Wieda v. American Box Board Co.

Miсhigan Reports. 343 D BOAR COMPANY. WIEDA v. AMERICAN BOX Previously-Exist- Compensation Aggravation — 1. Workmen’s Nonoccupational ing Disease —Accident. properly may to function failed power because turbine Loss of impose regarded as or fortuitous so as accidental be part of act under re- liability for workmen’s accident, injury remedying where quiring that be due operator up ran and down stairs turbine situation pre-existing ap- heart aggravated a' condition iwas' n specific parently pursuing unknown to him while instructions power shortage, of a an event as to what to do the event seq., anticipated (CL 1948, amended). 412.1 as et which § 2. Cause. Same —Accident—Proximate ’ injury, compensable An accidental under the workmen’s act, merely must than an unusual be more result; unanticipated the means must be accidental —involun- tary unintended, proximate must be con- and there some injurious nection between accidental means and rеsult (CL seq., amended). 412.1 et § Cause. 3. Same —-Accident—Proximate given may result not be the retroactive effect An unfortunate particular happening accidental making event place character when it took was not of such nature which portion impose liability of workmen’s and, thereby, under injury compensable requiring to be compensation act (CL 1948, proximately caused an accident must have been seq., amended). et 412.1 § ^[5] [1-4] [1-4] [1-4] 58 Am Workmen’s 95; existing from 58 Am Workmen’s Workmen’s 28 ALR overexertion Jur, physical Jur, References 204; compensation: compensation: Workmen’s 60 ALR 1299. condition of and excitement. Compensation Compensation Points Compensation Injury or employee 6 ALR 1256. § Headnotes 26. §§ contributed. death 195-198, for death or to which 255. ALR pre- ,v. Board Box Pre-Existing Aggravation Heart Condition —Condi- 4. Same — Employment Peculiar to and Characteristic tions —Proxi- mate Cause. operator’s disability ag- claim Plаintiff turbine that his gravation pre-existing heart of condition resulted from con- held, peculiar employment ditions characteristic of and to his 1948, presented (CL without basis under record et 417.1 § seq., amended). 5. Same —Construction of Act. - Supreme by pertinent provisions The Court is bound of interpret workmen’s act and must them in ac- apparent legislative cordance with determining intent liability imposed particular whether be under facts seq., (CL involved in a 1948, amended). case 411.1 et §

Smith, J., dissenting. - from Appeal Workmen’s Commis- Compensation sion. Submitted April 5, 1955. (Docket No. 17, Cal- endar 46,225.) No. Decided October 1955.

Fred A. presented claim bis for compen- sation the American against Box Board Company based on heart attack suffered exertion following power failure. during Award by deputy electrical reversed commission denied. Plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Campbell & Campbell, for plaintiff.

Lacey, Doelle, Jones é for defendant.

Carr, C. J. It does not appear any material facts this case are in On dispute. February 1952, and for years prior thereto, several plaintiff a whs defendant as turbine employed by operator. He said years date 39 of His age. employ- on ment was concerned of a operation steam turbine which for the use of generated electricity de- fendant’s turbine plant. Said was located on 2 floors, or of the which it was levels, building comprising separated placed, metal stairs a set required steps. hour to make a tour each He was equipment if inspection it was to ascertain of the of operating requiring approxi- properly, tour such mately he certain observed 5 minutes. Otherwise gauges of the same in the furtherance and meters purpose. general

In with his work was furnished connection specific as to what instructions should a list done power shortage. appears in case shortage testimony that 1 had occurred such duty prior February 15, 1952. when he was employer carried had also caused drills to be out by employees operation with the connected prepare purpose being each one turbine, the to' con- with reference the course to be followed cerned power shortage. event of the occurrence plaintiff began work at 10 the date mentioned On later, Approximately evening. in the an o’clock hour he heard a that washroom, while him' to noise caused

hurry up the stairs to the floor. He second voltage that the was out control. then"discovered appears on it that followed the instruc- From' then he given- taking step each him, that had been as tions directed any uncertainty and without on his necessary it was to do. In the as to what course of operations employee, plaintiff’s another who his plant, They superior finally came to aid. his getting equipment working sucсeeded employee by they might another were Advised auxiliary operation which switch, turn on an ed in result- receipt of electric current from the Con- Company.' The Power turbine was then' sumers operation approxi- The entire consumed started. mately 45 minutes.

In-endeavoring to restore the turbine to its normal plaintiff functioning hurried, or ran testified, as he up the stairs referred to at least and down 6 times. Board Box require specifically him to His did instructions apparently to restore anxious he was run, but opera- supervision normal equipment to its his under during possible. the 45- time At one as as tion soon dizzy experienced a period he referred minute feeling, away passed as the result he testified which shaking had After the situation head. his of his experienced again diz- he however, corrected, been room of to the first-aid and he taken ziness, hospital remained for plant where he to a and thеn approximately he returned to Thereafter 10 hours. period of about in bed for a and remained his home 3 weeks. April com- the workmen’s as found 28,1952, On employed pensation defend- commission, he was position he held which attendant, ant a first-aid following, September he was laid when 12th, until application to the workmen’s off. His adjustment hearing claim of his for commission February on recited occurrence hearing Following a as above indicated. 15, 1952, compen- deputy award before a commissioner appeal commission, to the which, sation was made on plain- granted by Court, aside. leave this was set On appealed. tiff has physician plaintiff who attended occa- question behalf, was called as a witness

sion testifying had suffered heart attack coronary coronary infarction or referred plain- diagnosis of He summarized his occlusion. trouble as follows: tiff’s type particular that he had, infarction “This opinion my circulation, his this: That his

in was coronary take care of circulation, was sufficient to ordinary conditions. heart under the of his needs -narrowing probably have There was been— —must vessel, the hole in the blood is, that of lumen, the of and heart made the demand exertion this sudden Beports.- Consequently get it couldn’t it. more blood and he present had in heart an ischemia the muscle due to particular part the fact that that of the blood vessel give enough didn’t developed heart blood, the muscle and that the into infarction.” testimony, The further in witness indicated his in above-quoted accordance with the that statement, plaintiff February, on 15th 1952, did have coronary heart, a normal occlusion and that the thrombosis or he that then had indicated such It fact. appears testimony thus deputy that there was before indicating that

commissioner there was a pre-existing apparently heart cоndition unknown plaintiff. Undoubtedly activity during 45- period following power aggravat- minute failure brought ed this condition and about the heart attack. compensation Plaintiff bases his claim for on urged, 2 of the workmen’s law.* It is power that the failure substance, was fortui plaintiff’s disability, event, tous that resulted in and that the commission inwas error declining compensation. prim award him The ary question may at issue is whether the statute properly interpreted covering the factual situa presented apparent tion on this record. properly the failure turbine to function ordinary accept not the of an result accident in ance term. of that Such failure had occurred on prior and once, least, at. occasions when duty. conducting pre drills order to pare employees opera defendant’s concerned in the any tion of the turbine for such occurrence, specific giving step as tо instructions each to be remedying regard situation, followed must be indicating power shortages anticipat- ed as wére (1st Sess), (CL *PA 1912 Ex No as amended §411.1 seq. et Ann 1950 Rev and Ann 1951 Cum Supp Stat 17.141 [Stat § seq.~\). et Board 187 1955] Weed Box y. employees. by The loss employer and said ed may question power be not on the occasion regarded fortuitous. accidental or plaintiff’s dis that in mind also be borne must directly power ability short-' from the result did not age any occurrence course from accidental or employment. arising Rather, his or out his by brought own about his unfortunate condition following during period the 45-minute acts up shortage. running development power His of the by his own desire stairs was actuated and down restore pos operation the turbine as soon as there was an accidental A conclusion that sible. occurrence may bringing the heart attack about predicated, involved, here on the under the faсts be pre conjunction with the fact that exertions brought existing about the result. condition heart Original Engine 122, 191 Mich Co., In Robbins v. Gas referring the distinction to be 128, it was said injury means which an is between the observed produced producing or and the result cause causes: “It not sufficient there be unusual unanticipated result; the must means be accidental—

involuntary There too, and unintended. be must, proximate connection between accidental means some injurious result.” quoted by foregoing this statement was Court in Nichols v. Central Crate recent decision Company, 235. Kut 232, See, Box 340 Mich also, & Manufacturing Briggs 146, 197 Mich schmar v. (LRA1918B, 1133). 150

In Mutual Accident Association v. United States (9 60) Barry, L 121 33 ed S Ct US construing policy,- an insurance said: court, in ordinary means, “If as follows a result such employed, voluntarily in a not unusual Michigan Reports. ‍‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‍way, cannot called a result effected acci- precedes means; dental but if, in the act which injury, something unexpectеd, un- unforeseen, produces injury, usual occurs which then the through has resulted accidental means.” pointed In the case, instant above out, there was nothing preceding plaintiff’s in the occurrence acts disability that resulted in his that was unforeseen unexpected. contrary, power shortages On the anticipated arrangements were made to deal proper with them in a and methodical manner when they may occurred. An unfortunáte result not be given particular making the retroactive effect of a happening event or accidental in nature which was place. not of such character when it took repeatedly This Court has considered eases involv ing analogous situations that at case bar. Hagopian City Highland In it v. Park, 313 Mich 608, employee engaged lifting was held an in cans containing rubbish and who suffered an acute heart compensation, ailment was not entitled to said ail being ment an disease of life to which the public generally exposed plaintiff is and from which prior had suffered to the attack on which his claim based. argued As the case at it bar, was not occupational that the heart condition was an disease. Likewise, as here, there nowas accident. In O’Neil Spencer W. depend v. R. Grocer 316 Mich 320, employee company ents of sought of the defendant to recover because of his death which was claimed to have resulted from undue exertion part operating on his heavy his automobile in showing snow. There was no of an accident in which employee holding was involved. In that the stat payment ute did not authorize the (p 324): under the it facts, was said v. Box Board opinion, . plaintiffs supply “In- our have failed "to competent evidence of the fact that re- deceased an-injury growing ceived from an accident out of employment. the course of Nor can it he said that a disease due characteristic of and death of Mr. O’Neil was caused from causes which conditions are peculiar to the business employer and which arises out of and in the course of employment. The record the claim substantiates that deceased’s death due life to disease of w.as public general exposed.” which the Hupp Motor Corp., Kasarewski v. Car Mich

.In aggravation previ 232, was held that the ously-existing nonoccupational is not com disease pensable compensa under 2 of the workmen’s accidental, aggravating tion law unless Mooney Copper Range in character. See, also, Company, Railroad 318 Mich 120. In the case at disputed suffering bar it is not pre-existing from a terpretation heart condition. the in Under cited, recognized the statute- cases and other of like in. decisions he is character, compensation injury not entitled to unless his was - proof the result anof accident. there However, is no that, this record on which to base a conclusion in plaintiff injury by sustained an accidental means. May Company, In v. A. H. Powell Lumber 335 compensation presented, the claim 420, was Mich by dependents May employee of Victor who was an Company. day prior of the Powell Lumber On the operated he to his death a bulldozer which did not properly. consequence function In fumes and smoke splashed resulted caused the oil over the This, motor. employee cough gag, appar .to and and ently inhaling persisted, effects such fumes during evening night. morning and The next approximately at 4 death o’clockhis occurred from a. testimony heart condition. Medical disclosed that.. suffering coronary he in fact was from' an advanced apparently condition of a serious nature of which he knowledge. had no held that the death of the employee brought had not been about accidental aggravating existing means ailment, that, consequence, provisions part 2 of the work-' compensation law, men’s under which the claim was authorizing compen- filed, could not be construed as sation. denying compensation

In in the instant case the- specifically McGregor commission relied on v. Con- Department, plain-, servation 338 Mich 93. There the employee pre-existing tiff had a arteriosclerosis. employed by He was On the 11th of the defendant as a fire warden.

May, following exertion on his part fighting coronary he fires, suffered throm- sought compensation and later bosis, for the result- disability. ing Citing approval the decision Hagopian Highland City supra, Park, it was disability noncompensable. held that such plaintiff’s part claim was filed first under 2 of the subsequently law amended to part part cover claims under in7, the alterna- tive. The awаrd of the commission being plain- was based on it concluded that brought tiff’s was not about accidental any means. In the case at bar there is no basis for plaintiff’s disability claim that resulted from condi- peculiar employ- tions characteristic of and to ment.

Among plaintiff rely other cases, counsel for LaVeck v. Parke, &Davis 190Mich 604. In that employee hemorrhage, case the suffered a cerebral paralysis, resulting working while in a room heat- high temperature. ed to compensa-' An award of theory tion made on hemorrhage that the was an accidental occurrence, and this Court affirmed ground finding supported by on the that such 1955] Wieda v. American Box Board testimony. Schlange Briggs Counsel also cite Manufacturing Co., 326 Mich 552. There this Court compensation, affirmed an award appearing plaintiff employee, from the that record while en- gaged performance of his duties, was thrown jerked against operating, machine that he was sharp pain at the time he felt a in his chest. disputed happening was not that such was ac- cidental. arising

Each compensa- case under the workmen’s tion law must he determined on the basis of the particular facts involved and in accordance with pertinent statutory provisions. We are bound provisions interpret such ance with the and must them in accord-

apparent legislative intent. The facts dispute in the case at bar are not in and, conse- quence, question is, before indicated, whether plaintiff the statute entitles on the theory disability that his resulted from an occur- rence principles accidental nature. We cannot so find. The par-

followed the decisions above cited, ticularly McGregor controlling. Case, are It is, unnecessary we think, to cite other decisions in ac- therewith. cord The workmen’s com- holding. mission was correct in so appeal The order from which the has been taken appellee. with affirmed, costs to Butzel, Sharpe, Boyles, Beid, Dethmers, JJ., C. J. Kelly, Carr, concurred with {dissenting). regret join

Smith, J. I that I cannot opinion my of the Chief Justice. It is belief opinion perpetuates that his a remedial statute and amendment a misconstruction of

thereto growing passage the law is more confused of time and the accumulation of cases. theory

Claim is made under 2 of the act. is that he suffered an “accident” at 343 192 that he The concludes ‍‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‍did work. Chief Justice

Ms agree. I not. cannot meaning “accident” as word is the

What employed act? Our in the workmen’s recently frequently and divided on the Court has present difficulty question. traces back Much of our employed by language Mr. Justice Stone in .to (1914), & Works Lead Color Adams v. Acme White (LRA1916A, 689, 1916D, Mich Ann 182 6 157 Cas 482). that alone I will examine For reason NCCA n itin poisoning, detail. The case invоlved lead some today occupa an ailment which we would class as tional disease then industrial accident hoard in it was so classified and, fact, (p 158). The claim injured was made on behalf of workman that personal granting our injury arising in for “a act, employ in out of and the course of his occupational enough to ment,” was broad cover act held not. It held that the diseases. The Court required injury. an accidental what was an As to Hensey quoted (p 164) it accident, cited and (1900) (69 1 81 LT White, QB LJQB 188, n r 767) language, following which essence' is present up found in to the time: our cases “ something ‘I the idea of un- think fortuitous and expected “peril” in both or “ac- words, involved ’ ” cident.” Hensey upon language Case, so relied in both subsequently, principle, and, warrants critical ex amination. It was a case which.a workman was injured (ruptured) “doing while his work ordinary way,” being nothing there fortuitous n happened. in what For this it held reason was recovery he had not suffered an accident denied. English

There are difficultieswith this decision. construction of The first is such “ac- word v. American Box Board language. cident” violence to our does Words ordinary meanings, statute should receive their unless context forces some subtle use. In our speech, goes usual when man to his work and leg, ruptures perform- breaks himself in the though merely ance of such work, his' .even ordinary ordinary way, work done in the he has suf- fered an at accident work. It is no less an ac- something ceiling of if That, too, cident, course, falls from the and hurts him. is an “accident.” The predominant, idea of the and it is present in both uses word. The difference in putting very roughly, uses, the is that the one use to a cause and refers the other to an effect. But permissible both uses are both form a daily speech. our constant, only English

Not did the construction of the court Hensey language, Case do violence to the but plain purpose, also to the of the act. The statute, as employer, beings well takes human itas finds them. Not all are stalwart able. The weak and stumbling they must also if and, are in- work, jured though stronger might in their work, even one they equally protected. not have been, are Hills v. Co., Oval Dish Wood 191 Mich 411. There are some complain opening who that this means wide the flood turning gates, a workmen’s act into general needy. insurance for the sick and Not so. prove The claimant still must a direct causal con- injury. nection between work and This is the es- Lacking speak. link. it, sential the act does not But injury if the comes from the work, paid, though should even one of more robust physique would not have suffered therefrom. surprising Hensey

Not it, then, to find that the Case was overruled, birth, land of its after very span point brief life. The at issue, the point precise plaguing now our commission, our 194 explored bar, our detail

bench, and Thorley highest English v. J. court in Fenton & (72 314), (1903) 89 LT Ltd., AC LJKB some years prior Adams Case. Case, our decision quoted Eensey was, Fenton Case like the This a 445): Macnaghten (p rupture According to Lord case. ordinary “Fenton was a man of health and strength. any slip, evidence of or There was no jerk. may be taken that wrench, or sudden injury engaged man was in his occurred while the trying very doing to do the work, 'accomplish.” thing he meant to which commenting Macnaghten continued, then Lord 446): supra Hensey (pp White, appeal “The held that which court ‘injury by within Fenton was not accident’ sustained holding they meaning the act. followed In so Hensey decision of the court case of an earlier in not which its circumstances is distin White, v. guishable present Hensey v. the case. In opinion passage from the of Hals was cited White bury Hamilton, Fraser & Co. v. in L.C. Pandorf lordship T Co.,* think the idea & of which his said: in something is involved fortuitous and ’Founding “peril” “accident.” them in both words judges expression, upon the learned selves they Hensey appeal White, the court of held no because here, accident, have there was held (to quote judgment) leading there ‘an entire the was the man ‘was lack fortuitous element.’ What of the deliberately, doing doing,’ in it ‘he was said, work, and that which course of his happened a fortuitous event.’ To in no sense by Halsbury expression Lord as used objection possible can passage occurs, it no which regretted that the I to be is, think, taken; but

* 726). LT (57 LJ (1887) 12 AC 518 QB v. Box Board applied word .‘fortuitous’ should have been to the by ‘injury compen- term accident’ in the workmen’s exactly thing act. If it sation means the same superfluous. ‘accidental,’ the use of the word is If haphazard (if may it introduces the elemeintof I use expression), an element which is not neces- sarily involved in the word- ‘accidental,’ its I use, misleading, by venture think, and warranted anything in the act.” opinion Addressing

Lord Robertson’s concurred. meaning himself to the held as follows of the word “accident” he

(p 452): poring by “Much over word ‘accident’ learned reasoning counsel has evolved some subtle about arguments I these sections. to confess that the seem entirely parliament, me to be over the heads employers, and of workmen. No one out of a say law court ever would hestitate to that this man met with accident, and when all is I said, think perfectly right. this use of the word is The word inappropriate by ‘accident’is not made the fact that directly the man hurt himself. use is indeed This (c),* itself, the act s. sub-s. sanctioned plainly implies giving right that an accident to com pensation may be attributable to the fault of the injured present man In the himself. instance the by man an act of over-exertion broke the wall of his Suppose by he abdomen. he had act same broken question leg, sup his pose would samе. But yielded the wheel had and been broken the ex actly surely breakage act, the same would be rightly argument described as accidental. Yet the against exactly application again act of the this case nothing the same—that there is accidental matter, as the man did what he intended do. fallacy argument leaving lies out of the of forces, account miscalculation or inadvertence now CL section ^[*] This 2 of is the wilful misconduct §412.2 ^[2] of [Stat original Ann act exclusion; Michigan counterpart, (PA Rev ^[1912] §17.152]). [1st Ex Sess], No '' mishap, element ‍‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‍of mischance, which is the them, misadventure.”

or upon reasoning, then, and lords, The house this Hensey supra. White, the In the overruled case Macnaghten through court, decision Lord the same 448), expression, quoted (p in the the also used (p 164), Adams Case that: expression popular “The ‘accident’ is used ordinary denoting the an word as un- not sense of mishap or an event which looked-for untоward expected designed.” or quotations only the hereto- Not it clear from completely rejected court cited fore that (as distinguished theory event of.the fortuitous ordinary work) as the an incident in the course sole meaning Lord “accident” but Mac- of the word explains (p meaning naghten 446) in detail “mishap” quotation, employed term the above in by our Court in the Adams Case: lifting weight trying a man, “If a in or to move something or easily moved, were to a muscle, strain mishap rupture himself, rick his or in back, parlance would be as an ac- described say Anybody that the man had would met cident. trying lifting weight, in accident heavy something for him.” move too accordingly held claimant, for the The Court suffering rupture, he had suffered an accident. passing, that there thus note, seems We support the statement Justice much Potter’s Paper Munising 275 Mich Twork v. dissent quarter-century later, 174, 184, almost upon Adams Case “is false based decisiоn plain language disregards premises statute.” 19? Wieda v. Box Board

Why English have we in reviewed detail these Certainly they cases? do not control us. Yet we shortly are examine the 1943 amendments to significance our appreciated act and their full can be only against background pre-1943 situa important background tion. It is to this to bear in language mind that of our act was adopted English from the and Scottish on the acts subject (Hills 20), same v. 182 Mich Blair, and that, generally speaking, adop under such conditions of presumed gloss tion will be that the of decision recognized by adopting State and im ported People, Attorney with the act. ex rel. Gen eral, v. Estate, Welch’s 235Mich 555. Our decisions, Hensey theory, however, followed the overruled namely, ployment injured that a workman who is in his em doing ordinary

while work in the ordi nary way has not suffered an accident. We thus assigned meaning a restricted and curtailed to the meaning word “accident,” a аt variance with its meaning ordinary speech. meaning in Since such great body excluded that of in cases whieh a man disabling injury through suffered at his work no any fault of his own, but without the intervention of fortuitous or outside force or subtle dis condition, grew through years, tinctions sought, court always, interpret light objec as tives in the the act in the of its pressing upon

mass cases it. some, In nothing I find fact, more than an result doing one’s and usual acts in his usual . way. Thus Watson Publix Theatre, Riviera 255 Mich was an actor who.turned “plaintiff’s leg gave somersaults. one On of them way injuries and he fell.” The Court held that his recently were the result of an accident. As Nichols v. Central Crate & Box 340 Mich 232, interpreted involving 236, we truly this case as (p accidental occurrence. 237), we said involved, Michigan Reports. , consequent way giving a member and “the sudden falling.” have the the case at bar we sudden Yet in way giving heart and it is held no accident. proper distinc I the 2 cases. Does cannot reconcile the case circumstance before lie tion (unknown himself) pre-existing to are claimant had us heart ' difficulty? If with Hur we confronted so, v, ley Co., 193 Mich 197. Selden-Breck Construction Hurley, Arthur the a brick There lifting While a terra cotta window mason trade. strangulated place hernia. It sill into he suffered a argued he suffered accidental not was injury. had allowed, compensation.

But our Court Hayes-Ionia approval (p 199) Co., Bell v. cited that: 192Mich and held pain, antedating actual “‘structural the weakness injury injury injury alleged, region the the where preclude recovery the a if occurred, does particular and the result a of itself distinct ” protrusion causing the .intestine.’ a of strain sudden Again The claim- I have trouble with reconcilation. par- equally of a heart the result ant’s condition was Dr. testified. ticular strain. Ramsdell so multiplied years through have As cases grown more more have subtle and distinctions anguish any thought at I must confess numerous and legal prin- differences reconcilation sound always ciple. can differentiations, course, Fact pointed they guide no tomor- out, but furnish truth the matter we have been is, row’s case. The attempting impossible, the differentiation of the result, from the accidental dif- accidental means impossible easy hypothesize ferentiation but practice. man at work. He is make in Thus a piece straightening of material. He does a bent every day. this occasion he exerts too much On say pressure. If material broke we he breaks, Í955] Box Board say it it is accident. If abdominal wall breaks, his we it? We commence

no accident. Or is onr labori- ordinary his ous search. Is this work? Or does ordinary work involve less stubborn material? strength we define How will of material which pass enclosing ordinary causes him border Bid work? is standard exertion for the work? his work involve over-exertion? Whаt This factor of the exertion has claimant prominence assumed a role of much in our deter mination of whether or not the workman had suf probably fered an accident. This is an inevitable emphasis upon result of our the fortuitous element ordinary to the exclusion of the work done in the way. goes many The exertion test back for years. We find it before the 200th volume of the reports today’s we find it in advance Stombaugh sheets. In v. Peerless Wire Fence 198 Mich 445, case, heart-failure the industrial accident board found the workman was “not heavy used to this in work and exertion.” This Court, reversing pointed the award, that out “the wall being ‘any '[was] of one auricle that so thin exer might tion at all been have the of cause its break ” ing.’ And in Nichols v. Central & Crate Box Mich note 237, we that the claimant’s work “ ‘required physical degree of exertion not shown greater to have been or unusual to than that ordi narily experienced general field of common labor. Exertion to that extent not did constitute a ” event.’ fortuitous difficulty making

But the turn upon ordinary the difference between exertion and is overexertion that it forces the commission this and appraisal degrees Court of into of exertion be- respective respective tween jobs. or claimants, as between apply

If we the exertion test to measure exer- beyond ordinary capacity person, the tion the then unfortunately, substandard in is, who

the workman muscularly strength while his recover, never can always compen- will receive brother well-endowed accept I cannot be- I this result. cannot sation. legislative protect intent the lieve that they strong, letting only lie where the weak the fall. appraisal contemplates of de-

The act no such grees it finds It takes workman as of exertion. is for one is underexer- him. What overexertion one for tion for another. is stress and strain What peace quiet Humans for a third. is relative differ in characteristics. all of these equally re- untenable

The exertion test leads apply the exertion if we the test to measure sults job. employee’s usually required In such job is voracious its if we have a that so event, demands even the system upon one, no the human keep strongest, can do work and no one will ever recover then health, it was the for it. I cannot conclude, either, give immunity, legislative such work so intent to compensation is concerned. far as Combinations may employed, aside but of the above tests complications resulting there is the confusion militating compelling circumstance decisive any against of exertion as a test use of measure legislature up compensability: The has set no for guidance. A factor so crucial whatever standard could had it left been undеfined,- not have been legislative that it control. intent question forced to answer, then, we have been interpretation meaning upon of the aet, our unexpected result ordi- this: Is nary result it the work nothing question more or less than a This work? verbal long puzzle. is made to As litigation and distinc- will have constant on it we turn v. Box Board multiply beyond hope will all tions of reconciliation. Mr. Justice concern Lan Cardozo’s bis dissent in v. Phoenix dress Mutual Insurance 291 US Life (54 1382), S 78 L 491, 461, Ct ed 90 ALR 934, forcibly comes mind: attempted “The- distinction between accidental plunge will

results and accidental means branch this bog.” law of the into a Serbonian By Thus we draw close to the 1943 amendment. year publicly expressed 1941there was much dis governors, satisfaction with act. Two now one distinguished member of this had recom Court, mended said, revision. The law, was was “inad equate today present economy.” for our industrial bring were ‍‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‍Amendments recommended about “to comprehensive provisions.” liberalization of its (Anderson Corporation, General Motors Mich 630.) study up accordingly. A commission was set * report page Its is found in 1943 House Journal, seq. personal injuries et The matter of received report (not much attention. The committee’s unan imous) part 320): (p read in as follows II

“Part Computation Definition Injuries; of Benefits change proposed “One this act occupational

abolishes the schedule of 31 contained in and accidental.” diseases present 1937 amendment to the law be requirement injuries also abolishes the study Other members of the commission were not, like respecting however, minded. Their views requirement matter of the of an “accident” their * See House Resolution No 2 House 1941, p Journal 1179.—- Reporter.-

202 343 respect statutory thereto fol- recommendation 337): (p low verbatim he deleted there should not “But we insist that do voting present members thе other law,

from the propose, must be as injuries personal all other the fact that any to it is evident accidental. Otherwise injustice grave person will minded reasonable up employer against force insur- an worked be rates.” ance proposed by 1 of them that section

It was (p 337): follows he amended to read as i employee accidental receives an 1. If an “Sec. injury arising personal in the course of of and out by employer employment at the time who is an his provisions injury subject act, of this to the such compensation paid in the manner benefits he be shall provided, in or, case extent hereinafter and to the of his death tion benefits injury, compensa- resulting from such dependents paid as here- to his

shall he defined.” inafter legislature say, had that the then, fair to It is question

clearly of whether time the it at this before requirement as act, accident in not the or rеtained. Its interpreted be Court, should passed, amended and the act as is found decision part, reading, follows: personal employee, who receives 1. An “Sec. em- arising of his injury and in course out of employer the time of such who is at ployment provisions subject of this shall act, injury he and to in the manner paid. provided, death in case of his or hereinafter extent injuries shall resulting such from such dependents defined. hereinafter paid' injury’ injury’ as used ‘date of or ‘time term or in the disease of a the case act shall in this single event to a attributable anof case employment in which day work the last he Box Board subjected employee last conditions re- disability (CL § sulting 412.1, death.” ' ! 17.151].) § [Stat Ann 1950Rev sug that the insertion It bewill observed rejected. gested has been word “accidental” under that the same amendment also be noted should the words “accident” and took wholesale excision of portions injury,” act, оf the from other “accidental “injury.” Anderson and the substitution word supra. Corporation, v. General Motors Our words People Adamowski, Mich would seem point: particularly applicable at this rejected affirmatively legislature the the “When statutory supported language have the which would present thereby made its intention view, State’s crystal a clear and not, clear. should without We contrary, cogent give- a con- reason the a statute to legislature plainly itself struction which the refused give.” to Legislative greater significance of even was,' action however, embodied in the same amendment. The legislature, it bewill has noted, now authorized com- pensation personal injury for per-1 due for disease, single sonal to a attributable event, injuries personal single attributable to a event. Why employment the speak- this word “event” in injuries? ing It will be recalled that the word usage, interpreted “аccident,” its common and as by highest English the court in the Fenton Case, involved both the idea of cause and the idea of might effect. One suffer an doing accident, not in ordinary ordinary way, by work in the but some wholly unexpected or fortuitous'condition or inci- aspect.. might dent. Such was the “cause” he Or unexpected suffer accident as the task, result of some ordinary rupture as such the case. This is aspect. the “effect” As we have seen, however, our embody interpreted Court the word “accident” to only aspect, excluding unexpected cause ordinary “event,” result of work. The word how- subject properly ellipsis. no ever, is such It is clearly indisputably referring a word both synonymous It is cause and result. a word steps occurrence all of the or incidents includes authority from be cause to final effect. Should first beyond authority demanded, of common speech, ed) Dictionary (2d New International Webster’s point. result, then,

will illumine the is that applicable “accident,” word even where the act original title, and its has now been restored to its meaning. It refers to both cause and effect. It unexpected only includes not incident condi- unexpected but tion also the result of work. Thus we have come full circle and have reached legislation Eng- remedial same result interpretation. lish courts my opinion, that the “accident” word then, comprehends employed the act unexpected cause, well result, as as we we hold, now and that should overrule should so inconsistent, it therewith. Let not be those cases thought unsettle the that such action would law of jurisdiction. repeatedly has divided Our Court our on matter,

this such divisions have contributed clarity certainty in a branch of law little many be others, should as as which, certain, above nonlitigious possible. and as as clear, undergone has of Flоrida similar The State question. very It would not be fruit- this travail on point in detail how Florida law be- out ful to supreme The and unsettled. court’s confused came Employers Gray Liability Mutual v. action, recent self-explan- (Florida), 64 So2d Ins. Co. atory : v, Board American Box Wieda enough,

“It is if there is an then, though unexpected cause, result, even there was no slip, misstep, fall or order to constitute such an ‘accident’ within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation law; the McNeill and insofar as supra, that an is not Cases, Peterson hold * per compensable happens if it while the claimant is forming these decisions are in the usual manner, work hereby modified, and we re-affirm Ficara, the rule laid Fla ceived usual manner Hotel down Co. v. Duff (7 unexpected injury 790), that an re So2d duty ordinary performance of a injury ‘by accident’ within the purview the without law, workmen’s showing anything fortuitous.” Upon analysis, the above Wieda is to com- еntitled pensation. disability The arose out and in the prop- employment, and, the commission course of erly relation found, there was a direct causal be- power tween the heart failure. failure and his my proper inter- But even view as to the should pretation rejected, the word “accident” be under the facts of is still entitled particular distinctions, this because certain case, plaintiff, urged upon must be made. us Company, Box defendant, Board argues, citing that there “accident.” It insists Nichols was no supra, Company, Central Crate & Box that, consistently “this has maintained that Court unexpected— results it is not sufficient that the be involuntary the means must be or unintended.” It points steps then out that the remedial to be under- power re- in event of failure had often been taken argues said that it could hearsed, hence, unexpected, though, course, incident injuries (the death) physical were. the results * Thomрson 869; (Florida), 868, McNeill 53 So2d Peterson v. v. City City Commission, (Florida), Jacksonville So2d 423,—Reporter. (cid:127)' n Michtxgan Reports.'

"206 - says: for, As does not train drill “One and re upon hearse an ‘accident.’” It relies the case of Department, McGregor v. Conservation 338 Mich 93, in which 101, was denied a fire stating: warden, Court plaintiff, doing “In the instant most, at case, customarily performed by hard labor him .the and n fellow employees during at least 2 of each months n year required degree physical which exertion greater not shown to have been unusual to or than n experienced ordinarily general field of n common labor. to that Exertion extent did not (cid:127) a fortuitous 'constitute event.” It should be connection the Mc observed, Gregor Case, that commission upon compensation, denying relied this case holding being its in this' connection as follows: “There can be.no doubt an examination of testimony the medical that there awas causal rela- tionship occlusion power coronary between the failure through aggravation pre- of an unknown existing arteriosclerotic in his condition heart. The (cid:127) disability arose out of the course of the employment. However, can see we no valid distinc- McGregor tion between this case and the case Department, Conservation 338 Mich decided Supreme . our. award on Court November- 1953. The deputy commissioner reversed compensation.” is not entitled plaintiff-appellant, the other hand, insists power that the failure was and for employed by tuitous event, sense heretofore remedy Court, "this and that its involved more than reply McGregor partial In exertion.. supra, points night Case, he watchman case (Schroetke v, Co., 193 Mich 616 Jackson-Church caught 64]), premises in which the [LRA1917D, v. Board Box previously-affected night the watchman’s fire, fire-fighting gave efforts, and out due to heart denying cоmpensation, reversed an order this Court 625),: (pp stating fairly question presents the think case “We this where death can recovered whether disability excite- from and overexertion results as broke out accidental fire such caused an

ment was with the deceased afflicted case, where in this heart failure due to heart of the heart where death was ailment, and deceased’s condition caused incident the fire. exertion and the excitement and % “In the instant case ^{[*] [*]} the whole circumstance, including ment of overexertion and the excite- fire, may to have been an ‍‌‌‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌​​​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌​​‌​‌‌‌‌​‌‌‌​‌​‌‍deceased, be said certainly a fortuitous circum- accident. stance.” upon upon to decision this

If I were called base an “accident,” or not there was sense whether distin- occurrence as of an guished fortuitous extraneous, hes- I would feel no work, emergency saying The there was. itation confronting extreme. was serious “disintegration,” plant threatened with the The revolving according of turbine. The record, foresight plans rapid and fact that careful makes measures in case of an remedial accident efficient threatening emer- á the accident nonetheless makes danger gency the tur- if it of when and occurs. repeated plaintiff’s distintegration, and bine’s hasty trips up as stairs various meas- down and planned long (yes, for such relief measures ures pres- employed, catastrophe) the sense were peril record, all described and so well sure to unusual exertions contributed constituted coping out-of-the-ordinary and fortuitous aspect completely imma- The “rehearsal” event. terial. There is constant rehearsal fires our buildings, of “man overboard” at sea, school power power plants. well in industrial failures deny actually Let those who will occurs, еmergency when the fire that, or the overboard, seaman falls the dreaded pres-

does involve the most intense beyond exertions, sures far normal eveiT routine, goes the routine of drills. Our mind back to the n morning understanding of Pearl Harbor. Our Bellinger, morning, that Admiral from his 0758that fateful at headquarters Ford Island, broadcast Japanese simultaneously the news of the attack dropping of the first bomb. His words were knowing “Air Raid, Then, Pearl Harbor.” some- thing of the human reaction we must take into ac- preg- us, count in case now before he added the nant words: “This no drill.” It was the real thing. There ais vast difference. place my ground,

IBut do not decision on this though place valid I believe to be. I it on the ground that the word “accident” includes both the unexpected cause and the result, that the claimant accident, suffered an from a single event or series thereof which arose out of and employment. in the course The commission’s denial of award should be re- deputy versed and award commissioner appellant. affirmed, should be with costs to

Case Details

Case Name: Wieda v. American Box Board Co.

Court Name: Michigan Supreme Court

Date Published: Oct 3, 1955

Citation: 72 N.W.2d 13

Docket Number: Docket 17, Calendar 46,225

Court Abbreviation: Mich.