390 S.W.2d 893 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1965
Upon a jury verdict Lucas Cole recovered judgment against McKinley Whittaker in the amount of $25,000 as damages for personal injuries sustained by Cole when he was struck by Whittaker’s automobile. Whittaker appeals, contending that (1) a verdict should have been directed in his favor because Cole as a matter of law had assumed the risk, and (2) the damages are excessive.
Cole owned and operated a small commercial garage in which there was a hydraulic hoist or grease rack used to raise
Whittaker pitches his argument, that Cole as a matter of law assumed the risk, entirely on statements made by Cole in his testimony that “It is pretty dangerous any time you are in front of a car”; he felt that he was in danger any time he was in front of a ear; he stood in front of the car and signaled it forward because “That was my job. That was what I was expected to take”; and he felt that he was “expected to take that risk if I done the work I did.” In substance the argument is that assumption of risk is a purely subjective matter; that if the injured person thought there was a risk it doesn’t make any difference what other persons would have thought.
Our cases consistently have used objective standards in applying the doctrine of-assumption of risk. In a number of cases we have said that in order to charge a person with assumption of risk the danger must be so obvious that a person of ordinary prudence would not subject himself to it. See Kentucky & West Virginia Power Co. v. Goodman, Ky., 257 S.W.2d 553; Beam v. Calvert, Ky., 277 S.W.2d 35; City of Cold Spring v. Ross, Ky., 358 S.W.2d 507. A similar view is expressed in Restatement of Torts, sec. 466, Comment (a) c, as follows :
“ * * * his intentional exposure of himself to the known danger must be unreasonable. In order that it may be unreasonable it is necessary that a reasonable man in his position would not expose himself to it. * * * ”
It may be that the foregoing test is not the best one, and that the test should be whether an ordinarily prudent man would recognize and appreciate the existence of a substantial risk, rather than whether a reasonable man would chance the risk. Cf. Morrison & Conklin Const. Co. v. Cooper, Ky., 256 S.W.2d 505. However, under either test the standard is the ordinarily prudent man. The appellant would have us measure the seriousness of the risk by the apprehensions of the particular plaintiff rather than by the appreciations of the ordinarily prudent man. We think this is not acceptable, because it would penalize the overly fearful man who envisioned substantial danger in a situation that an ordinary man would consider reasonably safe.
The instructions in the instant case (of which there is no complaint) called for a finding of assumption of risk if the jury believed the situation was unsafe, or for a finding of contributory negligence if the jury believed Cole did not exercise the care of an ordinarily prudent man. In our opinion the jury was entitled to find that the situation was not unsafe in that it did not present an unreasonable risk and the jury also was entitled to find that Cole did not fail to exercise ordinary care. There was no serious danger apparent in the situation. The only possibility of danger was in an uncommonly negligent handling of the car by Whittaker1, and we cannot say as a matter of law that a reasonable man would have considered this a substantial risk. Most drivers have no difficulty at all in controlling a vehicle at snail speed. Therefore, Whittaker was not entitled to a directed verdict.
The judgment is affirmed.