Thе appellant, Mildred Ioane White, and her son James Edward “Bo” Flynn were indicted for the murder and armed robbery of Hiram Nathan Wilson. A Cobb County jury found them guilty and they each received two life sentences. Her motion for new trial was denied, and she filed her appeal. We affirm. 1
*211 The Cobb County Fire Department answered a call involving a burning vehicle at approximately 4:30 a.m. on April 1, 1977. Firemen found a body, burned beyond recognition, in the front seat of the vehicle. The investigation showed that gasoline was used to start the fire. Papers in the vehicle bore the name of the victim, Hiram Wilson, but there was no wallet or identification on the body. Family members identified the vehicle as belonging to Wilson, and later his identity was confirmed through dental records. There wаs testimony that one day before his death, the victim had approximately $10,000 in cash in an envelope, and that earlier in the week he had been seen flashing large amounts of money. He allowed Flynn to count his money and he gave him a hundred dollar bill to purchase a package of cigarettes. The medical testimony showed that the victim had been shot once in the head with a .22 caliber weapon, and that the path of the bullet was consistent with someone shooting him from outside his vеhicle while he was sitting in the vehicle. The medical testimony also indicated that the victim was in the last phases of dying as the vehicle burned.
The appellant was questioned on April 1, 2, and 3, 1977. Flynn and a co-conspirator, Gene Huddleston, fled the state at approximately 5:30 a.m. on April 1, 1977, but they were later captured in Texas and returned to Georgia for questioning. The appellant was arrested on April 13, 1977, but she was not indicted. Sometime in 1982, Huddleston, who was serving time in an Indiana prison on charges unrelated to the victim’s death, contacted the Cobb County District Attorney with information regarding the crime. Huddleston was granted immunity for his testimony, and the appellant and Flynn were indicted in 1983. At the trial both the appellant and Flynn denied any involvement in the shooting, robbery, оr the burning of the vehicle and the victim.
1. The appellant asserts the general grounds in her first three enumerations of error and contends that at the most the evidence showed that she, Flynn, and Huddleston conspired to rob the victim and that there was no conspiracy to murder him.
“ ‘All of the participants in a plan to rob are criminally responsible for the acts of each, committed in the execution of the plan, and which may be said to be a probable consequence of the unlawful design, even though the particular act may not have actually been a part of the plan.’ ”
Carter v. State,
2. The appellant asserts that the court erred in admitting three out-of-court statements that she contends were not freely and voluntarily made.
Prior to the trial, the trial judge conducted a lengthy
Jackson-Denno
hearing to determine whether thе statements the appellant made were freely and voluntarily made. The state produced three signed
Miranda
and waiver of rights forms along with the three transcribed statements. The appellant admitted that she signed the
Miranda
and waiver of rights form prior to quеstioning, but she asserted that her rights had not been explained to her, that she was in custody during the interviews, and that the police used trickery and coercion to obtain her statements. The police officers testified that she was given all of her rights, that shе seemed to understand them, that she was not under arrest, that she was not in custody, and that she was free to leave when she wished. The third statement was given at her request, she read the transcript, made changes in it, initialed each page and signed it. The trial judge resolved the factual and credibility issues in favor of the police and held that the statements were admissible,
Lego v. Twomey,
3. The appellant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting transcripts of the appellant’s tape-recorded statements in violation of the best evidence and hearsay rules of evidence, and by allowing the district attorney to take part in reading them into evidence. We find no error. These objections, relating to reasons the appellant contends the evidence was inadmissible, were not asserted in the trial court and we will not consider them for the first time on appeal.
Brooker v. State,
4. The appellant asserts that her due process rights were violatеd by the prosecution’s loss or destruction of the tapes in that it denied her exculpatory or mitigating evidence under
Brady v. Maryland,
“Brady applies to ‘the discovery, after trial, of information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.’
United States v. Agurs,
5. The appellant asserts that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss her indictment as two public officials were serving on the Grand Jury that indicted her.
We held in
Ingram v. State,
6. The appellant asserts that the court erred in denying her motion for a mistrial after a police officer indicated that the appellant had taken a polygraph examination.
“[T]he mere fact that the jury is apprised that a lie detector test was taken is not necessarily prejudicial
if
no inference as to the result is raised. . . .” (Emphasis in original.)
Stack v. State,
7. The appellant asserts that the court erred in allowing a police officer to testify that the appellant invoked her right to an attorney when she was asked to sign the first two interviews.
The general objection of appellant’s counsel was sustained, and
*214
he asked for no other relief, thus he is left with nothing “to complain about on appeal as he asked for no further relief.”
Johnson v. State,
8. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a directed verdict of not guilty as she contends the testimony of the accomplice Huddleston was not corroborated.
“ ‘The rule is well established that, to sustain a conviction in a felony case upon the testimony of an accomplice, there must be corroborating facts or circumstances, which, in themselves and independently of the testimony of the accomplice, directly connect the defendant with the crime, or lead to the inference that [she] is guilty, and more than sufficient to merely cast on the defendant a grave suspiciоn of guilt.’ [Cits.]”
Slocum v. State,
9. The appellant asserts that the trial court erred in denying her motion for a mistrial when a spectator cried out during the trial.
When the spectator began to sob, the trial judge immediately ordered her out of the courtroom. Before she could be removed, she cried out, “I hope they burn both of you.” In light of the prompt reaction by the trial judge to have the spectator removed, her immediate removal, the instructions to the jury, and the questioning of the jury we find that this single outburst did not deny the appellant a fair and impartial trial.
Sheppard v. State,
10. The appellant contends that the trial court erred in failing to merge the conviction of armed robbery into the cоnviction of malice murder.
“[A]rmed robbery is
not
a lesser included offense of malice murder when a rational trier of fact could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was a party to
both
the armed robbery
and
his co-defendant’s murder of the victim,. . .” (Emphasis in original.)
Hoerner v. State,
After the victim wаs shot, the appellant helped Flynn remove the victim’s rings, wallet and watch and also assisted Flynn in taking the victim’s vehicle to the place it was ignited with gasoline while the victim was in the last phase of dying. The evidence negates any effort on her pаrt to “abandon ship” after the victim was shot and a rational trier of fact could find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the appellant was a party to both the armed robbery and the murder.
11. The appellant contends that the court errеd in charging the jury on malice in that it unconstitutionally shifted the burden of proof to the appellant.
The court’s instruction on malice, see OCGA § 16-5-1 (b), was not burden-shifting.
Franklin v. State,
12. The appellant contends that the court erred in failing to instruct the jury that in determining the voluntariness оf the out-of-court statements that the jury should determine whether or not the appellant was advised that she had the right to stop answering questions.
“The charge given was favorable to the accused, and the failure to give an even more favоrable charge where none was required is not error.”
Watters v. State,
Judgment affirmed.
Notes
The crimes were committed on April 1, 1977. The Cobb County jury returned its ver- *211 diet of guilty on November 10, 1983. A motion for new trial was filed on December 7, 1983, and denied on February 4, 1985. The transcript of the evidence was filed on January 12, 1984. Notice of appeal was filed February 12,1985. The record was docketed in this Court on March 7, 1985. The case was argued before this Court on May 7, 1985.