44 N.J.L. 105 | N.J. | 1882
The opinion of the court was delivered by
The effort to subject common law liens to uniform rules must necessarily be unsuccessful. Derived from the civil law, and founded on considerations of equity and justice, the rules by which they are governed vary with the grounds on which such rights are given.
Innkeepers, farriers and common carriers, by the common law, have a particular lien, for they are under an obligation to serve the public in their trades and occupations, and an ac
A common carrier, on account of his obligation to receive and carry goods, and his liability for their safety in the course of transportation, is allowed a lien upon them for his charges. Inasmuch as the obligations and liabilities of common carriers are identical in nature with those of innkeepers, it would seem reasonable that carriers should be put on the same footing as innkeepers with respect to liens. In York v. Grenaugh, 2 Ld. Raym. 866, it was held by Holt, C. J., (Powell, J., dissenting,) that a common carrier might detain goods for his charges for carriage, although they, were delivered to him by a person who had stolen them. I have not discovered that this opinion has ever been dissented from or discredited in the English courts; but the doctrine has been discarded in some eases in the courts of this country, and it has been held that the carrier has no lien for the carriage of goods which he has innocently received from a wrong-doer, without the consent of the owner, express or implied, on the ground that the duty of the carrier to receive and carry goods arises only when they are offered by the owner or by his authority. Fitch v. Newberry, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 1; Robinson v. Baker, 5 Cush. 137 ; Stevens v. B. & W. R. R. Co., 8 Gray 262; Clark v. L. & L. R. Co., 9 Gray 231. York v. Grenaugh and the American cases are referred to by Pigot, C. B., and a decided prefer
Besides the liens which are allowed to the above-mentioned persons, arising out of the public employment in which they are engaged, in a variety of cases other persons have, by the common law, a right to detain goods on which they have bestowed labor, until the reasonable charges therefor are paid, although such persons are not obliged to receive the goods for that purpose. 2 Kent 635. Such a lien arises out of the employment of the workman, and belongs strictly to the person
Inasmuch as the lien of a bailee who, by his skill and labor,
In both the cases cited the bailment was entirely without the authority of the owner, and without any circumstances from which his consent could be implied; for although in Hollingsworth v. Dow the owner knew that the third party was doing the work, he had contracted with another to do it. It must not, however, be inferred that the consent of the owner to such a bailment must in all cases be given with such formalities or in such a manner as would create a personal liability on his part to pay the charges. The property being improved and enhanced in value by the workman’s labor, authority to have it done on the footing of a workman’s lien will be implied from circumstances which would not raise an implication of a contract to pay the charges to be enforced by a suit.
Williams v. Allsup, 10 C.B. (N. S.) 417, is the leading case on this subject. In that case, the plaintiff, a shipwright, detained a vessel for his charges for repairs, as against a mortgagee under a prior mortgage. The mortgage had been recorded pursuant to the Merchants’ Shipping act. The vessel was left in the mortgagor’s possession and control for
The doctrine of Williams v. Allsup was applied as against prior mortgagees by the Supreme Court of New York in favor of the lien of a shipwright for the necessary repairs of a canal-boat, and by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts to repairs on a hack described in the mortgage as in use in certain stables. Scott v. De La Hunt, 5 Lans. 372; Hammond v. Danielson, 126 Mass. 294.
It will be observed that in each of these cases the right of the workman to his lien was placed upon the ground that the value of the chattel was enhanced, by the labor of the workman, and that it was presumably the intention of all parties that the chattel should be kept in a proper state of repair; from which facts authority was inferred that the person in possession and entitled to use it might have the repairs made upon the usual and ordinary terms, i. e., that the property having been augmented in value by the repairs, the workman should have a lien on it for the work and labor which enhanced its value, and for which, by the common law, he would be entitled to his lien if he was lawfully employed to render the services.
It is important to keep in mind the special grounds on which these cases were decided, for in Bissell v Price, 28 N.
In the present case the wagon was owned by the wife. It was put in the husband’s charge for use in a business which was carried on for the support of the family, and was probably owned and kept for that purpose. It was in the contemplation of all parties that the wagon could be made useful for the purpose for which it was designed to be used only by being kept in repair. The repairs were beneficial to the interests of both parties—to the husband in fitting the wagon for use; to the wife in enhancing the value of the property by the repairs put upon it.
I think it clear, on the facts certified by the court below, that the husband had authority from the wife—implied from the manner in which she permitted the wagon to be used—to have the repairs done; and if so, the properly became by law subject to a lien for the workman’s charges.
The-judgment should be affirmed, with costs.
The following- is an extract from the opinion of Pigot, O. B., in Waugh v. Denham, upon this point: “When an innkeeper receives a guest, with the horse on which he travels, or when, in the ordinary course of business, a carrier receives goods from the possession of the sender, he deals with a person having all the indicia of property. Possession is, in itself, prima facie evidence of ownership. To encumber an innkeeper or a carrier with the obligation of inquiring and determining the relation in which the guest or the sender of the goods stands in reference to his possession of what he brings, would be totally inconsistent with the relation in which both the innkeeper and the carrier stand towards the public, for whose benefit they profess to act, and do act, in their respective callings. The business of either could not be carried on if, in the one case, the doors of the inn were closed against a traveler, or in the other, if the carrier’s conveyance were delayed at each stopping-place on his journey, until such inquiry should be made. But no such mischief can result from the qualification which Lord Tenlerden applied to the rights and obligations of an innkeeper. There can, I apprehend, be no room for doubt that a similar qualification applies to the rights and liabilities of a carrier, and that if a carrier knows (for example) that a thief gives him the goods of the true owner to carry, he cannot charge the owner for the service which he has knowingly rendered to the thief in the carrying of the goods.”