alleged looting of BCCI, only that there would be merit to such a suit. Whether BCCI’s liquidators would be successful in pursuing any claim is irrelevant, of course, to the question of whether they own the claim.
Even if we assume that this Delphic footnote is inconsistent with SPIB’s position in this case, it is not a valid predicate for judicial estoppel. This is so, because
III. Adequacy of the Complaint
The district court dismissed the complaint on the alternative ground that it failed to adequately plead scienter as required by
We review the district court’s decision to deny leave to amend for abuse of discretion, mindful that
The Liquidators assert three claims: (1) aiding and abetting fraud; (2) aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty; and (3) commercial bad faith. As the district court pointed out, a required element of each of these claims under New York law is knoioledge of the underlying wrong. See Fidelity Funding of Calif., Inc. v. Reinhold,
The district court denied leave to amend on the ground of futility, concluding that even with the Canora deposition testimony, the Liquidators were incapable of adequately pleading this requisite knowledge. We disagree.
Under these standards, the complaint, as bolstered by the Canora testimony, passes muster under
In addition, the Liquidators have offered facts to show that SPIB had both a clear opportunity and a strong financial motive to aid the Gokal/Gulf fraud. See Cohen,
The Liquidators have alleged sufficient facts to satisfy the requirements of
III. Remaining Issues
The Liquidators also appeal the district court’s denial of their motion to add parties. The district court did not delve into the merits of this motion, but instead denied it on the grounds of futility. On this appeal, the merits of the issues underlying the Liquidators motion have been argued and briefed only cursorily. In such circumstances, we remand to allow the district court to consider those issues in the first instance. See Thompson,
CONCLUSION
We have considered the parties’ remaining contentions and find them to be unavailing. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court dismissing appellants’ complaint is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings.