59 Fla. 53 | Fla. | 1910
Lead Opinion
This writ of error is to a judgment of conviction of murder in tbe second degree. Tbe homicide occurred on a street at night with no eyewitnesses. Tbe points that will be here discussed relate to tbe admissibility of circumstantial evidence.
“Great latitude is to be allowed in tbe reception of indirect or circumstantial evidence. It includes all evidence of an indirect nature, whether the inferences afforded by it be drawn from prior experience, or be a deduction of reason from tbe circumstances of tbe particular case, or of reason aided by experience. The competency of a collateral fact to be used as tbe basis of legitimate argument, is not to be determined by tbe conclusiveness of tbe inferences it may afford in reference to the litigated fact. It is enough if these may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate tbe inquiry, or to assist, though remotely, to a determination probably founded in truth.”
In a prosecution for murder evidence as to the particulars or merits of a previous difficulty between the defendant and the deceased, not within the issues being tried, is not admissible. Sylvester v. State, 46 Fla. 166, 35 South. Rep. 142; 4 Elliott on Ev., Paragraph 3036.
But where a homicide is shown and an issue of self-defense is made, evidence is admissible as to the fact of a hostile meeting between the defendant and the deceased shortly before the fatal encounter, and also as to the apparent feeling of the parties towards each other when they separated, since such circumstances may tend to show the probable attitude of friendliness or hostility of each toward the other when the fatal meeting occurred. See Sylvester v. State, supra, 4 Elliott on Ev., Paragraph 3036; 21 Cyc. 894, 915; 21 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2nd Ed.) 217; White v. State, 30 Tex. App. 652, 18 S. W. Rep. 462; see also, Lester v. State, 37 Fla. 382, 20 South. Rep. 232.
An issue of self-defense under the plea of not guilty was made when the defendant testified that as he was going home about ten o’clock at night, he unexpectedly saw the deceased approaching him within six or more feet with what he supposed was a weapon in a threatening attitude, after ascertaining it was the defendant and saying “well, we can settle this matter right now, and will settle it right now,” whereupon defendant shot deceased five times, the deceased advancing on the defendant in a threatening manner when each shot was fired, and the defendant believing as he fired each shot that his life was in imminent danger. Testimony was admitted of a meeting of the defendant and deceased in the presence of á friend of the defendant, about an hour before the homicide, at which time the defendant struck the deceased once with his fist.
The bill of exceptions shows that after the above quoted question was excluded the following proceedings were, had: “Mr. Price: * * * * * * * * We further proffer to prove, in response to the same question, that he, Dr. Alexander, was leaving the office, having been let out of the office by the defendant, and the defendant told Dr. Alexander that it was his purpose to publish him to the people of Marianna publicly the next morning, and that the last thing that Dr. Alexander said before leaving and the last words that he said to the defendant before the meeting just preceding the shooting, was, Jim, for God’s sake don’t do that; it will ruin me here in Marianna.’
Mr. Kehoe: After having made that proffer and the court having ruled on it, we again except.” The same testimony had been offered and excluded and the ruling excepted to before the defendant testified.
Treating the above testimony as having been properly offered, and as having been excluded by the court and an exception noted, its admissibility will be considered.
This proffered testimony does not go to the merits of the altercation at the prior meeting. It does not disclose why the intention to publish was formed, or whether such action was justified; but it tended to show the feeling of the parties towards each other at the close of the previous interview, and was admissible as tending to explain the attitude of each at the fatal meeting as to which the defendant testified. Any circumstances tending “even if a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry, or to assist, though
Every circumstance not inherently improper that would tend to prove or to disprove the defendant’s testimony of an assault by the deceased that appeared to defendant to endanger his life, is admissible. Although in fact the deceased had only an umbrella in his hand when shot, the defendant is allowed to justify if -under all the circumstances he had reason to believe and did believe an assault was made by the deceased with a weapon that endangered his life. These circumstances include the defendant’s knowledge of the feeling and attitude of the deceased towards him; and in passing upon the reasonableness of the-defendant’s belief of his danger, the jury may be informed of the apparent attitude of the deceased towards the defendant at the close of an altercation an hour before. This does not go to the merits of the first encounter. It can not be said that the excluded evidence could not rea
For the error indicated the judgment is reversed and a new trial awarded.
Concurrence Opinion
concurring.
I think the judgment of conviction in this case should be reversed because:
1. The court erred in permitting the witness John Justice to testify that, upon the night of the homicide arid a short time prior thereto, the deceased, not in the presence of the defendant, asked the witness where Malcolm Stephens lived, and that the witness, not in the presence of the defendant, gave the deceased directions to Malcolm Stephens’ home.
2. The court erred in admitting the testimony of George Farley as to what his sister told him the deceased said to her the night of and a short time before the homicide.
3. The court erred in refusing to permit the witness, Malcolm Stephens, to answer the following question propounded by the defendant’s counsel: “State whether or not during the conversation there was any personal difficulty between the defendant and Dr. Alexander”-—referring to the deceased at a time shortly before the homicide.
4. The court erred in sustaining the objection by the State to the following question propounded by the defendant to the witness Malcolm Stephens: “State whether or not in that conversation, or at any time, there was any statement made by the defendant to Alexander that he
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
My judicial associates have been unable to concur in the opinion which I have prepared in this cáse and have reached the conclusion that the judgment should be reversed. I have decided to file the opinion as originally prepared as a dissenting opinion, making only the necessary changes therein.
At the Spring term, 1909, of the Circuit Court for Jackson County, the plaintiff in error, James Y. White, (hereinafter referred to as defendant), was indicted for murder in the first degree, was tried at the same term, convicted of murder in the second degree, and seeks relief here by writ of error.
I find myself confronted with a transcript of the record
I must respectfully but firmly decline the invitation of the defendant to discuss in detail all the assignments which are urged before us. To do so would almost require the writing of a legal treatise upon homicide, which we could hardly be expected to compass in one opinion. See Southern Home Insurance Co. v. Putnal, 57 Fla., 199, 49 South. Rep. 922, text 933, and Pensacola Electric Co. v. Bissett, decided here at the present term. All points made will be considered and those meriting it will be discussed. A number of other cases stand on our docket for disposition that are entitled to their due and proportionate share of the time and attention of the court, with as little delay as may be.
The first assignment is based upon the overruling of the defendant’s motion for a change of venue. This may be briefly disposed of. A large number of affidavits were submitted both in behalf of and in opposition to the motion. It was clearly made to appear to the trial judge, even if he could not have taken judicial • notice of the fact, that Jackson County was a large county, containing a population of about 30,000 people, of which about 6,000 are qualified for jury duty, such population being largely rural in its nature. The affidavits so submitted were very conflicting in the opinions expressed therein as to whether or not a fair and impartial jury could be obtained in such county for the trial of the defendant. With such a condition of affairs existing,, the trial judge evidently thought it advisable to exercise the judicial discretion vested in him by law, and put the matter to a
The third to the eighth assignments inclusive, and the tenth and eleventh assignments are based upon the sustaining or overruling challenges for cause to certain proposed jurors, or upon matters connected with the examination of jurors upon their voir dire. Suffice it to say that an examination of these assignments and of the defendant’s brief in support thereof discloses no reversible error to me. I am not informed by the transcript by what jurors he was tried, though there is a recitation to the effect that “there being twelve men in the jury box
The fifteenth assignment is based upon the refusal of the court to permit E. J. Schell, one of the witnesses introduced on behalf of the State, to answer on cross-examination the question, “You were sworn to tell the truth and the whole truth.” I find that upon the propounding of this question the court stated, “That is not a proper way to interrogate the witness; you need not answer the question.” The exception noted to this statement of the court forms the predicate for this assignment. The witness had previously stated that he had testified at the preliminary trial of the defendant but had not stated, at such trial that he had seen any of the flashes when the pistol was fired by the defendant, that he had answered the questions propounded to him. Thereupon this question was asked. Its relevancy and materiality have not been made to appear to us. We do not think that the two authorities cited by the defendant, Jacksonville, T. & K. W. Ry. Co. v. Wellman, 26 Fla., 344, 7 South. Rep., 845, and Wallace v. State, 41 Fla., 547, 26 South. Rep., 713, are in point. As we held in Wilson v. Johnson, 51 Fla., 370, 41 South. Rep., 395, courts of justice exists for the administration and furtherance of justice and in the conduct of trials generally must be left to the discretion of the trial judge. This principle was followed and applied in Adams v. State, 55 Fla., 1, 46 South. Rep., 152. So, in Mathis v. State, 45 Fla., 46, 34 South. Rep., 287, we held that it is within the sound judicial discretion of' the trial court to control the detailed examination of witnesses, and, unless an abuse of this judicial discretion is shown, an appellate court will not disturb the ruling made concerning the same. In the light of these authorities, as well as of those previously cited, I think that this assignment fails.
The twentieth assignment has its basis in the overruling of an objection made by the defendant to a question propounded to A. W. Calhoun, a witness for the State. After he had testified that he was a member of the coroner’s jury which had investigated how and in what manner and by whom the deceased came to his death and that the defendant had appeared before the jury and made a statement, he was asked, “Did you hear him say anything, about who killed Dr. Alexander?” The ground of the objection was that such evidence was stenographically reported and that such report constituted the best evidence. It seems sufficient to say that the question wa£ a preliminary one and therefore not open to objection. Ortiz v. State, 30, Fla., 256, 11 South. Rep., 611; Dickens v. State, 50 Fla., 17, 38 South. Rep. 909; Atlantic Coast Line R. R. Co. v. Crosby, 53 Fla., 400, text 444, 43 South. Rep., 318, text 331; Golden v. State, 54 Fla., 43, 44 South.
The twenty-sixth assignment is to the effect that the court erred in permitting J. B. Justiss, a State witness,
The twenty-eighth assignment is to the effect that the court erred in permitting George Farley to testify, over the objection of the defendant, as to a conversation between his sister and the deceased upon the night of the tragedy, the defendant not being present, while the refusal of the mo tion to strike out such testimony constitutes the basis for the twenty-ninth assignment. Assuming that error was committed in these rulings, it was rectified, later in the trial, by the court of its own motion fully and clearly directing and instructing the jury that such testimony was withdrawn from their consideration and that they were to disregard it. This disposes of these two assignments.
Malcolm Stephens, a witness called in behalf of the defendant, testified that the defendant lived right in front of him at the time of the tragedy, that he and the defendant came up toAvn together on the night the homicide occurred, that he saw the deceased for the first time that night at the school-house, that the defendant and the deceased came together to the court-house and went in the Sheriffs office, as also did the witness, where a conversation took place between the defendant and the deceased, which the witness heard. He was first asked to “state what occurred and what was said between them at that time.” The State interposed an objection and the court ruled that the question was too broad. The witness then proceeded to testify that the first thing which transpired
I think that the trial judge was correct in this statement. The defendant’s counsel then began to state to the court what he expected to prove by the witness, when, upon the suggestion of the State’s counsel, the court directed that the jury retire from the court-room. To this direction the defendant excepted an cl has assigned error
As quite a number of assignments are based upon the sustaining of objections to questions propounded to this witness and still other assignments are of like nature, I think it advisable to copy from the bill of exceptions all the proceedings from the time of the withdrawal of the jury, of which I have just spoken, up to the close of the testimony of this witness. Such proceedings are as follows :
“In the absence of the jury counsel for the defendant made the following proffer: Mr. Price: Now then, may it please the court, we proffer to prove by this witness, in answer to the question propounded to him, that the defendant stated to Dr. Alexander, ‘Dr., this is a very serious matter I have to talk to you about tonight. Judge Liddon: We object on the grounds it is irrelevant and immaterial. The Court: Objection will be sustained. Mr. Price: Your Honor will note an exception. Mr. Wilson: We object on the further ground that it is a self-serving declaration. The Court: Go ahead and make your proffer of what you propose to prove by this witness. Mr. Price: The next question I expect to ask in the presence of the jury. The Court: You cannot have the jury trot in and out. Mr. Price: We think the jury should be present. The Court: Go ahead and make your proffer of testimony and close the whole thing up. I will state that it would appear not within the rights of any party
Cross Examination.
When I say there was no agreement for a meeting after they were here at the Sheriff’s office together, I mean
Redirect Examination.
I was ahead of Mr. White and Dr. Alexander coming back from the academy; I suppose I was twenty-five yards ahead. That is an estimate. There was nobody else along with White and Alexander, they came down by themselves. They came up in the Sheriff’s office. I heard some shooting and I heard some hollowing down there where the shooting took place. I was just across the street from there, and I think the streets are sixty feet wide. If there was any remark made as ‘Men, please don’t let them kill me,’ I didn’t hear it. I don’t think the street is over sixty feet wide. I was sitting up at the time.
Récross Examination.
I am related to the defendant. I am his brother-in-law.”
For like reasons, I think that the assignments numbered from forty-five to fifty inclusive must fail, all being based on the exclusion of certain testimony sought to be elicited by the defendant from Jim Lewis.
The fifty-first, fifty-second and fifty-fourth assignments question the rulings of the court in refusing to permit W. A. Lewis, one of the defendant’s witnesses, to answer
“(Thereupon the jury was recalled and the taking of testimony resumed.) In the conversation I had with Mr. White on the night of April 12th, in front of Alderman’s
The defendant earnestly contends that the proffered testimony was admissible by virtue of the fact that as' the State had introduced a portion of the conversation referred to by T. G. Alsobrook, therefore he was entitled to have go before the jury the other parts thereof, so that they would have the benefit of the entire conversation. I find that the witness Alsobrook had testified that he saw the defendant “shortly before the shooting took place,” estimating the time at about fifteen minutes, sitting on a bench in front of Mr. Alderman’s store with Gus Lewis; that as the witness passed them he heard the defendant make a remark to the effect that “if he didn’t leave town to-night there would be a dead man in town to-morrow,” but that he “didn’t stop to hear to whom he was referring.” On cross-examination he testified, “I didn’t hear the first part of the conversation; that is all I heard, that if he didn’t leave town there would be a dead man in town to-morrow. I didn’t hear any name called. I don’t know of mv own knowledge who that remark had reference to.” This is all that such witness testified to concerning that conversation. I fully approve of our holding in Fields v. State, 46 Fla., 84, 35 South Rep., 185, upon which the defendant relies, that “where part of a conversation is given in evidence the defendant is entitled to have before the jury all that was said upon the subject upon the particular occasion, whether prejudicial or beneficial to him. The
The fifty-fifth assignment is based upon the statement made to counsel for the defendant by the court in the presence of the jury as to “this constant moving to and fro of the jury” being a hardship, which I have already copied herein in full. I set forth the full proceedings relating thereto in order to show just what did occur and what called forth the remark. I fully approve of our holding in Mathis v. State, 45 Fla., 46, 34 South. Rep., 287, as in both prior and subsequent cases, that “the utmost care should be used by the trial judges, especially in cases where human life is involved, not to let any expression fall, either by question or otherwise, that is capable of being-interpreted by the jury as an index of what he thinks of the prisoner, his counsel or his case.” I would also call attention to our discussion of this point in the cited case. As was said there, I think that it would have been better if such statement had not been made, but, under the facts and circumstances disclosed in the bill of exceptions in connection therewith, in this case, as in that, “we do not think the error sufficient to warrant a reversal of the case.” There was some justification for it, as appears in the explanation or statement of the trial judge, after the jury had retired, and as is also apparent elsewhere in the bill of exceptions. In their zeal and earnestness displayed on behalf of their client, we think it plainly appears that the defendant’s counsel did repeatedly try to get before the jury certain testimony which the court had held improper and inadmissible. It would further seem that the trial had been somewhat unduly protracted by the course pur
The fifty-eighth to the sixty-eighth assignments inclusive must also fall for the reason that they are all based upon the exclusion of proffered testimony, which not only formed no part of the res gestae but for the most part related to the self-serving declarations' and acts upon the part of the defendant. It was sought to show that on the night of the homicide the defendant had conversations with certain named persons in which he requested them to go that night and see Dr. Alexander for the purpose of discussing with him the matter of the assault which the defendant claimed Alexander had made upon his wife, but as a matter of fact no testimony was proffered to the effect that any of such requested persons did see or have any conversation with Dr. Alexander on that night; on the contrary, it ivould appear that they did not. It was clearly inadmissible testimony to show these conversations by the defendant and such requests upon his part.
The sixty-ninth and seventieth assignments are based upon the refusal of the trial court to permit the defendant to prove by Miss Richardson, the stenographer who took down the testimony of the witnesses at the preliminary tidal of the defendant, certain testimony given in thereat by Dr. N. A. Baltzell. I find that Dr. Baltzell had testified as a witness in this case on behalf of the State and had stated in such testimony that ñe had occasion to examine the body of Dr. Alexander shortly after his death. Among other things, he had testified, in speaking of a certain wound which he found on the body, as follows: “I made only one examination of the body. I examined the body.
I am of the opinion that, as Dr. Baltzell did not deny having made these statements so sought to be introduced but practically admitted that he had done so, no error was committed in excluding them. See Myers v. State, 43 Fla., 500, 31 South. Rep., 275, construing section 1102 of the Revised Statutes of 1892, now section 1511 of the General Statutes of 1906, under which such former testimony of the witness was claimed to be admissible. It would also seem to be doubtful whether any sufficient or proper predicate had been laid for the introduction of the proffered testimony. See Simmons v. State, 32 Fla., 387, 13 South. Rep., 896, and Sylvester v. State, 46 Fla., 166, 35 South. Rep., 142. Be that as it may, no error has been made to appear to me in the rejection of this testimony.
The seventy-first assignment is based upon the refusal of the trial court to let the defendant prove by Miss Richardson certain testimony given in by E. J. Schell, a state witness, at the preliminary trial. This assignment must fall with the sixty-ninth and seventieth and for like reasons.
The seventy-first to the eighty-first assignments inclusive are all based upon proffered and rejected testimony of Mrs. Susan Bettie White, the wife of the defendant. Again I am forced to copy the proceedings, so. as to show what actually occurred, in order to make these assignments clear and my disposition thereof understood:
“My name is Susan Bettie White. I know the defendant, J. Y. White. I am his wife. I knew Dr. S. B. Alexander when I saw him. I recollect hearing of Dr. Alexander’s death. The last time I saw him alive was in his office. It was on the same day that I heard of his death that night. His office was1 located over Porter-Carroll Hardware Store, in the town of Marianna. I was up in
I see no necessity for any extended discussion of these assignments, and, even if I did deem the same advisable, the length to'which this opinion has’already grown would preclude it. Suffice it to say that a careful reading of such proceedings, in connection with the defendant’s brief and the authorities cited by him, fails to disclose any reversible error to me committed in any of the rulings upon which these assignments are based. Much of what I have said in disposing of other assignments is also applicable here. This discussion, together with well settled principles of evidence will show, I think, that the proffered testimony was properly excluded and that these assignments have not been sustained. If the defendant had not presented such a multiplicity of assignments to us, I would have treated the questions here presented more fully;- As it is, I can only declare that, as the same are presented to us, I have found no reversible error in thé exclusion of such testimony.
The defendant also sought to introduce testimony along similar lines and to the like effect by Mrs. Lula King, the mother of Mrs. White, the exclusion of which forms the basis for the eighty-second and eighty-third assignments. They must fall with the preceding assignments.
The eighty-fifth to the eighty-ninth assignments inclusive are all based upon the sustaining of objections interposed by the State to certain questions propounded to the defendant, who had taken the stand as a witness in his own behalf. I now take up these in their order for treatment. The eighty-fifth assignment is that the court erred in refusing to permit the defendant to answer the question, “What commenced the altercation between you and him there, and caused the blow to pass?” The defendant had just testified as follows: “I had.known Dr. Alexander
Then this question was propounded, whereupon objec
The court sustained the objection. No error is made to appear here. What I have said, in treating former assignments, concerning self-serving declarations,' and evidence of a former difficulty not being admissible, unless shown to form part of the res gestae, applies with equal force here. While the jury was still out, the defendant testified that on-the evening of April 12th, he first went to my house about five or five-thirty, and that he first talked to his wife.about 7:30. Thereupon the following question was propounded to him: “At that time did she or not tell you or say anything to you about or concerning Dr. Alexander ?” The State objected thereto, the defendant’s counsel stated: “We proffer to prove by this Witness, in response to the'
The court sustained the objection and upon this ruling is based the eighty-sixth assignment. This question was then propounded to the defendant: “Now, Mr. White, I will ask you this question: You have stated that just before Dr. Alexander came up into the court-room here, the sheriff’s office, with you that you had gone to the academy for the purpose of seeing him there when he came out. What was your purpose in going to see him there at that time, and did you speak to him about the matter that you wanted to speak to him concerning?”
The defendant’s counsel then made the following statement : “In response to the question just propounded we proffer to prove by this witness that he went to the academy at that time for the purpose of asking Dr. Alexander about having made an assault upon his wife the morning of the same day, and that he did, as a matter of fact, before parting with Dr. Alexander after the meeting at the schoolhouse ask him about said matter.”
The sustaining of an objection to this question forms the basis for the eighty-seventh assignment.
Counsel for the defendant made the following statement: “In response to the question just propounded we proffer to prove by this witness that at the meeting of the defendant and Dr. Alexander, that Dr. Alexander admitted to him at that time that he had on the morning of that same day, in his dental office in Marianna, hugged and kissed the wife of defendant.”
This question was objected to and the objection sustained, which ruling furnishes the predicate for the eighty-eighth assignment.
This question was then propounded: “After Dr. Alexander had left the court-house, and after you had left the court-house, state whether or not there was any understanding between you and any other parties to the effect that they, that is, the other parties, should go and see Dr. Alexander in your behalf and insist that he either leave town or publish his apologies that he had made to you publicly in the Marianna paper”?
Defendant’s counsel made the following statement: “We proffer to prove by this witness that he did request Mr. Joe Davis, Mr. Ellis Davis and Jim Lewis, and that he had an understanding with the three named parties, that they would go and see Dr. Alexander and tell him that the defendant, Jim White, insisted and would be satisfied if Dr. Alexander would either leave the town of Marianna, or publish in the Marianna paper publicly the same admission and apology that he had offered him, the defendant orally.”
The court sustained the objection interposed to this
It is obvious from what I have said, in disposing of preceding assignments, that I do not think that any error was committed in any of these rulings, therefore it becomes unnecessary for me to comment upon these assignments, so I content myself with stating that they have not been sustained.
The ninetieth assignment is as follows: “The court erred in refusing to permit the defendant to prove separately each of the propositions that were proffered to be proven by the witness, Malcolm Stephens, Mrs. J. V. White, W. A. Lewis and Mrs. Lula King, which were proffered to be proven by each of said witnesses prior to the testimony of the defendant, J. V. White, as though each of said questions were propounded to each of said witnesses subsequent to the testimony of the defendant.”
It is readily apparent, in view of what I have already said, that this assignment must fail, so I pass it without any discussion.
Next comes the ninety-first assignment, which is as follows : “The court erred in instructing the jury as follows: ‘The other point is the question and answer of the defendant, White, the question being, ‘What was the remark you made at that time/ and that part of the answer which gave a reason for the action he proposed to take will be excluded from the consideration of the jury, and they are directed and instructed not to consider it in considering the case; this will leave the question,—‘What was the remark you made at that time/ and the answer,—‘I told Gus Lewis that if he did not leave town to-night, or publish his apology in the paper I would publish him myself to the people in this town and the surrounding country / the balance of the testimony being stricken from the answer on motion of the State.”
The next assignment urged before us is the ninety-seventh which is based upon the giving of the special instruction numbered eight, at the request of the State,.
It is obvious that this instruction relates to and is applicable to murder in the first degree.
As the defendant was acquitted of this charge by the jury returning a verdict finding him guilty of murder in the second degree, it becomes unnecessary for me to pass upon this assignment. Mathis v. State, 45 Fla., 46, 34 South. Rep., 287, and Vickery v. State, 50 Fla. 144, 38 South. Rep., 907.
The ninety-ninth assignment is based upon the refusal of the court to give the following instruction requested by the defendant: “If you believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant shot and killed Alexander, but you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant acted unlawfully, then you will find him not guilty.”
As the court had already fully and correctly instructed the jury upon the legal principles embodied in this requested instruction, no error was committed in refusing it. Bass v. State, 58 Fla., 1, 50 South. Rep., 531.
The one hundredth assignment is based upon the refusal to give the following requested instruction: “If you should believe from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant unlawfully killed Alexander, but have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not he is guilty of murder in the first degree, murder in the second degree or manslaughter, then, in such event, you should give the defendant the benefit of such reasonable doubt, and find him guilty of manslaughter; but if you should have a reasonable doubt in your mind as to whether or not
What I have just said, in treating the ninety-ninth assignments, is alike applicable here. Also see Maloy v. State, 52 Fla., 101, 41 South. Rep., 791.
The one hundred and first assignment is based upon the refusal of the court to give the following requested instruction : “If you have a reasonable doubt as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant, whether such doubt arises from evidence that has been submitted to you, or from the lack, want or absence of evidence as to any material fact or facts in this case, you should find the defendant not guilty.”
The one hundred and second assignment is based upon the refusal to give this requested instruction: “If, after a fair and careful consideration of the evidence in this case, you should still feel that there was any material fact or facts necessary to establish the guilt of the defendant, unproven by the evidence, or that you had a reasonable doubt in your mind as to whether any material fact or facts necessary to be proved in order to establish the guilt of the defendant had been proven by the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, then you should find the defendant not guilty.”
What I have just said, in disposing of the other refused instructions, upon which error is predicated, applies with full force to these two assignments.
I wish to call attention to the fact that, although the charge given by the court of its own motion was of some length and would seem to have covered pretty fully and fairly all the legal points involved in the trial of this case, and had also given nine instructions, at the instance of the State, the defendant presented thirty separate special in
This brings me to the one hundred and third assignment, which is the last and is based upon the overruling of the motion for a new trial. The only ground thereof urged before us is as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. Although this motion contains thirty-three grounds, it has no ground questioning the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the verdict. This being true, the trial judge was never afforded an opportunity of passing upon this question, therefore I am precluded from considering it. Davis v. State, 47 Fla., 26, 36 South. Rep., 170, and Manatee County State Bank v. B. F. Wade Packing Co., 56 Fla., 492, 47 South. Rep. 927, and other decisions of this court therein cited. Having failed to discover any reversible error, I think that the judgment must be affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting.
The only assignment of error which the majority opinion sustains is based upon the refusal of the court to admit evidence in response to a question admittedly improper'. In this I cannot concur. The relevance of the testimony is not so obvious, nor does the record as a whole, in my opinion, make such a case as to justify this court in overruling the well established rule that a proper question must first be asked before the party is entitled to elicit evidence in response thereto.