131 Minn. 261 | Minn. | 1915
There is evidence on the part of plaintiff that, on the second or third step from the top, the tread had become cracked and that the outer part projected forward half an inch above the inner part'
Plaintiff’s evidence is somewhat unsatisfactory, but we think it sufficient to sustain a finding that she fell from the defective step, that her fall was due to the fact that she caught her heel, and that the jury might infer that she caught her heel in the crack in the tread.
“It may naturally be supposed that, in general, where other issues than merely the amount of damages arise in a case, the same passion and prejudice which is indicated by the awarding of excessive damages, may have affected the determination of the jury upon other issues also; and if this should be deemed the fact, a new trial should be awarded. But, while it may hence be considered that the trial court ought not generally to refuse a trial de novo, where a verdict is so excessive as to lead to the conviction that the jury has been influenced by passion or prejudice in awarding it, yet, in a particular case, the court may feel satisfied that the verdict of the jury is right, and ought to stand, only that it is excessive in amount; and, where it does not appear that the court has exceeded the limits of discretion in such a case, its determination will not be disturbed.”
This rule has been followed in a large number of cases for now more than 34 years. McKnight v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. Ry. Co. 96
As to the railing, the evidence was first elicited by defendant’s counsel himself. He is therefore in no position to assert that the court erred in. receiving evidence of this fact.
The repair of the lower step is of little consequence in the case because no negligence was predicated on any defect therein, but the evidence introduced by plaintiff on this subject, if important at all, was justified by the fact that defendant had first offered proof that the condition of the stairs had not changed.
Order affirmed.