The grand jury indicted Marika Wicks, Ronnie Chinn and Robert Prather for numerous offenses related to the homicide of taxi cab driver John Agazie. Prather pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and testified for the prosecution at Wicks’ and Chinn’s joint trial. The jury found both co-defendants guilty of malice murder, two alternative counts of felony murder, armed robbery, aggravated assault, hijaсking a motor vehicle, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. After concluding that the verdicts on the felony murder counts were vacated by operation of law
(Malcolm v. State,
The Court affirmed Chinn’s convictions and sentences.
Chinn v. State,
1. In addition to Prather’s testimony, the State showеd that, shortly after the murder, Wicks was in possession of Mr. Agazie’s cab. The victim’s blood was found in the vehicle and on Wicks. Wicks made incriminating admissions to others. When construed most strongly in support of the verdicts, thе evidence is sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt of Wicks’ guilt of all of the crimes for which he was convicted and sentenced.
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Jackson v. Virginia,
2. Relying
on Batson v. Kentucky,
3. Wicks enumerates as error the denial of a motion to sever his trial from Chinn’s. The trial court’s denial of a severance motion in a non-capital case will not be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.
Davis v. State,
Moreover, the existence of antagonistic defenses, standing alone, is not sufficient to require a severance. “[H]arm due to the failure to sever must be shown. [Cit.]”
Heard v. State,
4. Wicks contends that his trial counsel was ineffective. To prevail on that claim, he must show that the attorney’s performance was deficient and that, but for that deficient performance, a reasonable probability exists that the trial would have ended differently.
Strickland v. Washington,
(a) With regard to deficient performance, “ ‘[t]he criminal defendant must overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel’s conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct. (Cit.)’ [Cit.]”
Woods v. State,
Wicks nevertheless asserts that the investigation was deficiеnt because trial counsel did not personally visit the nightclub and question its staff and clientele. If, however, Wicks’ own friends and acquaintances could not verify his alibi, it is highly questionable that total strangers would be likеly to provide any corroboration. Although Wicks testified at the new trial hearing that he now knows of additional alibi witnesses, he did not produce any of them and could not even supply their names. He certainly did not make any showing that any uncalled and unnamed potential witness was readily discoverable if trial counsel had only made a personal visit to the nightclub, rather than choosing to rely on thе list of names supplied by his client. In fact, Wicks admitted that he “can’t remember anybody who . . . was a solid witness.”
“Rather than focusing on what... would have [been] shown had it been sought, the proper emphasis is on whether counsel’s actions, under the circumstances then existing, were reasonable. [Cit.]”
Belton v. State,
[A] defense attorney may face finite resources of time and mоney such that a reasonably competent attorney often *553 must rely on his own experience and judgment, without the benefit of a substantial investigation, when deciding whether or not to forego a pаrticular line of defense. [Cit.]
Brady v. State,
(b) Because the trial court was authorized to find that trial counsel’s performance was not deficient, we need not address its additiоnal conclusion that Wicks failed to prove that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the failure to conduct the alibi investigation differently, the trial would have resulted in an acquittal. See
Lajara v. State,
5. Wicks urges that the trial court erroneously failed to give curative instructions after the prosecutor made an improper golden rule argument. In Chinn, supra at 389 (3), we held that the comment
was not a golden rule argument and did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial[. Therefore], we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying [the] motion for a mistrial or in failing to instruct the jury to ignore the argument. [Cit.]
Wicks maintains that the trial court still erred, because it stated that it would give a curative instruction, but then failed to do so. See
Goins v. State,
Moreover, the transcript shows that the trial court did give a full and fair charge touching on all of the applicable issues, including the presumption of innocence, the State’s burden of proving guilt beyond
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a reasonable doubt, which was defined as “a doubt of a fair-minded, impartial juror honestly seeking the truth,” and a specific instruсtion that the “arguments of counsel” were not to be considered as evidence in determining guilt or innocence. In the absence of a written request for a more detailed charge, this was sufficient to satisfy the trial court’s promise to instruct the jury that, rather than relying on anything that might have been said in the attorneys’ subjective closing arguments, it was to decide the case on an objective and impartial evidentiary basis. “The court was not required to use the exact language used earlier when the court gratuitously informed the parties of how it would later charge the jury on this issue.”
Hampton v. State,
Judgments affirmed.
Notes
The crimes were committed on January 10,1999. The grand jury indicted Wicks and the two co-defendаnts on September 3, 1999. The jury returned the guilty verdicts on September 5, 2000. The trial court entered the judgments of conviction and imposed the sentences on September 20,2000. On October 12,2003, Wicks filed a motion for an out-of-time appeal, which the trial court granted on December 11, 2003. Wicks filed a notice of appeal on December 29, 2003, and the case was docketed in this Court on March 3,2004. The appeal was submitted for decision on April 26, 2004.