15 Iowa 351 | Iowa | 1863
On the trial, exceptions were taken in the matter of refusing to give, and giving, certain instructions to the jury, and the overruling the motion for a new trial. The ground of this motion was, that the verdict is against the evidence and the law of the case. The testimony, as a
But it is claimed, as a matter of defense, that plaintiffs sold these liquors to defendants with the intent to enable them to violate the law of this State passed for the suppression of intemperance. In the case of Daller v. Laue & Guye, 13 Iowa, 538, we held, substantially, that such a defense was available in law against a foreign vendor of intoxicating liquors; but that the allégation of -such a purpose, on the part of the vendor, at the time of sale, must be supported by some evidence tending to establish its truth. The evidence in support of this allegation in the case at bar is to be found, if at all, in the testimony of defendant, Workman, and his partner, Fairall, who were the only witnesses that testified for the defense; and it is somewhat remarkable, in view of the character of the verdict, that they state no fact or circumstance tending, directly or indirectly, to show that a violation of the temperance laws of this State, was within the contemplation of the parties before or at the time of the sale of said liquors, or that the slightest allusion was at the time made to said laws,' or any other fact - showing that it was the purpose or intent of the plaintiffs to enable defendants to violate said
Now, in this state of the evidence, it is quite inconceivable upon what ground the jury found a. verdict for the defendants, and we-are forced to the conclusion that it is our duty to order a new trial, for the reason that there seems to have been no adequate testimony to authorize the verdict.
In regard to the instructions asked by plaintiffs, we suppose the court did not refuse them because they fail to state in the abstract correct principles of law, but it may be because they propounded some principles which the state of the case, as shown by the evidence, did not call into requisition, and therefore it is, we presume, that the court deemed it expedient to supply its own instructions, but the manner in which it did this was well calculated to mislead the jury, and in a large degree accounts for the character of their verdict. The court say, “if, at the time
This charge is somewhat vague, and howevér it was intended to be understood, it is susceptible of the meaning that it is the execution of the notes, and not the sale and delivery of the goods, that determines the place of the contract. This is a misconception. The evidence before us shows beyond a doubt that this was a New York contract; that the sale and delivery of the goods took place there; that they were shipped at the risk and expense of the defendants, and could have been attached as their property any time after the delivery of the same to the carriers at New York, and if the notes had never been executed, it would not in law alter the rights of the parties.
It is true, it was competent for the parties to have made a contract, to the effect that the plaintiffs should, at their risk and cost, deliver the goods sold, at Iowa City, and that the defendants should execute and deliver their notes for the purchase money before the title should pass to them. Under such a contract the above charge would have been proper, but under the contract proven, it was erroneous, and calculated to mislead. The cause is reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Reversed.