608 N.Y.S.2d 195 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1994
—Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Carmen Beauchamp Ciparick, J.), entered May 17, 1993, which granted defendants’ motion to dismiss the first through the sixth causes of action, but denied dismissal of the seventh cause of action, unanimously modified, on the law, only to the extent of also granting defendants’ motion to dismiss the seventh cause of action and, as so modified, the order is otherwise affirmed, without costs.
In denying defendants the requested relief with regard to plaintiff’s seventh cause of action for conversion which alleges that defendant Rosenblith removed from plaintiff’s personal
In his verified complaint and his affidavits in opposition to defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiff fails to meet this burden. First, there is nothing to indicate he has any ownership interest in the materials in question. In fact, the contrary is clearly evident from the bank’s employee handbook, which although not a contract binding upon the parties, nevertheless states the obvious; i.e., "The Corporation is the rightful owner of discoveries, inventions, computer programs, writings and other work products that you develop in connection with your job.” (Emphasis added.) Despite plaintiff’s claim that defendants rely selectively on such handbook and that in the history of the bank he is the only lawyer who was deprived of his writing samples, it is axiomatic that materials or products developed by an employee in the course of his or her employment, absent any agreement to the contrary, belong to his or her employer (cf., Veeco Instruments v Candido, 70 Misc 2d 333, 334 [action by employer for conversion by a former employee who, when discharged, took important programs with him]). Whether or not Manufacturers had a policy of permitting its departing employees to take copies of their work product to use as writing samples in seeking other employment, such policy can only be considered professional courtesy on the part of the bank and cannot be deemed to be in derogation of its ownership rights in such materials. Moreover, even assuming arguendo an ownership or possessory interest on the part of plaintiff, there is no allegation that the bank or Mr. Rosenblith refused any demand for their return. Indeed, the contrary is evident from the undisputed delivery of approximately 1700 pounds of documents shipped to plaintiff after his discharge. Moreover, his belated claim in his reply affidavit, that absent from such delivery were any copies of appellate briefs and trial memoranda prepared by him while at the bank, fails to establish the necessary demand and refusal.
Regarding plaintiff’s first cause of action for defamation
We have considered plaintiffs other points and find them to be without merit. Concur — Carro, J. P., Kupferman, Rubin and Nardelli, JJ.