38 Vt. 193 | Vt. | 1865
The opinion of the court was delivered by
This is an action of trespass guare clausum, and the plaintiff’s declaration describes the close on which the alleged acts of trespass complained of were committed as being in the town of Eden, and also as being the lots numbered 163 and 164 in that part of Eden which formerly belonged to and formed a part of the town of Belvidere. In the charter of the town of Belvidere, uthe usual quantity of land reserved in other townships” was reserved tlfor public uses,” consisting of five proprietary rights or shares, one of which was for the use of the University of Vermont, one for the first settled minister in the town, one for the support of schools in the town, one for a county grammar school, and one for the support and propagation of
The right which the town of Belvidere originally had in the land which was reserved and appropriated by its charter for the support of schools in that town was clearly a right in the nature of proprietorship. The town as a municipal corporation held the legal title as a trustee for a use which was perpetual, and it could not use the rents and profits of the land for any purpose other than that for which they were reserved and appropriated by its charter. Montpelier v. East Montpelier, 27 Vt. 704. Has the town ever been divested of this right of proprietorship ? Certainly it has not by the act of 1831, under which a portion of its territory was set off and annexed to the town of Eden, because that act makes no mention of any public lands, and it transferred nothing to the town of Eden except the
The plaintiff was in the actual and exclusive possession of the two lots now in controversy, “ claiming them in his own right and adversely to all the world,” from the time of his first entry thereon in 1855 until he was dispossessed by the defendant in May, 1863. Did his adverse possession have any effect upon the validity of the partition? The act of 1861 providing for the partition declares in its 2d section that the partition shall have no effect upon the title of any private person possessing or holding adversely any of the public lots, and the plaintiff must be treated as having precisely the same title and right since the partition was made which he would have had if no partition had been made. The apparent purpose Of the act was to provide for the partition, without creating, enlarging, changing, or affecting any private right which had previously accrued. The plaintiff had no interest whatever in the partition, and nothing which can be called a right of his is interfered with by it. His title, possession, and right of possession remain the same as before, and his position in respect to the* land in ‘controversy is rendered no more unfavorable in consequence of the partition. If, before the partition was made, he could have asserted a title or right to the land in controversy which would have been good against all of the proprietors of these public rights, the same title or right is still available to him against" those of the proprietors to whose shares this land was set in the partition to be held in severalty. The proprietors of these rights acquired no new rights by the partition except a right to hold their shares in severalty instead of in common, and no right of the plaintiff is impaired or affected in consequence of the partition. If the plaintiff is left with the full measure of his title or right unaffected by the partition, he is without any ground of complaint; and he is in no position to complain on the ground that the act providing for the partition did not confer upon him a right or privilege which he did not previously have in the lands in controversy. We regard the partition as being unaffected by the adverse possession of the plaintiff, and we are satisfied that it was intended by the act providing for the partition that all parties interested in the land to be divided
The right of the town of Belvidere and of the Trustees of the Lamoille County Grammar School in the public lands of that town could not be affected by any statute of limitations, and the length of adverse occupancy and enjoyment which would make a perfect title against any private right could give no title to these lands against the rightful original proprietors. (Acts of 1854, No. 14 ; University of Vermont v. Reynolds, 3 Vt. 542; G. S., p. 442, § 4.) This was the position in which the plaintiff stood as against the defendant’s lessors. But he claims that the leases executed to the defendant by the selectmen of the town of Belvidere and the Trustees of The Lamoille County Grammar School were void under the statute, because, at the time when they were executed, he, (the plaintiff,) was in the actual possession of the land under a claim of title adverse to the lessors. (C. S., p. 387, § 29.) The statute referred to was first passed in 1807, and its object, as expressed in its title, was “to prevent fraudulent speculations, and the Stiles of choses in action.” 1 Laws of Vermont, Tolman’s Comp., p. 196; Slade’s Comp. Laws of Vermont, p. 171. The application of the statute to any particular case is to be ascertained by taking into consideration its declared object or purpose and the course and tendency of the decisions under it. The statute was merely a legislative declaration of an established principle of the common law. (Robinson v. Douglass, 2 Aik. 364; University of Vermont v. Joslyn, 21 Vt. 52.) Where the conveyance is by operation of law, as by levy of execution, (Farnsworth v. Converse et al., 1 D. Chip. 139,) or by an officer of the state or the United States, (Aldis, Exec’r, v. Burdick, 8 Vt. 21,) or where a trust estate is conveyed to the uses for which it was originally created, (Mitchell et al. v. Stevens, 1 Aik. 16,) or where a conveyance is made by a trustee to his cestui que trust, as in the case of an adr ministrator holding the title for the benefit of the heirs, and where a court of chancery would compel a conveyance, (Appleton et al. v. Edson, 8 Vt. 239,) and in the case of an assignment of a mortgage, (Converse v. Searls, 10 Vt. 578,) the conveyance has not been considered as falling within the spirit, import, or operation of the statute,
The plaintiff also claims that, as the habendum clause of both leases was “ to have and to hold as long as grass grows and water runs,” the leases were equivalent to conveyances in fee, and that an authority given to the selectmen of Belvidere and the Trustees of The Lamoille County Grammar School to execute leases cannot be extended to empower them to execute conveyances in fee. If the real character of these instruments was that of conveyances in fee, they were undoubtedly void, as was held in Bush v. Whitney, 1 D. Chip. 369, and in Lampson et al. v. Town of New Haven, 2 Vt. 14. But we do not regard this objection as available to one who is a stranger to the title, and we are not satisfied that such is the legal character of these instruments. "We find in each apt words for a lease, creating a tenancy with specific rights and duties as between the parties, reserving a substantial and adequate rent payable annually during the whole term of the holding, and authorizing a re-entry for the non-payment of the rent or the non-performance of the conditions. In Arms v. Burt et al., 1 Vt. 303, and Stevens v. Dewing, 2 Vt. 411, the instruments which were adjudged to be conveyances in fee, though in form leases “ for as long as wood grows and water runs,” contained no reservation of rent, and were intended to be, and in effect were, conveyances of the estate in fee on condition. In the case of the Propagation Society v. Sharon et al., 28 Vt. 603, the lessee was “ to hold as long as water runs and wood grows,” on his yielding and paying a rent of one barley corn annually, if demanded, and the instrument was considered to be a conveyance in fee, though a lease in form, on the same ground of decision ; but Bennett, J., in delivering the opinion of the court in that case, distinctly intimates that if a substantial rent had been reserved, or if the instrument had created the relation of landlord and tenant between the parties, it would have stood upon different ground, and would have received a different consideration. The objection to these instru
The plaintiff claims that even if the land which was set to the town school right is to be considered as still belonging to the town of Belvidere, its selectmen could not execute a valid lease of it, and we are referred to the Compiled Statutes, p. 510, § 1, (G. S., p, 608, § 1,) as being the only statute provision authorizing the select
The plaintiff contends that the lease executed to the defendant in the name of the Trustees of The Lamoille County Grammar School by S. S. Pike, the Treasurer of that corporation, was void, on the ground that Mr. Pike had no authority to execute such a lease. It appears that at a meeting of the corporation held on the 7th of February, 1839, it was voted, “ That the Treasurer of this Board shall hereafter have power to execute leases of any and all lands belonging to this institution, which shall be as effectual and binding as if signed by each and every trustee.” When this vote was passed, Joseph Waterman was the Treasurer of the corporation, but, many years afterwards and before this lease was executed, Mr. Pike was elected as its Treasurer, and held that office at the time when this lease was executed. By the act of incorporation, the Trustees of The Lamoille County Grammar School were invested with full power to lease all the lands lying within the county of Lamoille, and granted for the
Judgment of the county court for the defendant affirmed.