173 Iowa 192 | Iowa | 1916
I. This case is not new; it has been before ns on four different appeals, and has been tried to a jury at least five times, with varying results. The opinions heretofore pronounced will be found in 144 Iowa, 92; 150 Iowa 27; 156 Iowa 210; 164 Iowa 693, and these dispose of nearly every question which could arise in the case. These cases also recite the facts and refer to the issues tendered, so that no extended statement of either need be made at this time. The chief complaint now made is of the size of the verdict and of the instructions given by the trial court, which permitted the jury to award the plaintiff exemplary damages against the defendant corporation. Claim is also made that the trial court erroneously allowed the jury to award compensatory damages to plaintiff for loss of time caused by his arrest and prosecution, on the theory that there was no testimony to justify the allowance thereof.
II. The instruction as to loss of time was not peremptory, but directed the jury to allow plaintiff compensation “for loss of time caused by said prosecution and the value thereof if any”. The jury was cautioned not to allow anything for loss of time caused by defendants’ discharge, of plaintiff, and warned to allow nothing on this item unless it were traceable to the prosecution. There was sufficient testimony to justify the charge as given.
‘ ‘ That the master is liable for the consequences of a tort committed by the servant in the course of his duty, and while acting within the scope of his employment, is a rule well established by many authorities. Moore v. Fitchburg R. Corporation, 4 Gray (Mass.), 465 (64 Am. Dec. 83); Ramsden v. Boston & A. R. Co., 104 Mass. 117 (6 Am. Rep. 200); Bass v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 36 Wis. 450, 463 (17 Am. Rep. 495). And when' a tort has been committed by an agent within the line of his employment, a joint action may be maintained against the principal and the agent. Hewitt v. Swift, 3 Allen (Mass.) 420, 422; St. Louis, etc., R. Co. v. Dalby, 19 Ill. 353, 374. But the principal cannot be held liable in exemplary damages for the wanton acts of the agent, unless it participated, either expressly or impliedly, or by conduct authorizing or approving the act, either before or after it was committed. Lightner Mining Co. v. Lane, 161 Cal. 689 (120 Pac. 771, Ann. Cas. 1913 C, 1093); Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101 (13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261; 37 L. Ed. 97); Haver v. Central R. Co., 64 N. J. Law, 312 (45 Atl. 593); Fohrmann v. Consolidated Traction Co., 63 N. J. Law, 391 (43 Atl. 892); Wells v. Boston & M. R. Co., 82 Vt. 108 (71 Atl. 1103; 137 Am. St. Rep. 987).” Dunshee v. Standard Oil Co., 165 Iowa 625.
“It was contended at the argument, that an action for malicious prosecution so differs from other actions that it cannot be maintained against a corporation. But although, in order to maintain such an action, both malice and want of probable cause must be found, yet proof of want of probable cause will warrant the jury in inferring malice. Mitchell v. Jenkins, 5 B. & Ad. 588; S. C. 2 Nev. & Man. 301; Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U. S. 187; Stone v. Crocker, 24 Pick. (Mass.) 81; Ripley v. McBarron, 125 Mass. 272. And, by the great weight of modern authority, a corporation may be liable even when a fraudulent or malicious intent in fact is necessary to be proved, the fraud or malice of its authorized agents being imputable to the corporation; as in actions for fraudulent representations; National Exchange Co. of Glasgow v. Drew, 2 Macq. 103; New Brunswick & C. R. Co. v. Conybeare, 9 H. L. Cas. 711, 738, 740; Barwick v. English Joint Stock Bank, L. R. 2 Ex. 259; for libel, Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. (U. S.) 202; Whitfield v. Southeastern R. Co., E. B. & E. 115; or for malicious prosecution, Vance v. Erie R. Co., 3 Vroom (N. J.) 334; Copley v. Grover & Baker Sewing Machine Co., 2 Woods 494; Goodspeed v. East Haddam Bank, 22 Conn. 530; Carter v. Howe Machine Co., 51 Md. 290; Wheless v. Second Nat. Bank, 1 Baxter (Tenn.)*197 469; Williams v. Planters’ Ins. Co., 57 Miss. 759; Iron Mountain Bank v. Mercantile Bank, 4 Mo. App. 505; Walker v. Southeastern R. Co., L. R. 5 C. P. 640; Edwards v. Midland R. Co., 6 Q. B. D. 287.”
In the case of Hussey v. King, supra, it is said:
“The old idea that, because a corporation had no ‘soul’,' it could not commit torts, or be the subject of punishment for tortious acts, may now be regarded as obsolete. The rights, the powers, and the duties of corporate bodies have been so enlarged in modern times, and these ‘artificial persons’ have become so numerous, and entered so largely into the everyday transactions of life, that it has become the policy of the law to subject them, as far as practicable, to the same civil liability for wrongful acts as attach to natural persons; and this liability is not restricted to acts committed within the scope of granted power, but a corporation may be liable to an action ‘ for false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, and libel. ’ . ‘The doctrine which once obtained, that the master is not liable for the willful wrong of his servant, is now understood as referring to an act of. positive and designed injury, not done with a view to the master’s service, or for the purpose of executing his orders. . . . Whether the servant did the act with a view to the'master’s service, or to serve a purpose of his own, is a question for the jury.’ Whether the corporation authorized or participated in the tort is matter of proof, and the defense of ultra vires is not admitted. It is true that it was held in Orr v. Bank U. S., 1 Ham. (Ohio) 25, that a corporation could not be sued in an action for assault and battery, nor could it be joined in such an action with other defendants; and in Gillet v. Missouri V. R. Co., 55 Mo. 315, it was held, by a divided court, that a railroad corporation was not liable for a malicious prosecution in the name of the state for alleged embezzlement of its funds, but a different doctrine seems now well established. ‘ Corporations are liable for every wrong they commit, and in such cases the doctrine of ultra vires has no applica*198 tion. They are also liable for the acts of their servants while such servants are engaged in the business of their principal, in the same manner and to the same extent that individuals are liable under like circumstances. An action may be maintained against a corporation. for its malicious or negligent torts, however foreign they may be to the object of its creation, or beyond its granted powers. It may be sued for assault and battery, for fraud and deceit, for false imprisonment, for ^malicious prosecution, for nuisance, and for libel. ’ Nat. Bank v. Graham, 100 U. S. 699, and many authorities there cited; Merchants’ Bank v. State Bank, 10 Wall. 604, 645; Ang. & A. Corp. § 388. ‘It is no defense to legal proceedings in tort that the torts were ultra vires.’ Gruber v. Washington & J. R. Co., 92 N. C. 1. Philadelphia W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How. (U. S.) 202, was an action against the defendant (plaintiff in error) for libel. It was insisted that the railroad, being a corporation with defined and limited faculties and powers, and having only such incidental authority as is necessary to the full exercise of the faculties and powers gránted by their charter; that, being a mere legal entity, they are incapable of malice, and that malice is a necessary ingredient in a libel; and the action should have been instituted against the natural persons concerned in the publication of the libel. ’ But a different view was taken by the court, and it was held that a corporation could be held liable ex delicto as well as ex contractu, and that this view was in consonance with the legislation and jurisprudence of the states of the Union relative to ‘these artificial persons’. The subject is discussed at length in Williams v. Planters’ Insurance Co., 57 Miss. 759, and the note to the case as reported in 34 Am. Rep. 494, in which the authorities are collated, from which the conclusion is fully warranted that a corporation is liable for malicious prosecution conducted by one of its agents. In the still more recent case of Denver & R. G. R. Co. v. Harris, 122 U. S. 597, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1286, in an elaborate opinion, in which many authorities are cited, it.is said: ‘If a corporation itself has*199 no hands with which to strike, it may employ the hands of others. It is now perfectly well settled, contrary to the ancient authorities, that a corporation is liable civiliter for' all torts committed by its servants or agents by authority of the corporation, express or implied. . . . The result of the modern cases is that a corporation is liable cwiKter for torts committed by its servants or agents, precisely as a natural person; and it is liable as a natural person for the acts of its agents done by its authority, express or implied, though there be neither a written appointment under seal, nor a vote of the corporation constituting the agency or authorizing the act.’ ‘The corporation and its servant, by whose act the injury was done, may be joined in an action of tort in the nature of trespass.’ Pierce, R. R. 292.”
The damages are not excessive, and we see no error which would justify a reversal. The judgment must be, and it is,— Affirmed.