Opinion by
Thе plaintiff in error, Kenneth Q. White, filed in the lower court his Motion to Vacate Decrees of. Adoption of his three minor children by W. Bancroft Dаvis, who after divorce between White and Rae Anne White, had married White’s former wife,, mother of the children. Davis challenged this motion by.moving to strikе it on the ground that White’s attempt to vacate the decrees of adoption was barred by C.R.S. 1963, 4-1-16 quoted as follows:
“Limitation on annulment of аdoption.' — No attempt to invalidate a final decree of adoption by reason of any *124 jurisdictional or procedural defеct shall be received by the court, or by any court of this state, unless regularly filed with such court within two years following the entry of the final decree.”
The lower court granted Davis’ motion to strike White’s motion to vacate the decrees of adoption and denied a motion for rehearing. The resultant effect was therefore a denial of an evidentiary hearing on White’s motion to vacate the adoption dеcrees.
By this writ of error, White claims the court erroneously applied the limitations of C.R.S. 1963, 4-1-16, supra, to these adoption decrees, which White аlleges are void since he, as the natural father, had no notice of the pendency of the adoption proceeding, and thаt his whereabouts, although known to Davis and the natural mother, Rae Anne Davis, formerly Rae Anne White, were concealed from the adoption court.
For an adequate consideration of the issues on this writ of error, a brief description of the proceedings predating the final decrees of adoption is set forth as follows:
On August 13, 1958, Davis filed Petitions for Adoption of the three children in the County Court of Sedgwick County. Consent to the adoption of each child by the natural mother is evidenced in the record as of August 14, 1958. Final decrees of adoption were filed and signed by the court on August 20, 1958. More than a year later, on November 3, 1959, an order was entered by the court vacating these final adoption decrees. On the same day, Davis on the basis of his previous petitions of adoption, filed a request that Kenneth Q. White, the natural father, be served by publication. In the request for authority to obtain service by publication, it was stated that the last known address of White is unknown to the petitioner or to the mother of the children. Service by publication was ordered and proof of publication was filed Decembеr 28, 1959 and thereafter on January 6, 1960 final decrees of adoption were entered by the court.
*125 On March 5, 1965, White obtained an order from the lower court for the inspection of files and records pertaining to the adoption proceedings and thereafter filed his motion tо vacate these decrees of adoption alleging inter alia: that it was not until after the death in December 1964 of the natural mother, Rae Anne Davis, that he learned of the adoption proceeding; that he did not then consent nor has he ever consented to said adoptions; that he did not receive sufficient notice or any notice of the adoption proceedings; that he had no oрportunity to appear in said matter and contest the same; that at the time said decrees were entered, the petitioner аnd the natural mother were well aware of his residence in California; and that the order of publication of service was wrongfully procured and improvidently entered. The record before us contains many extraneous matters of which we take special notice but upon which we do not choose to comment here due to their nonessential character in determining the issue involved in this writ of error.
The propriety of the application of C.R.S. 1963, 4-1-16, as a bar to an evidentiary hearing on White’s motion to vacate the decrees of аdoption constitutes the main issue we must concern ourselves with in this opinion.
It is elementary that the requirements of due process of law under both the United States and Colorado Constitutions take precedence over statutory enactments of our legislature. This, of necеssity, includes any bar to inquiry as may be provided in the statute, to those essential elements of due process including proper notice and an opportunity to be heard. C.R.S. 1963, 4-1-16 does not go so far and must not be interpreted in such a manner as to bar inquiry into questions raised involving due prоcess. This statute on the other hand clearly serves the beneficial purpose of curing such defects which are technical and dо not affect the basic rights of the parties. The statute further serves the purpose of guaranteeing to adopting parents the undisturbed re *126 lationship with the child, which was one of its legislative intents.
For the purpose of determining on review whether the lower court should have deniеd the Davis motion to strike the White motion to vacate, we must here take as admitted the allegations in the White motion to vacate thе adoption decrees. See
Martinez v. Ute Tribe,
The United States Supreme Court in
Armstrong v. Manzo,
Although in the instant case the record reveals service by publication, the adequacy or sufficiency of such notice was strongly challenged by White’s motion to vacate and therefore constituted а proper matter for evidentiary hearing by the lower court to determine whether the due process requirements in the adoption рroceedings were met. Where the motion to vacate the adoption decrees claims no notice whatsoever and further alleges that in support of an order authorizing service by publication the procurer of the order made a false represеntation he was unaware of the whereabouts of the natural father, it would seem that the inherent seriousness of such allegations would makе it patently clear that an evidentiary hearing would be required. If these allegations are substantiated, the lower *127 court would have no аlternative but to declare the adoption decrees void.
The ruling of the lower court is reversed and this cause is remanded for a hearing on White’s motion to vacate the adoption decrees.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded with directions.