White v. Louisiana & Arkansas Railway CompanyWhite v. Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Company
Kermit B. Guidroz, Baton Rouge, for appellees.
ELLIS, Judge.
Wabash Railroad Company, a defendant herein, has appealed from a judgment on a rule nisi in which it was adjudged in contempt of court for failing to answer interrogatories within the time allotted by judgment rendered in the prior rule nisi, and in which it was further orderd to pay all costs pertaining to said motions and rules previously issued for extension of time within which to answer the interrogatories and costs of the two rules, both being for contempt, and further ordering the defendant to pay to plaintiff‘s attorney as attorneys fees the sum of $300 which the lower court designated as reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining compliance with the order of the court requiring the defendant to answer the interrogatories.
In connection with plaintiff‘s main demand, on November 17, 1955 some eighty interrogatories were propounded to the Wabash Railroad Company in accordance with the provisions of
On March 5, 1956 counsel for plaintiff prayed for the issuance of a rule directed to Wabash Railroad Company “to show cause if any it has on a day and at an hour to be fixed by this Honorable Court, why said defendant should not be found in contempt of court for refusal to answer the interrogatories, refusal to make discovery, and failure to comply with the order of this Honorable Court read and signed in Open court on the 13th day of December, 1955, and why a judgment by default should not be rendered and signed in favor of the plaintiff, Earl H. White, and against the defendant, Wabash Railroad Company, as prayed for in plaintiff‘s original petition, according to law;” and then in the alternative prayed for the relief outlined in
The rule was tried and the court for written reasons rendered judgment recalling the rule for the contempt and ordering the defendant to answer the interrogatories propounded with certain objections within thirty days from the date of the judgment which was signed on May 3, 1956.
Thus we see at this point that the court on the trial of the rule, while compelling Wabash Railroad Company to answer certain interrogatories held in effect that its refusal was not without substantial justification and, therefore, denied “to the examining party the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including reasonable attorney‘s fees,” under
The Wabash Railroad Company failed to file its answers to the interrogatories within the thirty days allotted to them by
The rule was heard and the court in its written reasons stated:
“This matter is before the Court on a rule for contempt filed by plaintiff on June 5th, 1956, and heard July 2nd, 1956, growing out of defendant, Wabash Railroad Company‘s failure to answer interrogatories addressed to it in connection with an exception to the jurisdiction of this court previously filed.”
Although the rule was clearly one for contempt as stated by the Court and would, therefore, necessarily be governed by
From the above, it is clear that in the present case counsel for plaintiff upon the refusal or failure of the Wabash Railroad Company to have answered the original interrogatories should have applied to the court for an “order compelling an answer,” and praying also for payment by Wabash Railroad Company of the amount of reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order including reasonable attorneys fees. In his first application for a rule he prayed mainly that the Wabash Railroad Company be adjudged in contempt but he also asked for relief in the nature of expenses and attorneys fees which was refused. He then obtained an order for them to answer. Therefore, the Wabash Railroad Company was placed in the position of being guilty of contempt of Court if it failed to answer in accordance with the judgment rendered on the first rule directing it to answer certain interrogatories.
“* * * the court may make such orders in regard to the refusal as are just and among others the following: * * *.”
Under this broad language it would appear that a court would be authorized to impose the costs and attorney fees as was done in the present case.
One adjudged guilty of contempt can also be punished under
“The judges of the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeals and District Courts have the power to punish all contempt of their authority by fine not exceeding fifty dollars and imprisonment for a period not exceeding ten days for each offense of that kind. And provided that no publication of utterance out of court, respecting the conduct of such courts or its officers, jurors, witnesses or parties in any cause after judgment shall be construed to be a contempt and punished as such; reserving to the parties aggrieved their remedies by prosecution for libel or action for damages,”
or if it be an attorney at law, with which we are not concerned in this case, under
We find a short but comprehensive statement with regard to contempt in Tulane Law Review, Vol. 17, page 656, which reads in part as follows:
“In Louisiana contempts are of two kinds; ‘direct‘, those committed in open court; ‘constructive‘, those committed out of view and hearing of the court. State ex rel. DeBuys v. Judges of Civil Dist. Ct., 1880, 32 La.Ann. 1256; Graham v. Jones, 1942, 200 La. 137, 7 So.2d 688. The theory of punishment for contempt is that it is to vindicate the authority and dignity of the court for a disrespect or disobedience shown it. See State ex rel. Heffner v. Judge of First Judicial Dist. Ct., 1898, 50 La.Ann. 552, 557, 23 So. 478, 480; City of Gretna v. Rossner, 1925, 154 La. 117, 97 So. 335. The courts in this state have been expressly granted power by the constitution to punish for both types of contempt.
La.Const. of 1921, Art. 19, § 17 ;Art. 131, La.Code of Practice of 1870 . Nevertheless, it has been pointed out that the power to punish for contempt is inherent in both the courts and the legislative bodies even without constitutional grant. See State ex rel. Morton v. Meyers, 1930, 171 La. 313, 131 So. 31, 34. This inherent power to punish for contempt is manifested by the decisions to the effect that the court against which the disrespect is shown is the exclusive judge in determining whether the act committed constitutes a contempt. State ex rel. O‘Malley v. Houston, 1883, 35 La.Ann. 1195; State ex rel. Barthet v. Judge of Civil District Court, 1888, 40 La.Ann. 434, 4 So. 131; State ex rel. Dowling v. Ray, 1922, 150 La. 1030, 91 So. 443. From this general principle is deducted the ruling applicable in the instant case that the court commanding the doing of a certain act by a public body is alone vested with the right to determine whether or not the order has been complied with, or a sufficient reason has been given for failure to comply. City of Gretna v. Rossner, supra; State ex rel. Connerly v. Tangipahoa Parish School Board, La.App. 1942, 9 So.2d 826. This absolute right of the court over matters pertaining to contempt is the rationale for the rule that a judgment imposing a sentence for contempt is not appealable. State ex rel. Farmer v. Judge of Parish Ct., 1879, 31 La. Ann. 116; City of Gretna v. Rossner, supra. But it has been held that the case in which the contempt has been committed is appealable. State ex rel. Farmer v. Judge of Parish Ct., supra; see City of Gretna v. Rossner, 1923, 154 La. 117, 121, 97 So. 335, 336. Because of the non-appealability from a judgment imposing a sentence for contempt, it becomes important to inquire into the supervisory jurisdiction of the supreme court. The conservatory writs appropriate for cases of contempt are certiorari and prohibition.La.Const. of 1921, Art. 7, § 2 ;Arts. 846 ,855, La. Code of Practice of 1870 . Prior to the adoption of the Louisiana Constitution of 1879 these writs issued only when invoked in aid of appellate jurisdiction * * *“.
It is well settled that as shown by cases cited in the above quoted article there is no appeal from a judgment of contempt, the remedy being for writs to the Supreme Court under its supervisory jurisdiction. This Court, however, has no jurisdiction to entertain this appeal from a judgment holding the Wabash Railroad Company in contempt of Court for failure to answer. The proper recourse was to apply to the Supreme Court for writs.
For the above and foregoing reasons the appeal is hereby dismissed.