*1 MARYLAND еt al. OF STATE WIGGINS Term, 185, September 1974.] [No. 5, 1975. September
Decided *2 The cause argued before Singley, Smith, Digges, Levine, Eldridge, and O’Donnell, JJ. Smith,
Peter S. with whom was Michael S. Elder on the brief, appellant. for Keane,
James I. Attorney Assistant General, with whom Burch, were Francis B. Attorney General, and Clarence W. Sharp, Attorney Assistant General, brief, on the appellees.
Smith, J., opinion delivered the of the Court. Levine and JJ., Eldridge, dissent and J., filed a dissenting Eldridge, opinion in Levine, J., page concurs at 717 infra. appellant, Alphonso Wiggins (Wiggins),
In
C.
this case
approval
State,
asks us to overrule our
Franklin v.
264
62, 68,
“May 15, 1969,
(1972),
285
2d 616
Md.
A.
the date of
finality
Long
Robinson,
Supp.
(D.
in . .
set out
.
F.
22
316
[v.
1970),
1971),]
adopted
aff'd,
(4th
Md.
It is *3 burglary allegedly charge a in 1960 on of indicted was 2, August 1960. He was convicted on committed imprisonment more than one of not to a term of sentenced 15, August In 1961he was indicted 1960. year to run from 29, allegedly burglary committed on June May of five counts 26, July He convicted and 2, July 3, July 9, 1960. was imprisonment, year one some of count to sentenced on each and some were be consecutive which sentenсes Maryland imprisoned at He was concurrent. Hagerstown, Maryland, from at Correctional Institution February 4, he had not until 1963.Since September May years age of the incidents on at time attained waived to the 29, 1960, was and June “[h]e to be tried as jurisdiction of Criminal Court of Baltimore pursuant a indictments offender on an adult th[o]se Moylan signed by E. the Honorable Charles [of order waiver of the Court of for Causes Circuit the Division Juvenile February 23, hearing 1961. No was held City Baltimore on] order,” Wiggins signing nor was prior to the of the waiver City present of Baltimore physically in the Circuit Court preceding or the time the above immediately “either signed and was at no time order was mentioned waiver [he] with the offenses for brought court in connection before that waived.” He was then incarcerated as which he was felon. adult convicted Wiggins filed a bill of complaint in the Circuit City against
Baltimore Maryland the State of and the Clerk of the Criminal Court of Baltimore in which requested he the court “to declare that the aforementioned convictions nullity are a [him] may suffer legal no [he] disabilities as a result of such convictions.” He also asked the court “to permanently enjoin keeping defendants from or maintaining any record stating whatsoever way in any indicating [Wiggins] burglary convicted of the previously offenses” mentioned. That court against ruled Wiggins. appealed. He The Court Special Appeals in Wiggins State, App. 291, 22 Md. 324 A. 2d (1974), rejected considered and points here granted raised. We certiorari might order that we consider important question here involved.
Although' background we set forth of the much Maryland juveniles statutes relative in Matter of 85, 94-95, Anderson, Md. A. 2d 516 we shall background again refer understanding to that for a better controversy. Originally, juvenile this in Maryland matters by specially designated justices were handled peace of the judges general jurisdiction. rather than of courts of trial Maryland required justices Constitution never peace lawyers lawyers. to be and most of them were not special judicial Provision officer to handle Maryland passage Chapter matters came into law with 611 of authorizing appointment the Acts of 1902 City “Magistrate Baltimore of a for Juvenile Causes” to *4 jurisdiction trial, “have exclusive of all of cases or any trial, of commitment to reformatory commitment or for institution, or years other of all age minors under sixteen of appointed 1940 Governor Herbert R. O’Conor a Juvenile Delinquency “to Commission consider the whole field of the juvenile Maryland, of delinquency treatment and to report findings‘to its the Governor and to General Assembly pointed at its session of 1941.” It out only city large “Baltimore in the United States [was] judges whose Juvenile Justices of Peace.” It [were]. enabling empower the amendment to “an recommended City.” Juvenile Court Baltimore Legislature a to establish people of proposed to the Chapter the Acts of 824 creating Maryland Juvenile a amendment “[a] City.” also would . . for The amendment Court . Baltimore Assembly to “establish General have authorized the incorporated city town or any or Juvenile other Court for proposed amendment any county of This the State.” rejected by the electorate. Chapter 323 of the Acts authorized
The Governor was Art. Code which became 83-91, 1931, (1939) 52, §§ peace inclusive, for appoint justice “an additional of the to magistrate juvenile county for be known as each to particular provision did not county.” for This causes City Allegany, Washington, nor and apply to Baltimore person appointed be so was to “at Counties. Baltimore age twenty-five the bar of years of a member of least [and] Maryland.” Appeals of There was the further the Court of any appointment made in proviso “no such shfould] County have county until Commissioners sh[ould] Justice, provided salary for such and shfould] provision been that such the Governor ha[d] notified justices peace were to “have exclusive of the made.” Such given by any jurisdiction jurisdiction law where [was] magistrate in all justice peace for criminal causes trial, trial, for or commitment or commitment cases age any minor under the any juvenile institution of (16) years.” justices of By Art. sixteen Code 52, (1924) § Talbot, City, peace except in Baltimore of the State Counties, Harford, Montgomery, were and Frederick hear, granted try determine all cases “jurisdiction to particularly of the State were not the counties It is obvious that 1. system expense juvenile for implementing their such a interested expiring May, Maryland for reflects the existence terms Manual lHS-lHi Montgomery, Allegany, 1945, magistrates for causes Allegany Separate Washington Washington only. covered statutes Counties (1930) Art. Local Laws Counties. See §§ Code Public 558-578, originally in 1914 and enacted and Art. 370-375 §§ appointment respectively. and set These statutes mandated 83A, Supp.) compensation (1939, enacted Art. § did 1943 Cum. as Code 1943, Montgomery County. Chap. 147 of the Acts *5 694 charge
involving any offense, of misdemeanor, the crime or punishable by Penitentiary in the confinement or involving intent, m[ight] a felonious be committed respective prosecutions within their well Counties” as as “all proceedings recovery any penalty doing or for the of for or omitting any respective Counties, act within to do their doing which, or the of which omission to do made [was] punishable by any pecuniary under laws of this State penalty, by imprisonment fine or jail or in Maryland Correction, of House all which of acts or omissions [t]hereby declared to . be criminal offenses . [were] . most, all, From this it will be seen that from 1931 but not State, county if a its wisdom elected to fund the juvenile magistrate office for of causes then there to be magistrate such juris- who then would exclusive prosecutions diction persons of those under 16 which of misdemeanors, By Chapter involved but not of felonies. 807 year provision years Acts of 1941 this was raised to 18 provision magistrate with the further that the should “have jurisdiction concurrent in such with cases the Circuit Courts eighteen (18) for the several counties where the minor [was] years twenty-one age age (21).” but under the appointment by
The Governor O’Conor of the Juvenile Delinquency Commission been his had followed appointment 1, 1941, on November of a Commission on Judiciary Maryland, Article Constitution commonly known as the “Bond Commission” its chairman, Judge Chief Carroll T. Bond of this Court. Bond opinion Commission was of the that in order to avoid multiplication juvenile of courts a court Baltimore City Supreme should be a branch of the Bench and that judge qualified work that bench for such should continue serve in matters without rotation order promote the most effective Report administration.2 The Maryland Delinquency (1943) Commission on Juvenile courts, “accepted] present stated our that it the view that City is the Bench in and the Baltimore Circuit Judiciary See Report of the of the the 2. Interim Commission on Article Maryland (1942) Report Constitution of Commission on Judiciary Maryland (1942). Article of the Constitution of *6 jurisdiction to counties, inherent have in the several Courts guidance if proper and care every in the State child secure to neglect, due to lacking same, whether in or he she a or to dependency, delinquency, feeble-mindedness then went It of these causes.” or more two combination to recommend: city juvenile in Baltimore of a court
“Creation Judicial county or at least each in each and original, (1) exclusive Circuit, have shall by courts expressly waived such jurisdiction, unless courts, up to over children in favor of the criminal age delinquency, years all cases neglect, or dependency, abandonment feeble- mindedness; original jurisdiction (2) to deter- disputed cases; (3) original, paternity ex- mine right try, subject jurisdiction to to the clusive waived, any guardian or by jury parent, unless trial any wilful or omission adult for act other tending contributing to, encouraging to cause or bringing any a within condition child court, just dеfined; juvenile jurisdiction of a as any any for guilty, person if found to sentence such misdemeanor, pay a act or omission as such imprisonment, both, within limits to be fine or statute; by juvenile Baltimore fixed such court city part of Baltimore be a of the Bench City, juvenile in the Counties to be and such courts existing parts circuit courts.” at 85-86. Id. upon report by enacting Assembly this acted
The General providing for exercise of of 1943 Chapter of the Acts City. by of Baltimore jurisdiction the Circuit Court juvenile Maryland judge, Thus, the first time for jurisdiction in justice peace, had distinguished from a person as “a defined “child” was juvenile matters. term jurisdiction years subject to the age of sixteen under the delinquent individual “who included an A child of the court.” ordinance, any any act or who commit[ted] law or violate[d] adult, be a crime not which, would if committed an punishable by imprisonment. death or life . . Unless the judge jurisdiction “in his discretion waive[d] orderfed] regular procedure such child held for action under the if would follow such act or acts had been an committed adult,” granted “original, jurisdiction he was exclusive concerning any delinquent. child who . . . . . .” It is [was] passage to be noted that as of time of the of this act no provision Maryland was made in the counties of for a juvenile provision court other than the earlier we justice peace mentioned for a in those instances salary justice fund which the counties saw fit to for such peace magistrate as a causes. *7 from without the state who have Those occasion to read opinion this should understand that the circuit courts of the Maryland general are the courts of 23 counties trial Maryland IV, jurisdiction by created Constitution Art. 20.§ provides City “styled The for Baltimore what is Constitution City.” IV, Bench of Baltimore Under Art. [as] § City it includes the various trial courts of the jurisdiction The of those Baltimore. sum total courts The equals that of the circuit courts for the various counties. general Court of Baltimore has the same Criminal jurisdiction trial as the circuit courts the counties of Maryland. City The Circuit Court of Baltimore' has the equity jurisdiction vested the circuit courts for the counties. juvenile jurisdiction
In 1945 reached the circuit courts for Chapter 797 of the the counties with the enactment Acts (1939, Supp.) year which became 1947 Cum. of that Code applicable City 48A-48U. It was not to Baltimore Art. §§ Washington, Allegany, Montgomery nor to Counties. person for the fact' that it defined a child as a Other than years corresponding age with modifications under the similar, act, 1943 and 1945 acts are elsewhere in the including provided that a the fact that 48D of the 1945 act § investigation, m[ight] “[j]udge, full his discretion after under jurisdiction and order such child held for action waive if act acts regular procedure that would follow such specifically by been committed an adult.” It to had any definite forth of these acts sets neither noted that judge such consideration to be taken into criteria powers jurisdiction. under such broad waiving It was waived relative to the juvenile Wiggins jurisdiction as reaching his he crimes was said to have committed 1966 the birthday. By Chapter Acts of 127 of the 16th City was for Baltimore exemption the statewide act 1, 1969, June so that after that date eliminated to take effect County only Montgomery would not be included statewide act.3 appointed a subcommittee Legislative Council report extensive
juvenile in 1968. Its recommended causes Chapter for the basis in the law. It formed revision Yol.) Repl. (1957, 1973 of 1969. Most of Code of the Acts chapter. It 51-71, continued was enacted Art. §§ County. Montgomery for exemption from the subtitle however, difference, between the act no There was age. County act relative to Montgomery and the statewide person defined a child as a act would have As introduced the except birthday in Baltimore not reached his 18th who had person July 1, 1971, who had City this meant a where until Assembly birthday. in its The General not reached his 16th 1,1970. July Chapter elected to cut that date back to wisdom changed phase 1970, however, out to the Acts interesting regard note that the Bond it is 1971. this propose report in did not in its interim Commission *8 City, recommended age for but limit Baltimore different be exclusive jurisdiction the “the courts] that [of involving by proceedings or minors crimes offenses over all age years . . . .” below the nothing prior indicated, 1969 enactment was
As to the be considered in as to what should spelled out the statutes determining or in not to waive juvenile judge whether by a permit individual to be tried an juvenile jurisdiction (1974) (c) procedure. 3-816 Code the usual criminal under § today Proceedings Article and Judicial of the Courts opinion 97, note failed to Anderson, of this 272 Md. at the author 3. In 1,1969. act as June effective date of this the specifies making in a determination as to waiver of jurisdiction age child; the court shall consider the of the the physical child; mental and condition of the the child’s amenability any institution, facility, in to treatment program delinquents; offense; the nature available of the public safety. the No case under the reached this Court however, presumed, exercising It is in statutes. by their discretion factors such as these were considered juvenile judges. retroactivity genesis of the modern doctrine 618, Walker, litigation is Linkletter v. 1731, 14 (1965), in which Mr. Justice Clark L.Ed.2d 601
S. Ct. said for the Court: accepted today appropriate rule is that
“[T]he may justice cases the Court the interest of make prospective.... rule the prohibits requires neither nor Constitution
“[T]he
retrospective effect. As Justice
said
Cardozo
[in
Ry.
Refining
v.
Great Northern
Co. Sunburst Oil &
358, 364,
S.
1684,
699
‘pronounce
new
not to
a
was
duty of
court
the
the
that
rule
Blackstone,
expound the old
law,
and
but maintain
one/
1809).”
that
(15th
He further observed
ed.
Commentaries
something
do in fact do
judges
that
“Austin maintained
interstitially
filling
law; they make it
more than discover
vague,
indefinite, or
judicial
interpretation
the
in with
alone are but
statutory
terms that
or common-law
generic
approach
an
Implicit
is
such
empty
of the law.
crevices
the earlier
is overruled
when a case
admission
at 625 to
wrongly
He referred
Chicot
decided.”
decision
Bank, 308 U. S.
Drainage
v. Baxter State
County
Dist.
that Chief
and observed
60 S. Ct. Hughes in that case “reasoned Court] Justice [for prior determination of the law to the actual existence of may unconstitutionality operative ‘is an fact ignored. past consequences justly which cannot judicial always by a new declaration.’ He be erased cannot subsequent ruling down rule of the laid ‘effect invalidity may in various have to be considered aspects.’ concluded: U. 374.” Justice Clark [308 S.] change appears (1) it that a
“Under our cases
given
while
case is on direct
law will be
effect
Peggy,
review,
Schooner
States
[1
v.]
[United
(1801)],11
(2) that
The Court then enunciated test to aid in the problem: resolution of the “We believe that of the existence Wolf operative
doctrine Mapp to is ‘an may fact consequences which justly ignored. cannot be past always The judicial cannot be erased a new County Drainage declaration.’ Chicot Dist. v. Bank, supra, Baxter State at 374. The thousands of finally cases that were decided on be cannot Wolf ‘particular conduct, private obliterated. The official,’ ‘prior must be considered. Here finality determinations deemed to have and acted upon accordingly’ have ‘become And vested.’ finally, ‘public light policy in the of the nature both previous . . . and of its [Wolf doctrine] Ibid,. application’ given proper weight. must its short, In purpose Mapp we must look of the rule; placed upon doctrine; the reliance the Wolf justice and the effect administration of aof retrospective application Mapp.” Id. at 636.
It will be seen that the opinion heavily Court its relied upon County Chicot which was based on the doctrine of res judicata. In question that case the Court faced with give whether to its decision Ashton v. Cameron County District, L. U. S. Ct. Ed. 1309 application. retroactive Ashton held Bankruptcy unconstitutional the 1934 amendment Act readjust permitted political a state subdivisions jurisdiction of under the their circumstances dеbts certain Municipal had been debts District Courts. United States involving and in a case readjusted in Ashton under this act the affected County Drainage In Ashton District. Chicot constitutionality of the act challenged the bondholders jurisdiction under Thus, won. the act which conferred adjusted drainage had been district which the debts in the challenge in had been invalid. Ashton was held challenge adjustment proceeding. No had been made such *11 County involving proceeding the bonds of the Chicot expired. appeal had Drainage and the time for District drainage Nevertheless, district of that some bondholders holding attempted recover the in Ashton and invoked the drainage controversy. in The full on the bonds there amount pleaded readjustment of the district court decree district bondholders, however, judicata. The relied on Norton res as 1121, L. Ed. 178 Shelby County, U. S. S. Ct. v. granting since the 1934 act and contended jurisdiction in the been held unconstitutional Ashton had right; imposes duties; Norton it it “confers no it no words office; is, legal protection; it no it creates no affords though never had been as it contemplation, inoperative passed.” disagreed the bond- Supreme and barred collecting. holders from glean there are
We
from the
Court cases
retrospective application is
three circumstances
integrity
mandated, (1)
affected
of the
where the old rule
constitutionally
fact-finding process, (2)
no
where
trial was
punishment
permissible,
(3)
is
where
permissible. In
of one of those
constitutionally
the absence
circumstances,
three-pronged Linkletter
test
three
then the
applicable.
fact-finding process
involving
integrity Cases
opinion
by
plurality
represented
Williams
are
“Where the of new constitutional aspect doctrine is to overcome an of the criminal substantially impairs trial which truth-finding its questions function and so rаises serious about the accuracy guilty past trials, verdicts in the new given complete rule has been retroactive effect.6 good-faith Neither reliance state or federal prior accepted authorities on law or practice, impact nor severe on the administration of justice require prospective has sufficed application in these circumstances. quite purpose
“It is different where the proscribing new constitutional standard the use of particular certain evidence or a mode of trial is not arbitrary, to minimize or avoid or unreliable results but to serve other ends. these situations the new question guilt doctrine raises no about defendants convicted trials.
“6 See, e.g.,
Massachusetts,
Arenault v.
(1968) (giving
right
retroactive effect to the
provided
counsel
in White Maryland,
It will be noted that the significant plurality opinion 6 a effect footnote his had application fact-finding process on the and retroactive instance, U. S. Berger For 393 California, resulted. v. (1969), gave 540, 21 the Court
89 S. Ct. L.Ed.2d holding the absence of a effect to its witness retroactive jurisdiction justify use at trial of his from does not preliminary hearing has testimony unless the state first presence good to made faith effort secure a significant integrity effect on the This could have a witness. testimony fact-finding process use of such would since right deprive his Amendment to a defendant of Sixth against him, an the witnesses confront and cross-examine adversary process of ingredient in our truth essential determination. L.Ed.2d S. 93 S. Ct. 413 U. Mayden,
Gosa problem with (1973), presents a identical case almost question before it the there had faced here. The Court 258, 89 holding Parker, 395 U. whether its O’Callahan prospective should be S. Ct. 23 L.Ed.2d application. held that a retrospective in its O’Callahan War, under the Articles U.S.C. court-martial convened jurisdiction try a member of the not have seq., did et § charged with of a crime who was commission Armed Forces having military cognizable in court and no a civilian off-post alleged significance, committed been of his leave, depriving thus such an individual while on by grand jury and rights indictment a trial key passage jury A in the petit a civilian court. opinion plurality of Mr. Justice is: Blackmun necessarily impact also consider “We must society retroactivity holding the interests *13 promulgated the new constitutional standard when accuracy bring question the into does adjudications guilt. Wholesale invalidation of years ago rendered could well mean convictions persons would be freed without convicted witnesses, particularly military ones, retrial, no available, longer may readily may be memories faded, may incomplete missing, have records may disappeared. have physical evidence made, tolerate, Society not be must a. result significant question when there is no that kind accuracy process by concerning the of the or, words, judgment rendered other when justice is essential not involved. purpose to
“We that the be served conclude on the law as it stood O’Callahan, reliance decision, holding аnd the effect of a before that retroactivity, require all that O’Callahan be ac- only. prospective application corded Id. We so hold.” at 685. Douglas
Mr. concurred the result Justice companion Gosa, reargument Gosa. case of He advocated however, judicata. he the issue of res He said had on merits position on the and would reserve “reached no fully explored reargument,” judgment until the issue was on why opinion reasons what he set forth his were “the but . . . arguably lead to an .” judicata should affirmance res similarity opinion striking paragraphs his reflect a Two the case hand: at civilian, question is whether a rather
“Here the military, him. than should have tried tribunal ‘jurisdiction’ question Does the whether military can late date tribunal be contested this judicata inquiry? turn whether bars that res review of his conviction Gosa in the “Petitioner question military never raised the tribunal ‘constitutionally If he was raised O’Callahan. any court, wé would punishment’ in immune from presented in problem v. U. United States But 723-724. Currency, S. Coin &
705 kangaroo petitioner by was not tried court or by military eager vigilantes but authorities within by Congress in the framework established Military Uniform Justice.” Id. 689-90. Code (Footnotes omitted.)
Wiggins upon 505, Neil, relies 409 U. 93 S. Robinson v. S. 876, (1973), compelling Ct. 29 retrospective L.Ed.2d application theory Long jurisdiction on the previously exercised this instance the Criminal Court of Baltimore was Such a unconstitutional. contention was rejected support advanced and in Gosa. Robinson does not retrospective application compelled the conclusion that is In unanimously here. Robinson held that v. Waller 1184, Florida, (1970), 397 U. S. 90 S. Ct. L.Ed.2d 435 given was to “full be retroactive effect.” Waller held that the jeopardy municipal double clause bars state prosecutions for the same Rehnquist act. Mr. Justice there said for the Court: indicated, instance, only for
“Linkletter procedural affecting very integrity those rules ‘the factfinding process’ given would be retrospective S., effect. 381 U. at 639. terms nonprocedural guarantees, some simply this test is appropriate. In Georgia, Furman v. 408 U. S. example, this Court held that in the presented imposition situation there of the death penalty constitutionally permissible. Yet, was not holding while integrity this does not affect factfinding process, we have not hesitated to apply retrospectively regard it without to whether E.g., the rule the Linkletter meets criteria. Walker Georgia, v. U. 408 S. 936. prohibition against being placed
“The in double jeopardy readily susceptible is likewise not analysis under line Linkletter of cases.
Although fully the Court has not handed down a opinion reasoned retroactivity on the of Benton v.
Maryland,
U. 89 S. Ct.
23 L.Ed.2d
[395
(1969),]
it has indicated that
it is retroactive
Linkletter
without examination of the
criteria.
Pearce,
North Carolina
Ashe
(1969);
Similarly,
401
in United States v. U. S. Coin &
715,
1041,
(1971),
L.Ed.2d
the Court
91
Ct.
28
434
U. S.
S.
States,
given Marchetti v. United
the effect to be
considered
and Grosso
697,
(1968),
39,
“In the case before factfinding impeccable procedures could not decreeing forfeiture, for we legitimate a verdict being penalized is held that the conduct constitutionally punishment. immune from No invocation of a rule circumstances call more for the retroactivity.” (Emphasis complete at 724. Id. added.) noted, Rehnquist pointed Mr. Justice out
As Robinson giving retrospective example effect to a decision an punishment, application in Georgia, relative Walker v. 2845, (1972), 936, L.Ed.2d 753 408 U. S. 92 S. Ct. Georgia, 92 S. Ct. 33 L.Ed.2d Furman (1972). application A made in footnote 22 of similar U. S. Witherspoon Illinois, 391 Ct. jury in which the condemned a
L.Ed.2d *16 procedure which excluded veniremen who voiced selection penalty expressed general objection a to the death even religious scruples against its In that case the infliction. constitutionally no defendant be Court concluded that could put of a so to death at the hands tribunal selected because “uncommonly they willing a man die.” were to condemn In Woodallthe Fourth Circuit said: question retroactivity
“We think the
is
Kemplen
in
decision
State of
controlled
our
(4th
1970).
true,
Maryland,
F. 2d 169
Cir.
It is
as
contends,
the
the unconstitutional
state
petitioners does not relate
treatment of
finding
judicial
accuracy of the fact
function of the
Kemplen,
process. But as we said in
the normal
proceeding
point in the
waiver
is a critical
only
proceedings against
juvenile.
a
It
is ‘the
opportunity an
plead
accused has to
the defense of
his diminished
responsibility
juvenile.’
as
a
Kemplen,
deny juveniles
at 177. To
in Baltimore the
opportunity of such a defense and to allow it to all
juveniles
Maryland
other
seems
to us so
fundamentally
impeach
validity
unfair as to
proceedings
the ‘adult’
and render unreliable the
guilty
proceedings.
verdicts obtained in these
We
hold, therefore,
Long
Robinson,
436 F. 2d
(4th
1971),
retroactively
Cir.
is to
applied.”
at
1970), cited only Circuit Woodall, Fourth concerned question, Judge put court, Craven it for that may, enforcing laws, “whether a state its criminal elect to proceed against juvenile as if he were an adult without his having hearing1 juvenile counsel the ‘waiver in the court.” He was held entitled to such holding counsel and the retroactively. applied directed to be indicated, we have the Fourth Circuit in Woodall As Wiggins conviction of an individual such as concluded that fundamentally prior procedure is under our “so unfair as to validity proceedings impeach the of the ‘adult’ and render guilty verdicts obtained unreliable th[o]se differently. proceedings.” We see it somewhat The waiver opportunity juvenile hearing an is not intended as for “to responsibility,” plead a defense of his diminished but to opportunity judge an for a to determine fitness of afford juvenile giving due rehabilitative measures safety public applying consideration to the (1974) (c) factors noted Code 3-816 Courts § Proceedings proceeding Judicial Article. waiver is no fact-finding way ultimate determination concerned with the did nor did not commit the act he is of whether accused The fact there has been no said to committed. a matter for consideration in the waiver *17 proceeding determining in whether the child committed the Likewise, in question delinquent. in and thus is a trial act procedures an under adult the fact of waiver is not element determining guilt in or innocence. for consideration juvenile proceeding or in a presented in a same evidence conclusion, regular lead the same should to criminal trial Wiggins’ out, time of trials although, point shall at the as we guarded jealously might more rights his have been than in a trial constitutionally regular in trial a however, difference, procedure. The juvenile under basic juvenile in lies not as a as an adult and trial between trial looking procedures fact-finding processes, but individual did determination that an rehabilitation after a the criminal which were violations of fact commit acts of this State. statutes Jury of by the Baltimore
Wiggins was indicted
Grand
right
by jury. Since he
City.
of trial
He was accorded
felony, he
entitled to the
of a
became
was accused
his
as had been the
appointment of counsel on
behalf
many years
of the
Maryland
to the decision
rule
335,
U.
83 S.
Supreme
Wainwright,
Court Gideon v.
(1963).
218 Md.
792,
See, e.g.,
State,
“Moreover, put evidence, the State in over reports objection, summaries of school teachers, gathered by principals that had been superintendent, although persons the the school making reports present the were not original reports were not cross-examination. produced. only the in Not were some of statements derogatory, the reports highly but statements these point equivocal. whole were At one the as a speak unacceptable as Dinez of an statements to pattern, cooperation in the at another of behaviour Dwight, year. In of the statements current the case point disturbance, speak one of emotional at improvement. In of marked this case there another report Department, that was also from Health being suspected’ ‘after of a he had been referred finding on offense. Yet there was no serious sexual nothing kept point, but a that he notation Apart being from appointments irregularly. misleading.” report hearsay, the was irrelevant 415. Id. at among juvenile knowledge those involved with
isIt common in of this Court Cromwell cases decision rejected by the Court similar Cromwell evidence Thus, had freely juvenile proceedings. had been admitted City for Wiggins Court of Baltimore before the Circuit been delinquent juvenile he was a a determination whether not, his of the time of truth-finding processes would as carefully they out as were conviction, been carried of Baltimore. the Criminal Court three-pronged Returning test enunciated Long rule Linkletter, purpose Maryland all individuals thenceforth to ensure that years dealt with on the same age would be under of 18 alleged their basis, geographical location of regardless It is evident law of the State. violations the criminal of the enactment period years, from the time for a procedure until the decision general the 1945 law for the District District Court the United States City youth were Maryland of Baltimore Long, *19 reaching by Assembly that state of regarded as the General they prosecuted as adults two maturity where should be years peers in of the State.5 the remainder earlier than their way acquiring on the of statistics We have no accurate prosecuted, but persons of between and 18 so number considering years during all of those the the fact that City by figures of population as reflected the of Baltimore 900,000 of in of the Bureau Census was excess United States say the number of people, it safe to that such seems probably in in the hundreds and the individuals is numbered styled years of what “Part III thousands. For number was designated as “the of the Court of Baltimore” was Criminal in Court,” intended to deal with those defendants Youth ages the of 16 and criminal cases who were between Attorney’s of Report office years, of State’s inclusive. year in which of year most City for the Baltimore page 15 Wiggins place, reflects at of took convictions youth convictions 1,104 trials and in court convictions random, Selecting yet year at another 1,443 defendants. 1,285 individual year page 33 shows 1966 at
report for the selecting random the Then at youth defendants convicted. Office of the Report Administrative of the Annual 1966-1967 10,161 were cases page 67 that Courts, at one notes year in Court the Criminal during that fiscal filed The same 8,978 were terminated. such cases Baltimore notes, place course, in which an individual as the dissent 5. Of court, jurisdiction his bringing not him an within committed place as a act proceeded against residence, he of whether was determinative probable, however, juvenile that the General It is or as an adult. majority in Assembly acts committed vast such believed that city residing by persons City were Baltimore committed Maryland majority were in the committed counties of such acts the vast residing persons in the counties. committed report period reflects 7,329 that for the same juvenile causes were filed in City 7,170 Baltimore were terminated. We are not to implying be understood as the number of those youth criminal cases or the number of court cases which young would people involve ages between thé of 16 and 18. However, youth figures when those court alongside are read figures showing the vast volume of criminal and arising matters City they give Baltimore rise to any given an year inference that very out of the 25 a persons substantial ages number of between the of 16 and 18 prosecuted would have been City. adults Baltimore On persuasive the issue of we reliance find language used Denno, Stovall v. 1967, 18 (1967): S. Ct. L.Ed.2d 1199
“The unusual force of the countervailing con- strengthens siderations our conclusion favor of prospective application. The law enforcement officials of the Federal Government and of all 50 proceeded States have premise heretofore on the the Constitution did require presence pretrial counsel confrontations *20 Today’s rulings identification. were not cases; foreshadowed our no court announced requirement such a by until Wade was decided Appeals Circuit, Court of for the Fifth F. 2d overwhelming majority 557. The of American always courts have question treated the evidence admissibility not as one of credibility but as one of Wall, jury. Eye-Witness for the Identification Criminal Cases 38. Law enforcement authorities fairly virtually weight relied on this unanimous authority, longer valid, conducting now no pretrial confrontations the absence of counsel. It is, therefore, very application clear that retroactive seriously disrupt of Wade and Gilbert ‘would administration of our criminal laws.’ Johnson v. 719], Jersey, New U. S. 731. Tehan v. [384 406], Shott, thought persuasive U. S. we it [382 against application retroactive of the no-comment 609, that such U. S. California, rule of Griffin impact on the six a serious application would have an accused’s comment allowed States that said, require all ‘To We the stand. failure to take every the conviction to void States now those would testify at his trial person did not who criminal of their upon impact the administration an U. devastating need no elaboration.’ as to law so compared to insignificant impact is S., That at 419. retroactivity of the expected from impact to be least, very rules. At the Wade and Gilbert would be criminal calendars processing of current hearings were conducted while disrupted evidence, taint, any, if in identification determine any the admission event and .whether too, Doubtless, error. harmless evidence was unavailability by handicapped inquiry would conclude, memories. We dim of witnesses rules should therefore, Wade and Gilbert that the 299-300. Id. at be made retroactive.” Wiggins was concerned fact-finding process insofar The degree certainly not contaminated 1229,14L.Ed.2d 85 Ct. California, 380 U. S. Griffin I, Article 13 of the California Con- (1965). There § any case, provided “in whether stitution explain not, his or to or failure defendant testifies testimony any facts in the case by deny his evidence upon by may the court against him be commented jury.” may the court or the counsel, be considered Douglas put it for As Mr. Justice jury was so advised. Supreme Court: prosecutor much of the failure “The made testify: petitioner to certainly knows whether
‘The defendant *21 up appearance at the this beat Essie Mae had apartment her and went down the he left time alley her. with to is it that would want
‘What kind of man sex up have with a woman that beat if she was up beat at the time he left?
‘He know He would that. would know how got alley. He she down would know how the got steps. blood on the bottom of concrete long He he her in would know how was with got wig would how that box. He know her off. He know her or would whether he beat her. whether he mistreated He would know place away from walked cool as he Mr. cucumber when saw Villasenor because guilt own he conscious his and wanted injured get away damaged from or woman. things he take has not seen fit to
‘These deny explain. stand and world, anybody if ‘And in the whole would know, this defendant would know. dead, you her is she can’t tell side ‘Essie Mae ” story. The defendant won’t.’ Id.
610-11.
Amendment,
in its direct
held “the Fifth
The Court
bearing
and in its
application Federal Government
Amendment,
by
forbids
reason of the Fourteenth
the States
prosecution
by
on the
silence
accused’s
either comment
the court that such silence
evidence
or instructions
Nevertheless,
portion
guilt.”
as indicated
of Stovall
Shott,
quoted,
we have
Court Tehan
held
Ct.
which we live it original indicated at the time of the be found the address hunting complaint. Locating would be like some of them passage haystack. proverbial in a of time makes needle many longer of the witnesses are no alive. it inevitable that by Wiggins requested If to be the additional relief carried granted, would into effect were to be the State’s burdens it was unable to continue those instances successfully retry in which was an an accused or there obliged acquittal would be in a new trial. The State to comb eliminating any purpose records for countless reference such convictions. Douglas Wiggins Gosa, the words of Mr. Justice “was by vigilantes,” kangaroo eager
not tried court but highest regularly trial court this State of the constituted jurisdiction according regular procedure to the with right by jury of trial and the assistance of counsel. The required prove State was to adduce evidence sufficient Wiggins guilty beyond reasonable doubt. We must not lose sage sight of the observation of Mr. Justice Cardozo Massachusetts, L. Snyder v. U. S. 54 S. Ct. *23 (1934): Ed. maintaining in
“The law ... is sedulous for a charged defendant with crime whatever forms of procedure opportunity are the essence of an to of Privileges as inherent defend. so fundamental to be concept every of a fair trial that could be acceptable thought men will be to the of reasonable inviolable, kept crushing however inviolate and may pressure incriminating prоof. But be the of accused, justice, though due the due to the is to concept also. The of fairness must not be accuser We are to strained till it is narrowed to filament. keep true. the balance danger . . the There is law — brought contempt
will into be discredit great even touch the immunities assured will. — gossamer if the Fourteenth Amendment prejudice possibilities of to a defendant are to nul- lify pronounced competent a court of a sentence law, jurisdiction in obedience to local and set the guilty Id. 122. free.” at Gosa, language used holding the of persuasive find the
We Gosa, opinion in dissenting Douglas in his by Mr. Justice language used holding and holding Tehan, and the rights of as between Keeping balance true” “the Stovall. accuser to the and fairness accused the individual Wiggins and rights balancing large society to burden against the substantial he persons such otherwise, reason, State, no we find Maryland citizenry of the State upon imposing impose. Wiggins here seeks onus which
Judgment affirmed. J., Eldridge, dissenting: my view, Long holding Robinson, Supp. F. (D. 1970), (4th
22 Md. aff'd, 1971), F. 2d 1116 Cir. should applied grant retroactively present so as to relief Long application case. held Maryland that the Robinson (1957, Supp.), (c), Code Cum. Art. 70-1 and Code § (1949 Public Local City ed.), (b), Laws Baltimore § placed juveniles ages between the 16of and 18 under jurisdiction the “adult” of the Criminal Court of Baltimore juveniles while age same the counties were under “juvenile” jurisdiction courts, of the circuit was a denial equal protection petitioner of the laws. The should be granted a his burglary declaration that convictions are null and an void and order directed the clerk of the expunge Criminal of Baltimore to the records of his convictions.1 majority suggests petitioner, seeking to have
Long
applied
prior May 15, 1969,
v. Robinson
to cases
*24
asking
us to overrule our
State,
decision
v.
Franklin
62,
(1972). However,
264 Md.
A.
616
question
285
2d
no
overruling
presented
the Franklin
decision
in this case.
suggested
15, 1969,
While dicta
May
Franklin
should
the
applying
be
determinative date for
Long, the case did not
involve one who had committed an offense and whose
complaint, petitioner sought
In1.
his bill of
a declaration that his
burglaries
birthday
for
four
conviction
the
committed after his sixteenth
birthday
eighteenth
and before his
be
null
declared
and void
the
because
jurisdiction
Juvenile Court did not waive its
over those offenses before his
sought
trial
the Criminal
He
Court Baltimore.
also
a declaration that
burglaries
his conviction for the two
committed before his sixteenth
birthday
because, although
null and void
be declared
the Juvenile Court
jurisdiction
offenses,
granted
hearing
waived
before
over those
no
was
himto
Kemplen Maryland,
(4th
the
waiver order. In
v.
F. 2d
428
169
Cir.
1970),
Appeals
Circuit,
the United States Court of
for the Fourth
in a case
Maryland,
hearing
held
from
representation by
waive
that a
was entitled
ato
and to
hearing
counsel at the
before the Juvenile Court could
jurisdiction.
applied
its
The court also held that its decision was to be
retroactively.
throughout
petitioner,
proceedings,
these
has
consistently argued
given Kemplen
that retroactive effect should be
to
as
Long.
court,
Special Appeals,
well as
Neither the trial
nor
Court of
nor
majority opinion
Court,
of this
has drawn a distinction between the two
questions. Consequently,
retroactivity Kemplen
I shall
discuss the
separate
However,
essentially
issue.
the same reasons set forth
175-178,
Kemplen,
Maryland
Fourth Circuit in
2d
428 F.
at
I believe give
holding Kemplen.
full
courts should
retroactive effect
to
prior May 15,
become final
conviction had
to
1969. The
July
offense for
Franklin
convicted occurred on
15, 1969,
Long,
and this Court held that under
the Criminal
jurisdiction
try
no
Baltimore had
him.
Court of
points out, beginning
majority
with
As the
Linkletter v.
618,
1731,
(1965),
85 S. Ct.
On the other constitutional where circumstances there are opinions,
719
applied retroactively
criminal
holdings are
cases
regard
analysis of Linkletter v.
without
for the
criteria
One circumstance which a
Walker
v. Denno.
Stovall
retrospective
ruling
given full
effect
constitutional
should be
ruling
principle of
is where
declared no new
authority,
law,
prior
merely
constitutional
overruled no
but
applied
particular type
principles
settled
244, 247-248,
States,
of situation. Desist v. United
(1969);
Shoe,
89 S. Ct.
20 L.Ed.2d Another where the circumstance principle nonretroactivity Linkletter and Stovall has no application holding.in question is where the constitutional — prevented taking place would have the criminal trial from , subject where would the conduct not have been to the prosecution punishment. Neil, criminal Robinson v. (1973).
U. S. 35 L.Ed.2d S. Ct. principles compel Long These the conclusion that v. applied retroactively present Robinson should be in the case. First, any authority that casе did not overrule and did any principles law, not announce new of constitutional but merely applied equal protection principles settled to strike discriminatory practice City. Second, down a in Baltimore holding Long Robinson, petitioner’s under the punishment place. trial and Instead, should not have taken Equal under Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, petitioner proceeded against should have been and, if delinquent, found to have been dealt with as a suffering without a criminal conviction and the subsequent imposes. disabilities which such conviction Third, prong if even the “three test” of Walker, Linkletter v. subsequent Denno, pertinent here, cases is I Stovall application believe that of the Linkletter and Stovall requires retroactivity criteria full be accorded holding Long v. Robinson.
I. cases, particular Under the Court’s whether a judicial applied decision on a constitutional issue should be *26 retroactively, depends
prospectively the first instance principle declared a new whether or not the decision on principle, If it did announce a new then law. determining it should be whether other considerations prong retroactively, applied such as the three test set forth cases, may other become relevant. v. Denno and Stovall ruling question represent did judicial not a But if the given principles, should be full departure from settled it regardless of other considerations. effect retroactive play nonretroactivity only comes into principle of That the declaring has been new doctrine with decisions in connection many occasions. Supreme Court made clear Corp., Mach. Shoe, Shoe Inc. v. United Hanover action, that Court held supra, civil antitrust principle of whether to decide did not have it beyond applied the area of nonretroactivity should be because those antitrust decisions certain criminal law to did overrule a “novel” issue and not involve decisions did not (392 stated U. S. at The Court there earlier cases. emphasis supplied): Appeals theory seems to
“The party significantly has relied when a have been doctrine, upon a clear established newly application of a declared retrospective justifiable to his upset that reliance doctrine would justice injury, considerations substantial apply new rule require fairness only. Pointing to recent decisions of prospectively law, the Court the criminal this Court in area of why the no reason Appeals could see prospective only which had favored considerations applied should application in those cases area, especially in a the civil well as is, course, no reason treble-damage There action. us a theory we have this unless before confront clearly declared there was a in which situation relied and upon judicial which United doctrine lawful, a doctrine its conduct under which new rule was overruled favor performed reliance according to which conduct been rule would the old upon unlawful. presents case this we do not believe
Because
*27
upon
pass
situation,
occasion to
we have no
such a
Appeals.
theory of the Court
States
in Alcoa
[United
opinion
“Neither
America,
(2d
F. 2d 416
Cir.
148
Co.
Aluminum
Tobacco
opinion in American
1945)] nor
States, 328 U. S.
United
Co. v.
Tobacco
[American
(1946)]
1125,
indicated
L. Ed. 1575
781,
S. Ct.
90
66
novel,
innovative
issue involved was
that
that
it, or that the
necessary
resolve
principles were
a manner
in
cases in
had been settled
issue
ruling
held
those courts.
contrary to the view
competitors to
necessary to exclude
it was not
Appeals
monopolization,
the Court of
guilty
be
upon
long line of
relied
for
Second Circuit
stretching
to 1912. 148 F.
back
this Court
cases
will
2d,
429. The
that actions
at
conclusion
‘limited
monopolization
are
not
show
honestly
was also
industrial’
not
manoeuvres
Court,
opinions
premised on
this
earlier
Co.,
U. S.
particularly
v. Swift &
United States
460,
(1932).”
106, 116,
In Desist v.
347, 88 Ct.
States,
389 U. S.
S.
United
the decision Katz v.
retroactively,
applied
(1967), should be
507,
L.Ed.2d 576
retroactivity
argument
petitioner’s
initial
and
Court,
any prior
The
case.
that Katz had
not overruled
“compelled
however,
to decide whether”
held that
it was
be limited to the future” because
“application should
Katz's
past,” and had
represented
break with the
Katz
a “clear
129,
States, v. United
62 S. Ct.
overruled Goldman
States,
Olmstead v. United
993,
(1942), L. Ed. 1322
(1928). The
“We are met at the outset present actually that Katz does contention prospective choice between retroactive application new doctrine. said, decision, depart Court it is did not any existing interpretation from Constitution, merely previous but confirmed the enunciating demise of decisions obsolete ‘trespassory’ distinction between searches physical penetration those which there was no protected premises.” (394 247-248, And emphasis continued U. S. at supplied):
“But opinion this contention misconstrues our holding Katz. Our there that Goldman longer regarded controlling,’ Olmstead ‘can no S., Ct., recognized U. at 88 S. *28 those had decisions not been overruled until that day. True, principles they expressed had been modified. The belief that an oral could conversation object not be the of a ‘search’ or ‘seizure’ had not States, survived. And in Silverman v. United 365 U. 505, 679, S. 734, 81 S. Ct. L.Ed.2d 5 we had scope cautioned of the Fourth Amendment could not be ascertained resort to the ‘ancient property niceties S., of tort real law.’ 365 U. 511, Ct., 81 S. assumption persisted at 682. But the that electronic did surveillance not offend the Constitution unless there anwas ‘actual intrusion constitutionally into a protected While area.’ may decisions before growing Katz have reflected dissatisfaction with the traditional tests validity surveillance, of electronic consistently the reiterated those tests and declined invitations to abandon them. However clearly holding our may Katz have been foreshadowed, it was past, a clear break with the compelled and we are thus to decide whether its ” application should be limited to future.
723 Hudson, Company v. 97, 106, 404 U. S. Oil also Chevron See (“the 355, (1971) decision to be 349, 296 30 L.Ed.2d 92 Ct. S. principle a new applied nonretroactively must establish Kurtzman, 192, 197-198, U. Lemon v. .”); 411 S. . . law . (1973) (both 151 1463, L.Ed.2d 206-207, 36 210-211, S. Ct. 93 dissenting and the opinion of Justice plurality the Chief Douglas). opinion Mr. Justice Court cases
Consequently,
a decision should
whether
law area which have considered
which
prospectively all involve decisions
just
applied
be
with earlier decisions
which were inconsistent
overruled or
v.
example,
Adams
For
particular
issues involved.
on the
278,
916,
(1972);
202
Illinois, 405
S.
L.Ed.2d
S.
92 Ct.
31
U.
Massachusetts,
5,S.
v.
393 U.
Arsenault
Commonwealth of
Rhay,
v.
McConnell
35,
(1968);
393 U.
overturning
previous
decisions
and announcing
new
principles.2
retroactivity
Illinois,
478,
2.
1758,
1602,
Escobedo v.
378 U. S.
84 S. Ct.
(1964),
12
Arizona,
L.Ed.2d 977
436,
and Miranda v.
384 U. S.
86 S. Ct.
(1966),
725
reasoning employed
Moreover,
language and
“three
applying the so-called
cases
Supreme Court
ruling
constitutional
whether a
prong test” to determine
any
retroactively,
confirm
applied
should
a
application
limited to
of nonretroactive
consideration
For
doctrine.
announcing
new
decision
624,
supra,
U. S.
Walker,
381
example,
v.
in Linkletter
judicial
and
decisions
discussing
view of
the Austinian
after
Ct. 149,
Neil,
505,
(1937).
409
S.
93
S.
The of the Court throughout opinion principle, Linkletter, its was that though overruled, “decisions later ‘are law none the less for ” (381 625); U. S. at intermediate transactions’ “ ‘past always by judicial cannot be erased a new ” (ibid.); declaration’ and that “the existence of the Wolf prior Mapp operative may doctrine is ‘an fact ” justly ignored’ (id. 636). consequences which cannot be very prong The manner which the three test for nonretroactivity determining was set forth Stovall 297, Denno, 388 U. S. at which is the formulation set supra, subsequent dealing issue, in all of the cases with the forth nonretroactivity application only the rule of has shows that repeat, doctrine is announced. To where a new constitutional the Court stated Stovall: guiding question
“The resolution of the criteria implicate (a) purpose served new to be standards, (b) extent of the reliance law standards, and enforcement authorities on the old justice of a (c) the administration of the effect on application retroactive new standards.” (Emphasis supplied.) supra, at 651: States, 401 U.S.
See also Williams v. United give “In Linkletter v. Walker ... we declined to complete exlusionary rule retroactive effect to the cases, Relying we Mapp v. Ohio .... interpretations firmly rejected idea that all new always must be considered of the Constitution prior constructions to have been the law and that always ignored.” (Emphasis contrary must supplied.) past just term in Court’s decision this 95 S. 422 U. S. Ct. Peltier, States v.
United
non-
the rule
(1975), confirms
L.Ed.2d 374
depends
adjudications
retroactivity
for constitutional
initially
question
has
on whether the decision
announcеd
principle.
The issue
Peltier was
new constitutional
States,
whether
Almeida-Sanchez United
applied
was to be
The Court applicable a law not as “the law-new test” was old analysis, ground on the 'precondition to but retroactive “Almeida-Sanchez, roving patrol prior border searches Nationality Immigration (a)(3) and under sec. 287 [of (a)(3)] upheld repeatedly were 8 U.S.C. 1357 Act of by against Courts constitutional attack” United States Fifth, Id. and Tenth Circuits. at 540. Appeal for the Ninth disagreeing opinion Rehnquist, Mr. Justice The Court’s opinion dissenting of Mr. Justice Brennan that the with . . . “decision Almeida-Sanchez presents question no ‘“ sharp prospectivity” it did not constitute break because ” authority’ (id. 544), pointed out the line of earlier at patrol agents upon “in the border had acted reliance validly statute, supported enacted longstanding regulations judicial administrative and continuous approval” parties may “reasonably rely upon and that . .. legal pronouncements emanating from sources other than (Id. 541-542.) majority opinion this Court.. . .” at exclusionary the Court thus treated rule decision Almeida-Sanchez representing a “new constitutional principle only . . . prospective application” be accorded [to] applied under the test Walker, Linkletter supra, (Id. other similar 535.) cases.
While Peltier makes it clear that a “new constitutional principle” purposes nonretroactivity rule of need always overruling stem from the of a United States decision, majority while the dissenting opinions in Peltier disagreed over the nature of *33 the lower federal court decisions involved and the extent to patrol agents which border justifiably could have relied on 540-542), them at {id. majority opinion nevertheless the appear did question reaffirm that the nonretroactivity only respect arises with declaring decisions new constitu- tional doctrine. entirely
It reasonable to limit consideration Linkletter Stovall rule of nonretroactivity to those deci- declaring sions a new principle constitutional or doctrine. For example, at the time of the defendant’s trial in Linkletter,
729 in violation of seized of evidence at the trial the admission Colorado, proper under v. Amendment was the Fourth Wolf change in authoritative only later supra. It was Ohio, supra, coming Mapp v. decisions, with upon admission retrospect propriety doubt cast change applicable in the there is no But where the evidence. doctrine, and the defendant’s constitutional requirements then violated constitutional conviction was recognized effеct, defendant’s conviction to be in knowing waiver improper Absent a at the time it occurred. of his right the time existing of his constitutional at then challenge trial, principles permit him to would traditional proceeding on the conviction later in a collateral his Noia, ground. Fay v. constitutional S.U. Cf. State, v. (1963); Jourdan
83 S. Ct. L.Ed.2d 837 (1975).3 Md. 2d 341A.
Moreover, no new where decision announces argument principle, no for the there is basis public upon the officials “relied” “old” constitutional merely Finally, principle. where a involves decision principles particular application of to a settled constitutional justification public practice, is much less officials there upon complain about the effect of the decision justice. administration supra, declared no new constitutional
Long Robinson,
v.
merely applied
doctrine,
authority,
no
overruled
but
principles
long
Equal
under
established
Protection
down
the Fourteenth Amendment to strike
an
Clause of
practice
Maryland.4
arbitrary
discriminatory
law, youths
ages
Pursuant
to local
between the
of sixteen
rejected
argument
consistently
that,
has
with
3. The
retroactivity
holding,
respect
a distinction
to the
a constitutional
should
conyiction and
made
cases on direct
review from a criminal
between
See,
involving
upon
later
criminal conviction.
those
collateral attack
supra,
States,
651-652;
e.g.,
v.
401 U.
Desist United
Williams
United
States, supra,
majority in
instant case
Assembly
reaching
as
City
regarded
General
were
prosecuted
maturity
they
where
should be
state of
peers
years
than their
the remainder
two
earlier
adults
however,
or
This,
not have been the basis
State.”
could
treatment, because the distinction
for the different
rationale
upon
was a
dependent
whether
the defendant
not
was.
in the
City” or a resident elsewhere
“youth of Baltimore
year old was
a sixteen or seventeen
Whether
State.
criminally
as a
prosecuted
or
treated
depended upon
“delinquent”
committing
act
a “criminal”
committed,
upon
in the
where
the offense
where
(b)
3-818
youth resided. Code
State the
§
(1957,
Proceedings Article;
Code
and Judicial
Courts
(1957,
(1);
Vol.,
Supp.), Art.
70-4
Code
Repl.
1969 Cum.
§
Long
Maryland
901. In
v. Robinson
Repl. Vol.),
Rule
*35
court, who was
itself,
plaintiffs in the federal
of the
one
Municipal
facing
in the then
a criminal defendant
trial as
year
City,
old resident
was a sixteen
Court of Baltimore
temporarily
be
County
happened to
Howard
who
allegedly
he
when
City
appointment
Baltimore
for a medical
City.
Supp.
24.
316 F.
an
in Baltimore
committed
offense
protection clause have
applying
equal
the
While the cases
for territorial
there is a wide toleration
indicated that
state,
authority
the state’s
within a
nevertheless
distinctions
drawing
“reasonable distinctions
between
limited to
is
San Antonio
political
within
its borders.”
subdivisions
Rodriguez,
n.
Independent School District v.
411
S.
U.
(1973)
1278, 1294,
(emphasis
n.
L.Ed.2d 16
93 S. Ct.
36
Maryland,
420, 426,
S.
See McGowan
supplied).
366 U.
(1961) (“A statutory
1101, 1105,
discrimination will not be aside it.”) justify (emphasis reasonably may to be conceived Trader, 364, 389, A. 2d Matter of supplied); 272 Md. rational
(1974) require a (“. Maryland . cases seem to . the different for territorial discrimination as between basis State.”) (emphasis supplied); Horowitz and parts of the Equal Rev. Protection Neitring, 15 U.C.L.A. L. Intrastate years ago with (1968). forty this stated Almost equal protection clause, respect requirements Jackson, 251, 269-270, (1935): A. 534 Dasch v. 170 Md. consideration, “Nor, apart any from other any the territorial rational basis for there act, made there is no such for classification existing within the difference the conditions City and those within its state outside of Baltimore limits, paper the business of reference to pursuit hanging, which would make the of it in the public safety city to the health and but a menace beyond is, course, well harmless its limits. It may legislature settled that restrict application localities less in extent statutes exigencies ... of the several than the state parts may require. But of the broad as state power is, may deprive the citizens it used part
of one rights of the privileges state of they enjoy in common with the citizens of all parts state, other unless there is some in conditions in the territory selected and difference that not affected statute, sufficient to afford basis, slight, some however for the classification.” (Emphasis supplied.) ground
Since there was no reasonable basis youths distinction between committing offenses City youths committing Baltimore offenses elsewhere in State, striking down of this discriminatory practice (cid:127)in Long clearly represented Robinson application an *36 equal protection well-settled principles to the facts of a particular Long case.5 v. Robinson announced no new and, constitutional doctrine consequently, given should be full retroactive regard effect without to the criteria set forth v. Stovall Denno and Linkletter v. Walker.6
II. a ruling Another circumstance constitutional applied retroactively matter, be should to a criminal independently analysis, Linkletter, Stovall, the etc. of ruling prevented where would have criminal trial the the punishment taking place, type being or from the of from imposed. principle the
While
that certain constitutional decisions
only
applied prospectively
should
be
on occasion been
has
areas,7
part
principle
most
invoked
other
for the
this
of
nonretroactivity
procedure
is limited to matters of'
the
pointed
Judge
Long
Robinson,
5. As
out
as
Watkins in
v.
supra
Supreme
F.Supp.
28-29,
long ago as 1928 the
of
at
Court Missouri invali-
practice
equal protection grounds a similar
under
dated on
the Missouri
Gregori,
(1928).
318 Mo.
S.W.2d 747
statutes. State
application
Long
Even if
6.
v. Robinson had involved
“new"
the
requirement
deny
persons
that
any
state
equal protection
shall
to
the
no.
laws,
regarded
announcing
I would
doubt
it
a new
still
should be
as
principle
bring
so
rule
constitutional
to
into consideration the Linkletter
Currency,
nonretroactivity.
United States v. United
Coin and
States
Cf.
supra,
(concurring opinion
Brennan).
On cases, involving types questions certain procedure arising proceedings, during the criminal are not analysis susceptible Linkletter, Stovall, and similar to the 507-508, Neil, supra, cases. 409 U. Robinson opinion by Rehnquist in an Mr. Justice stated (emphasis supplied): readily
“We lends do not believe that this case analysis itself established Linkletter. nothing in
Certainly, there is those Linkletter or following cases it to indicate that all rules and arising interpretations under *37 eight subjected first must Amendments be analysis there enunciated. Linkletter itself exception general announced an to the rule of announcing retroactivity a decision exclusionary Mapp Ohio, 643, rule of v. 367 U. S. 81 1684, (1961), given would S. Ct. L.Ed.2d prospective only. Linkletter, effect and the other Circuit, upon cases relied the Sixth with dealt interpretations bearing those on particular of mode trial. use evidence procedural conducting rights Those methods See, e.g., 2, supra. 8. cases discussed in fn.
trials, however, do encompass not all rights found in eight the first Amendments. Guarantees that do not procedural relate to these cannot, rules retroactivity purposes, lumped he conveniently for together in analysis. terms purpose For the effect of the guarantees various constitutional vary sufficiently among themselves so as to affect necessity prospective for rather than retrospective application. indicated, instance,
“Linkletter
for
only
procedural
those
affecting
very
rules
‘the
integrity
factfinding
process’
given
would be
retrospective
S.,
639,
Ct.,
effect. 381 U.
at
85 S.
at
1743. In
nonprocedural
tеrms
some
guarantees,
simply
thr
test
appropriate.
is
In Furman v.
Georgia,
238,
2726,
S.
U.
S. Ct.
33 L.Ed.2d
example,
this
Court held that in the
presented
situation there
imposition of the death
penalty
constitutionally permissible.
was not
Yet,
holding
while this
integrity
does not affect the
process,
factfinding
we have not hesitated to
apply
retrospectively
it
regard
without
to whether
the rule
E.g.,
meets
Linkletter criteria.
Walker
Georgia,
408 U. S.
92 S. Ct.
33 L.Ed.2d
753.”
Court Robinson v. Neil went on to hold that Waller
Florida,
90 S. Ct.
(1970), which had held that the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy prohibited separate Clause municipal state and prosecutions offense, for the same given was to be full application retroactive because ruling the Waller would have prevented the state criminal trial and taking conviction from place Court, although at all. The pointing out distinction which drawing “ironclad,” it was was not explained (409 509, emphasis U. supplied): guarantee against
“The jeopardy double significantly procedural guarantees different from held in the Linkletter line cases to have *38 guarantee, like this prospective only. While effect right others, the criminal a constitutional is prevent a trial defendant, practical result its prescribe taking all, than to place at rather from a trial. procedural govern conduct rules that applied rules A number of the constitutional were only the Linkletter cases prospectively under fairness the earlier basic not to affect the found trial, to collateral directed instead but to have been police purposes of unlawful such as the deterrence Waller, supra. however, conduct, Mapp Ohio, v. ruling squarely
the Court’s was directed to the all, prevention taking place at of the second trial’s though might it have conducted with a even been scrupulous regard for all of the constitutional procedural rights defendant.” 1, Swenson, supra, n. 397 U. S. at also Ashe See ‘retroactivity’ of of the the Court’s can be no doubt “[t]here Maryland,” U. 88 S. Ct. S. decision Benton holding the Fifth Amendment’s L.Ed.2d 707 applicable Jeopardy to state Clause Double proceedings.
Again United Coin in United States v. States 722-724,the held that a supra, 401 U. S. at Currency, stopped the trial ruling would applied taking place, should be from punishment and retroactively. States, supra, U. S. United Marchetti v. 62, had, supra, States, 390 U. S and Grosso v. United convic- cases, the criminal overruling held earlier against privilege their gamblers asserted ground who tion complying for not with self-incrimination law, gambling was aspects federal tax certain constitutionally United precluded. United States v. States supra, held Currency, that Marchetti Grosso Coin and proceeds, precluded gambling the forfeiture of the also ground applied retroactively on the should constitutionally punishment. In immune from conduct (401 Harlan, U. opinion by Mr. the Court said Justice an supplied): 723,emphasis *39 “Unlike some of our earlier retroactivity decisions, we are here concerned with implementation the procedural of a rule which does not undermine the accuracy basic factfinding process at trial. ; Linkletter v. Walker . . . Tehan v. United States ; ex rel. Shott . . . Jersey ; Johnson v. New . . . Rather, Stovall Denno .... Marchetti Grosso dealt with kind the that conduct cannot constitutionally punished be in the instance. first gamblers Angelini’s These cases held that position had the right Fifth Amendment to remain silent in the the face of statute’s command that they reports submit which could incriminate them. right, absence of waiver the a of that such persons properly prosecuted could not be at all.” And, language particularly apt majority’s the concerning superior the case discussion instant the fact finding procedures court, Supreme the criminal the (401 Currency United States Coin and went U. S. at 724): us, however, the case before the even use of
“In
factfinding
procedures
impeccable
could not
forfeiture,
legitimate
decreeing
a verdict
for we
being penalized
held
conduct
have
the
is
constitutionally
punishment.
immune
from
No
for the
circumstances call more
invocation of a rule
complete retroactivity.”
Furthermore,
ruling
even
the
where
would
prevented
trial,
would
not have
but
imposition
particular
involved,
prevented
penalty
retroactivity”
applicable. Thus,
“complete
the rule
Georgia,
33 L.Ed.2d
Walker v.
408 U.
S. Ct.
Massachusetts,
(1972);
supra;
Stewart v.
and other cases
gave
time,
all
effect to the
decided at
same
retroactive
imposition
ruling
Georgia, supra,
in Furman v.
penalty
Eighth
Amendment. For
the death
violated
supra.
Neil,
cases,
of these
see Robinson v.
discussion
See
opinion
plurality
also
in Gosa v.
of Mr. Justice Blackmun
Mayden, supra,
Applying these Court cases to the decision in Long Long given Robinson dictates that full retroactive Although effect. majority opinion present in the case compares procedural rights applicable in a criminal trial applicable with those proceedings, simply this is Long irrelevant. v. Robinson was not concerned with procedural rights during trial, but with *40 unconstitutionality subjecting youths of certain to criminal proceedings punishment and criminal at the same time that youths other age, of committing acts, the same the same subject prosecution were punishment not to and as ruling Long criminals.9 If the v. applied Robinson were petitioner, he initially subject would not have been to a punishment Department trial and to in a Instead, Correction institution. he would have been treated proceedings which, as a as this Court has stated repeatedly, are “dispositions not criminal and the are not punishment Johnson, for crime.” In re 254 Md. (1969).
A. 2d 419 And Cromwell, see Matter 232 Md. 409, 415, 194 (1963). A. 2d 88
III. previously discussed, As the three criteria set forth in the applying rulings prospectively only, new cases constitutional “(a) purpose by standards, (b) are to be served the new by the extent of the reliance law enforcement authorities on standards, (c) the old the effect on the administration of justice application of a retroactive of the new standards.” Mayden, supra, 679;Michigan Payne, Gosa v. 413 U. S. at v. This, course, distinguishes Long 9. the instant case and from Gosa v. Mayden, supra, upon majority which the Gosa relies. concerned with retroactivity Parker, supra, regarding of O’Callahan v. court martial plurality opinion trials of non-service in Gosa connected crimes. As clear, question initially subject makes was not whether or not one was prosecution to criminal for non-service connected crimes but whether he procedural rights was entitled to the set forth the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments. See
supra, States, supra, 412 U. S. at Desist v. United U. 249; supra, Denno, at v. U. S. 297. And Stovall at see Walker, supra, U. Even v. S. at 636-639. if the Linkletter by retroactivity Long governed v. Robinson were to be criteria, Long should be these effect accorded retroactive provide ruling present relief in the so as to case. important determining the criteria most
retroactivity ruling purpose of a is the constitutional clearly points retroactivity, ruling. “purpose” If the test effect,” “complete ruling given retroactive “[njeither good-faith reliance or federal authorities state accepted practice, nor law or severe impact justice has sufficed on the administration application prospective in these require circumstances.” States, supra, 401 U. S. at cases Williams v. United Michigan supra, 412 Payne, v. U. S. therein cited. See also York, 203, 204, 92 55; New City V. U. S. S. Ct. Ivan v. 1951, 32 (1972). L.Ed.2d 659 ruling major purpose Where a of a constitutional does sentence, propriety of the verdict or relate to the fairness insuring police compliance objects has other such but imposed upon them the Fourth with the restrictions Peltier, (e.g., supra; United States Linkletter Amendment usually has limited Walker, supra), the *41 ruling subsequent the cases. On other the effect of the to ruling heavily hand, purpose the bears most where the against adjudicatory process the a upon fairness of the during right defendant, the to counsel trial such as right supra) or Wainwright, the (Pickelsimer v. California, supra), ruling will (Berger v. the confrontation given effect. normally retroactive be holding aimed at the Typically, is where a having process itself, than some adjudicatory rather integrity the object, to “infect the it said extraneous Denno, supra, process (Stovall truth-determining at trial” v. “ 298) or the ‘fair determination’ [the U. Russell, (Roberts guilt or innocence” defendant’s] has 294). often supra, Consequently, the Court S. at 392 U. deciding “purpose” whether the of the phrases in used such majority in the instant retroactivity. The ruling points to Long v. Robinson case, alia, that because, inter it concludes or the “determining guilt innocence” did not relate fact-finding trial, the and that “fact-finding process” at was better than Baltimore process in Court of the Criminal Long should be proceeding, holds that that a only. applied prospectively than this.
However, “purpose” is broader criteria the “integrity of Supreme to the has referred When the Court something fact-finding process,” meant more than the it has engaged particular in a action. whether or not the defendant guilt,” ruling the “verdict of doubt about Where a cast States, supra, it would 401 U. S. at Mackey v. United retroactively. Moreover, if applied the seem that it should only verdict but relates ruling affect the criminal does not may only sentencing procedure, have affected the clearly imposed, has held punishment ruling requires purpose retroactive (“The Rhay, supra, 393 S. at 3 application. McConnell v. U. very sentencing . . to ‘the right . relates to counsel at fact-finding process.’ ”); Witherspoon v. integrity of the striking (a ruling down Illinois, supra, S. at n. 391 U. procedure only to sentence jury which related selection jury, applied imposed or recоmmended to be was integrity retroactively ground it undermined the on the “ petitioner’s fate”). ‘process’ of the that decided ruling Long Robinson, may while it not have procedure deciding of the whether related to the fairness act, year particular directly a sixteen old did was guilty concerned with the fairness of verdict and the petitioner Long holding, Under the would not have sentence. and, been subject initially absent a to trial as an adult jurisdiction by juvenile court, would not have w.aiver punishment suffered a criminal conviction an adult Long ruling prison. Obviously, directly related to imposed, to be the verdict and sentence and thus the “purpose” ruling requires applied it be retroactively. *42 respect, “purpose”
In another standard dictates applying Long retroactively grant petitioner v. Robinson to majority opinion in relief. The the instant case seems to only youth purpose trying juvenile suggest that aas him, Maryland purpose to rehabilitate was and that such only However, Maryland would relate to the future. long “purposes” Legislature provided has that one of juvenile proceedings is remove from com- children “[t]o the, mitting delinquent criminality acts the taint of consequences of criminal behavior.” 3- Code § (a)(2) Proceedings of the Courts and Judicial Article. “purpose” relating This in the stated statutes to clearly Long retroactively proceedings applying for calls present very pe- to actions like the one. The relief which titioner seeks is to remove the taint and the disabilities suffers, right vote, which he such as loss of the because improperly engaging he convicted criminal be- having juvenile. havior instead of been dealt with Long v. “purpose” dictates standard Since retrospective application, given be should Robinson on the “effect administration of “reliance” criteria mentioned, particularly are not previously justice,” as point also However, of these criteria both relevant. retroactivity. discussing Court, “reliance” factor Supreme standards, invariably has almost
upon old constitutional authority prior judicial upon referring the reliance been As discussed “old” standards. upholding the setting forth or upholding prior authority supra, I, was no there Part only prior City. The Baltimore discriminatory practice in protection had, equal subject reported decision on the involved. type of discrimination invalidated the grounds, also, I, supra, in Part Moreover, delineated the reasons authorizing Maryland officials on the statute any reliance been reasonable not have would discrimination repeatedly opinions justified, See, “justified.” e.g., must indicated that the reliance at 295. Russell, supra, Roberts justice by upon Turning the administration effect to the retroactively, it would seem that Long applying Robinson *43 impact many would be minimal. Unlike the cases in the retroactivity Court concerned with the rulings cases, impact Long local, affecting v. Robinson is the administration of justice throughout nation or even the entire State of Maryland. Instead, only would affect convictions it Baltimore, youths Criminal Court of between sixteen and eighteen, during span time. It involve few certain would people incarcerated, who are still conceded the State at argument only the time of oral in this case to be about sixteen, probably Expunging now fewer. records of improperly light those convicted of criminal offenses in Long present insuperable burden, should no administrative office, as the are court records all one clerk’s that of the expungement Criminal of Baltimore. And if should burden, present turn out to a serious at least administrative petitioner’s position declaratory those in are entitled to judgments voiding convictions, thereby restoring their their right removing flowing to vote and the other disabilities from a criminal conviction. sum, reasons, agree I for several would with the 1973), Pettibone, (4th
decision in Woodallv.
Judge Levine me to state that he concurs authorizes expressed views herein.