43 W. Va. 819 | W. Va. | 1897
Lead Opinion
Action before a justice for recovery of personal property, and appeal to circuit court, and judgment for plaintiff. It appears there was no plea forming an issue in this case in either the justice’s or circuit court, and Judge ENGLISH insists upon the reversal of the judgment for that cause, but the other judges do not agree to do so. In Simpkins v. White, 43 W. Va. 125 (27 S. E. 361), I gave my reasons for refusing to reverse the judgment in an action of unlawful entry before a justice for want of issue.
But a grave error in this case consists in the facts (1) that the verdict does not give the value of each of the several articles of property sued for, nor does the judgment; (2) the judgment is one for the recovery of a sum of money found by the jury as the gross value of all the property, whereas it should have been for the recovery of the specific property, if to be had, and, if not, then for the alternative value in money. The verdict must find the separate values of the property, and each article, if more than one is sued for. This is old law. 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 657; 2 Bart. Law Brae. 705. The judgment must correspond. Though the case be before a justice, where rigid proceeding is not required, still there must be such a verdict as will support such a judgment, as the law requires; especially might we ask it on the appeal. The plaintiff' has right to the particular property he has sued for, if to be had, and, if not, then its value; while the defendant has right to surrender the property, and not pay its value. This judgment denies the defendants this right, and makes them pay the money at all hazards. Therefore we reverse the judgment, set aside the verdict, and send the case back to the circuit court for a new trial.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring) :
I concur in the conclusion reached in this cause for the following- reasons : This was an action of detinue, brought by David White, trustee, against. James and W. T. Emblem, before II. C. Petermann, a justice of the peace of Ohio County, to recover the possession of certain furniture, and twenty-five dollars damages for the wrongful detention thereof. After hearing the testimony, the said justice dismissed the action at the cost of the plaintiff, and from said judgment the plaintiff appealed to the circuit court of said county. On the 11th day of October, 1895, the case was submitted to a jury, who found a verdict for the plaintiff, and fixed the value of the property sued for in the action at two hundred and twenty-five dollars, and also further found that they assessed damages for the detention of the property without saying what amount, of damages they assessed, whereupon the defendants moved the court to set aside the verdict, and grant them a new trial, and further moved the court, in arrest of judgment upon said verdict, which motion ivas overruled by the court, and judgment was given upon the verdict for the sum of two hundred and'twenty-five dollars and costs, and from this judgment the defendants obtained this writ of error.
The first error assigned and relied on by the plaintiffs in error is that “the court erred in refusing to set aside the verdict and grant a new trial, the verdict, not being in proper form, nor in any sense legally drawn or properly responsive to the issue. ” This assignment of error leads us to examine the record, and inquire what was the issue made up between the parties and tried by the jury. An examination, however, of the transcript returned by the justice by whom the case was tried, discloses the fact. that, no plea of any character was interposed by the defendants, or either of them. Now, while the provisions of our Code with referene to pleadings before a justice are extremely liberal, and such pleadings are not required to be in any particular form, they must be such as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is intended; and it is further provided that, the pleadings may be amended at any time before the trial or during the trial, when, by such amendment, substantial justice, will be promoted,
It was claimed by counsel in that case that the judgment-ought not to be reversed, because the Code provides that “no other plea can be filed in an ejectment case except a plea of not guilty, and therefore it must be conclusively presumed that the jury was really sworn to try the issue on the plea of not guilty, though no plea was put in, and that the only issue that could be made up was the one actually tried, and it would be too technical to reverse because the formality of entering the plea of not guilty was omitted.” Judge Gbben, however, further says: “These cases [referring to many he had cited from Virginia and West Virginia] abundantly show that the court has not reversed judgments entered upon such verdict, because there was any doubt as to the real issue which the jury tried, nor because the defendant might have ma.de up some other issue if he had pleaded. * * * The real ground on which these decisions
Sir Matthew Hale, followed by Mr. Justice'Blackstone, in defining an issue says: “When, in the course of pleading, they come to a point which is affirmed on one side and denied on the other, they are then said to be at issue.” And in 8 Bl. Comm. 813, it is said : “An issue is, when both the parties join upon somewhat that they refer unto a trial to make an end of the plea.” In the case of Syndor v. Burke, 4 Rand. (Va.) 161, which was an action of detinue, there was no notice in the record of any plea or issue joined, but it was stated that a jury was sworn to try the issue joined. The jury rendered a verdict for a portion of the articles claimed by the declaration, and the court gave judgment accordingly. Judge Cabell, in delivering the opinion of
It is true, this case originated before a justice of the peace, and was tried before the justice without any pleading, oral or written, so far as the transcript shows, and was brought by appeal to the circuit court, and there tried without any pleas or issue. Now, while it is understood that the practice before, justices is, to some extent, a liberal one, yet the statute provides (section 50, c. 50, Code) that
Reversed.