69 P. 286 | Idaho | 1902
— This ease comes here on appeal from an order of Hon. Edgar C. Steele, district judge of the second judicial district, made at chambers at Mt. Idaho, Idaho county, on the sixth day of May, 1902, refusing to grant a temporary injunction on application of plaintiff.
The complaint is a voluminous one, occupying folios 1 to 125, inclusive, in the record. The statement of the case in the brief of appellant is conceded to be a fair one by counsel for respondent, and we adopt it as a correct statement of the case. This is an action brought by appellant, praying that the respondent be restrained from issuing or selling certain municipal coupon bonds of the city of Lewiston, and from purchasing or negotiating the purchase of the water system of the Lewiston Water and Light Company, John P. Vollmer, and Frank W. Eettenbach. The complaint alleges: That, among other things, the city of Lewiston is a municipal corporation, organized and existing under and by virtue of an act of the legislature of Idaho territory (now state), and that the above-named respond
' The first question presented to us is, Does the act of the legislature approved March 6, 1899, 'amending section 20 of the charter of the city of Lewiston, contravene article 8, section 3, of the constitution of the state? 2. Does the same act of the legislature contravene article 6, section 2, of the constitution in defining a qualified elector? 3. Does the same act contravene the state constitution and general election laws of the state in providing that an elector in voting at said special elections shall he a taxpayer of the city ? 4. Is said act of the legislature a special or local law providing for and conducting elections, or designating the place of voting, and thereby contravening article 3, section 19, of the constitution? 5. Should the election have been held and conducted under the provisions of the act of the legislature of the state of Idaho approved February 2, 1899, which is an act providing for the issue and sale of municipal bonds by incorporated cities and towns, etc. ? 6. Should not the polls have been kept open from 8 o’clock A. M. to 7 o’clock P. M., as provided for in the general election laws, instead of from 12 o’clock M. to 6 o’clock P. M. ? 7. In estimating the taxable property of the city, should both real and personal property be considered or the real property only? 8. Can a portion of the money realized from the sale of bonds as authorized at the first election, which was for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a system of waterworks, be afterward used for the purpose of purchasing waterworks ? 9. Is not the act of the legislature above referred to a special or local law providing for the assessment and collection of taxes for creating offices, prescribing the duties of officers in counties, cities, townships, election districts, and school districts, and thereby contravening article 3, section 19, of the constitution? 10. Did the ordinances and notices of the special elections comply with the terms and provisions of the act of the legislature under wliF1' said elections were sought to be held ? 11. Is the act of March 6, 1899, and under which the question of bonding was submitted by the city, repealed by the act of February 2, 1899, mentioned
The first, second, and third questions submitted to us relate to the qualification of a voter at a city election wherein and whereby it is to be determined whether or not the city shall create an indebtedness, issue bonds, etc.
The amendment to the charter of the city of Lewiston (section 20), as amended, provides: “If at said election, as provided for in this act, two-thirds of the qualified electors who are taxpayers in said city voting at said election assent to the issuing of said bonds, and the incurring of the indebtedness thereby created for the purposes aforesaid, said bonds for said purposes shall be issued in the manner hereinafter provided.” It is earnestly and ably urged by counsel for appellant that this provision of the charter contravenes article 8, section 3, of the constitution. The provision in the constitution says: “No county, city, town, township, board of education or school district, or other subdivision of the state, shall incur any indebtedness or liability in any manner or for any purpose exceeding in that year the income and revenue provided for it for such year without the assent of two-thirds of the qualified electors thereof voting at an election to be held for that purpose.” It will be observed that there is no property qualification in this provision of the constitution. But when we turn to section 20, article l,we find the qualification of a voter to create an indebtedness had already been provided for. It says: “No property qualification shall ever be required for any person to vote or hold office except in school elections or elections creating an indebtedness.” Our attention is also called to article 6, section 2, of the constitution by counsel for appellant. This section says: “Every male citizen of the United States twenty-one years old, who has actually resided in this state or territory for six months, and in the county where he offers to vote thirty days next preceding the day of election,” etc. This section only prescribes the qualification of a voter at a general election. Under the provisions of the constitution above cited, we think appellant’s first, second, and third questions are fully answered by section 20, article
We are asked by question 4 whether the amendment to section 20 of the charter of Lewiston is local or special law. The portion of the amendment referred to reads: “Said election shall be conducted as other city elections,” etc. It is urged that this amendment is in conflict with section 19, article 3, of the constitution, which says: “The legislature shall not pas's local or special laws in any of the following cases.” After enumerating a number of instances, such as the conduct of courts, etc., it says: “Providing for and conducting elections or designating the place of voting.” We answer, yes; hut an inspection of the proceedings of the city authorities in the conduct of the ejection to authorize the issue of the bonds declares that all of the provisions of the charter were complied with.
Questions 5 and 6 may be answered together. The act of February 2, 1899 provides that every city or town incorporated under the laws of the territory of Idaho, or of the state of Idaho, shall have power and authority to issue municipal coupon bonds not exceeding at any time in the aggregate fifteen per cent of the real estate value of said city or town, according to the assessment of the preceding year, etc. The same legislature, on the sixth day of March of the same year, in amending section 20 of the charter of the city of Lewiston, said: “Sec. 20. That said city of Lewiston shall have power and authority to borrow money and issue therefor its negotiable bonds with negotiable interest coupons attached not to exceed at any time in the aggregate fifteen per cent of the value of all taxable property in the said city as shown by the last preceding assessment-roll of said city.” Although the act amending the city charter of Lewis-ton is local or special, yet the same is authorized by the provisions of sections 2 and 3 of article 11 of our constitution. It
We find nothing repugnant to any of the provisions of the constitution in the manner of voting upon the question of issuing bonds or the per cent as fixed by the act of March 6, 1899, being fifteen per cent of all taxable property in the city.
Question 7 is answered by our conclusions in 5 and 6; that is, it was within the power of the legislature to empower the city, by amending its charter, to take into consideration both personal and real estate, such act not being repugnant to any of the provisions of our constitution.
In answering question 8 we will say that, under the provisions of our constitution and the charter of the city of Lewiston as amended, we conclude that the city authorities of the city of Lewiston were authorized by a legal vote of the taxpayers to provide waterworks for the city, and to expend therefor the sum of $80,000 if necessary. We do not think it makes any
Question 9 is answered by our conclusions in answer to 5 and 6.
In answer to question 10, we say that, so far as the record discloses, we gay, yes. As to question 11, we answer no. The act of February 2, 1899, applies to cities and towns of the state not operating under the provisions of a special charter, and not to the city of Lewiston, as the charter of that city excepts it from the general provisions.
Our answer to question 12 is, yes; as far as we can gather from the record, there was a compliance with the provisions of the act of March 6, 1899.
In support of our conclusions reached, we desire to call attention to Brown v. City of Denver, 7 Colo. 305, 3 Pac. 455; Carpenter v. People, 8 Colo. 125, 5 Pac. 828. It will' be found that the last case tafees up a similar question to the one before us, and discusses it, as well as a great number of authorities bearing on the question.
The carder of the trial court must be affirmed; costs to respondent.