115 Ky. 552 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1903
Opinion op the court by
Reversing.
John Whitney and H. A. Whitney, as partners, for many years conducted an insurance agency under the firm name of John Whitney & Co., in Covington, Ky. For reasons satisfactory to themselves, they dissolved the partnership, and each instituted an action in the Kenton circuit court against the other for a settlement of the partnership affairs. Subsequently these two actions were consolidated, and by agreement an order was entered whereby George M. Keifer was appointed special commissioner in the consolidated actions, with the following powers and directions Concerning the partnership assets: “The said special commissioner will forthwith take possession of the office, furniture and fixture of the firm of John Whitney & Co. He will take possession of the office of said firm and retain possession of ■said office until further orders. He will take possession of the horse, buggy and harness belonging" to said firm, and will sell said horse, buggy and harness at private or public sale, for cash or on credit, as may seem best to him. He will take possession of all the books, accounts, and papers of said firm, and will allow the parties hereto to inspect said books at reasonable times and at his convenience. He will take and retain possession of all other properties and assets of said firm. The said firm has funds on deposit at the Farmers & Traders’ National Bank and at the
The office expirations directed to be sold by the special commissioner are no more or less than a list of the names of the customers of the firm of John Whitney & Co. who have insured property through the agency of the firm, with the date of expiration of the policy of each customer. It is not pretended that the firm, or any member thereof, has any beneficial interest or property right in the contracts of insurance held by these customers. They have no control over the policies, nor any right to demand that they shall be renewed at the date of their expiration; nor have they any power or authority to demand that the insurance company issuing the policies shall renew them at the date of expiration. These expirations, then, which the order of the court seeks to sell, amount to no more than information as to what the firm has done in the past. The court can neither guaranty or convey any right with regard to it. It can neither require the patrons to renew their policies, nor the insurance companies to accept the business, should the patrons desire to renew'. All that the purchaser of this list of names and dates could possibly secure would be the opportunity to solicit business from the old customers of the dissolved firm. We do not think that this 1M of names and dates amounts to an asset of the firm which is capable of sale. The court could not prevent either .member of the firm from soliciting business from their former' patrons. It seems to us that the members of the dissolved firm have equal right to possession of the list of expirations, as well as equal right and opportunity to solicit the patronage of their former customers. This is not the sale of the good will of the firm, but the sale, merely, of the information shown by the books. We have been cited to no case which
Wherefore the judgment is reversed.