Whiting v. Whiting

reasons, jury case, In including if the service individual voir dire was Alltop. “The decision improper or work an undue conducted with as to “would be grant hardship’’ person. whether to a defendant’s motion on a jurors strike for cause rests within the sound trial court.” discretion of the State B. Bennett, W.Va. cir- appellant The also contends that the refusing to cuit court erred remove two jury prospective panel. from the jurors find no We error the circuit court ruling jurors. these either of prospective ju these two One of Cogar, Margaret rors was Jean who even Cogar

tually jury. had sat on the been V employed by Department Human upon foregoing, Based all of the appel months. Services for about six judgment of the Circuit Court Braxton Cogar lant should contends that have been County is affirmed. “law removed for cause due to the enforce Affirmed. Department ment of Human role” of the

Services, was involved the related neglect proceeding.

child This abuse and “The Department contention meritless. neither a law of Human Services is enforce agency prosecutorial agency, ment nor a and, therefore, per rule ... se dis [of qualification employment due to for cause prosecutorial by a enforcement or law 396 S.E.2d 413 agency] apply[.]” Bailey, does not State v. Harry J. WHITING 179 W.Va. 6 n. 51 n. 7 claims that appellant another Evelyn L. WHITING. prospective Alltop, juror, David should No. 19049. cause, for have been removed due to Morgan, a friendship Trooper key wit Supreme Appeals of Court of Alltop did not ness for the sit on the State. Virginia. West Rather, jury in he was this case. removed peremptory the exercise of a strike July appellant. Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Beckett, syllabus point 6 of State Neely July held: juror’s consanguineal,

A prospective relationship marital or social with an em- ployee agency a law enforcement does operate per disqualification se as a case cause a criminal unless the actively law official is in- enforcement prosecution volved in the the case. establishing After such a relation- exists, ship right has a to obtain challenged ju- dire of the individual voir prejudice possible ror to determine arising relationship, bias from the (emphasis supplied) Marlinton,

Roy Arrington, David for Eve- lyn Whiting. L. Weiford, Marlinton, Harry

Walter W. for Whiting. J.

MILLER, Justice: appeal This is an from a final order of County, the Circuit Court of Pocahontas 17, 1988, May granted dated parties, Harry Whiting Evelyn J. L. Whiting, a divorce and ratified and con- findings firmed and recommendations of a (master) family law master toas the divi- Whiting sion of their Mrs. con- appeal on that the tends trial court erred awarding pay- her one-half of a final ment on a note obtained from sale parties’ jointly owned real estate and of parties’ joint in the the funds bank account they separated. at the time We conclude these assets were marital distribution, subject and we judgment reverse the of the circuit court.

I. Whiting purchased Mr. a resi-

In 1965 $25,500. property Maryland for dential jointly in property was titled The wife, Whiting Mr. and his first names of Dorothy Clancy Whiting, as tenants Whiting Dorothy Clancy entirety. When 1975, her one-half interest died in 1974 or placed in trust for her in the Whiting subsequently ar- daughter. Mr. repurchase this interest from the ranged to trustees. married

The to this action were later, days on June 1975. Two June interest 9,1975, repurchase of the trust time, title to At that was consummated. in the placed Maryland tenants parties jointly as names of the accomplish this entirety. In order to $34,000 transaction, borrowed by agreement.2 savings loan.1 The sonal was divided Maryland from a trust, Whiting also executed on master that Mr. deed of recommended note and signed by $9,322.91 keep remaining both Mr. June were be allowed to Whiting. Maryland property Mrs. from sale money parties’ joint bank ac- Maryland proper- on the parties lived separation. By count on date of order $120,- they sold it when until 17, 1988, May dated the circuit court rati- portion of the sales They financed findings confirmed the recom- fied and $20,000 note from the price taking a mendations the master. part used buyers. Mr. and Mrs. sale, approximately proceeds Marlinton, $54,000, purchase a home II. Virginia. The County, West Pocahontas outset, At the that the court note trial in the names in Marlinton was titled house apparently experienced and the master They joint owners. lived of both as applying confusion in some 1,1985, they separat- until June when there facts this distribution statute of ed. therefore, begin, case. We with a brief thereafter, Whiting Mr. re- Sometime of the discussion statute. $15,022.91, amount of a check in the ceived payment represented W.Va.Code, 48-2-32, the final on the eq Under Maryland $20,000note the sale of three-step process. is a uitable distribution payable made check was property. The step The first is to differentiate between $5,700 in deposited He only. Mr. parties’ sep marital their account, kept parties’ bank property. purposes For of arate $9,322.91 property. remaining as his own distribution, property” is “marital defined W.Va.Code, 48-2-l(e)(l) as “[a]ll 1986, Whiting of Mr. instituted June earnings acquired by either proceedings in the Circuit Court divorce spouse during marriage, regardless a ... County. matter re- was Pocahontas ownership, except of the form ... master, hearing a was to the ferred separate shall include marital report In his on conducted June property_”3 “Separate property” is de- 20, 1987, master recom- dated October W.Va.Code, 48-2-l(f), including as fined marital home be sold and mended that the spouse equally property acquired a before proceeds between divided parties’ tangible per- marriage.4 particular unit parties. Most of the Whether a common, joint tenancy ancy tenancy or the record that the 1. There is some indication in $47,000. purchase price approximately right survivorship, Mr. or other however, sup- Whiting, he recognized contends that ownership other form of shared posed pay only state, half of that amount and except without than amount needed to he borrowed more marital shall not include charges legal care fees and settlement (f) take relating as defined in subsection attempt No first wife’s estate. section[.]” expenses or these to distin- was made itemize separate property An increase in the value of guish loan costs. them from the to the economic or noneconomic contribu- due is also considered “mari- tions either parties agree appeal that the marital 2. The on W.Va.Code, 48-2-l(e)(2). property” under tal personal property tangible were and the home section, full of the latter see note For the text correctly distributed. infra. W.Va.Code, 48-2-l(e)(l), provides in full: 4.W.Va.Code, (f), provides: 48-2-1 property1 ‘“Marital means: “‘Separate property1 means: "(1) earnings acquired by All "(1) acquired by person Property a before marriage, including spouse during a either every marriage; or interest, corporeal right or valuable "(2) acquired by person during Property intangible, incorporeal, tangible real or exchange marriage ownership, regardless personal, form of marriage; beneficial, which was before legal individu- whether whether “(3) person during acquired by held, Property party, ally held in trust a third marriage, from treatment but excluded whether held agreement valid co-ownership ten- marital some form of is marital or distribution, alter this without re- primarily question Wanberg of law. gard fault, based on consideration of (Alaska 1983); Wanberg, 664 P.2d 568 statutorily certain factors, enumerated Thomas, Thomas v. 259 Ga. including: (1) monetary contributions to Weiss, Weiss v. 122 Wis.2d marital property such as employment in- denied, (App.), 365 N.W.2d 608 review come, earnings, and funds which Wis.2d 367 N.W.2d 223 separate property; were non-mone- step The second process is valua- tary contributions to property, tion of the marital Under W.Va. services, such as homemaker child care Code, 48-2-32(d)(l), the measure of value is services, performed labor without com- property, the net value of the marital ordi- pensation, performed labor in the actual narily as of the date of the commencement improvement maintenance or tangible of the action.5 property, performed or labor step The final distribu- management or investment of assets process tion prop- is division of the marital which are property; the effect erty parties. between the 48- income-earning 2-32(a), provides equal parties, abilities such as contribu- division of the marital estate.6 Under by party tions either to the education or W.Va.Code, 48-2-32(c), this distribution training party, of the other foregoing only be altered if the circuit court party either employment or edu- equal determines that division of the mari- cation; (4) party conduct either properly inequitable in tal is view of cer- lessened the value of marital tain economic and noneconomic contribu- ty. 48-2-32(c) (1986).” W.Va.Code § tions to or devaluations of the marital es- Romine, 68, See also Romine v. 180 W.Va. spouse. recently tate either We summa- (1988); Vance, 375 S.E.2d 432 Vance v. 180 W.Va.Code, provisions rized the 48-2- 63, (1988). 375 S.E.2d 427 Where an 32(c), Syllabus in 1 Point of Somerville v. unequal contemplated, is distribution there Somerville, 179 W.Va. 369 S.E.2d 459 adjustments are additional that must be (1988): W.Va.Code, considered as set out in 48-2- agreement, “In the absence of a valid 32(d)(2).7 in the trial court a divorce case shall then, summary, In presume distribution that all marital is to be W.Va.Code, 48-2-1, equally parties, seq., divided between the under et is a 5.W.Va.Code, 48-2-32(d), provides, part; ”[T]he later date determined appropriate commencement of the action or as of such sulting from conditions outside the control of annulment or decree nance; distribution; or inflation parties marriage by ¿ft, bequest, riage; or ties sult[.]" "(1) "(4) "(6) Any "(5) parties.” and before the Determine the net value of all marital Property acquired by Property acquired by court shall: entered into before or as defined or to a but after the of this subsection which is due increase in the value of change attaining granting subdivision separation as of the date of the the court to be more in market value re- devise, during party of a equitable re- party (1), (2), of the descent or pertinent the mar- divorce, mainte- during par- judgment parties equally See otherwise language appears in the court shall divide the marital No W.Va.Code, 48-2-32(a), provides: “Except tutes marital value of their the case of an action therein which factors as are described two, der said subdivisions in subsection section, agreement shall: demanded question "(d) "(2) Designate note three and ^[******] After if provided requires the court to consider such annulment, between the infra. 48-2-32(d)(2), consideration of factors considering valuation property, and define the between the respective (c) four, each in this of this W.Va.Code, 48-2-32(c). one and two would is raised subsection divorce or wherein there is no the factors set forth interest therein. section, states: section, is entitled and the parties.” subdivisions which consti- and the relief in this upon every (c) separation, the court only interest Similar of this appeal. of the one, un- re-

456 ment, 52(a) Virgi is Rule step under West three-step process. The first circuit nia Rules of Civil Procedure parties’ marital or classify required findings to make of fact court step The is to value nonmarital. second of law its final order and conclusions step is to The third the marital assets. step reflect each par- divide the marital estate between Clay, Clay See v. procedure.9 distribution principles con- ties accordance with Ro (1989); 414, 388 182 W.Va. W.Va.Code, 48-2-32.8 Courts of tained in Romine, supra; v. Somerville v. mine reached the same have Somerville, supra. obligation same respect their conclusion with imposed upon family law master under Wanberg E.g., distribution statutes. W.Va.Code, 48A-4-4(d).10 supra; Brandenburg v. Bran Wanberg, denburg, (1980); Here, N.J. 416 A.2d 327 the final order of the cir- neither Rothman, Rothman v. report 65 N.J. cuit nor the master’s contains court Willis, findings Willis (1974); appropriate N.C. A.2d 496 and conclusions on other rev’d support distribu- App. 355 S.E.2d the classification grounds, questioned by Mrs. Whit- N.C.App. tion the assets Little, appeal. Ordinarily, Little (1987); N.C.App. ing we would Smoot, remedy inadequa- Smoot case to (1985); remand this S.E.2d 283 gener note, however, See cy in the record. We Va. ally hearing Divorce the mas- (1986); at the time of before 27B C.J.S. § 1987, Whiting Golden, Equitable Distribution seven- ter June of Mr. L. years there ty-two old. Because we believe Property § Gregory, J. 1.08 record from which Equitable Distribution is a sufficient factual Law 2.02 § parties’ can the merits determine claims, justice deem it in interest of the dispute further de- made a to resolve this without have Unless agree- lay. stipulation property or a settlement Syllabus Peoples unequal Point 1 of Bank Point of marital in an division sult Retreat, Inc., Piper W.Va. Pleasant v. Pied 158 ty, factors de- if an examination and 170, 573 we stated: 209 S.E.2d and said three four scribed in subdivisions “ (A) expended produce finding that a a 52(a) mandatorily requires trial ‘Rule marriage during the in efforts a his or her court, upon the facts with- in all actions tried par- or which limited decreased manner specially jury, and state out a to find the facts ability ty's income-earning or increased the separately law be- its conclusions of thereon income-earning party, ability of the other entry judgment. do fore The failure to (B) so as himself herself conducted neglect duty part so constitutes on depreciate dissipate of the mari- value court, appears appeal that and on trial if may, parties, the court of the then tal with, complied not the case the rule has been just alimony fair absence of a and in the compliance.’ Point 1 remanded for he provisions of section fifteen under the award Syllabus, Company v. Tire Commonwealth adequately of this article which [§ 48-2-15] 351], Company, 193 Tire W.Va. [156 Tri-State facts which underlie takes into account the (1972) S.E.2d 544 [ ].” in said subdivisions factors described 60, Gorby Gorby, S.E.2d v. 180 W.Va. 375 Accord four, adjust equitably the definition three and Jones, (1988); v. 176 W.Va. 345 424 Jones property, parties’ in marital Allen, of the increasing interest (1986); W.Va. Allen v. 173 313 Bills, the interest marital (1984); v. 170 W.Va. 112 Bills 320 S.E.2d 707, party adversely the factors con- affected (1982); Spence Spence, 348 v. three subdivisions and (1981); sidered under said Pierce v. 167 280 S.E.2d 307 W.Va. Pierce, be awarded less four who would otherwise 166 property, to half marital than one marital not to exceed one half of the W.Va.Code, interest 4(d), states: “All recom- 48A-4 property." the master shall include mended decisions of conclusions, findings and and statement of per opinion in therefor, the extent that our curiam all material

8.To basis reasons or Vance, law, provi- suggests presented supra, fact, on the Vance v. or discretion issues of 48-2-32, W.Va.Code, record; embodying proposed are involved order sions of sanction, relief, sepa- there- classifying appropriate denial step of initial added). (Emphasis of.” property, it rate is overruled. (Alaska 1990); v. III. Husband T.N.S. Wife A.M.S., (Del.1979); 407 A.2d 1045 In re Whiting’s appeal, principal Mrs. On Marriage Ill.2d Rogers, 85 Ill. contention is that the trial court erred (1981); Dec. N.E.2d 635 Carter v. awarding portion her one-half of that Carter, (Me.1980); 419 A.2d 1018 Conrad payment from the final sale of the Bowers, (Mo.App.1975); S.W.2d Maryland kept that Mr. Pascarella, N.J.Super. Pascarella v. money for himself. She contends that this (1979); A.2d Parsons v. Par property subject sons, 101 A.D.2d 476 N.Y.S.2d 708 W.Va.Code, distribution under 48-2-32.11 Quinn Quinn, (R.I. 512 A.2d inquiry Our primary whether the final 1986); Bonnell, Bonnell 117 Wis.2d payment Maryland from the sale of the 344 N.W.2d 123 a marital asset or Mr. Whit- gen- Many adhering to this ing’s 48-2- 1(f), sepa- eral rule conclude that this result is in includes within the definition of “[property acquired partnership concept accord with the of mar- rate person marriage riage “[proper- before ...” which the basis for distri- ty acquired during Typical by person marriage is this bution.13 observation exchange Supreme Carter, which was Maine Court Carter 1022; marriage[.]” before 419 A.2d at “Treating held Any Whiting acquired interest Mr. tenancy as part of the marital estate Maryland property pur- as a result of the pur- fully principles accords days chase of the trust’s interest two after [Marriage poses Di- Uniform his would fall second within adopted Act in Maine. property” vorce] definition of “marital contained exception definition of from the W.Va.Code, 48-2-l(e)(l). However, acquired by gift, for property one-half interest in the Mr. Whit- 722-A(2)(A), application has no Section ing acquired at the claims to have death of marriage from a transfer his been first wife could have considered jointly. Such both at the of his time transfer, in of clear and con- the absence meaning second within vincing contrary, the must be evidence to W.Va.Code, 48-2-l(f)(l). question is evidencing intention understood as an having title fee whether his act of to the transfer the to the marital es- placed in name of Mrs. as a the tate. ... time he the tenant at the converting of trust’s had the effect interest “This is consistent with the conclusion marriage, marital property. conception interest into of fundamental having community property its in roots agreement general that the There is law, partnership as a or shared enter- property into separately transfer of owned prise.” changes the of joint ownership character jurisdictions, transfer to in the In these ownership interest so gift to the marital so title is often viewed as from nonmarital marital transferred Rogers, Marriage estate. In re su subject equitable that of 14 Bowers, Lewis, supra. pra; P.2d Conrad v. E.g., Lewis 785 distribution. Proper- kopf, Classifying Separate party conflict of issue. Marital raises a law Neither Sepa- living Virginia ty-Combinations in Increase in Value were West Because the of J15,000 payment Property, final was made 997 at the time the rate 89 W.Va.L.Rev. 1985, equitable distribution statute would in our apply. 1984, legislature amended 14.In Illinois make it clear equitable statute to distribution 12. For the W.Va.Code, complete text of 48-2- separate property to a co-own- transfer that a of 1(f), 4, supra. see note ership See form will make it marital 498, Ill.App.3d Marriage Nagel, 88 13. Commentators In re much rea- have used the same of 5.27; Golden, Ill.Ann. Ill.Dec. N.E.2d 1192 supra Kraus- soning. § J. See recognized concept legislature eq- of mar When enacted the We have provisions enterprise. or shared uitable distribution of our riage partnership as a di- 289, 291-92, law, Tsapis, presumption vorce it Dyer W.Va. abolished of (1978), gift interspousal equitable “The 249 S.E.2d we stated: distribution marriage In Roig Roig, once saw a sacra cases.17 law which W.Va. roughly (1987), conceptualizes recog- it as ment now we analogous partnership.” presumption to a business nized the demise of the of an omitted). LaRue, gift (Footnote interspousal separate property In LaRue v. (1983), explained such cases and 172 W.Va. that asserting gift characterization such a must confirmed this now affirmative- ly concluding prove that contributions of tradi it: worthy tional domestic services were obviously leg- was intent of “[I]t of mar consideration distribution spouse islature allow one to transfer monetary estate as contributions. ital spouse the other irrev- provisions adopted distribution gift thereby ocable remove as- following legislature in 1984 our deci so sets transferred inclusion incorporated partner sion LaRue However, keeping estate. statutory into our ship concept of Code, spirit [1984], 48-3-10 divorce law.15 order for is transferred spouse from one to the other mar- Prior the enactment of riage to be excluded from the marital 1984, W.Va.Code, statute in distribution pool, proof there must be presumption 48-3-10 established was intended as irrev- gift separate property where one instances, gift_ ocable In all the bur- purchased placed title spouse property, but proof upon spouse den Where the title in the name of other. gift.” claim would spouses joint put in the names of both was Thus, pur Roig although ly, there that the we concluded possible money still to make “intended one-half an irrevocable chaser conveyed spouse, paid and half interest so to be to a proving gift” spouse. Dodd Hin burden of is now the to the ton, 69, 71, Roig who claims it. did not address gifts (1984).16 estate. 503(b) (Smith-Hurd Cum. W.Va. 74 S.E. 233 The Reviser’s ch. Stat. Supp.). ¶ Note to 48-3-10 states: equalize section is It is "This new. intended W.Va.Code, 48-2-36, concept makes the position husband wife in such trans- retroactive so distribution actions.” May long as was filed after the divorce action 25, LaRue, 171- 1983. In LaRue W.Va. at W.Va.Code, 48-3-10, 1984 amendment to 17.The discussed, way by of we proviso: the underlined added dictum, jurisdictions from other which cases purchases per- spouse real or "Where one equitable upheld retroactivity the of distri- have same, property pays for the but sonal cases, property: ‘In such claim is bution of usually the spouse, of takes title in the name apply that the should made statute shall, of in the absence evi- such transaction marriage prior occurred to a divorce where intention, contrary presumed a be dence of statute, date of because that to the effective by gift spouse purchasing so a be existing impair application would contracts spouse in name the title is taken: Pro- whose process. claims been violate due These have vided, under That in the case an action (Citations omitted). uniformly denied.” of seq.] provisions two 48-2-1 et [§ article of of chapter required Dodd, this wherein court recognized prior that to the

16. In we 48-3-10, property what consti- determine a we had enactment of of equitably property and divide the tutes marital presumption that a husband who common law same, by presumption section created jointly pre his wife was titled gift spouses apply, a between shall not gift a her of one-half to have made sumed (Emphasis affirmatively proved." Coffman, be must added). interest. See Coffman Burns, (1929); 150 S.E. Effler W.Va.Code, 48-2-l(e)(l), defining separate proper- transfers title to his or her property acquired during ty joint all spouses, into the names of both property except as marital for certain limit presumption transferring that spouse categories ed which are con gift intended to make a of the property to nonmarital, separate expresses sidered the marital estate is consistent with the preference characterizing marked principles underlying distri- as marital bution statute. We believe it is conclude reasonable to joint titling We‘ stress that the legislative rejection presumption separate gives only rise to a interspousal gifts distribu gift rebuttable to the mari tion prevent cases was intended to the au presumption may tal estate. The be over separate property tomatic creation of inter showing come transferring that the during marriage merely by ests reference spouse did not prop intend to transfer the to the manner in which the erty joint ownership18 or was induced to recognized titled. We as much in Roig, fraud, coercion, duress, do so decep Instead, supra. we believe that W.Va. Bonnell, tion. See Bonnell v. supra; Code, 48-3-10 is consistent with the Trattles, Trattles v. 126 Wis.2d joint titling view of other (App.1985). N.W.2d 379 estate, implies gift to the marital as we argued by It often transferring pointed have earlier out. spouse that the real reason for the transfer result, If this were not the intended joint into towas extremely spouse would be difficult for a consequences avoid taxes or other adverse jointly to claim an interest in that, separate ownership, therefore, spouse paid for which the other most of no to the marital estate was intended. the consideration. Absent affirmative uniformly rejected argu have Courts proof unequivocal of an ground deny ment that it does not circumstances, property in transfer, only the title states the rea would be held to be making gift. E.g., son for In re Mar separate property only despite one riage Moncrief, Colo.App. documentary proof co-ownership and an (1975); Carter, P.2d 1137 supra; Carter v. express statutory preference for marital Coffey Coffey, 119 A.D.2d 501 N.Y. distribution cases. (1986); McLean, S.2d 74 McLean v. legislature We do not believe the intended (1988); N.C. Lowry v. Instead, regressive such a result. Pa.Super. Lowry, 375 544 A.2d 972 recognizing that the transfer of title to the Brown, Pa.Super. Brown v. names of both husband and wife reflects 507 A.2d 1223 an intent to donate the estate, give basic credence to Nor is this result inconsistent with making title and to the the act W.Va.Code, 48-2-l(e)(2), provides for partnership enterprise concept of or shared property component a marital marriage. to the extent that the value We, therefore, where, dur is increased the ex hold marriage, penditure of marital resources.19 In this ing the course of the 18. 219, factors such as the utilization Boyce, intended to make the indicia that the transfer v. nent owned Quinn, supra; Burgess, W.Va.Code, 48-2-l(e)(2), 376 part: determining 694 N.W.2d 379 710 P.2d 417 S.W.2d 288 Trattles for marital intent, (App.1985). (Mo.App.1985); Quinn v. (Alaska courts have joint ownership Trattles, purposes provides, in marital. 1985); 126 Wis.2d as further looked to Boyce Burgess jointly perti- v. v. to a funds which reduces arate wise property, an “‘Marital "(2) expenditure of funds which are marital separate property of either of the marriage, which increase results from increases the net value of property, ^[******] The amount of including property’ extinguishes indebtedness an means: expenditure increase in value in liens, separate prop- against sep- or other- of such parties (A) 460 612, (1985). tracing 330 616

instance, permits of 313 N.C. S.E.2d See the statute generally 27B C.J.S. Divorce 521 § to the parties’ respective contributions in order determine the marital however, jurisdictions, it Even in these is Obviously, components. recognized nothing generally and nonmarital that there is incompa of funds rule that is application has where the source this statute no gift concept of a to the tible with jointly and the property has been resulting from transfer marital estate gift presumption of to the marital estate joint names of separate property into the has not been rebutted. spouses. As Missouri Court of both have, in the absence Some Kramer, v. Appeals stated Kramer 709 specific 48-2- statute like 157, (Mo.App.1986): 159 find S.W.2d “[W]e 1(e)(2), or adopted a of funds” trac- “source nothing prevents in that which [rule] in di- ing theory distribution agreement, spouse, by own [or her] joint no where there has been vorce cases implied, by gift, trans express or from titling marriage. A typical state- after muting of separate item into an Harper appears ment of doctrine v. property.” also v. Car See Carter 80, 916, 54, Harper, Md. 448 A.2d 929 ter, McLean, supra; 294 supra; v. McLean (1982): McLeod, N.C.App. v. 74 327 McLeod denied, S.E.2d cert. N.C. theory, “Under source [the funds] (1985), overruled on other S.E.2d acquired expendi- by when is an Johnson, 317 N.C. grounds, Johnson v. prop- ture nonmarital of both 346 S.E.2d 430 erty, is characterized as Indeed, only juris- are aware Thus, part part nonmarital and marital. diction, applies Maryland, the source spouse contributing proper- nonmarital doctrine, tracing of funds of mari- proper- is interest in the entitled contributions, in tal and individual cases ty in nonmarital invest- the ratio sepa- has a transfer of where there been total nonmarital and marital ment to the the mar- rate after remain- property. investment note, however, Mary- riage. that the We ing property is characterized as express- statute land distribution subject eq- property and its value from defini- ly excludes consideration distribution.” uitable property” tion of “marital “direct- Thomas, 259 Ga. Accord Thomas ly property.20 to nonmarital traceable” (1989); Brandenburg v. Bran Consequently, Maryland Court (Ky.App.1981); 617 S.W.2d denburg, Zich, Appeals concluded Grant v. (Me.1983); Hall, 462 Tib Hall v. A.2d Md. 477 A.2d the idea that Tibbetts, (Me.1979); 406 A.2d 70 prop- betts v. separate property can become marital Hoffmann, 676 817 erty by S.W.2d of title solely virtue of a transfer Hoffmann Wade, (Mo.1984); N.C.App. joint ownership entirely inconsistent with Wade denied, Maryland statute. disc. review (B) erty, Carolina distribution performed either or both North work during marriage.” specifies proper- statute is similar during exchange ty acquired Ann., Law, 8-201(e) Family 20. Md.Code § regard- "shall remain (1984) provides: less the title is in the name of whether property1 (1) ‘Marital “Marital means the — both[J” or wife or N.C.Gen.Stat. husband titled, property, acquired however Mims, 50-20(b)(2) (1987). Mims See § marriage. 1 or both Yet, North N.C. property’ does not include 'Marital recognizes presumption of Carolina ty: (i) sepa- arising the transfer of marital estate marriage; acquired before the E.g., rately rettl title. (ii) owned from a inheritance McLean, McLeod, supra; McLeod v. party; McLean v. third (iii) agreement; apply supra. this rule excluded valid North Carolina does (iv) directly any to of these joint traceable accounts. See note to bank infra. sources.” determining of court in whether to alter the We conclude that the source expendi- property to of marital is the ordinarily doctrine is not available division funds separate property acquire or separate that ture of to property characterize improve property.22 marital property has been which transferred Tracing marriage. the Here, days marriage, Mr. two after their classify the parties’ contributions to Whiting Maryland transferred title to the ignores property as marital nonmarital Whiting's into his and names Mrs. joint titling of the of effect Whiting presumed Mr. jointly. is therefore incompatible partnership and is with the separate donated interest to have whatever marriage. agree concept of We with may he have had to the Golden, supra statement from 5.29 § The property presumed estate. is marital 126: character, and, marital to have been very source of “At a basic level pre- no evidence was offered to rebut the [the does the reali- proceeds funds not reflect also sumption, the of its sale were doctrine] marriage; partners meaning ties of married tend within of our marital resources obliter- distribution pool their and this statutes. property. of ates identities any below in a Nor was evidence offered tracing discourages actually The law of statutory attempt to serious overcome sharing rewards equal presumption of division of the mari- running account what is theirs. keep a of estate. record did show that Mr. tal marital only One can surmise that Whiting skill devoted considerable time and strengthened by not such a bonds are making improvements parties’ addition, practice. problems proof In No of real estate. evidence of the value tracing can assets be so substantial ap- It these services was offered. also expense litigation is often not that the however, pears, Whiting that earned Mrs. effort.” worth the three times as much as Mr. approximately Whiting during marriage. any In say that contributions This is not event, Whiting requesting only one- Mrs. can never be considered. payment. half of the remainder of the final origins separately may it is the traced to establish that then, be summary, conclude that spouse, of one Maryland proper- estate was marital real W.Va.Code, means of the listed meaning of our within Moreover, tracing each 48-2-l(f). proceeds from law and that the distribution were, therefore, at the spouse’s permitted contributions of such the sale stage of the distribution division In the absence also overcoming statutory pre- process the trial court determines when evidence equal prop- equal sumption of an division distribution one-half under 48- was entitled to erty, Mrs. -32(c), apply.21 proceeds of the sale of such 2-32(a) should not Accordingly, we conclude ty.23 to be Among factors considered maintenance, W.Va.Code, 48-2-32(a), of mar- or increase in value see 21. For the text contributions, supra. monetary in- note ital cluding, but limited to: W.Va.Code, 48-2-32(c), provides, pertinent "(A) Employment earn- income and other part: ings; and agreement, valid ‘In the absence "(B) property.” which Funds are presume that all court shall parties, equally between the be divided is to exception emphasize of this 23.We distribution, regard may without alter this account dis- payment and the bank final to either attribution fault IV, parties’ infra, all of the in Section cussed alleged proved course be which equally, apparently property was divided action, after consideration of the following: therefore, not, satisfaction. We are to their considering these items in isolation "(1) party has each The extent the marital estate. rest of acquisition, preservation contributed 462 Moreover, allowing Whiting gen- this is consistent with Mr. court erred

circuit regard joint $9,322.91 remaining disposition from eral rule with keep the entire accounts, in Sylla- which stated payment. reverse the decision bank the final We Conner, Conner v. court, entry remand for 1 of 175 and we bus Point of the trial pay 512, (1985): him to her one- 334 S.E.2d 650 requiring W.Va. of an order “ half of amount. deposi- ‘Prior to the death of a donor

tor, presumption exists un- a rebuttable Code, 31A-4-33, provisions der the IV. amended, ownership of Whiting joint, asserts that she which Mrs. also funds is by Mr. competent funds be evidence.’ is entitled one-half overcome Short, 3, Dorsey joint v. Whiting Syllabus from their bank 157 withdrew Point (1974).” separated. is shortly they It account after S.E.2d separation, Mr. prior asserted that McComas, v. Accord McComas 178 W.Va. tangible items of Whiting sold a number The marital or depos auction and personal property at an character of the funds before nonmarital bank proceeds joint in the account. ited the deposit factor. In is not a determinative Whiting August, Mr. withdrew Simmons, 170, 174, v. Simmons 171 W.Va. gave He Mrs. $2,020 from account. (1982), rejected we the remainder to Whiting and used $20.00 joint funds in account assertion that were hunting Whiting Mrs. con trip. take a the sole con she to one-half of tends that is entitled the funds: factor tributed “[T]his deduction of money withdrawn after dispositive provi of the issue. Under the Whiting Mr. already she received. $20.00 and our sions of W.Va.Code 31A-4-33 § joint ac deposits that his contends Short, Dorsey supra, holding in once from sale of count were realized banking deposited joint in a ac funds are property24 and should be re own count, presumed they jointly are to be himto as such. turned funds is owned. The source of the irrele recognized that vant.” We further “with we in the Many principles recited depositor the funds donor drawal of discussing section in Mrs. Whit previous conclusively presump does not rebut proceeds the sale ing’s entitlement to the 171 W.Va. 298 S.E.2d at tion. ...” at Maryland applicable residence are McComas, also McComas v. su See Thus, as well. for joint bank accounts Conner, pra; supra. Conner dis purposes classification cases, Thus, believe that under we tribution a number (1969), funds where are spouse’s deposit of 31A-4-33 concluded that one have deposited in a in the names of jointly bank account separate funds into a wife, such funds are changes both husband the character of account presumed pur- for to be marital to marital funds nonmarital See, For e.g., poses distribution. subject to distribution. above, A.M.S., conclude that the A.2d reasons stated T.N.S. v. Husband Wife parties’ joint Marriage in the bank account of Emken, In re (Del.1979); funds within the 125 constituted 56 Ill.Dec. N.E.2d 86 Ill.2d W.Va.Code, 48-2-l(e)(l). Ac- meaning of (1981).25 Whiting. provides "[p]roperty in ex- disputed Mrs. 24. This assertion was prove change sepa- remain was offered to the nonmari- shall No evidence items Mr. sold regardless tal character the title rate whether auction. husband or both shall name of the or wife unless not be considered be marital permitted Some courts have classification contrary expressly intention is stated in the tracing bank accounts. See Allen Harrison-Manes, conveyance.” See Manes v. Allen, (Ky.App.1979). North 584 S.W.2d 599 N.C.App. Brown result virtue of Carolina arrives at this statute, Brown, N.C.App. S.E.2d 287 50-20(b)(2) § N.C.Gen.Stat. conclude, however, hearings that further in not cordingly, trial erred the court unnecessarily delay Mrs. resolution of awarding funds to would one-half those parties’ dispute. Whiting the an Whiting its distribution of this Mr. was afforded present marital assets. to his evidence at the opportunity have, June, hearing. Although we V. appeal, accepted as those facts true him, favorable to we still conclude most challenges circuit Whiting also the Mrs. Whiting prevail to on that Mrs. entitled findings master’s ratification the court’s circumstances, In such further her claims. In final fees his attorney’s and costs. as hearings would be futile. Mrs. report, the master recommended that Whiting Whiting’s attorney’s fees pay Mr. fee statutory family the law master VII. supplemental incurred the conduct of above, stated we reverse For the reasons

hearing on 1987.26 The master October finding of the Circuit Court Poca- judgment his recommendation on based conducting supplemental County hear- insofar it is conflict hontas as spent by un- ing, opinion. time was “additional We remand case with dersigned paid by which should be an court with instructions enter [Mrs. Whiting], requested determinations Whiting pay who Mrs. compelling Mr. order portion Whiting the above one-half of contested mattersf.]” Maryland prop- on payment of the final Whiting finding re- The that Mrs. erty and the funds withdrawn from not proceedings is sponsible for the further separation. In account after the bank by the evidence. The record supported addition, we direct the court to rescind the Whiting Mr. clearly that it was reveals Whiting pay prior compelling order Mrs. supplemental hearing by mo- requested the attorney’s fees attendant to the costs and August court on filed with the circuit tion October, hearing. not, finding should 1987. The master’s 25. therefore, adopted the circuit have been with instruc- Reversed and remanded Accordingly, judg- reverse the we court.27 tions. point court on this ment of the circuit well. NEELY, Justice, dissenting: Chief VI. wrong wrong in majority opinion is — nature, wrong understanding of human cross-assignment er its

Finally, wrong interpretation statutory in its ror, should Mr. asserts legislative analysis intent. hearings. We its for further remand the case discretion, June, may, hearing to af- before master was cut short terms, opportunity upon parties an settle different enter order ford negotiations require. issue. When justice may division court The circuit ends sup- through, recommendation, circuit court ordered fell plemental find- shall follow hearing. appears that no It addition- ings, to be: a master found conclusions October, was offered at al evidence hearing "(1) Arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis- transcript In was made. that no cretion, conformance with or otherwise not in event, transcript supplemental no law; hearing Court. appears in the record before this "(2) right, power, Contrary to constitutional immunity; privilege, or W.Va.Code, 48A-4-10, circuit states “(3) statutory jurisdiction, au- excess reviewing family law obligations in court’s limitations, statutory thority, short of W.Va.Code, 48A-4-10(c), pro- report. master’s right; vides: “(4) procedure re- observance of Without examine the recom- “The court shall circuit law; quired master, along with mended decision evidence; "(5) master, Unsupported substantial findings and conclusions conformance with enter an order in decision, may “(6) recommit the facts.” Unwarranted recommended case, instructions, hearing for further or her I. titled in his name to the other name, spouse’s couple allows a married persons contemplate married do not Most liability the tax that occurs at reduce Ninety-nine percent believe that divorce. spouse death one increases and the marriage beat the odds and that their will tax passed amount free to the children. promises they fulfill their marital until will marriage parts them. Because the is death of assets creditors is Protection from an- continue, use, to most expected property to jointly. other incentive title for and transfer the benefit title couples struggle every month to pay Some partners. their How- and only bills their is a house and asset divorce, ever, if ends the they protect want to from creditors ti- unjustly to the party intends enrich neither tling couples Other jointly. married other. spouse engages have who one business partner separates property, produce If even one activities that substantial contin- owned, separately couple’s gent spouse subject from the as- If if liabilities. to sets, likely most reac- partner’s support the other liability primary is also the for question viability is to of the mar- family tion and has titled most assets in his riage. very pigeonholing prop- alone, assets, spouse’s act name either hers, mar- erty his, ours—undermines the separate, jointly marital or should be titled — protecting separate riage. Sedulously protect part to at least from of them credi- transfer, renewal, every at rein- [1984], protects tors. 48-3-10 exchange will weaken a mar- vestment portion jointly titled from riage by emphasizing reemphasizing and creditors because it creates a viability option. of the divorce spouses; and the between credi- only spouse’s tor can reach the debtor psychological reassur- In addition to the jointly share of the titled Fur- spouse to one’s of a commitment to ance thermore, reaching share the debtor’s when marriage, couples married have three expensive jointly titled involves practical commingle major incentives litigation that makes the whole undertak- federal tax ex- their assets: estate ing Crowder, uneconomical. See Harris v. creditors; from emption; protection At administration, and, (3) ease both before day disputes end of most between and after death. settled, debtors and creditors are and amassed Couples have substantial gives edge title the debtor settlement legally least pay want to tax wealth negotiations. By taking advantage possible. of federal couples deductions, Finally jointly most title tax credits and low rates estate administration, (rates begin quickly at mount ease of both before and and 35% Either renew 50%), couple up spouse can after death. can a married transfer tax, pay car redeem $1,200,000 paying tags, their children without transfer, and, remaining necessary, es- bonds when in- federal estate taxes and Jointly liquidate property. vest Joint title subject then to lower rates.1 also tate is probate is used to avoid which reduces property, or transferred titled expenses, At paperwork, delay. an excess of from deduction, ly By using the Estate Tax Credit Preservation the unlimited marital called $600,000 credit, The estate in excess of would the unified 26 U.S.C. Trust. § U.S.C. surviving spouse pass pass up without federal and wife can a husband § $1,200,000 liability generation unlimited marital estate tax under the to second beneficiaries surviving spouse, paying taxes. At the death of the federal estate To accom- deduction. without result, testamentary up estate would also receive unified plish trust is set that second $600,000. $600,000, up exempted estate tax liabili- the amount credit Federal and funded reduced other estate tax under the cred- ties can be credits, further federal income tax unified by gifts annual exclu- surviving spouse's interest under the in the testa- it. sion, 2503(b) ($10,000 gift exclu- mentary § 26 U.S.C. trust should be limited a life inter- Gibbs, sion). est; usually “Basic Estate Gift are Federal beneficiaries the remainder Taxation,” Mary’s design frequent- 17 St. L.J. 809 couple’s children. This trust productive spouse, jointly property World where assets death of a are distrib- quickly easily political groups transferred to uted to favored can be never to be spouse. can living replaced. The widow/widower property immediately.

use or sell regard, perhaps example the best all Jointly titled benefits almost political of Third World oc- redistribution couples, class Uganda married middle as well curred in the 1970’s. Presi- However, poor. majori- under Amin, rich and attempting dent to increase the opinion benefits share, expropriat- Black Africans’ economic law were available under the old as enacted the Asian store dis- ed Indian owners and (see infra) legislature section III inexperienced tributed their assets to Black outweighed by possibility are now regime. followers of the re- Those who through a divorce. food, loss this unexpected ceived boon ate the up supplies, quickly used and then went opinion’s majority presumption Uganda’s economy out business. jointly property titled which would other- ground many a halt to starved for lack qualify “separate property” is a wise sophisticated of a distribution network.2 marital is not on an estate based Alas, majority, similar President to functioning understanding accurate Amin, only looks to the short benefits run couples. quilt, al- of most Aunt Minerva’s constituency to a favored and fails to see spouses, really though used both be- problems longer killing term the fabled really longs to her niece. Mother’s house golden-egg-laying goose. belongs daughter. Grandpa her to John’s belong grand- to really law, law, watch and stock along Divorce with criminal people separate jointly son. Most quickly people po- known to becomes who gift, property as a conditioned on but tentially prison are it. Many affected couple’s remaining married. procedural know inmates more and sub- criminal law than recent law stantive creating in favor of By graduates. their school The reason for property time marital at the of divorce course, knowledge, of is that law criminal title, majority mere rewards based on directly affects current their condition. who, spouses by keeping property majority opinion today’s law will divorce names, mari- only their refuse allow the so as to have relied on catch those naive separate property, and tal unit to use their law, majority opin- the old but when punishes spouses allow who general- redistribution effect becomes ion’s property. The to use their unit known, ly spouses individually title will generous caring spouses up in a end separate property. their losing part divorce of their ty- hurt this deci- Family security will be marriage, During spouses will sion. majority’s Although applaud I con- likely, more death question which is financially unit be family cern that di- Other believe divorce? secure, (redistributing sepa- approach possibility will still ask who vorce bare unwary the marital rate money, likely get my creditors more estate) it’s on will fail based because question spouse? others will my Still misunderstanding of human nature. is worth the ease of administration whether inter- probably their majority believes in a divorce. losing half the help pretation of our statute will divorce keep their Spouses will by increasing the in a homemakers divorce not family will individually and equitable distri- subject titling or the financial benefits shortsighted in have action today’s But bution. In the transfers. tax-saving interspousal poli- is similar to temporary redistribution emo- financially and family loses Third end the regularly observe cies we Uganda’s redistribution. Naipaul, Bend in the River V.S. A See accurate, although fictional account ... after the separation in all loss occurs mar- ... and this tionally, ending ...; di- riages just Any not those increase value (Emphasis added), vorce. separate property ...” W.Va.Code, 48-2-l(f) Neither [1986].4 II. rather, preferred; prop- type of opinion majority’s based only Not is the according form erty is classified to its nature, misunderstanding of human on a ownership but how and when it was According to to follow the law. fails acquired. property system This dual statute, distribution adopted “essentially common- because divorce, is classified time of a extrapolations sense fairness notions on how and when based spouses’ expectation.” and beliefs about example, acquired. For Divorce-Proper- Levy, “An Introduction ac- earnings “All includes: Fam.L.Q. Issues,” quired ... regard- during the ... legislature’s Additional evidence of the (Em- ownership ...” less of the form of classify according intention Code, 48-2-l-(e) added), phasis acquisition means of rather than its title separate property includes: [1986]3; and to proviso added found in the ... before mar- acquired “(1) Property Code, part eq- 48-3-10 in 1984 as of our acquired (2) exchange in riage; or ... ... statute. The added ... uitable distribution acquired ..., during (3) a mar- or ... requires, divorce, of proviso at the time a by agree- riage ... a valid excluded acquired spouses (4) “gift between must be affirm- ...; by gift, ... that ment or ... distribution; devise, atively proven.”5 Certainly separate for or or bequest, descent otherwise, pro- property except expressly complete cation or as of marital 3.The definition [1986], W.Va.Code, 48-2-l(e) provisions by is: for of this article as found in vided brought provisions applied are in actions (1) earnings acquired by property ei- and All marriage, including article or the enforcement of spouse during ev- under this for a ther interest, corporeal ery right rights or and under the article. valuable intangible, tangible incorporeal, or real or complete separate 4. The ownership, property regardless definition of personal, of form W.Va.Code, beneficial, 2—1(f)[1986], legal individu- in is: or whether found whether ally 48— held, by party, third or held trust a in (1) by person Property acquired a before marriage parties by whether held marriage; or co-ownership such as ten- form of some ancy (2) Property acquired by person during a common, joint tenancy tenancy or exchange marriage for any right survivorship, or other of ownership recognized marriage; acquired before the or which was other form of shared (3) Property acquired by person during a state, except this without marriage, but excluded from treatment separate property shall not include marital by agreement property a valid marital parties (f) property of the as defined subsection during mar- into before or entered section; and riage; or (2) in value in amount of increase (4) acquired by party during Property mar- a of the of either devise, by gift, bequest, riage or distri- descent (A) marriage, increase results from to a bution; or are expenditure funds which an during (5) acquired by party Property a including expenditure of such property, marriage par- separation but after the against sep- indebtedness funds which reduces divorce, granting and before the of a ties liens, extinguishes or property, other- arate separate mainte- annulment or decree of separate prop- net value of wise increases the nance; and (B) by erty, performed both either or work (6) Any value of increase marriage. parties during the (2), (3), property as defined in subdivision property" con- of "marital The definitions (5) is due to this subsection which "separate prop- in this and tained subsection change re- in market value inflation or to (f) erty” of this sec- contained in subsection sulting outside the control of from conditions application pro- outside the shall have no tion parties. article, this and the common law visions of ownership respective W.Va.Code, [1984], with the added 48-3-10 wife, earnings and as al- of a husband proviso, states: underlined provisions by three 48- [§ article tered purchases person- real or chapter provi- Where one seq.] of code, 3-1 et same, pays but takes by for the abrogated impli- al are sions of [1984], requiring that at the time of a di- martial there become vorce, spouses between the be af- gift. adding the amendment By must be a firmatively proven. legisla- [1984], the 48-3-10 although alone ture indicated that was Furthermore, injury insult to add protect sufficient to credi- “legislative game, majori- intent” tors, prove mere title not sufficient ty’s opinion is on a version of the based ownership in a contest between the equitable distribution statute was ac- proof at the time of and affirmative divorce tually legislature. rejected The Sen- required.6 equitable ate version distribution statute, according to the Journal of III. (1984)529-42, Delegates proposed House of majority opinion is based on un- following property: definition of legislature, in supported inference that the property, personal, All real or whether statute, passing distribution acquired earnings, party either preference a “marked for ... marital had rebuttably pre- 14) (Slip property,” Op. based property regard- be marital sumed to “presume[s property jointly to be titled] individually less title is held whether purposes for party or in trust analysis majority’s distribution.” The co-ownership in some such as form legislative is not on the lan- intent based tenancy, tenancy in common guage found in the distribution except: tenancy by entirety, statute, according which classifies acquired Property be- was ac- how and when fore the in ex- II, quired. (See supra section for the stat- change acquired prior for to of marital and utory definitions marriage, including any increase in value Our dual def- separate property.) statute’s change due inflation or in market preference” no “marked inition indicates result of conditions outside the value as a rather, type property; classifi- for either of excluding any parties, but control of depends how and of improvement by cation made additional “acquired” and not expenditure when the was funds or a re- of marital legislature’s by The intent create sult either or both its title. of work furnished system by parties during is also shown of with a dual improvement W.Va.Code, value of such addition 48-3-10 provision added Brotherton, writing opin- spouse, Justice unanimous in the of the other name ion, shall, classify proper- source of funds to of used the in the absence evidence transaction intention, Rogers Rogers, appreciated); v. 182 contrary presumed be a be of a (1989) (in which spouse W.Va. 387 S.E.2d 855 by purchasing so Workman, again writing Provided, a unanimous Justice the title taken: in whose name opinion, was deficient to deter- noted the record provi- an action under That in case of ownership jointly real of certain mine the seq.] 48-2-1 et [§ article two sions case for further devel- estate remanded the required chapter the court deter- wherein fact opment the items were in to determine if parties constitutes what mine property). equitably divide property and same, by created section jurisdic- majority’s discussion The apply, and a between shall not recognize although because most tions is flawed interspousal affirmatively proved. be must gifts gifts, gifts, the same as these proof parties, require affirmative from third holding majority opinion gift, delivery misstates showing 6. The make a an intention to Moser, Roig, Roig W.Va. 794 acceptance. v. See v. 117 Ariz. and 312, Moser Potter, (1977); (1987) Hamstead v. and in effect returns to Potter P.2d 446 572 38, Hamstead, (1987) (1983); Marriage 357 S.E.2d re W.Va. Ark. 655 S.W.2d 382 Weinstein, Syllabus specifically Ill.App.3d Point 83 Ill.Dec. overruled in that we of 470 N.E.2d 551 Smith, ignores majority 472 A.2d Roig supra. orn- Smith also (Me.1984); Lowry, Pa.Super. system Lowry recognized the dual eases legis- theory In addition our adopted 544 A.2d 972 a “source funds" Shank, proof of required specifically affirmative classifying property. lature interspousal gifts. See Shank v. (1989) (in 48-3-10 [1984]. being ratio of the value added property immediately the value of Martha Louise GOODE improvement the addition or was before made; (2) acquired by party one Property Carl Edward GOODE. by agreement par- valid excluded before, during into ties entered or after No. 19439. marriage; Supreme Appeals Court acquired by one Property party Virginia. descent, West including gift, bequest, devise or any in value due to inflation or increase July change market value a result of conditions outside the control of the

parties, excluding addition or expenditure improvement made funds or result of work fur- either or nished both the value of such during being improvement in the ra- addition or and the tion of the value added value property immediately before the addi- made, improvement or to the tion or equity is increased extent that marriage; acquired by af- Property separation and before the ter the final [Emphasis add- divorce or annulment. ed]. version, above, quoted Senate roundly prop- of our dual rejected favor

erty system, quoted earlier. justification majority offered giving a rebuttal in favor pre- without the

of marital that sumption, spouses paid for the would, divorce, in with funds (Op. up separate property. their

end with 421). majority The result seeks to legisla- result intended avoid is the namely separate property, ab- ture — agreement by the parties, sent original remain its owner. Indeed with people agree most would is a fair just result should, affirmatively proven gift, absent jus- majority’s remain its owner. tification is merit and decision without fiat, adopts, very position rejected legislature.

Case Details

Case Name: Whiting v. Whiting

Court Name: West Virginia Supreme Court

Date Published: Jul 18, 1990

Citation: 396 S.E.2d 413

Docket Number: 19049

Court Abbreviation: W. Va.