Lanor Ramon White was convicted of trafficking in cocaine and received a 30 year sentence. On appeal, he enumerates nine errors.
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, revealed the following. In May 1994, a month before White’s arrest, Gerald Easley, an undercover agent, purchased approximatеly two ounces of cocaine from Marvin Johnson at American Auto Detail, a business Johnson owned. Easley ordered the cocaine from Johnson, who stated that his cousin would pick up the drugs and deliver them to the detail shop. White, who subsequently was identified as Johnson’s cousin, arrived on a red and white Honda motorcycle, opened the recеptacle under the seat, removed a hat containing three clear plastic bags filled with a white powder, and took them to Johnson. Easley then exchanged $2,000 for the cocaine. While Easley was waiting for the delivery, surveillance agents observed a black male drive a red and white Honda motorcycle from the detail shop to 55 Branchwood Drive in Covington, stop briefly and then return to the detail shop. White’s mother owned the Covington residence and lived there with three of her children, including White, and his girl friend and their child.
Several weeks later, Easley ordered three more ounces of cocaine from Johnson. Johnson contacted White, and the three men met at the detail shop. Because White’s lunch break at work left him too little time to retrieve the cocaine, Johnson drove to 55 Branchwood Drive, returned to the detail shop, and sold the cocaine to Easley.
Several weeks after this transaction, agents obtained no-knock search warrants for the detail shop and the Branchwood Drive residence and simultanеously executed them. In so doing, agents discovered White at the residence as well as approximately $4,500 in cash and three bags of cocaine of over 80 percent purity. One of the bags contained 444.4 grams; the other two collectively held over 36 grams.
*75 The State predicated the charges against White solely on his possession of thе cocaine seized at his residence. Evidence of his participation in the May delivery was admitted at trial as a similar transaction. Held:
1. We reject White’s contention that the absence of probable cause invalidated the search warrant and required the suppression of the evidence seized at the residence. Elaborate specificity is not required in affidavits supporting search warrants and, where the affidavit leaves doubt as to the existence of probable cause, such questions should largеly be resolved by a preference accorded warrants.
Davis v. State,
Notwithstanding White’s contention to the contrary, the affidavit supporting the warrant was not inadequate for failing to mention him by name, state that contraband had been seen in the house, or specify that he entered the residence. The affidavit and the record showed that Johnson was а high volume dealer whose family participated in the enterprise.
Hale v. State,
Nor was the information supporting the warrant stalе. In light of the continuing nature of Johnson’s enterprise, the statements in the affidavit were sufficient to create a reasonable belief that the conditions described in the affidavit still prevailed when the warrant was issued.
Hale,
2. White waived his enumeration challenging the admission of similar transaction evidence of his delivery of the cocaine to Johnson in May 1994. Althоugh White asserted a lack of similarity objection at the similar transaction hearing, he failed to object when the evidence was admitted at trial.
Sapeu v. State,
Had this issue been propеrly preserved, we would have rejected White’s claim of lack of similarity. Similar transactions need not be identical in every respect.
Lumsden v. State,
3. The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the victor, was sufficient to support the verdict.
Jackson v. Virginia,
4. Because the standard of review for the denial of a motion for directed verdiсt of acquittal is identical to that used to review the sufficiency of the evidence, we need not reach White’s fourth enumeration.
Carter v. State,
5. The trial court did not err in refusing to charge thе jury on the rebuttable presumption that the owner or lessor of premises possesses the contraband found therein. See
Mobley v. State,
6. The trial court’s refusal to charge on mere presence was not reversible error. The evidence, including that demonstrating White’s intense involvement in Johnson’s enterprise, did not support the charge. Id. The court instructed the jury on equal access, which mоre accurately characterized the evidence in light of the number of individuals occupying the residence. In any event, mere presence is not a recognized dеfense, only a “ ‘corollary to the requirement that the State prove each element of the offense charged,’ [cit.]” and the instructions as a whole fairly presented White’s case and theories to the jury.
Ancrum v. State,
7. We reject White’s contention that the trial court committed reversible error by permitting one of the agents, who was not tendered or qualified as an expert, to testify that he had never seen fingerprints successfully lifted from plastic bags. Because the agent,
*77
who had over seven years experience in lаw enforcement and had participated in over 200 drug operations, could have qualified as an expert on this matter, the admission of this testimony does not require reversаl. See
Jefferson Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Clark,
8. The trial court did not abuse its discrеtion in prohibiting White from challenging each fact contained in the search warrant on cross-examination.
Fletcher v. State,
9. The State’s failure to provide White with a scientific report stating that tests revealed no fingerprints on a plаstic bag seized at his home or a videotape of the search does not require reversal. Because the information was provided to White at trial and he failed tо satisfy his burden of showing the positive effect of earlier disclosure or the harm resulting from its absence, no
Brady v. Maryland,
The trial court erred in permitting the State to present testimony on the results of the written scientific report on the fingerprints because it failed to provide White with the report, notwithstanding his request.
1
OCGA § 17-7-211 (b). OCGA § 17-7-211 (c)’s specific prohibition against the admission of such evidence in rebuttal as well as in the prosecution’s case in chief undermines the State’s contention that White opened the door by cross-examining a witness about the results оf the fingerprint tests. White’s failure to demonstrate harm from this error precludes reversal, however. See
Johnson,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
OCGA § 17-7-211 was repealed effective January 1, 1995. The criminal discovery provisions currently in effect are codified at OCGA § 17-16-1 et seq.