31 F. 122 | U.S. Cir. Ct. | 1887
We need not at all consider any of the interesting questions argued in this case except that which relates to the time when the lodge “dues” become in arrears, for, in the view the court takes of
The facts are that Wiggin died on the thirteenth day of October, 1883, having paid all assessments necessary to keep his life insurance benefit in force, but leaving unpaid four dollars of dues to his local lodge; and the question is whether, under the rules and regulations of the order, they were in arrears more than six months. The constitution of the endowment rank, in which the member obtains the benefits of the life insurance department of the order, provides as follows:
“Art. 11, § 1. A member shall be considered in good standing in the section, as regards dnes, who is not more than six months in arrears for dues to his lodge; and shall not be considered in good standing, as regards dues, when lie is more than six months in arrears lor dues in liis lodge.
The general laws for the government of subordinate lodges in Tennessee enact as follows:
“Art. 5, § 1. Bach subordinate lodge shall regulate its dues and benefits: provided, however, that a member who is one year in arrears shall stand suspended, unless he be under charges.” ’
The by-laws of Constantine Lodge, No. 23, contain the following regulations:
“Sec. 6. Members of this lodge shall pay into the treasury thereof, as dues, the sum of $6.00 per year, payable semi-annually, at the last stated meetings in June and December.”
“Sec. 35. All members who shall refuse or neglect to pay all duos, assessments, and fines in full, at the end of each semi-annual term, shall bo declared in arrears, and non-participants in any of the benefits of this lodge.”
“Sec. 86. The terms begin on the first days of January and July, and end on the last days of June and December.”
The officer of the lodge introduced as a witness testifies that the dues were not payable in advance, but at the end of each term, and this is clearly the meaning of the rules of the lodge already quoted. Each lodge has the power to regulate that matter for itself, may make the dues
That this is always the fixed and technical meaning of “arrears” is too plain for argument. The oldest -lexicographer of law terms known to me defines the word as coming “from the French arriere, retro; behind; money unpaid at the due time, as rent behind.” Cowell, Law Diet. h. t. To the same effect are all the dictionaries. Jac. Diet.; Bouv. Law Diet.; Abb. Law Diet.; Soule, Syn.; Roget’s Thes.; Webster’s Diet.; Worcester’s Diet. The same meaning is developed if we examine the legal signification of the words “due” or “dues,” and “accrue,” and the like, in their relation to this idea of being “in arrears.” The word “due,” unlike “arrears,” has more than one signification, and expresses two distinct ideas, and this distinction is important in relation to its use in these rules and regulations. “At times it signifies a simple indebtedness, without reference to the time of payment. Dehitumin presentí, solvendum in futuro. At other times it shows that the day of payment has passed.” Scudder v. Coryell, 5 N. J. Law, 340, 345. It is evidently used in the rules and regulations of this order in the first of these significations, and not at all in the second; and hence there is some confusion of ideas, perhaps, in their interpretation. But there is no such ambiguity about the word “arrears,” as has been shown by its definition. The cases of Moss v. Gallimore, 1 Doug. 279, and Birch v. Wright, 1 Term R. 378, and many others in the law concerning real property, illustrate this meaning, when used to express that “rent is in arrears,” etc. Always, it must be past due to be “in arrears.” Also the case of Mundt v. Sheboygan R. Co., 31 Wis. 451, construing a statute for the protection of laborers which required that notice should be given “within thirty days after such claim or demand shall have accrued,” is instructive. It was there hold that a claim for -wages already earned and payable, but which, by the custom of the railroad company and its laborers, were to be paid on the fifteenth day of the next month, as .a pay-day, did not accrue until that pay-day arrived, and that this custom became a part of the contract.
Here the disputed dues for the term commencing January 1st, and ending June 30th, did not become finally payable until the latter date, after which only did they become “in arrears;” and, as Wiggin died before the six months’ indulgence expired, his policy was not forfeited by the very terms of the contract itself. Judgment for the plaintiff-.