*1 WIESEMAN, KIENSTRA, Plaintiff-Appellant, INC., THOMAS E. v.
Defendant-Appellee. Fifth District No. 5 — 91—0780 4, 1992. Opinion filed December CHAPMAN, J., dissenting. Meacham, Smith,
William Meacham, Ltd., J. McGrady & of East Alton, appellant. Mitchell,
Thompson (Allan Goodloe, Jr., & of Belleville M. and William Schmitt, A. counsel), appellee.
JUSTICE WILLIAM A. opinion LEWIS delivered the court:
Plaintiff, Wieseman, Thomas E. appeals from a judgment circuit court Madison County, which dismissed the com plaintiff’s plaint pursuant 615(b) section of the Code of Procedure Civil 2 — (Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. par. 615(b)) for failure to state a 2 —
cause of action. The sole issue on the court appeal raised whether granting erred in the defendant’s motion to dismiss. For the reasons below, set forth we affirm.
A of fac complaint which fails state a cause of action because City must Mad legal insufficiency (Robbins tual be dismissed. legally ison 549 N.E .2d A sufficient sets forth a claim which the complaint legally recognized upon plain *2 recover, tiff to a must factually complaint is entitled while sufficient Robbins, sufficient alleged essential to the cause of action. plead facts 379, 193 Ill. 3d 549 App. N.E.2d 947. dismiss,
In
a reviewing
accept
a motion to
court must
considering
the
well-pleaded
alleged
complaint
as true all
facts
in
and all reason
193 Ill.
(Robbins,
able inferences that can be drawn from those facts.
379,
of
947.)
appears
3d
If it
that no set
App.
clearly
re
alleged
proven
facts can
and
which would entitle the
to
plaintiff
be
lief,
has
Ill.
complaint
properly
(Robbins,
then a
dismissed.
193
been
379,
947.)
3d
549 N.E .2d
If
a
App.
complaint
plain
stricken and
amend,
tiff fails
seek
to
the
elects to
presumed
plaintiff
to
leave
dismissed,
and, if
the cause of action
complaint,
stand on the stricken
Robbins,
the complaint
must stand or fall
the contents of
alone.
upon
379,
193 Ill.
3d
Here, plaintiff’s the was dismissed he did not seek complaint amend, on viability plaintiff’s complaint solely to so the of turns forth in his In sufficiency allegations complaint. set 19, 1991, he was complaint, alleges prior April he that to plaintiff’s to (Klueter); Brothers Concrete that employed by just prior Klueter defendant; re- date, that he offered that he employment by was 19, 1991; at reported from Klueter on he work signed April that 1991, 22, 1991; 22, that April April of the defendant on on the offices clock, orders, safety issued given he a time was work was punched duties; on his that also perform work equipment, proceeded date, by he examination the defendant’s physical that underwent a 1991, defendant; 23, April and that on physicians required him. The work, plain- the defendant reported when he for his dis- given that the reason also in his alleges complaint tiff Kien- personnel of supervisory it was charge was “that believed a breakdown might time suffer stra, that Plaintiff some future Inc. fil- in result Plaintiff may his knee which structure of physical to Illinois Rev. Stat. pursuant for ing a claim workers[’] in 138, further states plaintiff The 48, seq. et Chap. Paragraph [sic].” of in contravention direct discharge his his that complaint ap- it is allegations, Illinois. From these of State of policy public 723 retaliatory under a cause of action of sought relief parent plaintiff as a retaliatory recognized of was first discharge tort Motorola, 172, 2d v. Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 384 cause action employer may N.E.2d 353. the common law doctrine that an While for or for no reason is still discharge at-will reason general Illinois, the tort of has been rule held to a limited to this rule. exception general and narrow (Fellhauer City v. Geneva 495, 870; 2d N.E.2d (1991), 142 Ill. 568 Thomas v. Zamberletti 3d N.E.2d (1985), 869.) Our court reaffirmed this limited narrow recently excep act by saying: “simply tion ‘Illinois on the put, employers allows disabilities; basis their it is employee’s physical only request off ground decision,’ benefits state law limits as a puts Lines, McEwen v. Air Delta 1990), F.2d (7th Cir. 60” (Hartlein Illinois Power Co. 160), and “with regard to the fact we decline to tort discharge, expand the to en ” (Hartlein v. Illinois compass a retaliatory ‘process.’ Power Co. state To a valid claim for re taliatory discharge, a must show that he was (1) discharged, (2) activities, retaliation (3) discharge violated a (Hinthorn clear Bloomington, v. Roland’s of mandate of policy. *3 Inc. With principles these mind, we now consider the plaintiff’s whether was suffi complaint cient to a withstand motion to dismiss.
The plaintiff discharged contends that he “prior having was to the occasion to seek medical attention for a related and that job injury,” the defendant plaintiff’s believed that the of preexisting condition one of his knees aggravated would be the of the required plain work tiff, and that some “at future date Plaintiff would to seek required be medical due attention to the physical breakdown Plaintiff’s structure,” resulting in the a claim for workers’ com plaintiff The pensation. plaintiff discharge characterizes this as a “preemptive against asserts, therefore, strike” him. The plaintiff that his discharge was violative the public Compensation of stated in the Workers’ policy (Ill. 48,138.1 et seq.) Act Rev. (the Act). Stat. ch. that
We find the fails plaintiff’s complaint to state sufficient to facts two of a support necessary the elements to state cause of action for retaliatory that the for dischargé: plaintiff was activities, his and that the a clear of discharge public violates mandate In the not policy. plaintiff’s he does relate he complaint, any activity performed provided which a retaliatory the defendant with for motive he He does not state that filed a workers’ defendant, or or the that employer against
claim his former or with the employer he sustained a with a former injury work-related even for he medical treatment. We cannot be sought defendant which the bad reading complaint plaintiff’s potential assured from that not an a motive for congenital. activity, knees are Without discharge the cannot found to exist. plaintiff’s be Further, Act Compensation provides strong while the Workers’ Act, policy protection to insure workers covered public that is called into under the circumstances policy play we find this not to provide case. Act is present payment this employee injured medical at The Act an work. does expenses rights not to and an un- apply anticipated injuries, employee’s future Act time only injury der the accrue at such when a work-related oc- alleged injury curs. Since the not he has sustained an plaintiff has work, Act, foregoing he has he under the defend- no is From any public ant’s of him has not violated policy. plaintiff's facts in the it can be determined presented complaint, only an that employee at-will the defendant had no right to him or for reason whatso- reason ever. to force to
Finally, poor employer would be an public policy job might an at a cause the breakdown keep employee ultimately who be a physical plaintiff’s might structure knees and dan If way to the if his knee a truck. we ger gave operating while to hold retaliatory discharge, were -in this case that there had been a in effect seekers discouraging giving job we would be employers determining examinations for the em physical purpose whether duties, going could their ployees perform employer held examination. We would regardless liable the results of the be in a job encouraging employers also be continue an to the ultimately injury knew would em employer result held whether the going because the liable ployee, be An him. employer might employer keeps discharges the em keeping for the out and that opt expensive least him as op at the work out of thereby getting some ployee job to do another discharging employee, paying person posed *4 defending paying the costs of a suit employee’s job, suffering Hartlein, a that it not retal In court held damages. to seek another to cause an at.work iatory discharge employee injured program. (Hartlein, 151 of his rehabilitation part job 725 a less seek stren- causing employee is In this case the rehabilitation. lindergo not have to might uous so that he job the circuit court of reasons, of judgment foregoing For the is affirmed. County Madison
Affirmed, LEWIS, J., concurs.
H. CHAPMAN, dissenting:
JUSTICE limited, time particular “If hiring general, be without a hiring upon principle it to a for a year; law construes be serve, and the master of natural the servant shall equity, him, respective all the revolutions of the throughout maintain seasons, done as there as well when there is work when Blackstone, England is 1 on The Laws of not.” Commentaries of the 1783 ed. (Garland Publishing, 1978) (reprint Inc. London, Prince, Cadell, Strahan and and D. printed W. T. Oxford). inflexible, general that a or indefinite
“With us the rule is prima will, at if the seeks hiring hiring servant facie him to hiring, upon to make it out a the burden is estab- yearly *** hiring lish it an indefinite and is determin- by proof. [I]t at the will of either and in this there is no party, respect able Wood, distinction between domestic and other servants.” H.G. §134, (1877). Master and Servant at 272 employer’s are not convinced that an otherwise absolute “We should when power prevail to terminate an will asserting power prevent is exercised Act.” Compensation under the Workmen’s statutory Motorola, 172, 181, Kelsay 353, 357. of the seasons recognition importance
From Blackstone’s height at the through statement made agrarian society Wood’s ex- of limitations adaption laissez-faire to the modem capitalism of the em- history pressed slightly years covers over excep- its public policy doctrine. This doctrine and ployment-at-will e.g., Callahan, many (see, tions have been the commentaries subject At Will Rule Comes Policy Exception Employment The Public to the Analysis, 29 Am. Bus. L.J. 481 Age: Proposed A Framework Public Pol- Retaliatory Discharge Economics of Swan, (1991); Loseman, Action, Unrav- icy (1990); 9 St. Louis U. Pub. L. Rev. *5 726 Tort, 517; Retaliatory Discharge Illinois 1989 Ill. L. Rev.
cling the U. Illinois, in L.J. Update Retaliatory Discharge on 40 Lab. 426 Henry, Illinois, Tort in Henry, Retaliatory Discharge: Status the (1989); of Yonover, in (1987); Retaliatory Discharge 38 L.J. 146 Illinois: Lab. Feinman, 61 L. Rev. 671 Developments, (1985); Recent Chi.-Kent Rule, Legal Am. Hist. Development Employment the at Will 20 J. of have critical of (1976)), employment-at- 118 some which been the Sokachitch, in (see, Dealing rule Faith and Fair Illi e.g., will Good Context, Ill. L. Application nois: An in the 1987 U. Rev. Employment 183; Blades, at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limit Employment Power, 67 Rev. ing Employer the Abusive Exercise Colum. L. (1967)). dissent, criticisms, I of the but I believe the not because because on the imposed has not followed the limitations doctrine majority by its with My disagreement majority and based progeny. I it has and un- grounds; assumptions on two feel made unwarranted conclusions. justified
Turning
assumptions,
majority sug
first
to the unwarranted
have been
because it was unsafe
gests
plaintiff may
operate
employer
trying
for him to
a truck
because his
was
pro
However,
arguments
unpersuasive
tect him from
these
are
for
injury.
defendant,
first,
reasons:
raised
they
by
probably
two
were not
record;
second, while
they
nowhere in the
evi
appear
because
might
on those
this
proceedings,
dence
matters
later
these
appear
of the
pleadings,
allegations
case is before us on the
and the
com
of a
2 — 615
must be taken as true
section
motion
plaint
purposes
Chicago
to dismiss.
Title & Trust Co.
Fitzgerald
179,
What That the reason for was “that was believed plaintiff’s Kienstra, Inc. that Plaintiff at some future supervisory personnel of his knee might physical time suffer a structure breakdown compensa- a claim for which result in Plaintiff may workers[’] worker slightly, employer tion.” To refine the issue can him to file a problem might he has cause physical some affirmatively, claim? The trial court answered majority and the affirms. indicated, assumptions makes I have certain majority
As with which I certain conclusions are unwarranted reaches which as- of the unwarranted discussed two agree. already do not have injury future sumptions, protection assumption former from an driver. The unsafe protection sentence, “In this case concluding in the again majority’s is alluded job so a less strenuous seek causing 3d at (237 undergo not have to rehabilitation.” might that he of paternal can this conclusion majority draw 725.) The fact me of a comment us reminds from the record before istic benevolence commis during the anthracite Clarence Darrow reportedly made evidence ago. Apparently many years hearings Pennsylvania sion mines underground in the the hours of work presented about girls and of young in the mines young boys the use and abuse this the mines. To counter adjacent the mills that had been built of its testimony presi offered evidence, companies one of the coal this, reportedly responded, To Darrow dent’s concern for children. _ children; little like a wolf loves Mr. loves the yes, “Oh Kienstra the coal that I do not with equate lambs!” I hasten to add *6 sup- neither in the record to anything for there is company president, a nor is it this court’s function to make such port equation such an to the But neither is it this court’s function to attribute judgment. to seek a encouraging employee defendant the notion of laudable undergoing less and rehabilitation. job strenuous avoid to the con- Turning from what I view as unwarranted assumptions clusions I not the latter are of first agree, types; with which do two a are the factual results that the fears will flow from rever- majority dismissal; conclusions it legal sal of the trial court’s second are the of Kelsay progeny. draws from its examination and its majority expresses There are two factual results about which the reverse,” discourage concern. “If we “we will em- majority says, agree. from I do not Pre- ployers giving preemployment physicals.” tool of em- important are an and employment physicals appropriate a that can and the ployers, employer employee tool benefit both used, not foreclosed by when and a tool whose use would properly this case actu- (in a reversal in this case. It is not the preemployment challenged; improper that is it is the ally post-employment) physical a to discharging prevent use of the as a means of worker physical a challenged by claim that is compensation of a workers’ possibility reversal.
Second, encourage that a reversal would majority postulates knew employer an an in a that the employer keep employee job to A re disagree. in Again result harm the worker. ultimately a concerned choose be employer versal of this case would not force and an injuries keeping tween its work force to minimize regulating (237 out of him.” in some work place “thereby getting Instead, of this case would do is 3d at what a reversal App. regard the State’s with prevent employers violating public policy compensation claims. disagreement assump In addition to with the on its my majority conclusions, I disagree holding tions and factual also with its fails to contain sufficient facts to two of the ele complaint establish case; ments of “that retaliatory discharge plaintiff a was dis activities, charged discharge for his and that the violates a clear man date of 3d at 723. policy.” first, to the it is Turning plain second stated failure clear that tiff has alleged discharged that he was because the condition of his knees in Plaintiff claim for “may filing compensa result workers [’] true, tion.” At this point allegation must be as what accepted can it except discharged mean prevent possi ble future of a workers’ claim? Such a right violates the a worker’s to the free exer public policy protecting Compensation recognized cise of under the Act first benefits Workers’ Motorola, in by supreme court 353, and the courts of this consistently reaffirmed in intervening State 14 years. strength public policy court’s convictions on in recognition
this area is indicated its of the need for the tort of re damages protective mechanisms taliatory punitive enactment provision legislative the absence of constitutional Indeed, Underwood, the sole dis establishing such a Justice policy. result, “I no disagreed senter in not because of the write Kelsay, who tells an industrially injured employee brief if a claim for is filed.” will be J., (Underwood, at 361 concur (Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at N.E.2d dissented be ring dissenting part).) Justice Underwood part *7 legislature and not cause he felt the relief should come from the alleviated, and the court. Justice Underwood’s concern would be in this area policy on strength legislature’s convictions demonstrated, Compensa can the amendment to the Workers’ by rights un to interfere with workers’ tion Act which made unlawful der it: company insurance any employer, It shall be unlawful
“(h) with, restrain or to interfere adjustment company or service or in the exercise coerce an in manner whatsoever employee any this Act or by to him granted or remedies rights her] [or discriminate, to discrim- discriminate, or threaten to attempt to of his employee way inate her] [or him by to granted or remedies rights exercise of [or her] this Act. or individually for any employer,
It unlawful shall be com adjustment or or service through any company insurance or to refuse discharge, to threaten to discharge or pany, to an em capacity in a suitable rehire or recall to active service remedies rights of his or of the exercise ployee because her] [or 1975, ch. (Ill. him this Act.” Rev. Stat. granted her] [or 138.4(h).) par. Act that of Thus, the amendment to the it is obvious legislative provisions, constitutional public policy, the three sources decisions, pol- the latter have indicated enactments, and two judicial their under to claim benefits icy protection workers’ of this State. workers’ laws of this State policy
If else is establish anything necessary 3 of the Act issue, I an examination of section suggest on this would the Act 138.3), apply ch. which makes (Ill. par. Rev. Stat. designated employers and without election all automatically their employees: shall following apply
“The of this Act hereinafter provisions automatically and without election State, to the county, city, town, district, po or school township, incorporated village body to all and all municipal corporation, employers lictic or Stat. added.) their ***.” Ill. Rev. employees (Emphasis 48, par. ch. 138.3. in this Assume a significance hypo-
What is the of section 3 case? thetical situation in which an her with employee approaches following offer: “I understand that I’m covered workers’ com- that, the cash really and I but I’d rather have pensation, appreciate and I’ve never years, than the I’ve worked for for five protection. you line of If you been hurt. There aren’t hazards work. many my hour, compen- cents more an I’d pay my would me 25 waive rights, happier employee.” employee sation and I’d be a Note of coercion has made the initial and there is no indication approach, the em- Assume also that any improper activity by employer. for this costs 40 ployer premium knows that the insurance ac- cents an hour so would compliance employee’s request with hour for the complish things, employer, two save 15 cents an happier. apparently make the Both be better parties arrangement. every off as a result of the new Contracts are made parties on the Both every day appearances. minute basis such There is no coer- agree agreement. it is their interests to make the *8 there consideration, will be no con- cion, duress; there is but fraud or even though Because Why in this not? recognized hypothetical. tract expressed The legislature the State does not. parties agree, both it passed when such a contract prohibiting State public policy without Act Compensation applicable the Workers’ making section 3 public policy the State’s trumped by Freedom of contract election. their right to claim ben- that all covered workers have ensuring If the of the State this area public policy efits under the Act. bargained agreements negotiated strong enough prohibit freely it will prohibit unilaterally can there be doubt parties, both of a possibility such as restrictions imposed the answer must claim? submit compensation future workers’ court of this supreme no has been the answer of the and that State. v. in 1978 in court first on this issue supreme spoke
The Motorola, 172, 353. Since then there Inc. 74 Ill. 2d 384 N.E.2d (1978), have several additional cases. been retaliatory discharge the tort of
The court has addressed It has expanded cases. compensation no less than nine workers’ Co. (Ryherd v. General Cable (1988), employees tort to include union Inc. Sackett-Chicago, v. Midgett 418, 431; 124 Ill. 2d 530 N.E.2d med who 143, 1280), employees request 473 N.E.2d (1984), 105 Inc. 2d Bloomington, v. Roland’s (1988), (Hinthorn ical care 526, 909), and who have filed employees 519 N.E.2d Industries, (Darnell Impact v. employers claims other 935). (1984), 105 Ill. 2d 473 N.E.2d with the addition, grappled Court has Appellate In State more clear. grown have discharge, tort its dimensions retaliatory in a of situations plaintiffs variety court has held that appellate The example, For a claim for retaliatory have stated a claim filing after more was employee for an who recognized Rush-Presbyterian- v. (Beauvoir warned not despite being claims 294, 484 N.E.2d Medical Center 137 Ill. 3d St. Luke’s (1985), App. after immediately injury terminated who was 841), employee 133 Ill. 3d Corp. Industries (1985), App. (Wolcowicz Intercraft not recalled after who was 1039), for a seasonal 478 N.E.2d 3d Roofing v. Pine Co. (1988), App. 178 Ill. (Motsch a claim discharged because who was 533 N.E.2d and for an 1), additional claim benefits he file an feared Bell Co. Telephone v. Illinois (Richardson 134). listed the history with those chart together below These cases con- discharge in the tort of are as follows. text. cases COURT ILLINOIS SUPREME Power
Hartlein v. Illinois Co. 142. *9 418, Ill. 2d 431. 124 530 N.E.2d Ryherd v. General Cable Co. (1988), Co. Mining (1988), Ill. 2d v. United Coal 123 Beckman Freeman 281, 527 303. N.E.2d Bloomington, 526, Inc. (1988), 119 Ill. 2d
Hinthorn v. Roland’s of
Gonzalez N.E.2d 308. Mass Transit District Ill. 2d
Boyles v. Greater Peoria (1986), 113 545, 499 435. N.E.2d
Midgett v. Inc. 143, 473 Sackett-Chicago, 105 N.E.2d (1984), 1280. Industries,
Darnell v. Inc. 158, Impact 105 Ill. 2d 473 (1984), N.E.2d 935. Motorola, Inc. v. 172, 384 (1978), N.E.2d 353. FIRST DISTRICT Son,
Groark v. Larsen Inc. 61, & (1992), App. 231 Ill. 3d Thorleif 596 78. N.E.2d Sons,
Colvett v. L. & Inc. 731, Ill. Karp 211 3d 570 (1991), App. N.E.2d 611.
Marin v.
Co.
302,
Packing
American Meat
App.
204 Ill.
3d
(1990),
Austin v. St. 891, 543 Hospital 187 Ill. 3d (1989), App. N.E.2d 932. Service, 808,
Netzel v. United Parcel
Inc.
181
(1989),
App.
Ill.
3d
Motsch v. Pine 169, 3d 533 Co. 178 Ill. N.E.2d (1988), App. 1.
Taylor v. Tsekeris 195, (1987), 163 Ill. 3d 516 562. App. N.E.2d Lewis 311, Zachary v. Co. 153 Ill. 3d 505 (1987), App. Confections N.E.2d 1087.
Beauvoir v. Luke’s Medical Center Rush-Presbyterian-St. (1985), 294, 137 Ill. 484 3d N.E.2d 841. App. Industries,
Raisl v. Elwood Inc. 170, Ill. 3d 479 (1985), 134 App. N.E.2d 1106.
732 Corp. (1985), Wolcowicz v. Industries 133 Ill. 3d App. Intercraft
157,
Rubenstein Lumber Co. v. Aetna & Co. (1984), 122 Life 717, 462 App. 3d N.E.2d 660. Bryce v. Johnson & Johnson 913, (1983), 115 Ill. 3d App. N.E.2d 1235.
Henon v. Lever Brothers Co. 608, 114 Ill. (1983), App. 3d N.E.2d 196.
Wyatt
v. Jewel Cos.
840,
(1982),
App.
108 Ill.
3d
Kritzen v. Flender 226 Ill. 3d 589 N.E.2d App. 909.
Thompson v. Abbott Laboratories 193 Ill. 3d (1990), App. N.E.2d 1295.
Bragado
Cherry
Electrical Products
Corp.
191 Ill.
App.
3d
Parton v. A.L. Randall Co.
1077. Siegler,
Fuentes v. Lear Inc. 864, (1988), 174 Ill. 3d 529 App. N.E.2d40. Telephone
Richardson v. Illinois Bell
Co.
(1987),
App.
156 Ill.
3d
1006,
Byrd Casualty Surety v. Aetna & Co. 292, (1987), App. 152 Ill. 3d 504 216. N.E.2d 180, Optimum/Ideal Managers
Cook v.
Inc.
Ill.
3d
(1984),
App.
130
Colley v. & Co. 812, 364. (1984), App. 129 Ill. 3d 473 N.E.2d Swift
THIRD DISTRICT Bilderback v. Admiral 268, Co. 227 Ill. 3d 591 N.E.2d (1992), App. 36. Jostens, v.
LaPorte Inc. 1089, 213 3d 572 N.E.2d (1991), App. Ill. 1209. Rental, Inc. 384,
Bray v. Stan’s 196 Ill. 3d 553 N.E.2d (1990), App. 791. Mining v. Coal Co. (1983), 112 Ill.
Armstrong
Freeman United
1020,
3d
733 FOURTH DISTRICT the Third Sisters Hospital Hospital Wright v. St. John’s 680, Ill. 593 1070. Francis 229 3d N.E.2d Order St. (1992), App. 799, Ill. 3d 587 N.E.2d Miller v. J.M. Jones Co. (1992), App. 225 654. Co. Ill. v. Illinois Public Service (1991), App. 220 3d
Melton Central
1052,
Cunningham
396,
App.
87 Ill.
3d
FIFTH DISTRICT Foam, 500, Inc. Jones v. Burkart 231 Ill. 3d 596 (1992), App. N.E.2d 882. Co. Pepsi-Cola Bottling
Lowrance v. Marion
(1991),
App.
221 Ill.
3d
623,
Knecht v. Radiac 219 Ill. 3d 579 (1991), App. N.E.2d 1248. No. 1 Jasper County Community
Sloan v.
Unit School District
867,
(1988),
App.
167 Ill.
3d
Wayne Coal Ill. (1987), 3d 510 App. N.E.2d 468.
Hugo
v. Tomaszewski
1139.
(1987),
3d
App.
Slover v. Brown
Before to the second ad *11 of Hartlein v. Illinois Power reliance recent dress its the case upon Co. for several rea distinguishable which is sons. entitled in order for the worker in Hartlein
First, to have been relief, he had “the fact or threat dis- injunctive would have to show could not do. There is 161), 2d at which he (Hartlein, 151 Ill. charge” discharged. however, in this case was plaintiff that the no question, not “accompanied in Hartlein were Second, Illinois Power’s actions discriminatory indicated a prohibited which by conduct statements Rather, that Hartlein was advised of Illinois Power. part intent on the by workers’ governed was considered to be the work search proposed case, 162.) In this the 151 Ill. 2d (Hartlein, law.” compensation file a might he discharge that his was because alleged has Third, impor the future. and most claim in Hartlein, su of causation. In tant, difference in the element is the that the worker that there was no question court concluded preme ap acted job his earlier perform was unable to efforts. engage the worker to rehabilitative requiring propriately contrast, in this By no motive was shown. Consequently, improper case, only alleged motive case, at this in this point or at least notes: As Hartlein discharge improper. not employer may holds “Kelsay, 74 legal his and his job with a choice between present thereby an em prohibits to compensation. entitlement condition leverage utilizing employee’s job ployer from not, however, Act; Kelsay does rights exercise under the the Act to condition of benefits under leveraging prohibit added.) rights.” (Emphasis of employment the exercise 151 Ill. 2d at (Hartlein, only from Hartlein not in the last emphasized language quotation it. it militates position, support majority’s
does not the plaintiff Therefore, argument, second majority’s activities, for his that he was allege failed to adequately fil- meant the generally that “activities” has agree fail. should While act of it not take the affirmative claim, it is clear that does ing of a for retaliatory a cause of action filing support a claim to em designed prevent retaliatory The tort of under the exercise of frustrating employee’s from ployer carrot, than a more of a stick discharge is retaliatory Act. The tort of a prereq claim as of a filing not require does is in if an example, of the tort. For to the existence uisite the gate out as he is carried pink slip handed a at work and is jured he would be attendants, contend that anyone the ambulance he had not claim because barred not, nei I think discharge? claim before his filed a compensation Bloomington, v. Roland’s in Hinthorn court ther did the 909: *12 discharge action retaliatory to allow a anomalous “It would be compensa a workers’ filing after who are fired employees are in not those who injuries, but tion claim for work-related such chance to file get the they fired ever before jured employer her because penalized should not be claims. Plaintiff at medical orally requesting her in retaliation discharged claim—the ef filing compensation a formal tention, instead asserting legal in retaliation for fired being fect is the same: injuries.” (Hinthorn, for work-related to medical care rights 534, 519 N.E.2d 119 Ill. 2d at medical Hinthorn, injury requested the reported
In the employee Corp. Industries attention. In Wolcowiczv. Intercraft intervened as apparently the employer 478 N.E.2d App. 3d fell and his allegedly injured plaintiff as it aware that soon became the court filed, claim was but Again, no workers’ back. employee. the protected tort of dis retaliatory majority the contends
Similarly, injury. has suffered an unless the worker charge cannot be invoked filing nor the of a claim submit, however, injury, that it is neither the right to exercise the ability It is the protect. that the tort seeks relief, the tort. claim, protected by to seek that ability file a the Industries, recognized Impact Darnell by This position plaintiff’s which the upheld (1984), 105 present at all in her injured claim the had not been although plaintiff employment. hold, the second element and I that suggest,
These cases
would
an
requires
the
holds
retaliatory discharge,
majority
the tort of
which
to demonstrate
requires
plaintiff
more
“activity,”
accurately
efforts to frus
improper
an
by
employer’s
was caused
statutorily
and to
its
under the Act
avoid
employee’s rights
trate the
on the
discussed,
opinion
in its most recent
As I have
imposed duty.
employer’s
motive was
issue,
recognized
court
the element of causation.
concerning
the ultimate issue to be decided