49 | SCOTUS | Dec 18, 1876
WHITE ET AL.
v.
LUNING.
Supreme Court of United States.
*521 The case was argued by Mr. Montgomery Blair for the plaintiffs in error.
Mr. William Henry Rawle for the defendant in error.
*523 MR. JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.
This is the case of a mortgagor unable to pay his debt, and getting it satisfied by a judicial sale of the mortgaged premises, who, on the ground that no title passed by reason of misdescription in the deed of the sheriff, seeks to prevent his creditor, who purchased them, from recovering possession. And this, too, when, if there be any misdescription, it was presumably caused by him, as they were offered for sale in parcels, by his direction and for his advantage. As the court does not find that the descriptive errors misled any person, or caused any sacrifice of the property, the presumption is, that no one was injured, and that the property brought a full price. Obviously, therefore, there are no merits in this defence. It rests alone on the idea that sheriffs' deeds and ordinary deeds inter partes are subject to different rules of construction. In regard, however, to the description of the property conveyed, the rules are the same, whether the deed be made by a party in his own right, or by an officer of the court. The policy of the law does not require courts to scrutinize the proceedings of a judicial sale with a view to defeat them. On the contrary, every reasonable intendment will be made in their favor, so as to secure, if it can be done consistently with legal rules, the object they were intended to accomplish. Is this deed void for uncertainty of description, or can the property intended to be conveyed be *524 reasonably located by means of that description? The court below located it by adopting, except in one instance, the calls for courses and distances, and rejecting as false and repugnant certain calls for known objects. It is true, that, as a general rule, monuments, natural or artificial, referred to in a deed control, on its construction, rather than courses and distances; but this rule is not inflexible. It yields whenever, taking all the particulars of the deed together, it would be absurd to apply it. For instance, if the rejection of a call for a monument would reconcile other parts of the description, and leave enough to identify and render certain the land which the sheriff intended to convey, it would certainly be absurd to retain the false call, and thus defeat the conveyance.
Greenleaf, in his Treatise on Evidence (vol. i. sect. 301), in speaking on this subject, in effect says, That where the description in the deed is true in part, but not true in every particular, so much of it as is false is rejected, and the instrument will take effect if a sufficient description remains to ascertain its application. Applying this rule to the subject-matter of this deed, we do not think there is any difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the description is sufficiently certain to pass the title to the land.
The court below found, among other things, that if the courses and distances, being the field-notes of the survey, are followed from the point of beginning, changing east into west in the last course, the lines would, by closing, embrace the tract of land sued for, and correspond with all the other calls and monuments mentioned in the deed, except that there would be a departure at nearly right angles from the partition fence at the beginning of the call N. 47½° E. 127 chains, and the lines would not extend to, nor in any manner correspond with, the north boundary of the rancho Sal Si Puedes. There are, therefore, three descriptive errors, which, if removed from the deed, would harmonize all other particulars in it, and leave enough words of description to identify the demanded premises.
These errors will be noticed in the order stated by the court. The deed closes with these words: "and thence S. 41° 37' E. 17.32 chains to the place of beginning." This distance was correct, and so, except in one particular, was the course. It *525 should have been west instead of east. To follow the course as given would manifestly not close the lines of the survey; and as, other things being equal, boundaries prevail over courses, the court rejected the latter and adopted the former as the true description in this particular. This was so obviously right, that further comment is unnecessary.
The next error relates to the "fence along the line of partition."
There is a call for this fence as a boundary during the running of seven courses; but it is plainly a false call, after the sixth course has been run, for the seventh course departs at nearly right angles from the line of the fence, and if this course be rejected and the call for the fence retained, none of the other calls in the deed can be complied with, and the instrument is wholly unintelligible. On the contrary, if this course be accepted as the true description, and the call for the fence be discarded at the termination of the sixth course, there is no difficulty of harmonizing the other parts of the deed, with the exception of the northern boundary, and the difficulty there, we think, can be easily removed. It would therefore be manifestly wrong, not to say absurd, to retain the call for the fence, and reject the call for the course and distance. The reason why monuments, as a general thing, in the determination of boundaries control courses and distances, is, that they are less liable to mistakes; but the rule ceases with the reason for it. If they are inconsistent with the calls for other monuments, and it is apparent from all the other particulars in the deed that they were inadvertently inserted, the reason for retaining them no longer exists, and they will be rejected as false and repugnant. This applies with equal if not greater force to the last and main error in this deed. Adopting the seventh course as the true description, the calls in the deed proceed as follows: "N. 47½° E. 127 chains to the north boundary of the rancho Sal Si Puedes on the mountains, thence along said north boundary the following courses," &c.
The calls for these boundaries are equally false and mistaken with the call for continuing the line along the partition fence, as is clearly shown in the findings of fact by the court below. There are two ranges of mountains in the direction of the *526 course N. 47½° E. The summit of the first range is the northerly boundary line between the counties of Santa Cruz and Santa Clara, and both the summit and county line are about the distance of 127 chains from the point in the partition fence where the course N. 47½° E. begins.
There is another range of mountains in the same northerly direction, in the county of Santa Clara, about three-quarters of a mile beyond the summit of the first range, and the northerly boundary of the rancho Sal Si Puedes is on this range of mountains.
The calls for courses and distances run along the summit of the first range, and do not apply to the second. Besides this, if the summit of the first be treated as the boundary intended to be called for, all other calls, monuments, courses, and distances in the deed completely harmonize, except the two descriptive errors which have already been corrected, and the lines enclose a tract of the precise number of acres sued for, lying wholly within the county of Santa Cruz. But if the call for "the north boundary of the rancho" be retained as the true description, there is not only conflict with all the remaining courses and distances, but all the subsequent monuments mentioned in the deed, and the lines would not enclose the land in controversy, nor, indeed, any other. With all these facts to rest upon, is not the conclusion irresistible, that the words of the call at the end of the course N. 47½° E. 127 chains to wit, "the north boundary of the rancho Sal Si Puedes on the mountains," and "along said boundary the following courses" were mistakenly inserted, and should be rejected? Rejecting them, with the other particulars we have named, from the deed as false and inconsistent with the other parts of the description which are true, and of themselves sufficient to make a complete instrument, we are able to give effect to this judicial sale, according to the plain and manifest meaning of the officer who had it in charge.
It is rare, where so many field-notes of the survey of an irregularly shaped tract of land are incorporated in a deed, that there are so few mistakes. The courses and distances in this deed are numerous, and are all correct, except the last; and there the only error is in the course, which is easily corrected, *527 as the call is for the post where the survey begins. And these courses and distances enclose the identical land in dispute. In such a case, it would be wrong to let two false boundaries stand in order to defeat a conveyance.
It is proper to remark that a map will accompany the report of this case, so as to make this opinion intelligible.
Judgment affirmed.