216 Mass. 598 | Mass. | 1914
These two actions were tried together. The exceptions in the action for conscious suffering having been
At the trial it was admitted by the plaintiff that her intestate, hereinafter called the deceased, had for a period of at least five years next before the accident been afflicted with Bright’s disease; and we do not understand the plaintiff to deny that this disease is fatal, that it continued from the time of the accident and that it was a contributing cause to the death, which occurred about seven months thereafter. Upon the evidence, however, the jury might have found that notwithstanding its presence it was in a latent and inactive form; that the deceased, who was a chief cook, had been able, up to the time of the accident, to work at his trade all day with the exception of a few days; and that but for the accident he might have lived fifteen or twenty years longer, and during a considerable portion of this time might have worked at his trade; that through the “shock” and other injuries caused by the accident his system became weakened and less able to resist the progress of the disease than it otherwise would have been; that subsequently the disease became more active and its progress more rapid, and that this weakened ability was operative up to the time of his death; and that the death at the time it took place was due to the combined effects of the disease and the accident. Shortly stated, we are dealing with a case where a person afflicted with a disease sure in the end to terminate fatally is so far weakened by an accident as to succumb fifteen or twenty years sooner than he otherwise would have done, both causes operating to the time of his death; or, in other words, where the death is substantially hastened by the accident.
It is strongly urged by the defendant that the statute is penal in character and should be strictly construed; that only the proximate cause should be considered; and that in this case the accident was not a proximate cause.
The legislation providing for the liability of common carriers of passengers for the death of a passenger caused by the negligence of the carrier began with St. 1840, c. 80; but the first statu
St. 1886, c. 140, subjected a street railway company to an action of tort for causing the death of a passenger, the damages to be assessed with reference to the degree of culpability of the corporation or of its servants or agents. Ever since the passage of this statute the liability of a street railway company for causing the death of a passenger may be enforced either by indictment or by an action of tort; St. 1864,c. 229, §§ 37,38; R. L. c. Ill, § 267; St. 1907, c. 392; if by indictment then in accordance with the general course of criminal procedure the fine imposed will be assessed according to the degree of culpability as determined by the judge; if.by an action of tort, then by the statute the damages are to be according to that degree as determined by the jury. By whomsoever determined the standard must be the same, and in the theory of the law at least the amount assessed accordingly will be the same. The amount assessed goes to the same parties whichever course is pursued. The main purpose.of giving the civil remedy was not to increase the amount to be paid by the negligent party, but to leave the management and control of the suit not in the public prosecuting officers as before, but in the hands of the private parties most interested in the result.
At common law, on an indictment for causing the death of
The charge to the jury was sufficiently favorable to the defendant. There was no error in the manner in which the presiding judge dealt with the defendant’s requests for rulings.
Exceptions overruled.