Whitehead v. StateWhitehead v. State
A Chatham County jury found Javis Whitehead guilty of murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Dominique Larry.1 Whitehead contends that the evidence was insufficient to rebut his claim of self-defense and to support his conviction for murder beyond a reasonable doubt. He also claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his
1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury‘s verdicts, the record shows the following. Whitehead and Larry grew up together and were close friends. At some point before the shooting, however, a rift had developed between the two. In the week prior to Larry‘s death, Whitehead had stopped by Larry‘s home several times, looking for him. On the day of the murder, he drove up to Larry‘s home with a gun on his lap. After learning that Larry was at the Stallion Motel, Whitehead drove there, accompanied by his friend, Ronald Giles. When Whitehead and Giles arrived at the motel, they found Larry with a woman, Lashawn Quarterman. Quarterman testified that, after Whitehead and Giles entered the motel room, the group drank and partied together. During their visit, Whitehead kept his gun visible and within reach. Although Larry also owned a handgun, he had put it away when he arrived at the motel earlier that day. According to Quarterman, shortly after Whitehead
About an hour or so into their visit, someone knocked on the motel room door. Giles testified that, when the knock sounded, he was standing near the front door, and Whitehead and Larry were standing by the bathroom. Larry asked Quarterman to go into the bathroom, and she complied. Quarterman testified that, after closing the bathroom door, she heard “a big pop sound.” Quarterman immediately walked out of the bathroom and saw Whitehead holding a gun, which he briefly pointed at her. Giles testified that, when the knock sounded, both Whitehead and Larry drew their weapons, but Larry pointed his gun toward the floor. Giles testified that he did not see Whitehead shoot Larry. Giles ran from the room, followed closely by Whitehead. Quarterman immediately called 911, and the police and paramedics arrived within minutes of her call.
When paramedics arrived, Larry was in critical condition. As they worked to secure Larry on a backboard, one of the paramedics moved a 9mm pistol lying near Larry‘s foot out of the way. The
Surveillance video recordings from the area showed Whitehead and Giles fleeing from the motel room. One recording showed Whitehead dropping to the ground briefly near the bush where the pistol was found. Whitehead and Giles were also captured on a video recording standing together shortly after the shooting at a nearby gas station. The police determined that a car found parked outside the motel was registered to Whitehead.
The day after the shooting, Whitehead called a detective and told him that he had witnessed the shooting and would come in later to help identify the shooter. Instead, the police arrested Whitehead.
Whitehead contends that this evidence supported his affirmative defense of self-defense and was insufficient to support his conviction for murder.3 Whitehead, who did not testify, argues that he was the only one who saw Larry attempt to shoot him. He contends that neither the testimony of Giles nor Quarterman was sufficient to rebut his claim of self-defense because they did not see everything that transpired between him and Larry. Although neither witness saw Whitehead shoot Larry, their testimony nevertheless conflicts with Whitehead‘s statement in many significant respects. Giles and Quarterman testified that only four people were in the motel room when Larry was shot (Giles, Quarterman, Whitehead, and Larry) and that only two of them were
The evidence presented at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational jury to find Whitehead guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes of which he was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). See also Vega v. State, 285 Ga. 32, 33 (1) (673 SE2d 223) (2009) (“‘It [is] for the jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence.’ (citation and punctuation omitted)“).
2. Whitehead contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his custodial interview because the detective improperly continued questioning him after he had invoked his right to remain silent. The record does not support Whitehead‘s contention.
“When reviewing a trial court‘s decision on a motion to suppress evidence of a defendant‘s custodial statement to investigators, we must accept the factual findings and credibility determinations of the trial court unless clearly erroneous.” (Citation
So viewed, the record shows that the trial court conducted a Jackson-Denno4 hearing prior to trial concerning the admissibility of Whitehead‘s custodial statement. The trial court reviewed the video-recorded interview and heard testimony from the detective who interviewed Whitehead. The detective testified that he read a Miranda waiver-of-rights form to Whitehead. Whitehead said that he understood his rights and that he did not want to talk to the police. He also checked a box on the form indicating that he was
The trial court denied Whitehead‘s motion to suppress the custodial interview, finding that he had agreed to talk with the detective after being given Miranda warnings. The court concluded that although Whitehead had initially declined to speak with the detective, he immediately changed his mind and unambiguously expressed his desire to speak with the detective and that his resulting statement was made freely, voluntarily, and without any hope of benefit or fear of injury.
The record shows that the detective honored Whitehead‘s right to remain silent and did nothing to pressure or encourage Whitehead to speak with him. Rather, after initially invoking his right to remain silent, Whitehead immediately changed his mind and expressed an unequivocal desire to talk about the shooting. Thereafter, Whitehead did not reassert his desire to remain silent or ask for a lawyer. Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err in admitting Whitehead‘s custodial statement into evidence.
3. Whitehead contends that the trial court erred in allowing the District Attorney to participate in voir dire as a prospective juror instead of immediately excusing her for cause. Whitehead argues that the District Attorney‘s presence on the venire of prospective petit jurors “created a substantial appearance of impropriety.” He contends that, even though the trial court ultimately excused her for cause, the damage to the integrity of the process had been done, which denied him a fair trial.
The trial transcript shows that, before the trial court excused her for cause, the District Attorney answered a few preliminary
Generally, the dismissal of a jury panel is required when, during voir dire, a prospective juror relays prejudicial information that is “specific to the defendant and germane to the case for which the defendant is on trial. Dismissal is not required, however, when the statements establish only gossamer possibilities of prejudice.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Williams v. State, 248 Ga. App. 111, 112 (1) (545 SE2d 669) (2001). See also Sharpe v. State, 272 Ga. 684, 688 (5) (531 SE2d 84) (2000) (When a juror makes remarks heard by other prospective jurors, the proper inquiry is whether those remarks were inherently prejudicial and deprived the defendant of his right to begin the trial with a jury free from even a suspicion of prejudgment or fixed opinion. And where the facts establish only “gossamer possibilities of prejudice, prejudice is not inherent.” (citations and punctuation omitted)). Because there is nothing in the voir dire transcript suggesting that the District Attorney relayed to the prospective jurors any prejudicial information specific to the defendant or germane to the case being tried, Whitehead has failed to demonstrate any basis for reversal.
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.