White v. General Motors Corp.

White v General Motors WHITE v GENERAL MOTORSCORPORATION (Calendar 4). 7, Argued Docket 79194. No. October No. Decided 27, 1988. September 31, 1980, Frederick White retired on March from General Motors Corporation Thereafter, nondisability pension. and received a sought compensation he and was awarded workers’ benefits on ground early that he had retired because of a work-related respiratory pending, chronic condition. While the case was Disability PA Compensation 357 amended 373 of the Workers’ § Act, 1, 1982, January creating effective a new standard of employee which an who retires and receives a nondis- ability pension compensation must meet to receive workers’ Compensation Appeal benefits. The Workers’ Board affirmed benefits, declining apply the award of to the new standard after determining rights 373 affected § substantive and was applied prospectively. Appeals, intended to be The Court of Gillis, P.J., JJ., and Gribbs and Sullivan, ordered the board’s decision vacated and remanded the case the wcab for recon- light Wojciechowski Corp, sideration in v General Motors (1986), App applied retroactively Mich which had 373§ ground procedure applied on the that it was a rule and pending injuries preceded cases which arose out of (Docket 92867). plaintiff ap- statute’s effective date No. peals, given limited to the issue whether 373 should retroactive effect. opinions by joined In Chief Justice Riley, Justices Cav- anagh Brickley Boyle, and Justice and Justice Supreme Archer, Court held: Disability Compensation Section 373 of the Workers’ Act applies prospectively employees injured January on or after 1, 1982. Cavanagh Boyle joined by Chief Justice Riley, Justices Disability Compensation would hold that 373 of the Workers’ and, rights thus, employees applies Act affected substantive prospectively employees injured January to those on or after rights presumed Statutes which affect substantive are operate prospectively contrary clearly unless a intent is mani- they fested or unless are remedial in nature. While the work- 431 Mich 387 whole, act, legislation, is remedial ers’ rights employees by changing affected the substantive addition, disability. to the retroac- no reference standard of provides tivity appears in 1980 PA and the act of 373§ future effective date. concurring, agreeing that Bkickley, while § Justice plain- apply prospectively, stated that the date of the should employment receipt nondisabil- of his and of tiff’s termination ity applicability the of the section. benefits should determine prior occurred to the enactment and Because these events section, apply date the amendment should effective of plaintiff’s to the claim. light existing concurring, Archer, Justice stated application determining prospective retrospective case law or amendments, legislative statutory the absence of clear intent 373(1), respect application of and the statute’s with § predominant upon effect a claimant’s entitlement substantive benefits, Compensation Disability of Workers’ § injured apply prospectively employees on or after Act should 1,1982. January Reversed. joined by dissenting, Griffin, Levin, Justice stated Justice 357, 373, presumption provided in 1980 PA that an

that the employee nondisability pension has retires and receives a who earning capacity compen- as a result of a not suffered a loss disease, injury apply respect to sable or should with workers’ 1, 1982, payable January after without benefits regard employee injured or to when an was disabled. operate prospectively presumed to unless a Statutes are contrary clearly is remedial intent is manifested or the statute regarded operate retrospec- procedural. A statute is not tively merely an event. Section because relates to antecedent wording and substantive in its of the act is both presumption a and effect. It refers both to a standard disability disability. language that its standard Its makes clear apply is different than that which would otherwise under whole, purpose 373 reflects a on the act. When viewed as part Legislature change of the standard with employment respect employee active to an who terminates private governmental receiving under either a or a program. pension or retirement operate retrospectively may if it does not A remedial statute away rights. not abolish or take take vested Section 373 does addition, rights. away did not indicate vested Rather, legislative retrospective prospective intention. White v Motors General Opinion by Riley, C.J. history subsequent to enactment tends to confirm an intent apply employees 373 should to all who terminate active employment receiving nondisability pension and are or retire- regardless they injured. ment benefits of when were In the express intent, contrary absence of an a reasonable construc- requires specific tion that a statute which contains a future applied efiective date should be from and after that date to all scope who come within the of its terms. Meklir, Schreier, Friedman, Nolish & P.C. (by Tyler), Matthew A. for plaintiff. Cooney, Stanczyk

Plunkett, Rutt, Watters, & Kopit Pedersen noster), Jonathan T. and Paul F. Pater- (by Hays, Evans, Nelson, Pletkovic & P.C. (by Evans), Hays John J. and William Nole and Wil- lard W. Wallace for the defendant.

Amicus Curiae:

Sachs, Nunn, Kates, Kadushin, O’Hare, Helve Sachs), Waldman, ston & P.C. (by Theodore for Michigan State AFL-CIO.

Riley, case, C.J. In this we are asked to decide 17.237(373)(1)1 whether 418.373(1); MCL MSA of the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act has application. retroactive We would hold that 373§ and, thus, affects rights substantive applies pro- spectively to those on employees injured or after 1, 1982, January the amendment’s effective date. we Accordingly, would reverse the of the judgment Court of Appeals and reinstate decision Compensation Workers’ Appeal Board.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Plaintiff White was employed thirty-seven for 357, 373, including enacted PA as an Disability Compensation amendment of the Workers’ Act of 1969. See 17.237(101) seq.; seq. 418.101 MCL et MSA et 431 Mich Riley, C.J. plaintiff years by 31, 1980, March defendant. On "thirty out” nondis- retired under defendant’s and plan. May ability, early 29, 1980, retirement On Compensa- plaintiff filed a with the Workers’ claim alleging Bureau, that he was disabled as tion early the date of his retirement chronic bron- arising pulmonary emphysema, chitis out of prolonged exposure paint, dust, smoke, finding hearing referee, other irritants. The plaintiff disability and had had a work-incurred early respiratory condition, retired because his plaintiff weekly benefits effective from his awarded retirement payable

date, until notice from further appealed argu- the bureau. Defendant wcab, ing plaintiff was not disabled. pending

While case was before wcab, Michigan Legislature 1980 PA enacted January 418.373; 1982. MCL MSA effective 17.237(373), provides:

(1) employee employ- An who terminates active receiving nondisability pension or ment and is private gov- retirement benefits under either a or pension program, ernmental ing old-age or retirement includ- act, security benefits under the social 1397f, paid by or on USC that was behalf employer weekly of an from whom benefits under presumed not to have shall be sought this act are earnings earning capacity as the result a loss compensable injury of a or disease under either chapter chapter presumption may This only by preponderance of the evi- be rebutted unable, employee dence that because of perform to suitable disability, work related work including training qualifications, employee’s to the super- This standard of experience. or applicable sedes other standards used to determine chapter chapter disability under either this (2) shall not be construed as a bar This section employee receiving medical benefits under to an 391 Motors White v General Riley, C.J. of a causal upon the establishment 315 section relationship and the work employee’s between [Emphasis treatment. for medical added.] need the referee’s 1986, affirmed 2, the wcab May On set presumption apply to and declined award defendant was §373, stating forth it concerned §373(1) because to assert entitled in- and that rights substantive to apply prospectively to the amendment tended date. its effective after injured employees to the action remanded Appeals The Court Wojcie- light to reconsidered the wcab be App 151 Mich Corp, General Motors v chowski (1986). 399; 390 NW2d limited appeal, granted leave Court then This PA 357 should 373 of 1980 the issue whether 428 Mich retrospective application. given

II. ANALYSIS retroactive the issue of addressed This Court has of amendments application prospective versus in Selk v First, recent cases. in several the wdca Products, 9; 345 NW2d Detroit Plastic rule, "stat- general (1984), that as we stated unless operate prospectively are presumed utes A year manifested.” clearly intent contrary Div, Copper Pine v White in Franks later, (1985), recog- this Court 636; 375 NW2d Mich for statutes rule general exception nized an Most in nature. are remedial Co, Mich Motor Hurd v Ford recently, (1985), considered this Court 534; 377 NW2d 301(2), act, public the same provision another invalidate it "was enacted concluded Laboratories, v Difco in Deziel decision this Court’s Mich by Opinion Riley, C.J. (After Remand), Inc 268 NW2d (1978), effecting change thus a in the substantial provisions law and that have of this amendment prospective application.”

A against backdrop It is this that this Court must characterizes 373 as examine Defendant procedural.2 analysis procedural. However, careful of this sec- tion reveals that is not Section pertinent part: provides in employee employment An who terminates active receiving nondisability pension or retire- is presumed . . . shall not to have ment benefits a loss of a earnings earning capacity or result as the compensable injury or disease under either presumption may chapter chapter 4. This only by preponderance be rebutted dence of the evi- unable, employee is of a because disability, perform work related work suitable training qualifications, including employee’s experience. [Emphasis added.] upon language highlighted Relying above, argues defendant 373 creates a rebuttable upon quote The dissent relies from an article written Justice Moody. Although procedural- properly the dissent asserts that distinguish, passage dichotomy is often difficult to substantive addresses Justice fact, article, retroactivity in In a criminal case. later in the Moody specifically discusses the differences between retroac tivity in cases: criminal civil area, greater consistency In the the cases reflect both civil upon retrospective

result and more severe limitations a reach. sense, cases, explained by this can be the fact that in civil arena; range of alternatives is narrower than in the criminal judicata operate concepts to cut off the backward effect the full essentially as res and statutes of limitation such Thus, law-changing decisions. retroactivity occasionally in criminal is accorded cases litigation [Moody, .... unknown in civil Retroac- law-changing Michigan, application decisions in tive (1982).] Wayne L R 483-484 White v General Motors Riley, J.C. is, therefore, presumption of law and However, Michigan specifically pro- law nature. vides: place presumption solely The function of a opposing producing on the

the burden of evidence party. person allows a

"It is a device which presumption on the to avoid a directed relying verdict, verdict permits person a directed that opposing party if the fails to introduce rebutting presumption.” [McKinstry v evidence Clinic, PC, 428 Mich Valley Obstetrics-Gynecology (1987) 167, 180; (quoting Widmayer v NW2d Leonard, 280, 289; 373 NW2d 538 Mich [1985]).] claimant’s burden of

Section 373 does shift the Therefore, it does not create producing evidence. Rather, "pre- that "presumption.” we conclude classifies sumption” language merely § under persons those entitled to benefits B rule that statutes reiterating general be rights applied affect should substantive prior noted that the Hurd Court prospectively, 301(2),3 of an em- enactment eligibility workers’ com- a mental disorder for ployee with percep- the "honest by was determined pensation Deziel, Section supra. forth in tion” standards set thus, 301(2) disability;4 the standard changed change affected sub- that the Court concluded 17.237(301X2) part 418.301(2); was also enacted 3 MCL MSA 1980 PA 357. 301(2) provides: Section aging process, in- of the Mental disabilities and conditions conditions, cluding heart and cardiovascular not limited to but aggravated compensable or acceler- if to or shall be contributed 431 Mich by Riley, C.J. Emphasizing rights employee. of the stantive indicated had not fact whether the Hurd Court held that retrospectively, applied should be

the amendment must be occurring applied prospectively injuries on or for indistinguish- January 1, 1982. We find Hurd after able. As the Hurd Court stated: origi- applicable "In with the rule accordance acts, presumed provisions by added nal it is affecting rights are the amendment substantive operate prospectively. Provisions intended added that affect substantive the amendment apply to transac- rights will not construed to prior completed to its enactment tions and events legislature expressed its intent unless the has clearly by the implied that language intent effect such the circum- of the amendment [Hurd, supra surrounding its enactment.” stances at 535.] present prior

Similarly, case, enact in the prove only an § a claimant need ment of wage-earning capacity impairment within his employment. Hecla, & field of Kaarto v Calumet Inc, 128; 116 Section 367 Mich NW2d ***5 pro changed Specifically, § 373 this standard.* disability supersedes "[t]his vides that standard applicable dis used to determine other standards chapter chapter ability 4.” or under either this is similar to the The effect of 373 on claimants 301(2) Both under in Hurd. effect on claimants significant by employment in a manner. Mental disa- ated arising compensable out of actual events bilities shall be when perceptions employment, thereof. not unfounded [MCL 418.301(2); 17.237(301X2).] MSA eligible prove requires for he or she is Section 373 claimant unable, showing employee compensation by "the because employee’s disability, perform suitable to the work related work a qualifications, including training experience.” or White v General Motors Riley, C.J. 373(1) changed §§ a standard of disabil- ity. Thus, Hurd, in accordance with 373 should applied prospectively injuries occurring for on January 1, 1982, or after the effective date of the statute. upon by distinguish-

Cases relied defendant are present able from Hurd and the case. The statu- tory supra, Selk, amendment in affected the amount of interest an individual was entitled to already receive after it was pensation determined that com- supra, Franks, was due. As we noted in Selk, "[i]n we found the interest rate on overdue compensation payments remedy related to a procedure mode of and was 'but an incident and ” right liability.’ Franks, not the essence of a supra provision Selk, § at 672. Unlike the question employee involves the whether a retired right compensation has a substantive under affecting directly § 373, thus of his essence right, merely calculating and not the amount of may eventually which he receive.

Similarly, Conditioning, Bryant Air Karl v (1982), 331 NW2d 456 this Court comparative negli- newly held that enacted gence applied retroactively pending statute6 to a products liability However, action. actions under very are, nature, the wdca their different than products liability actions.7_ seq.; seq. See 600.2949 et MSA 27A.2949 et MCL however, Assuming, applicable case, Karl is it is more Karl, closely present jury related to Selk than to the case. In plaintiff $52,000, special finding returned a in favor of verdict for implied warranty. the manufacturer had breached its The factfinder plaintiff ninety-five percent negligent. also determined that was court, pending While in the trial enacted Karl was provided comparative negligence statute which for its immediate appeal, held effect. On applied retroactively, Karl Court that statute should be stating "[wjhile damages the total plaintiff ute], plaintiff’s significantly could have received were reduced [the stat legally away.” cause of action was not barred or taken 396 431 Mich 387 Riley, C.J.

C argues §if 373 is substan- Defendant that even ap- tive, and, therefore, it is remedial should be agree plied retroactively. we that the wdca While sense, remedial, in the broad we believe act, whole, a a characterization of the as such provides par- insight into no further whether retroactively applied ticular amendment should be prospectively. recognized whole, It that the as is well wdca, legislation. McAvoy H B Sherman v is remedial Co, (1977); 419, 457; 258 414 Van 401 Mich NW2d Dorpel Co, 135, 154; 85 350 Mich v Haven-Busch (1957); Mfg Co, 125 Mich v Gale DeKind NW2d (1983). App Therefore, 598, 609; 337 NW2d provision as remedial of a wdca characterization statutory dispositive. any Otherwise, should not be could be characterized amendment of the wdca applied retroactively. remedial and meaning problem of "reme- with this broad explained as follows: has been dial” Generally, are those which statutes remedial improve remedy, provide reme- or facilitate rights existing already for the enforcement dies They injuries. include also the redress Selk, Karl Karl, amendment supra 577. Like the statute at right going to the individual’s substance a matter of was "not Thus, holding might Franks, supra the Karl compensation.” at 672. the "amount” explained by drawn between the distinction be benefits Karl, supra 577. This at to benefits. "entitlement” and the "amount” recognized drawn between the distinction has Court compensation cases in workers’ to benefits and "entitlement” MESC, capacity. v earning Leskinen involving See a claimant’s (1976). Camp- v 501, 508-509; also Medacco See 247 NW2d Mich bell, 217, 226; Co, App 210 NW2d Foundry Wyant & Cannon explained might recognize Similarly, that Karl also we Douglas aspects. v See remedial it has both because Robbins 1980). (WD Mich, Inc, Supp Meyers, F & 397 1988] White v Motors General Opinion Riley, C.J. defects, statutes intended for the correction in mistakes and omissions the civil institutions and the administration of the state. change Every any in statute that makes existing excluding only body law, those enact- prior merely codify law,

ments which restate or prior "remedy” can or some social evil. The mere fact that a statute is characterized as some flaw the law be said "remedial,” therefore, is of little statutory the term value in construction unless purpose "remedial” has for this a more discrimi- meaning. Statutory Sands, [3 Con- nate struction Sutherland (4th ed), p 60.02, 60.] Michigan times, At cases have used the broad meaning apply arguably of "remedial” to substan retrospectively. See, tive amendments to the wdca e.g., Fosterling, 578, 588; Lahti v 357 Mich 99 (1959) (retroactively applying 1955 PA NW2d 490 repealing two-year maximum on medical hospital Twp, expenses); Spencer 142 v Clark (1985) App (retroactively Mich NW2d provisions applying 357, § 1, of 1980 PA allow ing volunteer ambulance drivers to obtain benefits county, city village employee as if a at rate). context, However, we maximum prefer meaning, "[t]he the narrower in which term legislation employed 'remedial’ is often to describe nature, i.e., not which is does rights.” Sands, affect substantive Sutherland (4th ed), p Statutory See, § 60.02, Construction e.g., Rookledge Garwood, 444; v (1954) retroactively (applying the 1952 NW2d 785 provision allowing injured PA 155 an worker tortfeasor) proceed against in tort a defendant supra retroactively (applying PA Selk, the 1981 increasing provision interest on the amount of to twelve award from five a workers’ ' 431 Mich Riley, C.J. percent).8 previously noted, § 373 As we have We, therefore, substantive that, in nature. conclude context, in this it is remedial and the applied prospectively. statute should be

D Legislature significant also it that the We find retroactivity any §of 373. omitted reference to the example, in that the For Legislature the Court noted Selk, retroactivity

made no reference specific provided and, fact, 1981 PA 194 in resolving application. the future date for its retroactivity issue, Court the reasoned: Legisla- the carefully one examines how When dates, however, it is clear ture utilizes effective prop- respect that which is

that we have accorded erly due. Legislature in by the dates are inserted Effective it to address the kinds of statutes. When wishes

all Legislature spe- retroactivity, has question of cifically done so for an providing in addition date. effective passed the example, when the For action, in 1976 delivery and rule for a claim

new PA 79, that provided it enactment §2 "[t]his pending apply to all actions amendatory act shall of this the effective date on or after or commenced act.” provided: 3 of the same statute Enactment § July take effect amendatory act shall "This Legislature in connection with 1975.” Because specifi- has sections statutes in enactment other may be limited to Alternatively, "remedial” indicates that Sands Sands, penal nature.” 3 criminal "legislation which is (4th 60.02, ed), p 60. In the Statutory Construction Sutherland construing as either retroactive of the wdca an amendment context or meaning more value than to be of no prospective, we find However, may that meaning we note general Sands. outlined strictly distinguishing must statutes which value have some (4th ed), Sands, Statutory Construction Sutherland construed. See 60.01, pp 55-56. White v General Motors Bkickley, cally retroactivity provid- addressed in addition to date,

ing an agree effective we are unable that date, standing mere insertion of an effective alone, dispositive prospective/retroactive of the [Selk, supra effect of 1981 PA 194. at n 2.] Therefore, persuaded we are providing specific, future effective date omitting and any reference supports our retroactivity holding prospective 373 is in application.

III. CONCLUSION We would hold that Hurd controls in present case. Section 373 should apply prospectively only for injuries occurring on or 1, 1982, after January Thus, effective date of the statute. we would reverse judgment of the Court Appeals reinstate the decision of the wcab.

Cavanagh JJ., Boyle, concurred with Riley, C.J. J. I concur with the result of the

Brickley, opinion of Justice, the Chief but write separately to say that while Co, Hurd v Ford Motor (1985), 377 NW2d 300 adopted the date of injury as the controlling date for the application of the amendment case, at issue in that I am less sure that that date would necessarily be control- ling this case. Hurd, the amendment provided a new defini- personal

tion of injury. We based our decision in Hurd on the "[provisions admonition added the by amendment that affect rights substantive will not be construed to to apply transactions and events completed to prior its enactment . . . .” 1A Sands, (4th Sutherland Statutory ed), Construction Hurd, 22.36, supra, 535. pp 300-301. 431 Mich by Archer, J. to

Here, and events” which “transactions of applies employee’s are the termination receipt nondisability employment and the of active on date pension or retirement benefits. The and date completed injury these are events not, but need coincide. may, question was en- Although the amendment determina- effective to the prior acted and became terminated his plaintiff tion of the wcab, and there- prior to the amendment employment subjected not new standard. fore should be granted This Court (concurring). Archer, 418.373(1); MSA MCL leave to consider whether 17.237(373)(1)1 Disability Compen- the Workers’ I applied retroactively. would sation Act should be applies prospectively the provision hold that 1, January those on or after employees injured 1982, I effective date. would the amendment’s the Workers’ May decision of affirm the per- Compensation Appeal Board vacate Appeals. the Court of reversal of emptory BACKGROUND FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL for employed White Frederick was Plaintiff employment employee is 1 An terminates active who pension receiving nondisability or retirement benefits under pension pro private governmental or retirement either or act, security gram, including old-age under the benefits social 1397f, paid or behalf of an 42 employer 301 to that was on USC sought weekly under act are from whom this earnings earning presumed or shall capacity have a loss be compensable injury disease under as the of a or result presumption may chapter chapter or 4. This either only preponderance evidence that rebutted unable, disability, employee work related because of a qualifications, employee’s perform ing training includ work suitable disability super experience. This standard of applicable used to determine sedes other standards chapter chapter under either 1988] White v General Motors Opinion by Akcheh, thirty-seven years by defendant Truck GMC & Bus Group painter as a and sander. Plaintiff retired on “thirty 31, 1980, March under defendant’s early plan. May out” 29, 1980, retirement On plaintiff petition hearing filed a for with the Work- Compensation asserting ers’ Bureau he was early disabled as of his retirement date chronic respiratory problems arising lengthy expo- from paint agents. hearing sure to and other toxic plaintiff weekly referee awarded benefits effective payable from his retirement date and until further notice the bureau. The referee further attrib- plaintiff’s lengthy exposure uted condition to place: toxic fumes the work It is further plaintiff found that who age retired at exposure after 37 years paint fumes, paint mist pollutants, proved and other has that he has a disabling work incurred chronic disease, lung obstructive cigaret He was not a smoker and had an excellent work It record. believed that he retired early respi- because of his ratory condition. appealed arguing Defendant wcab, plaintiff was not However, disabled.2 in the July filing interim between 13, defendant’s Michigan and the wcab’s decision, eventual enacted 1980 PA effective Janu- plaintiffs injury At the time of filing, and defendant’s wcab eligibility standard for benefit was well settled: injured employee’s right The test of an is his inability by reason of wages the accident to work and earn employment engaged injured. which he was at when [Leva- Copper Corp, 592, 601;

nen v Seneca 227 Mich 199 NW 652 (1924).] Hecla, Inc, See also (1962); 128; Kaarto v Calumet & 367 Mich 116 NW2d 225 Corp, Kidd v General Motors 327 NW2d 265 431 Mich 387 402 by Opinion Archer, 17.237(373X1), 418.373(1); ary 1, 1982, MSA MCL presumption of a non- which instituted rebuttable plaintiffs of retirees. as to class plaintiffs May 1986, 2, the wcab affirmed On upon However, in reliance benefit award. Co, in v Ford Court’s decision Hurd Motor (1985), the board further Mich 377 NW2d entitled to that the defendant was not commented presumption §373(l)’s con- rebuttable assert by rights substantive and was intended cerned employees prospectively Legislature injured apply to date. after its effective peremptory a rever filed motion for Defendant 373(1) Appeals arguing in the of that sal Court (1) prospective governed claimant classes: two (2) retroactive identified and a class class of those who were entitled to benefits wcab, January injured prior yet after date.3 On plain Appeals July 10, 1986, the vacated Court the wcab award and remanded the action to tiffs light Wojcie in of its decision be reconsidered Corp, App Mich v Motors chowski General 399; 390 NW2d (1986).4 synonymous "retrospective” The terms "retroactive” and are interchangeably. They judicial usage may employed and operate have on transactions which oc describe acts which rights passage obligations or which existed before curred designate opinions Although court often statutes as the act. prospective retrospective, the statutes in fact are either susceptible Many to such clear characterization. often statutes tion thus cerning prospective retrospective. are Characteriza both may nothing judgment reflect a con do more than grounds. interpretation, validity at on arrived other example, it has been held is not rendered For statute subsequent merely upon the facts which its because retroactive action tive date. depends to its effec are drawn from time antecedent (4th ed), Sands, Statutory Construction Sutherland [2 41.01, pp 337-338.] 373(1) Appeals Wojciechowski, to be construed § Court applicable retrospectively in nature and therefore injured prior to claimants its effective date. 1988] White v General Motors Archer, J. appeal

Plaintiff filed for leave to to this Court. granted upon We leave whether issue applied retroactively. should be 428 Mich 873

i Retrospective application of a statute is disfa- explicit legislative vored absence intent contrary. the McQueen v Great Markwestern Packing (1978); Co, 321; 402 Mich 820 NW2d (1868): Metz, Harrison v 17 Mich Courts will construe no law to have a retroactive effect, legislative intent, unless the it shall so operate, expressly upon and clearly appears the itself, face of the statute and if a construction of any prospective statute shall limit it to found, only effect can be the same is at time express statute, consistent with the letter such adopted. such will universally construction be Despite general prohibition against the retroac- tivity, provisions or remedial which fail unduly impair rights vested or accrued have given retrospective application. Hansen-Sny- been Corp, der Co v Motors However, General exception NW2d this oft-cited favoring application, frequently retroactive belies balancing difficulty the inherent an uncertain legislative against ambiguous statutory pro- intent visions:

In dealing problem retroactivity, the it with is extremely to establish criteria difficult definite upon which court decisions can be foretold. A upon rights statute act the unreasonably must not applies. is those to whom What reasonable difficult and what is unreasonable is to state in ". advance of decisions. . . method to actual [T]he Mich Archer, unerring pursuit of a fixed pursued is not the Rather to an conclusion. legal principle inevitable balancing intelligently it discriminating is method against.” reasons for and between (4th Sands, Statutory Construction Sutherland [2 ed), 41.05, p 364.] 373(l)’s legislative history upon is silent Section regarding applicability Legislature’s intent presumption. Therefore, I find of this rebuttable provision presents probable construc- three (1) §373(1) prospectively to claim- tions: extends (2) pre- injured date, ants sumption after its effective after its

extends all benefits received regardless injury of the retiree’s effective date (3) provision governs date, all benefits prior its date. received both to and after effective against thus criteria task balance these Our precedent in order to discern the con- our own the intended be- struction which strikes balance underlying policies and the tween itself. wdca

CASE LAW ANALYSIS prospective retrospec- question The versus the application amendments of tive of several recent the the wdca Court. has been a recurrent one before Initially, in v Detroit Plastic Products Selk (On Resubmission), 32; 419 Mich 348 NW2d 652 (1984), Legislature’s the deemed the increase Court per upon unpaid workers’ com- in interest pensation annum January 1, 1982,5was a benefits effective retroactively, applicable limited to remedial act any regardless injury, of their date of claimant to receive was either awarded entitled who provision’s date. after the effective Copper year later, in Pine Franks v White One 5 17.237(801X5). 418.801(5); MCL MSA See 1988] White v General Motors 405 Archer, J. (1985), Div, 375 NW2d 715 the pro- §§ 358, Court concluded that 354 and payments vided for the coordination of wdca with employer-funded applied prospec- benefits, other injured tively to claimants the after amendments’ receiving effective dates and to those benefits after regardless the effective date of their of in- date jury.6 recently However, in most Hurd v Ford supra, Co, Motor this Court determined that 1980 PA which amended the wdca’s causation mental-disability pro- applied claims, standard for spectively solely provi- injured to those after the sion effect. took prior following decisions,

From our I discern the (1) pattern: specific Each amendment contained a (2) concerning effective date. In the instances the amount of which a claimant enti- was (Selk, Franks), disregarded tled the Court the date injury, finding date of benefits received By contrast, Hurd, redefining awarded determinative.7 sole an decision address amendment eligibility, a standard of benefit the Court focused upon injury controlling instead the date of provision’s our construction date. effective disregarded In no instance has the Court both injury date of date of benefits received or impose retroactivity awarded order total upon a claimant.8_ 6 general employee Section concerned benefits. Section unemployment 103, §354(17), addressed Legislature benefits. PA portion applying recipi overruled the of Franks 354 to injured prior ents to its date. effective The did not act regard

with to 358. solely reference Franks now extends to its discussion of PA retrospective application The absence of a total in these decisions presence specific inis accord with well-settled rule that aof Legislature’s effective retroactivity. date indicative of intent to limit the act’s Selk, J., 41.02, (Levin, Sands, supra dissenting); See at 36 (4th ed), Statutory p Sutherland 3. Construction n Mich Archer, ASPECTS v PROCEDURAL

SUBSTANTIVE procedural elements Section contains application arguably the of favor retroactive procedural nature of a rebut- instant statute. upon unquestioned. presumption However, is table disability applica- the of examination of standards 373(1), prior passage the §of I find that to the ble changes key provision substantive has effected under the wdca: designates who terminate 1. retirees The amendment programs early retirement employment

active under plan, out” as a class of to defendant’s "30 and similar seeking from wdca benefits. claimants distinct others presumes this class of claimants has 2. Section 373 to a wage-earning capacity a due not incurred loss passage, injury. Prior amendment’s work-related claimant, retirees, any other bore burden wage earning capacity. loss of proving a presumption only A may 3. retiree-claimant rebut the retiree is preponderance a of evidence that performing incapable injury to a due work-related qualifications, training, or the retiree’s work within Previously, upon the nar- experience. the act focused earning capacity of a claimant’s within rower issue employment. fíeld of claimant’s any explicitly supersedes standard of Section 373 a previously to determine claimant’s disability eligibility used chapters 3 and 4 of the for under wdca. prior my of the state of law examination 373(l)’s apparent readily enactment, is

to the impose strin- more has chosen upon plaintiffs gent disability standard Although of dis- the definition of claimants.9 class ability context, in couched within prior the wdca discussion of under For an excellent Comment, Michigan 373(1), Disability passage under see of § act, Det L R 433 62 U worker’s White v Motors General 407 Opinion by Archer, J. light disability of its redefinition of a retiree’s 373(l)’s standard, § I conclude that substantive paramount Thus, elements merit consideration.10 applicable original accordance with the rule to [i]n acts, presumed provisions it is that added affecting amendment rights substantive are in- operate prospectively. tended to by Provisions added rights the amendment that affect substantive will apply not be construed to to transactions and prior events completed to its enactment unless the legislature expressed has its intent effect or that clearly implied language such intent is by the the amendment or by the surround- circumstances ing Sands, its enactment. Statu- Sutherland [1A (4th ed), 22.36, tory Construction pp 300-301.] 373(1) Because defines substantive rule of plain and is therefore determinative of eligibility, plaintiff’s rights tiff’s I find that in present instance, this as with all under others injury accrued at the time and wdca, prospective applica factor militates in favor 11 tion.* REMEDIAL COMPONENT OF § purely However, even the instance of a predominantly appli- rule, substantive retroactive may employed provision cation where further deemed be remedial nature: exception recognized

An general to the rule is (4th Accord, Sands, ed), Statutory Sutherland Construction 41.09, p Fund, Wright 279; App Cf. v State Accident Ins 43 Or 602 P2d (1979), (1980), grounds rev’d on other 289 Or 613 P2d presumption disability applied which held an amendment fighters Oregon applied injured prior fire under wdca to those change its effective date it did not effect a in the because substantive plaintiff’s proof. burden of Archer, J. a statute is remedial or where nature. Thus, in fur- operate statutes . . . procedure of a or mode of remedy therance which rights en- destroy, nor neither create new existing rights generally are

large, or diminish operate retrospectively contrary held to unless supra [Franks, legislative intention is manifested. Emphasis at 672. added.] I the in- agree defendant argues in that was de- provision stant is "remedial” alleged to counter decades of abuse under signed system: compensation the workers’ topic many years most hotly For discussed concerning Michigan compensation the the workers’ problem.” "retiree It system was so-called was unique underpinning legal this State. Its almost to Compen- developed by the notion was Workers’ Board, Appeal support some from sation with ., worker, . . voluntarily even judiciary that a retired one a com- gone had retired and on who pany-funded pension, suffering could still from be wage capacity. earning a loss of If the retiree could or she had incurred a disabil- demonstrate that he pre-retirement job ity activity caused or work- (a on ing years environment bad back from 30 in years line assembly or a dust disease from foundry), the to com- retiree was entitled workers’ emphasized many in pensation. It should be undoubtedly genu- disability cases was of these sense, ine, impairment in physical at least eligible employee unquestionably an such for would fighting medical The issue was benefits. wage to for he entitled recover whether was also manufac- "Big . . . Three” loss. turer automobile [F]or (the target practice), most of this common plainly provoking, costly, not to mention was see workers a walk out of early take retirement and proceed to file workers’ plant day one and then Antoine, next compensation claims the week. [St. Michigan: Compensation in on Workers’ Report Beneñts, Costs, (1984), Fairness p 60.] 1988] White v General Motors Opinion by Archer, J. However, Franks, this Court cautioned that " exception inapplicable '[retroactive is where

application significantly would] also and detrimen- right tally employees injured affect the certain substantive receipt compensation of workers’ ” added.) supra (Emphasis Franks, benefits.’ at 673. argues provision The defendant that the instant impair plaintiff’s right not does substantive disagree. benefits. I Defendant correct that a is claimant’s benefit levels are not vested as to so them shield from review at a date: future right disability to workmen’s whether, depends given benefits time, on point at a statutory the claimant is within the intend- scope of subject ment. The intendment change. A determination that a claimant is not today pre- entitled to does clude reexamination of his entitlement should law, by legislative facts or the amendment or court decision, change tomorrow. Entitlement to contin- uing disability v Wolverine Bolt open [Hlady an question. benefits is Co, 224 NW2d (1975) (Levin, J., concurring).] provisions However, unlike the addressed §373(1) supra, Selk, Franks and the embodies substantive determination whether a retiree is any Although entitled to defendant as- benefits. provision truly the serts not concern does benefit entitlement, benefits, that I excludes medical 373(1) compensation the § find excluded is from secondary compensa- to basic entitlement injured employee’s tion benefits which sustain an livelihood. 373(1)

Although argues § defendant should applied only be tive to effec- benefits received after its

date, I conclude that defendant’s construction subject plaintiff would to a law substantive rule of Dissenting Griffin, J. rights accrued time his at the in existence to be reticent This Court should the wdca. under impose could review which stricter standard to conceivably entitlement a claimant’s eliminate injured they compensation were where January prior 1, 1982.12

CONCLUSION 373(1) from the wdca divorced cannot be Section policy to em- economic fairness to balance overall ployers injured

against protection workers. prior light decisions, the absence Thus, in of our predomi- legislative intent, the statute’s and clear upon entitle- a claimant’s effect nant substantive 373(1) is hold that benefits, I would ment applicable solely employees injured after its May 2, 1986, I affirm effective date. would Appeal Compensation of the Workers’ decision Board and vacate peremptory reversal of Appeals. Court of upon appeal (dissenting). This focuses Griffin, Disability 373,1 of the Workers’ an amendment

Compensation Act,2 a rebuttable created employees presumption retire, receive who security nondisability pension benefits, or social apply are not then for workers’ meaning set aof standard within the disabled forth decided The issue in the amendment. applies presumption case in this whether pending time of enactment at the which was may to rebut be able individual claimant The fact that (see ante, hearing p referee’s presumption 401 for upon premised findings), dispositive. must be Our construction is not large light factors of the other provision’s and in effect at the examined opinion. in this 17.237(373). 418.373; MCL MSA 17.237(101) seq. seq.; et 418.101 et MSA MCL White v General Motors Dissenting Opinion by Griffin, plaintiff-retiree where the claims to have suffered injury prior a work-related to the amendment’s exception effective date. Since 373 contains no coverage claiming injury from for retirees before date, its effective and in view of its remedial purpose perceived directed at a abuse of the work- compensation system, ers’ I would hold it is applicable respect in this case with to workers’ payable January 1, after 1982, when the amendment became effective.

i general presumed rule, As a "statutes are operate prospectively contrary unless the intent is clearly manifested.” Selk v Detroit Plastic Prod- (1984). ucts, 9; Mich 345 NW2d 184 An exception general recognized rule is where a statute is remedial or in nature. Copper Franks v White Div, Pine (1985); supra 672; 375 NW2d Selk, at Hansen-Snyder Corp, Co v General Motors 480, 485; Mich Moreover, NW2d 286 "a regarded operating retrospectively statute is merely because relates to an antecedent supra supra Franks, event . . . .” 671; Selk, at at

A plaintiff argues bar, In the case at procedural. substantive, rather than He main- §373(1) new, tains that gent establishes a more strin- disability receiving standard for those non- disability pension security or social benefits. Plain- prior tiff contends that to enactment of 373 a satisfy retiree-claimant quirement could re- by demonstrating impair- then in effect 412 431 Mich Dissenting Opinion by Griffin, J. wage-earning particu- capacity

ment of within his employment. lar field of Kaarto v & Calumet (1962). Hecla, Inc, 128; 116 367 Mich NW2d 225 points in He out that the standard embodied 373(1) requires showing perform inability § a of "to employee’s qualifications, in- work suitable to the training argues cluding experience.” or Plaintiff that this "new standard” affects substantive rights and therefore should be of retiree-claimants applied prospectively. Co, Ford

Plaintiff relies on Hurd v Motor case, 531, 534; 377 In that Mich NW2d 301(2),3 provision examined another the Court public 357, act, PA and found that the same this Court’s decision it "was enacted to invalidate (After Remand), Laboratories, Difco Inc in Deziel v (1978), effecting a 1; 268 thus NW2d change provi- in the law and that substantive prospective applica- have sions of this amendment tion,” 301(2), Hurd, at issue enactment of Prior to eligibility employee disor- an with a mental determined was der for workers’ perception” in Dez- set forth standard the "honest supra. however, Hurd, iel, we concluded 301(2), enacting part 1980 PA as changed dis- standard of mental change ability a was substantive that such nature. right quite Moody when he wrote: was

Justice is ruling procedural or substantive is Whether decide; legal may rule difficult sometimes aspects and substantive have both appli- [Moody, Retroactive separate. are difficult 17.237(301X2). 418.301(2); MSA 3 MCL White v General Motors Dissenting Opinion by Griffin, law-changing cation of Michigan, decisions in 439, Wayne L (1982).][4] R n 44 I believe that reading §373(1) a careful re- veals that both procedural is substantive wording its and effect. The provision might be regarded purely procedural if it contained only following:

(1) employee An employ- who active terminates ment and receiving nondisability pension private gov- retirement benefits under either a pension program, ernmental or retirement includ- ing old-age act, security benefits under the social 1397f, paid 42 USC 301 to by that was or on behalf an employer from weekly whom benefits under presumed sought this act are shall be not to have earnings earning loss of capacity a or as the result compensable a injury or under disease either chapter chapter this or 4. However, provision also includes these words: presumption may by This only be rebutted a

preponderance of employee the evidence that unable, is perform because of work disability, a related employee’s qualifica- work suitable to the tions, including training This stan- experience. or of disability supersedes applicable dard other stan- dards used to determine disability under either chapter chapter or 4. [Emphasis supplied.] 373(1) to a Obviously, "presump- refers both § tion” to a "standard lan- disability.” The guage of 373 itself makes clear that the standard § set forth is different that than which would other- Moody’s commentary upon judicial changes Justice focused in the however, law; tory applicable equally I believe his is statu statement changes. 431 Mich by Dissenting Griffin, interpretation apply. is indicated Such an wise 373(2) eligi- that which mandates the addition bility not be barred for medical benefits shall Legislature’s Furthermore, the new standard. disability and different to establish a new intent emphasized by of this the inclusion is standard language: ap- disability supersedes other This standard of disability plicable used to determine standards chapter [Emphasis chapter or under either this supplied.] recognizing characteristics, its While whole, as a that when viewed I believe part purpose of the on reflects applicable change to an standard employment "employee active who terminates private receiving under either . . . benefits is governmental pension retirement agree program Furthermore, I with . . . .” §in plaintiff forth set the standard stringent otherwise the one which than more supra; Kaarto, v Adair See have obtained. would App Building 393; Metropolitan Co, 38 Mich holding (1972).5 with Consistent NW2d supra, substantive 373 is I Hurd, conclude procedural in nature. as well

B argues § 373 is substan- if that even Defendant retrospectively applied because tive, be it should Michigan: Compensation in Antoine, Workers’ See, generally, St. Larson, Compensa- (1984); Costs, Beneñts, Workmen’s and Fairness Michigan: Welch, Law & Compensation in 57.22; Law, Worker’s tion Practice, § of the deñnition course of Leslie, seq.; The tortured et 8.01 law, present past, and compensation Michigan workers’ (1988). future, Cooley L R 65 White v General Motors Dissenting Opinion Griffin, Garwood, statute, citing Rookledge v is a remedial 444, 453; 65 340 Mich NW2d Rookledge In this Court held: if a statute or generally It is understood "designed existing an amendment to correct law, existing grievance, or introduce redress an regulations public good,” it will conducive to the regarded as remedial in nature. re School 6, Townships, Wyoming District No Kent Paris and County, NW 792 [278 (1938)]. given The same connotation is to those apply statutes or amendments which rights. matters rather than to. substantive Jur, respect, definitive rule in this in 50 Am found 33, 34, Statutes, pp is: "Legislation regarded which has been as reme- abridge dial in its nature includes statutes which laws, superfluities of remedying former defects therein, or implying mischiefs thereof an intention existing rights, having reform or extend for purpose promotion justice their and the public advancement of and important welfare and of public objects, protec- beneficial such as the health, morals, tion of the safety society, public generally.” There can be no question but 373 was enacted by for purpose remedying perceived abuse of the workers’ com- pensation system. Antoine, Professor Theodore St. who served governors two as an adviser on work- compensation reform, ers’ described problem in a report Governor Blanchard these terms: many years For hotly topic the most discussed concerning system Michigan workers’ problem.” was so-called "retiree It was unique legal almost to this underpinning State. Its developed

was the notion Compen- the Workers’ Board, Appeal sation support with some from the Mich 387 Griffin, J. Dissenting Opinion worker, . . . judiciary, that a retired even one gone voluntarily who had retired and on a com- pension, suffering pany-funded could still be from wage earning capacity. a loss of If the retiree could demonstrate that he or she had incurred a disabil- ity by pre-retirement job activity caused or work- (a ing 30 years environment bad back from on the assembly line or a in a years dust disease from foundry), the retiree was entitled to workers’ com- pensation. emphasized It in many should be genu- the disability undoubtedly these cases was ine, sense, physical impairment at least in the and employee unquestionably eligible such an would fighting for medical benefits. The issue was wage whether he was also entitled to recover for "Big . . loss. . Three” manufac- automobile [F]or (the target practice), turer most common of this plainly provoking, costly, was to mention early see workers take retirement and walk out of plant day proceed one and then to file their compensation workers’ claims the next week. [St. Antoine, Report Compensation on Workers’ Costs, Beneñts, Michigan: (1984), p and Fairness 60.] Antoine,

As Professor St. as early chair- Compensation man of the Governor’s Workmen’s Commission, Advisory report had delivered a part: Governor Milliken which stated in question of the of the retirees is one most important, perhaps single most intracta- ble, arising currently all issues under Michigan system. workmen’s Three,” Motors, Ford, "Big General paid Chrysler out over million dollars to retir- administering ees. With the additional costs of and, necessary appropriate, these claims where counsel, retaining companies the total costs to the According Michigan exceeded million. $30 Base, Department of Commerce Data other self- White v General Motors Dissenting Opinion Griffin, paid insurers and the insurance carriers almost as much, 20 over million dollars. Hence the total cost by of claims in retirees exceeded 60 million dollars 1973, reasonably the most recent year for which firm statistics are increased benefit available. With levels since 1973 and an increased volume of claims, reasonable estimates for the total retiree Michigan range cost in for from [Report million dollars. of Governor's Workmen's (1975), Compensation Advisory p Commission 17.] Although advisory the 1975 commission was agreement upon unable to reach recommendations improvement system Michigan, for report further stated: solution, employer spokesmen

As a some offer a two-step approach. Any worker who retired be- age pension plan cause of old rebuttably or under a would be

presumed to have removed himself capable from the labor market and therefore not suffering earning pre- of sumption a loss of capacity. The showing

could be by overcome evidence the worker had been unable to obtain sub- employment stantial disability because of a rather age Then, than because of or economic conditions. rebutting presumption, after any retiree-claim- eligible pension ant who was also for would have his workmen’s reduced employer pension the extent of his funded bene- fits.

This solution many employers addresses what problem: consider to be the central Is the retiree prevented working by from occurred in and employ- arose out of the course ment or has the retiree withdrawn from the labor market merely seeking something and is a little [Id., p extra? 21.] attempt legislation dealing In 1977 an to enact Mich Dissenting Opinion Griffin, with the "retiree fell short.6 problem” One com mentator, effort, in summarizing this stated: Some of the notorious abuses of com- workers’

pensation Michigan were also attacked S. .... importantly curbing More for the "re- problem,” tiree S. 1285 would have created a presumption rebuttable that retirees have not suf- earnings earning capacity fered a loss of as a compensable injury [Hunt, result of a or disease. Compensation Michigan: Workers’ Problems (Kalamazoo: Prospects E. Upjohn W. Institute Research, 1979), Employment pp for 22-23.] April On Governor Milliken delivered special message a to the Legislature on workers’ compensation which further underscored the reme- dial nature of the legislation embodied in He said: frequent Michigan, A criticism is that almost states, among large

alone pays portion persons a of its workers’ who have left the labor market for reasons other than disability._ 2350-2351, proposed See 1977 Journal of the Senate SB provided: would have employee An who retires or who otherwise terminates active employment eligible receiving pension and is for or or retire- private governmental program ment benefits under a or or is eligible receiving benefits, security for or social retirement shall presumed earnings earning capacity not to have a loss of compensable injury presump- as the result of a or disease. This may only by proof by employee by tion preponderance solely substantial work suitable to the training, full to the conditions not be construed as a bar to under section 315. be rebutted a unable, employee of the evidence that act, perform because of as defined in this employee’s qualifications, experience merely earning and not disabled from wages employee subject at the work in which the last was resulting disability. This subsection shall receiving payable medical benefits General Motors White v Dissenting Opinion by Griffin, minimize

I recommend that we eliminate or persons longer no compensation payments to those in the labor market. negotiations produced gen-

Previous reform have agreement presumption should be es- eral that a recipients pensions and social tablished a security retirement benefits have not suffered earning unless rebutted capacity, loss of preponderance presumption This evidence. in the statute. Journal should be established [1979 of the Senate 608.] Finally, 30, 1980, while this case on December hearing pending referee, § 373 was was before Michigan Legislature part enacted step 357,7 in a series of reforms 1980 PA the first Michigan compensation system. In of the light workers’ legislative history other circum- of the surrounding enactment, its I would con- stances meaning § 373 is remedial8 within the clude that Rookledge, supra. See also the rule laid down Fosterling, 99 NW2d 490 Lahti v Conditioning (1959); Bryant Co, Air Karl v 558; 331 Mich NW2d

c supra Karl, at As this Court said may operate retrospectively if remedial statute rights.” Ballog away also not "take vested See does Knight Newspapers, Inc, 527; v (1969); supra. Hansen-Snyder, NW2d 19 right assessing a "vested” would be In whether important away, in mind that it is to have taken history legislative PA of 1980 For information on the additional compensation Studley, reform: A Workers’ see VanderLaan & Michigan, legislative process L study in 14 U Mich J Ref of the case 451 8 Hurd, there supra, not find that the statute the Court did In Rookledge. in involved was remedial the sense 431 Mich 387 Dissenting Opinion by Griffin, the nature of right to workers’ compensation quite right different from the to recover damages in tort or other civil actions. As the Court said Franks, supra at 654: compensation

Workers’ benefits are social-wel- fare income-maintenance pensation benefits. Workers’ com- progenitor is the first or safety net providing a means of income maintenance for persons who have met regu- misfortune or whose lar income source has been cut off. All the social programs welfare ployment compensation, compensation, unem- —workers’ security age, social old disability, benefits, and survivors no-fault automo- benefits, bile aid to dependent families with chil- dren, general assistance —are directed to the objective, same income maintenance. All these programs are by impositions funded employers on (to and others of mandatory payments govern- ment, or, insurers self-insured, the case of the beneficiary), prescribed with statutorily bene- providing beneñts, fits. for such did not covenant not legislation. amend the [Emphasis supplied.]

In a concurring opinion, Justice Levin Franks, supra at wrote: Workers’ benefits are payable

weekly, geared and are to weekly wage loss. The nature of workers’ compensation is that events after an award of benefits may change the extent of an entitlement to benefits. A disabled worker may cease to gainful be disabled or obtain employ- ment. The number of the dependents worker’s may change. right to receive compensa- workers’ tion generally depends thus on one’s sta- tus, week, week subject and is change during any week. A compensation award, thus, workers’ differs judgment from a where, in a tort action when the plaintiff prevails, lump-sum award is fixed and General Motors White v Opinion by Gbiffin, J. Dissenting regard predictions payable concerning damages to whether without severity longevity of the claimed or by subsequent experience. are borne out right Taking the nature of the into consideration compensation, I that to workers’ conclude rights. away vested See does not abolish or take Rookledge, supra; Detroit, 261 Mich also Harsha v (1933); Bejger Zawadzki, 252 586; 246 NW 849 v 14; Mich 232 NW 746

D though is remedial and does not Even a statute rights, away it will not be abolish or take applied retrospectively vested legislative contrary if a supra Karl, at intent has been manifested. citing Rookledge, supra. supra Selk, at question words, a statute is In other whether retrospectively always apply prospectively legislative governed, analysis, in- in the final said, if it can determined. As the Court has tent Rookledge principle simply one of is also "the supra statutory Selk, construction.” at Appeals Wojciechowski said in v As the Court of Corp, App 399, 408-409; Motors General 390 NW2d 727

(1986), did prospective retrospective intention "its indicate express respect lan- § 373] [with clear guage.” Furthermore, a careful examination of surrounding its en- statute and the circumstances provi- intent its reveal no manifest actment sions should not pre- injury apply to one whose contrary, legisla- the effective date. On ceded subsequent history enactment tends its tive apply to all 373 should confirm an intent employment "employee[s] active terminate who pension receiving nondisability or retire- [are] Mich Dissenting Opinion Griffin, regardless ment benefits” of when were in- they jured.

Notice should be taken of the fact that on May 14, 1987, the enacted and Legislature gave imme- 28, diate effect to PA which amended various provisions of the Workers’ Disability Compensa- tion Act. Included an amendment was § (providing for security coordination social benefits). certain employer-financed The amend- ment provides: Michigan Supreme The decision of the Court in Division, Copper

Franks v White Pine (1985) is declared to erroneously have been interprets rendered insofar as it this section 354], having being legislative been and the [§ payments intention not to coordinate section 351, 361, under resulting pursuant from liability to section personal injuries occurring or 835 for 31, before March purpose 1982. It is the of this amendatory act to so affirm. This remedial and curative liberally amendment shall be construed to purpose. effectuate this venturing Without concerning comment the con- of such a stitutionality pronouncement, an issue us, not before I believe the amendment sheds some light on the intent of the Legislature, at least as of 14, May 1987.

It is significant that the Legislature, through its amendment, limited and carefully worded sought to "overrule” only part of our decision Franks course, interpreted which Of § Franks we also considered whether (provid- ing for the offset of unemployment benefits) should apply to a workers’ compensation claimant whose injury preceded provision’s the effective date. provision We held that "the setoff 358 may applied to reduce compensa- workers’ White v General Motors Dissenting Opinion Griffin, prior injured liability workers to its effec- tion tive date.” supra Franks, at 668-669. May noteworthy on

It is also 14, 1987, Legislature enacted 1987 PA when and several other sections of amended despite the fact act, it not to amend chose §373, year May earlier, 5, 1986, that more than a on Wojciechowski, supra Appeals at Court presumption § ruled that "which creates had of no loss of tively wage earning . . . should be retroac- applied” injury occurred in a case where provision’s prior date. effective too into course, should not read much Of courts part Legislature. one on of the On silence caustically questioned occasion Justice Voelker "clamoring are that members of get elbowing zeal at each other in their pearls of embalmed in the latest decisions wisdom Dorpel . . . Haven- sheets .” Van v and advance Co, (1957).9 350 Mich 85 NW2d 135, Busch where, However, as in case of workers’ the legislation, product compensation the final reform bargaining represents compromise of intense strong, divergent interests, it would accommodate contending the forces unrealistic to believe that fully Legislature beyond the were not in and package, left out as well aware of what was of Particularly in included. such situa- as what was part tions, of the and inaction on silence Legislature, very can be meaningful.10_ silence, legislative rely heavily Criticizing on courts which too practice "Rip-Van-Winkle referred as Justice Voelker inertia,” Dorpel, supra judicial stagnation Van at doctrine 32, approved part on PA with immediate effect As a of 1982 10, 1982, Legislature repealed enacting of 1980 clause March PA along 357, simultaneously other with certain reenacted § 1, January providing again provisions, that "shall take effect 373§ 668, Franks, 1982, supra taken at that action As we noted in 1982.” directing 1, subsequent January at the time of had the effect retrospective operation of 373. 431 Mich Dissenting Opinion by Griffin, that,

Guidance also may be drawn from the fact while it 30, enacted 1980 PA 357 on December the Legislature specifically directed that should later, take effect until a year on §373 1, 1982. January Comments made Justice Franks, although related to other provi- Levin acts, sions the 1980 and 1981 reform are equally applicable to 373: legislative purpose providing specific

future effective date was to indicate when the provisions effect. amendatory of the . . . acts would take language is no basis in the [T]here . legislation the . . reform or in its history that justify would Legislature, conclusion that which expressly stated that these amendments 1, 1982, were all to become January effective on did not intend they would be effective as to weekly payments all workers’ becoming due on or after that effective date even though injured the worker was before that date. (Levin, J., at concurring).] 683-684 [Id. Moreover, when the effectiveness of a statute (for has been postponed specific to a future date 373) one year the case of it seems reasonable believe, in the absence of some contrary indica- tion, a purpose of the was to provide advance notice to those who would be if, affected by provisions. its Obviously, plaintiff contends, Legislature had intended that 373§ should apply only to those who would injured be work-related accidents occurring after the effective date, purpose of notice could not be served.

In the absence of contrary expressed intent by the Legislature (e.g., such that provided with 354), respect I believe a reasonable construe- 1988] White v General Motors Griffin, J. Dissenting Opinion requires spe- tion that a statute which contains a applied date cific future effective should from expressly and after that date to all who are cov- has often dem- ered its terms. "grandfather” it onstrated that when wishes except coverage particular group, from can language find the to do so.

Accordingly, provisions I that the would hold applicable respect § 373 of 1980 PA 357 are with payable after workers’ Jan- determining uary any, 1, 1982, amount, if any employee weekly payable benefits due and §373(1) regard to described in employee without when injured may or disabled. have been J., Levin, Griffin, concurred with

Case Details

Case Name: White v. General Motors Corp.

Court Name: Michigan Supreme Court

Date Published: Sep 27, 1988

Citation: 429 N.W.2d 576

Docket Number: 79194, (Calendar No. 4)

Court Abbreviation: Mich.