Case Information
*1 Before: FUENTES, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: July 29, 2015)
___________
OPINION [*]
___________
PER CURIAM
Pro se appellant James Schneller attempts to appeal from several of the District Court’s orders in the above-captioned case, in which Schneller attempted to intervene. For the following reasons, we will dismiss his appeal from the District Court’s May 20, 2014 order, and we will affirm in part and vacate in part the District Court’s April 24, 2014 order.
I.
In November 2013, Schneller filed a pro se motion for leave to intervene in the above-captioned case, which involved a same-sex couple’s challenge to, among other things, Pennsylvania’s Marriage Law, 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 1102 and 1704. Schneller sought to intervene on behalf of himself and the Philadelphia Metro Task Force (“Task Force”), [1] which he states is a community organization of which he is the co- founder and sole decision-maker. The District Court denied Schneller’s request, concluding that he could not proceed pro se on behalf of the Task Force, and that he had *3 not established that he was eligible to intervene by right or permission pursuant to Rule 24(a) or (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
On March 17, 2014, the District Court denied Schneller’s motion to reconsider. Schneller did not appeal from that order, and instead filed a motion for leave to file an amended motion to intervene. Schneller argued that the District Court should allow him to file the amended motion to intervene pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), which governs the amendment of pleadings. He also stated that “[t]he order denying intervention . . . set forth errors that clearly could be resolved by an improved pleading.”
On April 24, 2014, the District Court denied Schneller’s motion, explaining that it was more properly construed as a second Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion for reconsideration. The District Court stated that, “[i]nasmuch as we have previously denied Mr. Schneller’s request for reconsideration, we again easily do so here, noting that he has met none of the touchstones of Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and is merely attempting to gain a ‘second bite” at the apple.” The District Court’s order also effectively issued a filing prohibition against Schneller, directing the Clerk of Court to “return any future filings by Mr. Schneller to him upon receipt.”
Schneller’s May 7, 2014 notice of appeal was returned to him due to the District Court’s filing injunction. He then submitted a notice of appeal to this Court, challenging the denial of his motions, as well as the District Court’s filing prohibition and its initial *4 failure to file his notice of appeal. (See C.A. No. 14-2871.) We instructed the District Court to docket the appeal as filed on May 15, 2014.
On May 20, 2014, the District Court granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and declared that 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 1102 and 1704 are unconstitutional. The defendants did not appeal. Schneller, however, filed a notice of appeal on June 14, 2014, attempting to appeal from the District Court’s May 20, 2014 order. (See C.A. No. 14-3049.) He also again challenged the District Court’s filing prohibition and its denial of his various motions.
Schneller’s appeals have been consolidated for all purposes, and are now ripe for disposition.
II.
First, Schneller does not have standing to challenge the District Court’s May 20,
2014 order holding Pennsylvania’s Marriage Law unconstitutional. He was a non-party
whose motion to intervene was denied and, despite his arguments, he has not been
aggrieved by the District Court’s May 20th order. See United States v. Stoerr, 695 F.3d
271, 276 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Supreme Court and our Court have long recognized, as a
general matter, that ‘only parties to a lawsuit, or those that properly become parties, may
appeal an adverse judgment.’”) (quoting Marino v. Ortiz,
Second, our jurisdiction is limited to review of the District Court’ April 24, 2014
order. A second motion for reconsideration does not toll the time to appeal from an
initial judgment, see Turner v. Evers
,
We will, however, vacate the District Court’s filing prohibition against Schneller.
We review such an order for abuse of discretion. Abdul-Akbar v. Watson,
Here, the District Court’s April 24th order directed the Clerk “to return any future filings by Mr. Schneller to him upon receipt.” The District Court did not provide Schneller with notice of its intent to prohibit future filings or an opportunity to respond. Moreover, the restriction does not appear to be limited in any way. Although Schneller has filed numerous meritless actions and has attempted to intervene in many cases (and may very well constitute a vexatious litigant), the District Court offered no explanation for its imposition of the order. Thus, we will vacate the portion of the District Court’s April 24, 2014 order setting forth the filing prohibition against Schneller. [2] *7 We have thoroughly reviewed Schneller’s remaining arguments and claims on appeal and conclude that they are meritless. Schneller’s motions to file his brief out of time and to accept the noncompliant filing are granted, and Schneller’s brief is deemed filed as of February 26, 2015. Appellees’ motion to be excused from filing a brief is granted. Schneller’s motion for oral argument is denied.
Notes
[*] This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.
[1] We dismissed the Task Force as a party to this appeal in our January 2, 2015 order.
[2] We need not remand for any further proceedings because the District Court, if it wishes, can sua sponte direct Schneller to show cause why he should not be subject to a filing injunction. We express no opinion on that issue.