*1
case, however,
That
involves the rule where
only
circumstantial,
obviously inapposite
evidence is
and is
here.
testimony
confusing
have been
children/victims
part,
predicament
nature,
but that
unusual
is not an
cases of this
reconciling
or sifting through
testimony
paramount
such
is a
function of the
the evidence in
jury. Reviewing
light
most
verdict,
any
favorable to the
we conclude that
rational
trier of fact
appellant guilty beyond
could have found the
a reasonable doubt of
molestation,
molestation,
child
statutory
child
rape
charged.
Virginia,
as
Jackson v.
Rodger Davison, E. Tise,
Lindsay Jr., A.
71154. WHITEHEAD v. THE STATE.
Deen, Presiding Judge. July 7, 1983, the appellant, Whitehead, cohort, Ben and a Larry Wilson, purchased one-way bus tickets from Macon to East- man, Georgia. Eastman, Once in they proceeded to Depart- Fred’s Store, where, ment according to the state’s a bungled till-tapping. Whitehead and Wilson were subsequently charged with of attempted convicted robbery by snatching. Whitehead contends that the trial court erred charge. Held:
1. The trial court
instructed the
person
that “a
commits the
when,
offense of robbery
theft,
with intent
to commit
he takes prop-
erty of another sudden snatching.”
pointed
As
appel-
out
lant,
this definition unfortunately omitted the essential element of
taking the property from person
a
the immediate
of that
(a).
OCGA 16-8-40
however,
Earlier in the jury charge,
§
specified
trial court
that under the indictment Whitehead had been
charged with attempted robbery “by attempting
to take
value,
wit,
U. S. currency from
the immediate
of Teresa
Hicks
sudden snatching”; and immediately following the incom-
plete
robbery,
definition of
the trial court
advised the
(and Wilson)
at-
reasonable doubt
robbery
in the indict-
tempted to commit the offense
ment,
convict.
it should
“
the trial
Generally,
‘[u]pon
judge,
the trial of
request, should instruct
jury,
his
with or without
charge to
*2
necessity
ap
must
of the law which of
be
general principles
as to the
questions
upon
in
correct conclusion
plied by
reaching
them
(1) (26
State,
Sledge v.
given requested jury misdemeanor theft charge trespass criminal as lesser included offenses. state’s crime, Wilson, cohort tossed evidence showed that Whitehead’s merchandise, paying floor for some some coins onto the while pick up, over to Whitehead that while the sales clerk bent tray of the cash Another opened money register. reached for the store room nearby clerk from a stock and observed Whitehead’s emerged being tray kept; upon hand in where bills were thus no- the $20 ticed, trial, Wilson register closed the drawer. At de- Whitehead cash took register nied to the counter and where this incident going even opened he cash place, had noticed claimed helpful. specifically be He register drawer and had closed it to having any money to steal or other the de- any intent partment He he had come to explained store. also and Wilson improve to consult with root doctor on how their Eastman to a black luck, Store because they Department had entered Fred’s buy stockings. Wilson to some needed
Thus, and Wil- the evidence the state and that of Whitehead snatching attempted robbery by son either an showed that occurred no crime or that at all committed. With such a situa- tion, there in failing was no error jury on the lesser Durden v. by taking, offense of theft as well as trespass. State, King State, App. 127 Ga. 392) (1972). App. 83 J., Pope, J., Beasley, concurs. concurs
specially. Judge, concurring specially.
I 2; concur fully Division I concur Division 1 except that I would not place very heavy reliance on Baxter v. 176 Ga. (7) (335 dangerous It is for the trial in instructing apply law to in deciding a criminal clearly state what the elements of the crime are. Where the indictment artfully drawn clearly them, so as to recite reading the be sufficient because it tells the precisely what fact, must find doubt, a reasonable in order to return a verdict of guilty. But when the reading of the indictment does not do job, further, court is obligated go filling what might not be clearly stated for jury’s understanding. When the court *3 reads the indictment and also undertakes to set out the elements as such, such undertaking complete should be correct; otherwise there is substantial room for by confusion the jury which could choose to base a verdict on finding only the by elements itemized the having given heed to the court’s caution that the merely is the by means which the State charges Baxter, In defendant. trial court defined arson differently than the indictment charged.
In definition, is, that a recitation of the ele- ments, was not conflict with what inwas the indictment. In its instructions to the jury, the court read the indictment as constituting what defendant with, was charged including that there was an at- tempt to take property from the immediate of Teresa Hicks by sudden snatching. It also instructed that allegations of the indictment and plea of guilty not formed the issue it was to try, is, whether “guilty he was of the charged in this indict- ment.” Finally, it if a reasonable doubt that defendant “did intentionally attempt to commit the offense of robbery as charged in Indictment,” this Bill of then it should find guilty. defendant There is thus no basis for jury confusion here or lack of understanding that it had to find a from person or from the immediate Phillips v. Compare What the trial court must assure is is aware of the facts it must find in order to convict; if as a whole falls short in conveying elements, it cannot be concluded that the jury was aware of the elements and of consti- upon misunderstanding guilt it did base crime. tuted the December Decided 1985. December Mullís, for Dennis
W. Solis, T. Attorney, Assistant L. District Michael Wiggins, James for AGENCY, GENERAL ALEXANDER UNDERWRITERS LOVETT et al. INC. et al. v.
Banke, Judge. Chief general its company agent against
This is a suit an insurance company failure of the insurance damages to recover based policies. by covered one its pay allegedly a claim either to defend summary partial judgment an order appeal granting motions for sum- liability denying plaintiffs the issue mary judgment filed defendants. Indemnity Company, general and the
The insurer is International Inc. Prior to Agency, General agent is Alexander Underwriters au- Craig Agency, was Craig, B. Insurance Wilmith d/b/a According agents. of its sales Alexander to act as one thorized Alexander, application an mailed Alexander this meant un- met all of Alexander’s insurance which automobile rules, check the correct amount derwriting accompanied by a Interna- bound coverage would be considered premium, Indemnity postmark date. tional plaintiffs one of the two Acting through Craig, Curtis in- herein, Indemnity automobile accident an International obtained Buick, January 8, covering a effective surance *4 following 8, policy face of the January Stamped YOUR ACCIDENT NOTIFY THE EVENT OF AN notice: “IN UNDERWRITERS, INC.” OR ALEXANDER AGENT 25, effect, Alexander 1980, policy was while the above Craig’s author- Agency, but not Craig Insurance notified or renewal that no further new was revoked and ity to bind Nevertheless, on September accepted from it. business would be for the request submitted complied Alexander with a LTD Lovett’s Ford adding a 1974 endorsement issuance a letter it sent Lovett Alexander asserts that coverage. premium remit an additional him to instructing September