Lead Opinion
The sole issue in the instant cause is whether the one-year statute of limitations, under the purview of R. C. 2305.11(A), or the two-year statute of limitations, under R. C. 2305.10, is applicable to a negligence action against an optometrist.
The common-law meaning of malpractice was restricted to intentional or negligent acts by physicians and lawyers. That meaning was given to the term “malpractice” in the original version of R. C. 2305.II.
Further, in Hocking Conservancy Dist., supra, this court noted, at 198, that “***[t]he inclusion of three specific medical classes does not indicate that the General Assembly has accepted Judge Matthias’ invitation [in Richardson v. Doe (1964),
If the General Assembly had wished to protect groups which are not traditionally associated with malpractice, such as optometrists and dentists, it would have listed them under R. C. 2305.11(A), as it did by amendment for podiatrists and hospitals, or included them in an expanded definition of “physician” under R. C. 2305.11(D). Hocking Conservancy Dist., supra, and Richardson v. Doe, supra. We do not feel that the General Assembly intended to extend the one-year
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Franklin County is reversed as to the issue of the applicability of the statute of limitations, and the cause is remanded to the Court of Common Pleas for proceedings consonant with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Notes
R. C. 2305.11(A) reads in relevant part:
“An action for libel, slander, assault, battery, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, or malpractice, including an action for malpractice against a physician, podiatrist, or a hospital, or upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture, shall be brought within one year after the cause thereof accrued* * *.”
R. C. 2305.10 provides:
“An action for bodily injury or injuring personal property shall be brought within two years after the cause thereof arose.”
During the course of this litigation, the parties have assumed that Earle Whitt’s claim for loss of consortium, loss of services and medical expenses rises and falls with his wife’s claim. Whether a spouse’s claim arises from alleged medical malpractice under R. C. 2305.11 (A) or from bodily injury under R. C. 2305.10, the other’s claim for loss of consortium, loss of services and medical expenses is governed by the four-year time limitation set forth in R. C. 2305.09(D). Amer v. Akron City Hospital (1976),
R. C. 2305.11, in pertinent part, originally read as follows: “An action for***malpractice***shall be brought within one year after the cause thereof accrued* * *.”
R. C. 2305.11(D) was added to the section. It provides:
“As used in this section:
“(1) ‘Hospital’ includes any person, corporation, association, board, or authority responsible for the operation of any hospital licensed or registered in the state, including without limitation those which are owned or operated by the state, political subdivisions, any person, corporation, or any combination thereof. Such term further includes any person, corporation, association, board, entity, or authority responsible for the operation of any clinic that employs a full-time staff of physicians practicing in more than one recognized medical specialty and rendering advice, diagnosis, care and treatment to individuals. It does not include any hospital operated by the government of the United States or any branch thereof.
“(2) ‘Physician’ means all persons who are licensed to practice medicine and surgery or osteopathic medicine and surgery by the state medical board.
“(3) ‘Medical claim’ means any claim asserted in any civil action against a physician, podiatrist, or hospital arising out of the diagnosis, care, or treatment of any person.
“(4) ‘Podiatrist’ means all persons who are licensed to practice podiatric medicine and surgery by the state medical board.”
Concurrence Opinion
concurring. On the basis of this court’s determination in Hocking Conservancy Disk v. Dodson-Lindblom Assoc. (1980),