On August 30, 1992, at approximately 10:00 p.m., Wayne Whit-more went to make a night deposit for his employer at one of First Federal Savings Bank of Brunswick, Georgia’s branches. As Whit-more slowed his car to cross a speed bump on the driveway to the night depository, he noticed a blur in his rear-view mirror. A man armed with a gun then entered Whitmore’s car and ordered Whit-more to drive to a designated location. Once at that location, the gunman shot Whitmore twice and took his car and the deposit money. Subsequently, Whitmore and his wife filed a complaint against First Federal alleging that it negligently maintained its premises and failed to take reasonable precautions to protect Whitmore from reasonably foreseeable criminal acts of third persons. First Federal answered the complaint denying liability and later moved for summary judgment contending that the assailant’s conduct was an unforeseeable criminal act for which it could not be held liable. The trial court agreed and granted First Federal’s motion. Finding no error in the trial court’s ruling, we affirm.
1. In order for a plaintiff to prevail against a proprietor for injuries incurred as the result of a criminal act committed by a third party on the proprietor’s premises, a plaintiff must first show that the criminal act was reasonably foreseeable.
Savannah College of Art
*769
&c. v. Roe,
A review of the record shows that the sole prior criminal act occurring on First Federal’s property clearly was not substantially similar to the attack on Whitmore. Specifically, the crime involved the theft of a bag of money from an unlocked, unattended car in First Federal’s parking lot. As such, it was a property crime and not a crime against a person. As we held in
Matt v. Days Inns of America,
With regard to the police reports and printouts, although it is true they demonstrate that certain crimes of violence occurred in the area surrounding the bank over a two year period, they do not demonstrate that First Federal had any knowledge concerning such crimes. As the Supreme Court of Georgia held in
Sun Trust Banks v. Killebrew,
The mere fact that one of First Federal’s vice presidents had some vague recollection of having read something about muggings in a nearby parking lot also does not create an issue of material fact as to the foreseeability of the attack in this case. Such vague, equivocal, unsubstantiated recollection, which itself was based on hearsay, does not amount to credible evidence of First Federal’s knowledge of prior substantially similar criminal acts. See
Hall v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store,
2. Having determined that the Whitmores cannot demonstrate through the existence of prior substantially similar criminal acts that an issue of material fact exists regarding foreseeability on First Federal’s part as to the attack on Whitmore, we now turn to the Whitmores’ claim that such an issue of fact exists based on the general knowledge within the banking community that ATMs and night depositories are dangerous. As Justice Sears notes in her special concurrence in
Killebrew,
the dangers of ATMs are well known.
In cases like this, a plaintiff must show that the proprietor had a duty to protect him, and the existence of that duty depends not just on foreseeability, but also on
superior knowledge.
See
Days Inns of America v. Matt,
In the instant case, criminal activity was foreseeable to First Federal because of the general dangers of criminal activity associated with ATMs and night depositories as acknowledged by the banking industry. But the well publicized danger of criminal activity associated with the use of such devices is equally apparent to members of the general public absent specific knowledge on the bank’s part leading to an awareness that a particular ATM or night depository is even more dangerous than it appears to members of the public based on their general knowledge. As with issues of foreseeability, such specific knowledge may be demonstrated through evidence of the knowledge of prior substantially similar criminal acts committed on or in the near vicinity of the property. In this case, however, the Whitmores have failed to demonstrate the existence of any such acts *771 or any other evidence demonstrating that First Federal had specific (and thus superior) knowledge that the night depository in question was more dangerous than it appeared to the general public. This is especially true in light of Wayne Whitmore’s admission that he had used the night depository on several occasions, and thus was aware of the general surroundings in the area. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to First Federal.
Judgment affirmed.