9 Rob. 495 | La. | 1845
The plaintiff alleges that he contracted with the defendants, Alfred Kearney & Co., through their agent, Alden Miller, to sell and deliver to them in New Orleans, sixteen hundred barrels of Thomaston lime, for which they were to pay
The evidence shews, that in 1842-3, Miller was a clerk for Kearney & Co., in whom they had great confidence. About the commencement of May, 1843, he was about to return to the State of Maine; but previous to his departure, Kearney told him that he would be glad if he would get for his firm a quantity of Thomaston lime, either by purchasing it for them, or to sell on commission. On the 24th of May, 1843, he writes to Miller, giving a long account of the business and prospects of his firm, and says: “If you have an opportunity of shipping lime at $1 25 or less, landed here, you may ship us, within thirty days after the receipt of this, from 600 to 1200 casks, and charge a commission on it, or take an interest in it.” In a letter dated the 16th of June, he writes again about the business of his house. He tells Miller that the firm is to be dissolved on the 1st of October following, expresses his regret at not having lime to sell, and says: “ Lime is very high and selling for $2 25 to #2 50. If you can send out a cargo on our account, joint account, or your own account, not to ex
The evidence is conclusive, as to the fact, that the lime was all on board the vessel previous to the 1st of September. Miller says, that it was all on board on the 29th of August, and that the vessel hauled out into the stream. Snow says the same thing. In the written contract, dated the 31st August, it is stated that the vessel is ready for sea. Snow says, that he saw the plaintiff at the custom-house on that day, and that he said he had every thing ready, except a few supplies. A copy of the clearance of the vessel was admitted in evidence, subject to exception, which is dated the 31st of August. It is also proved, that on the 1st of September, the wind was such as to prevent any prudent master of a vessel from attempting to go to sea, from Thomaston, and that it continued so until the 5th, when the vessel sailed. The defendants also proved by a clerk, and an exhibit of a statement of sales made by themselves, that lime, about the time of the arrival of the cargo in controversy, was selling at from $1 25 to $1 50, per cask.
The court gave a judgment in favor of the plaintiff for $768, and the defendants have appealed.
Our attention is first called to a bill of exceptions, taken on various grounds, to the opinion of the court below, permitting a copy of the vessel’s clearance and manifest from the customhouse in New Orleans, certified by a person styling himself deputy collector, to be read in evidence. We shall not notice all the objections taken, as the one, that it is not the best evidence, that could have been produced, is sufficient, and should, in our opinion, have induced the judge to reject it- The best evidence was the original. It, and the person having it in possession, were within the jurisdiction of the court, in reach of its process ; and we are not aware of the law, that authorizes a deputy collector of the customs, to certify copies of the clearances of vessels from other ports, and thus make them evidence in our courts, whilst the deputy, and the documents, are within their jurisdiction, and amenable to their process. We do not think a deputy collector of the customs, is such an accredited
The next bill of exceptions is taken by Kearney alone, to permitting a witness to testify to the declarations of Simms, in a conversation with, the witness, held sometime after the dissolution of the firm of Kearney & Co., because he says, he is not bound by such declarations. The judge admitted the declarations and statements of Simms to be given in evidence, “ because the transaction had commenced during the existence of the partnership, and had not been completed at the time the declarations were made.” We think the judge did not err in permitting the admissions of Simms as to any acts, or transactions that took place previous to the dissolution of the partnership; but as to what took place afterwards, his acknowledgments do not bind Kearney. When the vessel, with the lime on board, arrived in New Orleans, the partnership had been dissolved, and each partner was afterwards responsible for his own acts; and the admissions of one as to what subsequently took place between himself and the plaintiff, or a third person, are not binding on the other,
Upon the merits of the case, we are clearly of opinion that Miller was authorized, as the agent of the firm of Kearney & Co., to purchase the lime for them, and that in doing so, he did not exceed his powers. We are also of opinion, that it was shipped, and the vessel ready for sea, on or before the 1st of September; but that she was prevented from sailing by adverse winds. The fact of her not clearing on, or before that day, we do not consider of much importance, as it was not necessary, when it was evident she could not go to sea. The clearance could be effected in a very short time, the proposed voyage being a coasting one, and the cargo all consisting of one article, consigned to the same persons, to wit, the defendants. But the evidence as to the defendants being put in default, is far from being conclusive. Article 1905 of the Civil Code provides, that when the party is not deemed to be in default, by the terms of the contract, or operation of law, then the act of the party is necessary ; and four modes of putting him in default are mentioned, with not one of which has the plaintiff shown that he
Besides the objection of the defendants’ not being put in default, we are of opinion that the evidence as to the amount of damages is weak and suspicious. The lime was put into the hands of Bridge to sell; he swears that it was only worth one dollar per barrel, and that he sold one thousand barrels at that rate ; and, in a day or two after, before any lime was delivered, or paid for, he admits that he became interested with the purchaser, and made a speculation by selling it out again. We do not think the measure of damages should be established by such a proceeding as this, particularly when the defendants show, that lime was worth more in the market at the time. Chancellor Kent, in speaking of cases of this kind, says: “ If the buyer unreasonably refuses to accept of the articles sold, the seller is not obliged to let it perish on his hands, and run the risk of the solvency of the buyer. The usage on the neglect, or refusal of the buyer to come in a reasonable time, after notice, and pay for and take the goods, is for the vendor to sell the same at auc
Upon a review of all the circumstances of this case, we think that justice will be best attained by remanding the case for a new trial.
The judgment of the Commercial Court is, therefore, annulled and reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial, with directions to the judge to proceed therein in conformity with the principles herein stated, and otherwise according to law ; the plaintiff paying the costs of this appeal.