24 S.E.2d 787 | Ga. | 1943
Lead Opinion
1. "A discharge under a writ of habeas corpus, after a conviction, can not be granted unless the judgment is absolutely void, as where the convicting court was without jurisdiction, or where the defendant in his trial was denied due process of law, in violation of the constitution. Since the writ can not be used merely as a substitute for a writ of error or other remedial procedure to correct errors of law, of which the defendant had opportunity to avail himself, no question as to guilt or innocence or as to any irregularity can be so raised, unless it was such as to render the judgment wholly void." Aldredge v. Williams,
2. Where a direct contempt is committed in the presence of the court, the offender is not entitled as a matter of right to a hearing before the court, acting on its own knowledge of the facts, proceeds to impose punishment for the contempt, though the court may in its discretion allow such a hearing; and the refusal to grant such a hearing does not deprive the offender of the due process of law guaranteed by the State and Federal constitutions.
The petition for habeas corpus alleged that the contempt order was void, because (1) the judge was not in a fit physical or mental condition to undertake a judicial duty at the time the alleged contempt occurred, in that the judge was under the influence of alcohol, and extremely irascible and irritable; and (2) the judge denied petitioner an opportunity to be heard on the merits of the contempt proceeding. The petitioner attached to his petition a copy of a motion which he had filed in the civil court of Fulton County, asking for a hearing on the merits of the alleged contempt, but on which he alleged he had been unable to obtain a hearing from Judge Bell. The motion alleged that when Judge Bell announced from the bench that he had passed an order holding petitioner in contempt, and that he had delivered this order to the marshal of the court, petitioner immediately asked the court to grant him a hearing to show the court that he was not in contempt of court, but that the judge immediately refused this request and *467 hurriedly left the bench; that the petitioner followed the judge into his private office and asked that he be given sufficient time within which to determine his rights in order that he could contest the order, but the judge stated that he would not give him any time, and that if he did not pay the fine he would have him placed in jail immediately. The motion asserted, that the petitioner was justified in making the remarks on which the contempt order was based, because of the manner in which the judge had presided in the trial of the case which he was conducting; that the judge was under the influence of alcohol during the trial of the case; that the judge needlessly interrupted the petitioner in his examination of witnesses, and shouted at him "just like a person under the influence of intoxicating beverages would shout;" and that the judge had shown personal animosity to the petitioner ever since the petitioner had supported another candidate in one of the judge's races for reelection. The petition for habeas corpus alleged that the statements made in the motion above referred to were true. In an amendment to his petition for habeas corpus, the petitioner alleged that the contempt order was void, because the refusal to allow him an opportunity to be heard violated the due-process clauses of the State and Federal constitutions (Code, §§ 2-103, 1-815), as well as the provision of the State constitution that "No person shall be deprived of the right to prosecute or defend his own cause in any of the courts of this State, in person, by attorney, or both." Code, § 2-104.
On the hearing the petitioner testified, that he had no idea that the judge contemplated adjudging him to be in contempt of court until the order had been issued; that he immediately asked to be heard in the matter, but the judge refused to hear him, and stated that he had drawn a written order and given it to the marshal of the court for execution; that the judge refused to grant petitioner any time to determine his rights; that when he refused to pay the fine the marshal took him in custody under the order dated October 20; that he was later taken in custody under an order dated October 27, 1942, the order produced by the defendants on the hearing; that he did not know what became of the first order, but he understood Judge Bell had it; that the judge took the first order back and wrote the one dated October 27; and that the judge refused to act on his motion, a copy of which was attached to the *468
petition for habeas corpus. The only evidence introduced by the defendants was the contempt order signed by Judge Bell, dated October 27, 1942. After the hearing the court entered an order denying the relief sought by the petitioner, and remanding him to the custody of the sheriff. The petitioner excepted.
1. This court is not here concerned with whether or not the facts stated in the contempt order were sufficient to authorize the court to adjudge the prisoner to be in contempt of court. "A discharge under a writ of habeas corpus, after a conviction, can not be granted unless the judgment is absolutely void; as where the convicting court was without jurisdiction, or where the defendant in his trial was denied due process of law, in violation of the [Federal fourteenth amendment (Code, § 1-815) and the State] constitution [art. 1, sec. 1, par. 5 (Code, § 2-105)]. Since the writ can not be used merely as a substitute for a writ of error or other remedial procedure to correct errors of law, of which the defendant had opportunity to avail himself, no question as to guilt or innocence or as to any irregularity can be so raised, unless it was such as to render the judgment wholly void." Aldredge v. Williams,
2. It is admitted that the civil court of Fulton County has authority to punish for contempt, and that the punishment inflicted in the instant case does not exceed that authorized by law. Therefore the sole question here presented is whether one who has committed a direct contempt in the presence of the court is entitled to a hearing before the imposition of the punishment for the contempt, it being contended by the plaintiff in error that the failure to allow him a hearing deprived him of due process of law and rendered the judgment of contempt void. Where a direct contempt is committed in the presence of the court, no service of any commitment is necessary; but the rule is otherwise in cases of constructive contempts. Hall v. Martin,
Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.
Concurrence Opinion
I do not understand that this judgment means, or that anything in the opinion holds, that a party is remediless who is adjudged in contempt for conduct in the immediate presence of the court, when in fact such conduct was not contemptuous.