59 S.E. 58 | N.C. | 1907
The court found the facts to be as follows: "That the plaintiff, at the date of the institution of these proceedings, was a resident of North Carolina, the defendant, Thomas Co., residents of North Carolina, and the codefendants, a corporation, having its principal place of business at Wilmington, N.C. operating a railroad in Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. Plaintiff and other defendant reside in Wilmington, N.C. That at said date plaintiff was (263) a resident, having a family residing in Wilmington, where plaintiff worked as an employee of defendant company. That on ____ May, 1906, defendants Thomas Co. sent an account against plaintiff for collection to Atlanta, Ga., where an attachment was issued against plaintiff in a justice's court, levying upon the indebtedness of the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company to plaintiff, such action not being prosecuted further by reason of the restraining order issued in this cause. That the amount of indebtedness due by the defendant company to plaintiff was $70, being for his personal services, rendered within sixty days prior to said levy, and said sum is necessary for the support of said debtor and his family, supported by him. That the debt claimed by Thomas Co. against plaintiff is just and correct, and was then due." And thereupon adjudged that the restraining order be continued to the hearing, and defendants Thomas Co. excepted and appealed. At the time this action was commenced and the Georgia attachment was levied, the property attached was protected, both by the personal property exemption provided for by the Constitution and the general exemption laws of the State, and also by section 493 of The Code (section 678 of the present Revisal), prohibiting wages due for personal services of the debtor rendered within sixty days prior to the levy, and necessary for the use of the family which was supported by his labor, from being subjected and applied to the laborer's indebtedness; and, this being true, on the facts established, the judge correctly ruled that the restraining order be continued to the hearing.
As stated in 12 A. and E. Enc., 256: "It may be regarded as settled that a court of equity has jurisdiction to enjoin a resident creditor from instituting or prosecuting an action or proceeding in another State for the purpose of evading the exemption laws of his State, (264) and of collecting his claim by subjecting to its satisfaction property or credits which the debtor could claim as exempt if the action or proceeding were brought within the State. And in such a case an injunction should generally be granted." And the doctrine so stated is grounded in right reason and fully sustained by authority.Dehon v. Foster, 86 Mas., 545; Teager v. Langley,
It is objected chiefly that an injunction on the facts before us is in violation of Article IV, section 1, of the Federal Constitution, providing that in each State full faith and credit shall be given to the judicial proceedings of every other State, etc., and section 2, same article, providing that citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of the several States. This view is fully discussed in the authorities cited, and rejected as unsound; and the correct doctrine is held to be that the courts of the resident creditor have power in proper cases to issue an injunction, not in restraint of the action of the court of another State, but operating in personam on the creditor and compelling him to obey the laws of his own Commonwealth. Thus, in Dehon's case, supra, Chief Justice Bigelow, speaking to this question, says: "The authority of this Court, as a court of chancery, upon a proper case being made, to restrain persons within its jurisdiction from prosecuting suits, either in the courts of this State or of other States or foreign countries, is clear and indisputable. In the exercise of this power courts of equity proceed, not upon any claim of right to interfere with or control the course of proceedings in other tribunals, or to prevent them from adjudicating on the rights of parties when drawn in controversy and duly presented *192
for their determination, but the jurisdiction is founded on the clear authority vested in courts of equity over persons within the (265) limits of their jurisdiction and amenable to process, to restrain them from doing acts which will work wrong and injury to others, and are, therefore, contrary to equity and good conscience. As the decree of the court in such cases is pointed solely at the party, and does not extend to the tribunal where the suit or proceeding is pending, it is wholly immaterial that the party is prosecuting his action in the courts of a foreign State or country. If the case stated in the bill is such as to render it the duty of the court to restrain a party from instituting or carrying on proceedings in a court in this State, it is bound in like manner to enjoin him from prosecuting a suit in a foreign court. 2 Story on Eq., pp. 889-900; Mackintosh v. Ogilvie, 3 Swanst., 365n, and 4 T. R., 193n; Carron Iron Co. v. Maclaren, 5 H. L. Cas., 416, 445;Maclaren v. Stainton, 16 Beav., 286." And in Snook v. Snetzer,
And the question was directly presented to the Supreme Court of the United States, the final arbiter on such matters, in Cole v. Cunningham,
There is nothing in our present decision which is intended to militate against the position, undoubtedly correct, that our exemption laws have no extraterritorial vigor; nor do we question in any way the doctrine declared by the United States Supreme Court in several recent decisions, that, for the purpose of attachment and jurisdiction to the extent that it may be so acquired, the situs of the debt is at the debtor's residence, or wherever he may be personally served with process. R. R. v. Deer,
In Sturm's case, supra, which was strongly urged upon our attention in behalf of defendants, it does not appear in any report of the case to which we have access that the attaching creditor was a resident of the State whose exemption laws were alleged to have been violated, and the right of the court of the resident creditor to compel obedience to its own laws does not seem to have been presented. It was certainly not considered or passed upon. The Court only applied the recognized principle that, the court where the attachment issued having acquired jurisdiction, its judgment condemning the debt would protect the garnishee from a second payment. The same doctrine was applied here in a recent case — Wright v. R. R.,
We note an affidavit sent up with the record to the effect that, since this suit was instituted, the plaintiff has removed from the State and become a resident of South Carolina. This is not adverted to by the court in its findings of fact; and, while the findings are not conclusive upon this Court in a case of this kind (Mayo v. Comrs.,
There is no error, and the judgment of the lower court is
Affirmed.
Cited: Carpenter v. Hanes,
(269)