163 P. 434 | Or. | 1917
Lead Opinion
delivered the opinion of the court.
“That a misrepresentation or misunderstanding of the law will not vitiate a contract, where there is no misunderstanding of the facts, is well settled.”
In Fish v. Clelland, 33 Ill. 243, cited with approval in Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 45 (23 L. Ed. 203), we find the following:
“A representation of what the law will or will not permit to be done is one on which the party to whom it is made has no right to rely; and if he does so it is his folly, and he cannot ask the law to relieve him from the consequences. The truth or falsehood of such a*691 representation can be tested by ordinary vigilance and attention.”
In Clem v. Newcastle & Danvill R. R. Co., 9 Ind. 488 (68 Am. Dec. 653), we find this language:
“As a general rule, a party who has been induced to execute an agreement, by reason of the fraudulent representations of the other party, may set up such representations in bar of an action on the agreement. But this rule is subject to various exceptions; and one of them occurs when the representations, though false, relate to the legal effect of the instrument sued on. Every person is presumed to know the contents of the agreement which he signs, and has, therefore, no right to rely on the statements of the other party as to its legal effect.”
In Rogan v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 93 Ill. App. 39, it is said:
“Not only is it presumed that the law is ‘equally within the knowledge of all parties’ but no cause of action arises from or can be predicated upon a misunderstanding or misrepresentation of the law.”
In Burt v. Bowles, 69 Ind. 1, 6, we find this:
“These facts are concerning the law, upon which •fraud cannot be predicated, however false and fraudulent they may be, and whether they are suppressions of truth or representations of falsehood. Every person is bound to know the law, and not to be deceived by Its suppression or false representation. This is a necessary maxim, lying at the foundation of government and jurisprudence, and without which neither government nor jurisprudence could exist as a system.”
Counsel for plaintiff has not cited us to any cases which we regard as conflicting with this doctrine as applied to the case at bar. He appears to have relied largely upon the case of Richmond v. Ogden Street
“There are, therefore, two well-defined classes of mistakes common to parties entering into contracts; (1) A mistake in law as to the legal effect of the contract actually made by them; and (2) a mistake in law in reducing to writing the contract, whereby it does not carry out or effectuate the intention of the parties. In the former the contract actually entered into will seldom, if ever, be relieved against, unless there are other equitable features calling for the interposition of the court. In the second class the mistake is not in the contract, but terms are used or omitted which give the instrument a legal effect not intended by the parties, and different from the contract actually made; and here equity will always grant relief, unless barred on some other ground. Now, in the case at bar, the mistake falls clearly within the latter rule. The contract made was definite and certain, but a mistake was made in reducing it to writing. The notes for the balance due upon the judgments were, under the contract, to be payable out of the trust estate, without any personal liability on the part of the trustees. In drawing the notes, Starr thought he was accomplishing this result; but, through a mistake as to the legal effect of the terms used, the notes were drawn so as to render the trustees personally liable thereon, and did not, therefore, carry out or effectuate the contract as made. A part of the contract was by mutual mistake omitted from the writing, and the notes should be reformed accordingly.”
In this case nothing of the sort is presented. It is not claimed that the notes are otherwise than as agreed
Rehearing Denied.
Rehearing
Rehearing denied April 3, 1917, Second petition for rehearing denied April 10, 1917.
On Petition for Rehearing.
(163 Pac. 988.)
Petition for rehearing denied.
Mr. Edwin 0. Potter, for the petition.
Mr. Fred E. Smith and Mr. J. E. Young, contra.
Department 1.
delivered the opinion of the court.
‘ ‘ That at the time of the execution of said mortgage the plaintiff was informed by the defendants that in order to make the security good it would be necessary for the plaintiff to sign said promissory notes as well as said mortgage.”
In the amended complaint it is further stated:
“And plaintiff relying on the representations of said defendant, and not otherwise, that the execution of said promissory notes was simply for the purpose of making valid the security aforesaid, executed said promissory notes along with her said husband, Joseph Wicks.”
The averments of the complaint are insufficient as a statement of fraud inducing the plaintiff to execute the contract. It is well established in this state as a rule for pleading fraud that it must be stated that the representations were false; that the person making them knew they were false; that they were made with intent to defraud; and that the party seeking to be relieved from the fraud must have relied upon such representations: Rolfes v. Russel, 5 Or. 400; Dunning v. Cresson, 6 Or. 241; Martin v. Eagle Development Co., 41 Or. 448 ( 69 Pac. 216); Anderson v. Adams, 43
Rehearing Denied.